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Private food law 21 
Foreword
Over the last decade, worldwide initiatives from the private sector have turned 
the legal and regulatory environment for food businesses upside down. Litigation 
is no longer solely framed by legislative requirements, but ever more by private 
standards such as GlobalGAP, BRC, IFS, SQF and ISO. Private standards incorporate 
public law requirements, thus embedding them in contractual relations and 
exporting them beyond the jurisdiction of public legislators. Private standards 
are used to remedy shortcomings in legislation, to reach higher levels of consumer 
protection than the ones chosen by the EU legislature, to impose new obligations 
on contracting parties, to manage risks and liability beyond the traditional limits 
of food businesses and finally to give substance to corporate social responsibility.
Private standards also play a role in defining specific markets of growing importance 
and in self-regulating the commercial communication/advertising for foods 
and beverages. Organic standards have found an interesting symbioses with 
public law. Halal standards express the demands of some two billion consumers 
worldwide. Food businesses are inspected more often by private auditors than 
by public inspectors. Effects in terms of receiving or being denied certification 
often far outweigh public law sanctions. In short, based on private law, an entire 
legal infrastructure for the food sector emerges, in parallel to, and sometimes 
complementing, the public law regulatory infrastructure.
The European Food Law Association (EFLA), in its 18th international congress 
held in Amsterdam in September 2010, explored this emerging private food law.
The congress looked into developments, backgrounds, structures, specific examples 
of varying nature, consequences for businesses and for the EU internal market; 
interplay with public law through accreditation, imposed self-regulation in the 
form of HACCP or hygiene codes, adoption of non-binding Codex Alimentarius 
standards in contractually binding private standards; possibilities for the food 
sector, limits due to competition law and all that needs to be known by lawyers, 
academics, quality managers, regulatory affairs officers, and civil servants active 
in the ever expanding world of European food law.
This book is not conference proceedings in the usual sense of the word. It does 
not simply bring the presentations made at the conference. It does not either 
reflect all the very rich debate that took place during the conference.
The conference has however inspired the speakers and some other experts to 
contribute to this first book in legal literature analysing private food law, a topic 
which clearly deserves great attention in our world. Many other topics could 
also have been discussed within that frame: Competition rules, Contract law, 
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International Commerce, Ethics, etcetera. Let us hope that the EFLA conference 
and this book will just be a start and inspire other works in the future.
I express my gratitude to Wageningen Academic Publishers and the European 
Institute for Food Law for the way they cooperated in the creation of this first 
‘EFLA-book’ and for including it in the European Institute for Food Law series. 
This cooperation between EFLA and the European Institute for Food Law has 
proved to be extremely fruitful and promising. I thank all the authors for their 
beautiful contributions and, last but not least I thank professor Van der Meulen, 
who is also an active member of the Board of EFLA. He designed the conference 
topic, helped identify speakers and authors and edited the book. It is fair to say 
that he coined the concept ‘private food law’.
Nicole Coutrelis
President of EFLA
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Abbreviations
AB  Accreditation body
AFNOR  Association Française de Normalisation (French national organisation 
for standardisation)
AGCM  Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Antitrust Authority)
AHC Europe  European Association of Halal Certifiers
AIJN  Association of the Industry of Juices and Nectars from Fruits and 
Vegetables of the EU
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
B2B  Business to business
B2C  Business to consumer
BER  Block exemption regulation
BERR   Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (United 
Kingdom)
BIPRO   Brand integrity programme
BMZ  Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development)
BNN   Bundesverband Naturkost Naturwaren
BRC  British Retail Consortium
BSE  Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
CAC  Codex Alimentarius Commission
CAC/GL  CAC/Guideline
CAC/RCP  CAC/Recommended international code of practice
CB  Certification body
CBL   Centraal Bureau Levensmiddelenhandel (Dutch organisation for 
supermarkets)
CC  Civil code
CCP  Critical control point
CEC  Commission of the European Communities
CEN  Comité Européen de Normalisation (the European committee for 
standardisation
CIES  Comité International d'Entreprise à Succursales (The Food Business 
Forum)
CIPRO   Certification integrity programme
CISG Convention for the International Sale of Goods
COLEACP  Comité de Liaison Europe-Afrique-Caraïbes-Pacifique
CPCC  Control points and compliance criteria
CQP  Critical quality points
CRC   Central rabbinical congress
CSR  Corporate social responsibility
CVUA  Chemischen und Veterinäruntersuchungsämter
CWG   Criteria working group of the RSPO
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CZ   Coördinatiegroep Zelfreguleringsoverleg (Dutch Self-Regulation 
Coordination Group)
D. Leg.vo  Decreto legislativo (Legislative decree)
DDB   Dutch Dairymen Board
Defra   UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DfID  UK Department for International Development
DG  Directorate General of the European Commission’s civil service
DNV  Det Norske Veritas
EC  European Commission (or European Community)
EDI  Electronic data interchange
EESC  European Economic and Social Committee
EFF   European Franchise Federation
EFIP   European Feed Ingredients Platform
EFLA  European Food Law Association
EFSA  European Food Safety Authority
EFTA   European Fair Trade Association
EJC  Court of Justice of the European Union
EMB  European Milk Board
EN  European norm
ETI  Ethical Trading Initiative
EU  European Union
EUREP  Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group
EurepGAP   European Retailers Protocol for Good Agricultural Practice
FAO  UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FCD  Fédération des entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution
FCO  German Federal Competition Office
FDA  Food and Drug Administration of the United States of America
FDD   Franchise disclosure document
FEFAC   European Feed Manufacturers’ Federation
FINE   Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, International Fair 
Trade Association (now WFTO), Network of European Worldshops 
and the European Fair Trade Association
FLO  Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International 
FMI   Food Marketing Institute
FOS   Friends of the Sea
FPEAK  Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya
FSC  Forest Stewardship Council
FSEP   Food safety enhancement programme (Canada)
FSMS  Food safety management system
FSSC   Foundation for Food Safety Certification
FTF   Fair Trade Federation
FVO  Food and Veterinary Office 
GAA  Global Aquaculture Alliace
GAP  Good agricultural practices
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GAPKI  Gabungan pengusaha kelapa sawit indonesia (Association of 
Indonesian palm oil producers)
GATT 
GfRS  Gesellschaft für Ressourcenschutz
GFSI   Global Food Safety Initiative
GlobalGAP  Global Good Agricultural Practice
GMO  Genetically modified organism
GMP  Good manufacturing practice
GMP+  Good manufacturing practice + HACCP principles
GTZ  Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HACCP  Hazard analysis and critical control points
HDE  Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels
HEII  Horticultural Export Investment Initiative
HIC  Halal International Control
HMSA  Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (USA)
IAF   International Accreditation Forum
IAP  Istituto dell’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria (Institute of self regulation 
in Marketing Communication)
ICS  Internal control system
ICTSD  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
IFA  Integrated Farm Assurance
IFANCA  Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America
IFAT   International Fair Trade Association
IFIS  IFSA feed ingredient standard
IFOAM  International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
IFS  International Featured Standard
IFSA   International Feed Safety Alliance
IHIA  International Halal Integrity Alliance
IIED  International Institute for Environment and Development
IKB  Integrale ketenbeheersing (Integral chain control)
ILS  International logistic standard
IPOC   Indonesian Palm Oil Commission
IPPC  International Plant Protection Convention
IRMA  International Raw Material Assurance
ISC   Integrity Surveillance Committee
ISEAL  International Social and Environment Accreditations and Labelling
ISO  International Organization for Standardization
ISO/IEC  ISO/International Electrotechnical Commission
ISPO   Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil
JAKIM  Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic 
Development Malaysia)
KKM   Keten Kwaliteit Melk (Chain Quality Milk)
KSA  Kosher supervision agency
L.  Legge (Law)
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LCB  Licensed certification body
LOD  Limit of detection
LTO   Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie (Dutch Organisation for Agriculture 
and Horticulture)
MEDA  Mesures d’accompagnement (Mediterranean Region Partnership 
Relations (Barcelona Agreement)
MEL-Japan   Marine Ecolabel Japan
MLA  Multilateral agreement or multilateral recognition arrangement
MP  Member of parliament
MPOA  Malaysian Palm Oil Association
MRL  Maximum residue level
MS  Member State(s)
MSC  Marine Stewardship Council
MUI  Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia Council of Ulama)
MVO  Dutch product board for margarines, fats and oils
NACMCF  National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods
NEN  Netherlands normalisation institute or Nederlandse norm (Dutch 
standard)
NEWS!  Network of European Worldshops
NFV   Nederlandse Franchise Vereniging (Dutch franchise association)
NGO  Non governmental organisation
NMa   Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Dutch competition authority)
NMV   Nederlandse Melkveehouders Vakbond (Dutch dairy farmers union)
NNI   Stichting Nederlands Normalisatie Instituut (Dutch normalisation 
institute)
NRI  Natural Resources Institute
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIE   Office International des Epizooties (International Organisation for 
Animal Health)
OK   Organized Kashrus
OOS  Out of stock
OU   Kashruth Division of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations 
of America
PDO Products of Designated Origin
PDV   Productschap Diervoeder (Dutch product board animal feed)
PETA   People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
PID  Pre-contractual information document
PMO  Produce Marketing Organisation or Primary Marketing Organisation
PPP  Public-private partnership
PVS  Private voluntary standards
QLIF  Quality low input food
QMS  Quality management system
QS  Qualität und Sicherheit für Lebensmittel vom Erzeuger bis zum 
Verbraucher
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RA  Rainforest Alliance
RQCS  Regional quality control system
RRP  Recommended resale price
RSPO  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
RTRS   Round Table on Responsible Soy
SAI   Social Accountability International
SCM  Supply chain management
SGF  Schutzgemeinschaft der Fruchtsaftindustrie/Sure Global Fair
SGS  Société Générale de Surveillance
SPS  (Agreement on the Application of) Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (WTO)
SQF  Safe Quality Food
SQFI  SQF Institute
TBT  (Agreement on) Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO)
TFEU   Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TPC  Third party certification
TQS   Thai Quality Shrimp
TSR  Tripartite standards regime
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US  United States (of America)
USA  United States of America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture
VWA  Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit (Dutch food and consumer product 
safety authority)
WFTO   World Fair Trade Organization
WHO  World Health Organization
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO  World Trade Organisation
WWF   World Wide Fund for Nature (previously known as World Wildlife 
Fund)
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Private food law 29 
1. Private food law
The emergence of a concept
Bernd van der Meulen
1.1 The first book on private food law
When I invited Lawrence Busch to contribute to the European Food Law Association 
(EFLA)  conference on private food law, he remarked something to the effect of 
‘finally the lawyers are joining in the discussion’. For over a decade important 
developments take place in the field of food governance based on private law 
instruments, with hardly any serious participation of lawyers to the debate. Busch 
himself is a social scientist responsible for ground breaking empirical research 
on – in his vocabulary – grades and standards.1
The current book may well be the first book discussing the length and breadth 
of private food law for a law audience. It certainly is the first to present ‘private 
food law’ as an area of law in its own right. The expression ‘law audience’ here 
is to be taken in a broad sense. The world of food law, from the food business 
perspective also known as regulatory affairs, covers a wider audience than lawyers 
per se. Many come to the field from a food science background and pick up the 
legal part on the job.
While this book addresses the world of food law, its content is not strictly limited to 
legal scholarship but also includes empirical research and social science analyses 
of interest to the food law audience.2
This book is not a conference book in the customary meaning of the word. Its 
creation has been inspired by the presentations and discussions on 16 and 17 
September 2010 at the 18th biannual scientific congress of the European Food Law 
Association (EFLA) held in Amsterdam.3 The topic of this congress was ‘Private 
food law; Non-regulatory dimensions of food law’. Some of the contributions to this 
1 See for example: Busch, L., 1997. Grades and standards in the social construction of safe food. Invited 
paper presented at a conference on The Social Construction of Safe Food and the Norwegian Technical 
University in Trondheim, Norway, April 1997; Reardon, T., Codron, J.-M., Busch, L., Bingen, J. and 
Harris, C., 1999. Global change in agrifood grades and standards: agribusiness strategic responses in 
developing countries. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 2: 421-435; and most 
recently, Busch, L., 2010. Standards, law, and governance. Journal of Rural Social Sciences 25(3): 56-78. 
Generally see http://cs3.msu.edu/people/pubs/busch-lawrence/. See for a special issue of the Journal 
of Rural Social Sciences focused entirely on the work he and his team have done on standards: http://
www.ag.auburn.edu/auxiliary/srsa/pages/TOCs/JRSS%20vol25-3.htm.
2 See in particular Chapter 2 by Busch Lawrence, Chapter 7 by Otto Hospes, Chapter 8 by Margret Will, 
Chapter 12 by Tetty Havinga and Chapter 16 by Maria Litjens, Harry Bremmers and Bernd van der Meulen.
3 On the congress programme and on EFLA in general see www.efla-aeda.org.
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30 Private food law
Chapter 1
book are written by speakers at the congress elaborating on their contribution.4 
We have however completed the picture by inviting other scholars to update 
and rework previous publications5 or write new ones6 in order to cover as much 
as is possible at this moment in time of the emerging field of private food law. 
Finally we added the two most important policy documents from the European 
Commission as Appendices.
1.2 Private food law
1.2.1 Private
The label ‘private food law’ is meant to cover all applications to the food sector of 
rules and instruments generally labelled ‘private’ or ‘civil’. These are rules found 
in civil codes and related legislation or case law. We have chosen the word ‘private’ 
to avoid possible confusion due to the double meaning of the word ‘civil’. It can 
be used as synonymous to private to indicate the area of law that is not public 
law encompassing topics such as property, liability and contract. In comparative 
law, however, the word ‘civil law’ is used to indicate the continental European 
(Romano-Germanic) family of legal systems as opposed the Anglo-Saxon ‘common 
law’ family, encompassing both public and private law. Private food law, however, 
surpasses the borders between civil law and common law systems in the world.
Private food law may include topics such as (product) liability law where the 
relevant rules are in the civil code or related legislation. Indeed the contribution 
of Van der Veer goes into the specific legislative arrangements for distance sales as 
they apply to online purchases of food products. Also competition law has its place 
in this book.7 It is public law ‘par excellence’ but an area mainly concerned with 
the regulation of private agreements and in this sense it may set a boundary to the 
expansion of private food law. Mainly, however, this book focuses on the elaborate 
structures of rules known as, self-regulation, private (voluntary) standards, codes 
of conduct or certification schemes. These structures have been created by private 
actors using private law instruments to regulate conduct of food businesses. The 
regulated businesses may be parties to contractual relations but also businesses 
further upstream the food chain and geographically remote. In this sense private 
food law is food law privately made.
4 In particular Chapter 3 by myself, Chapter 2 by Lawrence Busch, Chapter 5 by Spencer Henson and 
John Humphrey, Chapter 6 by Marinus Huige, Chapter 8 by Margaret Will, Chapter 9 by Ferdinando 
Albisinni, Chapter 10 by Alessandro Arton, Chapter 13 Hanspeter Schmidt, Chapter 15 by Irene 
Scholten-Verheijenand Chapter 18 by Nicole Coutrelis.
5 Chapter 4 by Theo Appelhof, Chapter 12 by Tetty Havinga, Chapter 16 by Maria Litjens, Harry 
Bremmers and myself and Chapter 17 by Fabian Stancke.
6 Chapter 7 by Otto Hospes, Chapter 11 by Esther Brons-Stikkelbroeck and Chapter 14 by Lomme Van 
der Veer.
7 See Chapter 16 by Maria Litjens, Harry Bremmers, Chapter 17 by Fabian Stancke and myself and 
Chapter 18 by Nicole Coutrelis as well as Appendix 1.
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1.2.2 Law
At the EFLA congress’ discussions the existence of such a thing as ‘private food 
law’ was contested. It was argued that businesses creating private standards never 
set out to create ‘law’ but merely to ensure compliance with regulatory food safety 
requirements. Partly this discussion relates to another language issue. In English 
language the word ‘law’ may refer to a specific piece of legislation. Obviously there 
does not exist any text deserving the label ‘the private food law’ in a similar way 
as in public law EU Regulation 178/2002 does deserve the name ‘the general food 
law’. However, the word ‘law’ may also be used to refer to an entire rules based 
system or to an area of scholarly attention among lawyers.8
I believe that, indeed, in the food sector rules based systems emerge governing 
national and international food chains that are made by chain partners on the 
basis of private law instruments. This book may contribute to proving this point. 
And yes, I believe this to be an area worthy of scholarly attention. The research 
attention and the labels used by scholars to describe their findings not necessarily 
coincide with intentions and wordings chosen by the stakeholders subject to 
scrutiny.
Probably furthest in the direction of identifying private food law as a system of 
law, goes the chapter of Lawrence Busch, labelling private schemes in the form 
of tripartite standfards regimes ‘quasi states’. After all is not a state (even quasi) 
very much more than ‘just’ a system of law? Not as explicit but also quite strong 
are Ferdinando Albisinni’s labels: ‘private regulatory law’ and ‘collective food law’.
The label ‘private food law’ is ambitious in that it designates private sector regulation 
of the food chain as an entire area in its own right, not just a detail within some 
other context.9 It is modest in that it does not take a qualifying position. An 
expression such as ‘self-regulation’ creates an image of equality, mutuality and 
an inward direction in the sense that stakeholders organise their own behaviour. 
This label would be less appropriate for arguments that private food law in fact is 
used by dominant players in the chain to impose de facto duties upon dependent 
players. Such argument is indeed made by several authors in this book. For the 
same reason a label such as ‘private voluntary standards’ – while used by some 
of the authors in this book – may from the point of view of others be considered 
misleading in that the voluntariness may – as is argued be some authors in this 
book – be limited to legal theory but not apply to economic reality. The label 
‘private food law’ is neutral in all these respects.
8 In other languages the two meanings have distinct words, for example in Latin ‘lex’ and ‘ius’ respectively.
9 In this sense the current book distinguishes itself from books discussing topics such as certification. 
While certification without a doubt is a core issue in private food, it is not a label claiming to cover a 
branch of law.
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1.3 Cover
As law is often symbolised by Justitia10 holding her paraphernalia: sword, blindfold 
and scales (or just the scales), private law is often represented by a hand shake 
(Figure 1.1).
The hand shake symbolises that private relations are self-made on the basis of 
equality and mutuality. For the cover of this book we have chosen a picture - 
gracefully provided by the European Union – that combines the two notions: 
law represented by Justitia, but self-made by private actors represented by the 
hand shake.
1.4 Food law
Private food law positions itself in different ways under the wider umbrella of ‘food 
law’. In the following subsections I will discuss its place with regard to agricultural 
law and the different other parts of food law.
10 Lady Justice; the Roman goddess of justice.
Figure 1.1. Symbols of Justitia (left) and Private law (right). Images found at: http://www.
floridaadr.com/ and FreeDigitalPhotos.net (Nutdanai Apikhomboonwaroot). Used with the 
website’s owners consent.
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1.4.1 Agri-food law
The scope of the private schemes discussed in this book includes the food chain 
from farm to fork; from feed ingredients to retail. In particular schemes such as 
GlobalGAP and SQF 1,000 address primary production. Sometimes a distinction 
is made between ‘food law’ on the one hand and ‘agricultural law’ on the other. 
This distinction is not a watershed however. Food and agricultural law overlap 
in that the food chain (or agri-food chain) fully includes primary production of 
food. Thus this primary production of food is fully within the scope of food law. 
Agricultural law covers the legal aspects of everything related to the primary 
sector including the production of feed and food at the farm.
Many of the questions addressed in this book are just as relevant for the primary 
sector as they are for (industrial) production and retail. Our choice of the label 
‘private food law’ by no means implies the claim that our topic is exclusively part 
of food law. It is just as well agricultural law and a case within regulatory law 
more in general.
1.4.2 Another level of food law?
The concept ‘food law’ is multi-level. It encompasses different topics and different 
levels. Among the topics corner stones are food safety, food security and food 
trade.11 These topics are addressed by national law, regional law such as EU law 
and by international law. Arguably private food law is another level in addition to 
these three. Figure 1.2 attempts a graphic representation. It positions international 
11 I elaborated this opinion in Van der Meulen, B.M.J., 2004. The right to adequate food. Food law 
between the market and human rights. Elsevier, The Hague, the Netherlands.
Food trade 
Fo
od
 sa
fe
ty
 Food security 
Food Law 
Rights and regulation 
International 
National
Regional 
Business
Consumer 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Figure 1.2. The pyramid of food law.
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food law at the top of a pyramid. International food law is the law on food as 
developed by the UN, the WTO, FAO, WHO, the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
and other international organisations. The WTO places emphasis on trade, the 
Codex Alimentarius on safety and FAO on food security. The three issues come 
together – therefore the pyramid shape – in the human right to adequate food, 
where the concept of adequacy combines availability with protection from harm, 
thus security via trade and otherwise with safety.12
International food law provides models and requirements for the other levels 
such as the regional level.13 In the EU this regional level places requirements on 
the national level that are strict to the point of being mandatory for the national 
legislators. In this situation the distinction between regional and national is of 
limited significance. Should we for example consider food law of the United States 
– a federal state instead of a union of sovereign states – more akin to EU or to 
member state food law? Should we consider it regional or national? The national 
level in turn incorporates decentralised levels.
The figure goes on to place the private sector below these public law layers. 
This positioning only to a limited extent is hierarchical or geographically more 
focussed. For the public law layers one could argue in favour of the pyramid’s tip 
to point downwards instead of upwards to indicate increased geographic scope. 
Private food law does not by its nature have a geographic orientation. In practice 
it can be very international and very independent but often it has to comply with 
mandatory requirements from several of the public law layers.
Figure 1.2 tentatively distinguishes the private sector in a business level and a 
consumer level. The topic of this book resides in the business level, the fourth 
layer marked in grey. I am not entirely sure that a consumer level (fifth layer) 
holds an independent place in food law. The role of consumers in the process 
of regulation seems limited. In some private standards retailers claim to express 
and channel the desires of consumers. Sometimes consumers or NGOs are heard 
in the setting of public or private regulations but not to the extent that I can see 
an independent consumer layer of food law emerging. Figure 1.2 can be read to 
suggest that the consumer layer, may not be a layer of regulations but of rights. 
After all does not food law revolve around consumer protection and consumers’ 
rights? I doubt if it does. If I look from the European perspective, regrettably I 
do not see many countries committing to the human right to food to the extent 
that individual citizens can hold their governments accountable in a court of law 
12 On the human right to adequate food see: Hospes, O. and Hadiprayitno, I. (eds.), 2010. Governing 
food security. Law, politics and the right to food. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the 
Netherlands.
13 On international food law see Van der Meulen, B.M.J., 2010. The global arena of food law: 
emerging contours of a meta-framework. Erasmus Law Review 3: 217-240. Available at: http://www.
erasmuslawreview.nl/files/the_global_arena_of_food_law.
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for living up to their obligations.14 Also EU food law imposes many obligations 
upon businesses but hardly grants individual consumers any corresponding rights 
towards these businesses or participation rights towards the institutions.15 Food 
law may protect consumers, it does not seem to empower them in any serious 
legal way.16 At best it gives content to rights consumers can uphold in a court of 
law which rights they derive from other sources such as product liability law. A 
food unsafe by legal definition is very likely to qualify as ‘defective’ in the sense 
of product liability law.
So this figure of food law is tentative in several ways. I am convinced that food 
trade, food safety and food security are rightfully positioned as ribs marking the 
14 On this issue see for example, Van der Meulen, B. and Hospes, O. (eds.), 2009. Fed up with the right to 
food. The Netherlands’ policies and practices regarding the human right to adequate food. Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
15 Article 9 of the General Food Law, Regulation (EC) 178/2002 only requires the public to be consulted. 
EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24.
16 It may empower in an economic way in that it endeavours to ensure availability of information that 
makes informed choice possible.
Types of food law Level 
International food law Global 
EU 
Food Law 
Regional 
MS MS MS MS National  
Private food law Business 
                 Model, obligation and limitation 
                 Model 
MS Member state 
Figure 1.3. Multi-layered food law.
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cornerstones. But, should it be a pyramid? If so should it taper above or below? 
Should there be four or five layers? Whatever the answers to these questions, I 
believe that this book contributes to proving that private food law provides a layer 
in its own right of a status comparable to the layers of public food law.
Maybe Figure 1.3 is less ambitious in depicting the relations and for this reason 
more acceptable. It shows international food law as inspiring both public and 
private food law and additionally making requirements on public food law (at 
regional and national level). In this book we see that private regulation adopts 
models from the Codex Alimentarius (mainly the HACCP concept) and thus is 
inspired by international food law. See Chapter 5 by Spencer Henson and John 
Humphrey. It seems to escape, however, the limits the WTO places on measures 
that may provide barriers to trade. See Chapter 6 by Marinus Huige. The influence 
private food law experiences from public (national and regional) law is much 
stronger. Just as the influence public food law experiences from international 
food law is stronger. The geographic scope of private food law may, however, be 
wider than the scope of national or regional food law. In this way it may connect 
different national systems of public food law and even export requirements from 
one system to businesses working within the jurisdiction of another.
So if we claim a certain level of autonomy for private food law, this in no way 
implies it to be disconnected from the other areas of food law.
1.4.3 International and national law
The effects of the global and regional level of food law may differ for countries 
depending on their membership to international organisations and ratification 
of international treaties. Most chapters in this book – but not all – take an EU 
perspective both on international and regional food law. For the global level 
this means membership of WTO and Codex Alimentarius, for the regional level 
this means applicability of EU food law. The national level differs among the 
contributions. We find connections to the Netherlands in Chapter 11 by Esther 
Brons-Stikkelbroeck, Chapter 12 by Tetty Havinga, Chapter 14 by Lomme van der 
Veer, Chapter 15 by Irene Scholten-Verheijen, Chapter 16 by Maria Litjens, Harry 
Bremmers and myself, and to a lesser extent Chapter 4 by Theo Appelhof and 
Chapter 7 by Otto Hospes. We find connections to Germany in the chapters by 
Hanspeter Schmidt (Chapter 13) and Fabian Stancke (Chapter 17), to Italy in the 
chapters by Ferdinando Albisinni (Chapter 9) and Alessandro Artom (Chapter 10), 
to the United States in Chapter 12 by Tetty Havinga, to Kenya, Ghana, Thailand 
and Macedonia in Chapter 8 by Margret Will and to Indonesia in Chapter 7 by 
Otto Hospes.
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1.5 Classifications in private food law
Private food law revolves around private standards holding requirements with 
which businesses must comply to achieve directly or indirectly certain product 
characteristics as defined in the standard. These characteristics may relate to 
safety, sustainability, conformity to religious demands and many other aspects. 
These different aspects can be grouped under the heading ‘quality’ when quality is 
understood to mean any form of conformity to customers’ desires. Criteria directly 
defining the desired product characteristics can be called ‘outcome standards’, 
criteria indicating the way to achieve them can be called ‘process standards’ 
(Henson and Humphrey, Chapter 5).
The standards are embedded in structures (called ‘schemes’ in some of the 
contributions) that ensure their development and fulfilment such as audits and 
third party certification. Maria Litjens in Chapter 16 proposes to label the entirety 
of standard plus scheme ‘system’.
Different classifications of standards, schemes and systems have been proposed 
for different purposes. Some use as criterion ‘who makes’ the standard, other 
depart from the tool used to communicate compliance or the addressee of 
this communication, again others classify on the basis of the addressee of the 
requirements i.e. the regulated parties.
Spencer Henson and John Humphrey on the basis by whom standards are 
set distinguish individual firm standards and collective standards. Collective 
standards they further distinguish in national and international standards. This 
latter distinction is based on the location of the parties setting the standards. 
Within schemes they identify different functions: standard setting, adoption 
(which is requiring other businesses to implement the standard), implementation 
(fulfilling the requirements of the standard setter), conformity assessment (verify 
implementation) and enforcement in response to non-compliance.
Other authors place more emphasis on certification as basis of structures assessing 
and communicating compliance with standards. For example, the European 
Commission in its Best practice guidelines for voluntary certification schemes 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs (see Appendix 1 of this book) proposes 
a classification based on type of attestation, audience, object and content of 
requirements measured against the baseline of public law requirements (Table 1.1).
Maria Litjens, Harry Bremmers and myself (Chapter 16) on the basis of the 
requirements distinguishe vertical and horizontal standards. All these classifications 
have their limitations but may help to group and compare. It seems highly likely 
that with further research into private food law, nuance and precision will be 
added to the classifications used.
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1.6 Topics covered in this book
1.6.1 Introduction
This book provides a rich harvest of aspects of private food law. It enquires into 
the origin of private food law as it stands today, but also into the crafting of 
some individual schemes. Some are made by businesses exclusively. Others are 
the result of a meeting of stakeholders of varying background and interest. The 
book provides an overview of a wide variety of systems. Thus giving the flavour 
of the content of private food law. It attempts a legal theory as instrument for 
analysis. Then it continues to single out specific topics of significance. There is 
the relation to international food law. Several private standards draw inspiration 
and content from the Codex Alimentarius. On the other hand, private food law 
may enter into competition with the Codex as a means for global harmonisation 
of food law. Some fear that private food law may set trade barriers undoing some 
of the achievements of the WTO. This is partly a matter of WTO law and partly a 
matter regarding the makeup of private systems and measures taken for capacity 
building.
Many private systems place emphasis on product characteristics and on production 
processes. A classic is the organic standard. While organics are increasingly 
embedded in public law, new sustainability initiatives emerge. Another challenging 
area, is the area of religious standards. From a legal perspective they are public 
in some countries and private in others. From a religious perspective both 
qualifications may be inadequate as they make their legal significance depend 
on human agency. A majority of standards, however, addresses more mundane 
aspects of food quality in general and safety in particular. If this is the ‘inside’ of 
private food law, the ‘outside’ consists of the external relations of private systems 
to other private systems.
Table 1.1. Classification of voluntary certification systems for agricultural products and foodstuffs 
proposed by the European Commission
Type of attestation: Self-declaration Certification (third-party attestation)
Audience: B2C B2C B2B
Objects of specified 
requirements:
Products and 
processes
Mostly products 
(including services) 
and processes
Mostly management 
systems
Content of 
requirements: Mostly above baseline Mostly above baseline
Baseline and above 
baseline
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Apart from product and process, some systems address communication in 
labelling and advertisement. Public authorities seem reluctant to enforce the 
ban on misleading the consumers in situations where no more specific rules exist. 
Private initiatives can give meaning to what is good and proper in the presentation 
of products to consumers.
A topic of private regulation that does not have a parallel in public law is the 
format of businesses. Franchising provides requirements on how businesses are 
conducted and how they present themselves to the public.
The relation between private food law on the one hand and public (food) law and 
legislation on the other hand is complicated and divers. Private food law finds 
its legal bedrock in the national civil codes that provide contract law, sometimes 
adapted to new challenges such as the use of the Internet, (intellectual) property law, 
liability law and also in the national court systems to uphold private arrangements. 
Many private standards incorporate public food law requirements and some public 
rules require compliance with certain private standards. Public controls may take 
the performance of private systems into account. Can public authorities refer to 
private standards to express their desires in public procurement?
It is doubtful whether WTO law sets any limits to the expansion of private food 
law. The area of public law most likely to provide yardsticks for the legality and 
legitimacy of private systems seems to be competition law. Competition law 
makes strict requirements on agreements between businesses and unilateral 
conduct of dominant businesses that may restrict competition to the detriment 
of consumers. Private systems almost by definition come within the scope of 
agreements or unilateral conduct. Thus, from a competition law point of view the 
businesses concerned have to be aware of their systems’ impact on competition 
and on consumers’ interests.
In the 1980s, the EU chose a ‘new approach’. European law would restrict itself 
to formulating the basic safety requirements, which would then be fleshed out 
by private standard setting organisations. Compliance with the private technical 
standard would then be considered to imply compliance with the European safety 
norm as well. In such a situation businesses complying with the technical standard 
are entitled to use CE-marking.17 The food sector has explicitly been excluded 
from this new approach. In the final chapter of this book, Nicole Coutrelis argues 
against bringing the food sector within its ambit. It is my believe, however, that 
private food law de facto already has achieved what the new approach set out to do, 
17 See EU, 2002. Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 
2001 on general product safety. Official Journal of the European Union L 11, 15/01/2002: 4-17.
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namely to decide by private standard how to comply with the most fundamental 
norm in food law: the ban on unsafe food.18
The chapters in this book have been placed in a sequence that provides the reader 
with a storyline when reading them from the beginning to the end. However, they 
have been written in such a way that the reader can follow and understand the 
argument of each individual chapter without having to have read the previous 
chapters. In this sense the chapters each can stand alone like articles in a journal. 
The price we pay for this choice is that a little overlap and repetition between 
some of the chapters could not be avoided. The organisation of the chapters and 
appendices is represented in Table 1.2.
18 In the EU, Article 14(1) of EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. 
Official Journal of the European Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24.
Table 1.2. The organisation of the chapters and appendices of this book.
Chapter / Topic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 A1 A2
Background x x x x
History x x x x
Theory x x x x x
Concepts x x x
Overview x x
International law x x
Effect in 3rd world x x x
Individual schemes x x x x x x x x x x
Standard setting x
Certification x
Advertisement x x
Business format x
Religion x
Sustainability x x x
Environment x
Organic x
Fair trade x x
Legislation x x x
Public sector x x x x
Competition law x x x x
EU policy x x x
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1.6.2 The origin of private food law
After this introductory chapter, the book continues with Chapter 2 ‘Quasi-states? 
The unexpected rise of private food law’ by Lawrence Busch. In his opinion much 
of the global economy has been transformed as trade in food and agricultural 
products has burgeoned, many supermarket chains have begun to operate across 
national boundaries, and Supply Chain Management has eclipsed business to 
business exchanges on spot markets. One important aspect of this transformation 
has been the rise of what he calls the ‘Tripartite Standards Regime’, a largely 
private regime of standards, certifications, and accreditations that parallels formal 
legal regimes and is dependent on it (e.g. with respect to contract, intellectual 
property, and criminal law). The neoliberal project of limiting the role of the state 
has led to the unexpected rise a wide range of ‘quasi-states’ consisting of individual 
firms, industry groups, and private voluntary organisations, each pursuing their 
own aims and interests through the production of private codes, laws, rules, and 
regulations. Whether some or all of these quasi-states are able to achieve legitimacy 
and develop democratic modes of governance remains to be seen.
1.6.3 The anatomy of private food law
In Chapter 3 ‘The anatomy of private food law’ 19 I attempt a legal theory of private 
food law by identifying the legal instruments used and by unravelling the structure 
of the creation, the binding character, control and enforcement of private food law. 
In this way this chapter maps the legal structure of private food law. Using the basic 
instruments from civil law such as property, intellectual property, corporate law, 
labour law but mainly general contract law food businesses have set up systems 
of private regulation of the food chain. These systems include standard setting, 
auditing, accreditation, enforcement and sometimes also conflict resolution.
The chapter goes on to present summary descriptions of the currently most 
important systems to provide an impression of the topics most prominently 
regulated today in private food safety law.
1.6.4 Inventory of private food law
In Chapter 4 Theo Appelhof and Ronald van den Heuvel present a more 
encompassing overview of standards and schemes in the food and feed sectors. 
Where several of the other authors consider private standards to be at least de 
facto binding, this chapter sees them as voluntary in more than name only.
19 This chapter elaborates on the chapter ‘Private food law’ in Van der Meulen, B. and Van der Velde, 
M., 2009. European Food Law Handbook, 2e edition. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, 
the Netherlands.
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The chapter starts from the EU imposition of self-regulation in the HACCP system 
and the possibility to make hygiene codes as a collective alternative. These codes 
can be recognised by national or EU authorities as proper implementation of the 
hygiene obligation of the businesses. The authors continue to set out the Dutch 
policy of supervision of controls. This is public authorities taking account of 
trustworthy private systems in prioritising official controls.
They then visit one by one the relevant sub-sectors of the food sector such as 
animal feed, primary production, manufacturing, packaging and transport to 
identify the most important standards used and to provide a summary of their 
content. It turns out that a forest of schemes has grown almost overnight.
1.6.5 The Codex Alimentarius in private food law
Chapter 5 ‘Codex Alimentarius and private standards’ by Spencer Henson and 
John Humphrey further elaborates on a legal theory by providing categorisations 
of private and mixed standards and by distinguishing roles of stakeholders setting 
and using such standards. It then goes on to discuss how the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission addresses the issue of private standards and how private standard 
setting bodies are clients of the Codex Alimentarius in that they turn legally 
non-binding Codex standards and codes of practice into contractually binding 
requirements by including them in their standards.
In Henson’s and Humphrey’s view private standards have become a much more 
prevalent part of the governance of global agri-food value chains in the last 10 
to 15 years. Private firms and standards-setting coalitions, including companies 
and NGOs, have created and adopted standards for food safety, as well as for 
food quality and environmental and social aspects of agri-food production. This 
has raised profound questions about the role of public and private institutions in 
establishing and enforcing food safety norms. Such discussions have, however, 
been hampered by a failure to recognise the diversity of agri-food private standards 
with respect to their institutional and administrative characteristics, scope or 
functions, and also the often tight inter-relationships between private standards 
and public regulation. Private food safety standards are predominantly directed 
at the management of risk of food safety failures, many of which are defined by 
regulatory requirements. While there are instances where private standards lay 
down requirements that are beyond regulations, in many cases their function is 
to establish systems for more reliable and cost-effective regulatory compliance. 
Although there are concerns that private food safety standards are undermining 
the standards, guidelines and recommendations promulgated by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, private standards can be seen as substantively packaging 
multiple Codex norms and national legislation. At the same time, private standards 
fill ‘voids’ where international standards are missing. Certainly the rise of private 
standards presents challenges for Codex, including the need to reflect on its client 
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base, review its procedures and to examine where international norms are needed 
in a world where private governance is taking on an increasing role.
1.6.6 International versus private food law
In Chapter 6 ‘Private retail standards and the law of the World Trade Organisation’ 
Marinus Huige sets out the discussion within the WTO SPS Committee on the 
question whether private standards constitute barriers to international trade and 
whether WTO members have a responsibility in this regard.
The argument against private standards in general and EurepGAP/GlobalGAP in 
particular has been based on Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). Huige does not believe that the 
argument holds but calls for improved communication between the players in 
international food law and the players in global private food law.
1.6.7 The making of private food law
Public law is made on the basis of well-defined procedures ensuring democratic 
input and legitimacy. Private food law can be made whichever way the standard 
setting organisations have agreed upon. In Chapter 7 ‘Private law making at the 
round table on sustainable palm oil’ Otto Hospes presents a case study on the 
setting of private standards for the sustainable production of palm oil for food 
and other uses.
The 1990s and even more so the 2000s marked the rise of different, world-wide 
initiatives of non-governmental organisations and multinational companies to 
develop private law for the sustainable production of global commodities. One of 
these global initiatives has been the Round Table for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). 
The chapter by Hospes analyses private law making at the RSPO: it describes 
how the normative contents, actors and instruments of the RSPO have evolved 
in relation to market power, public law and state authorities. A key question is 
whether the law making process at the RSPO has contributed to the development 
of new public standards on sustainable palm oil. The focus is on the different ways 
in which the governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands have each responded 
to the establishment of the RSPO principles and criteria.
1.6.8 Capacity building in private food law
Margret Will, in Chapter 8 ‘GlobalGAP smallholder certification. Challenge and 
opportunity for smallholder inclusion into global value chains’, addresses the 
core topic in private food law: certification. In particular a form of certification 
developed within GlobalGAP to overcome financial and technical barriers to 
certification for small producers in third world countries. This chapter particularly 
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shows private food law as a form of global governance, the fairness of which 
can – probably – only be ensured from the inside as a global government that 
could counterbalance the global business world does not exist. The chapter is 
based on empirical research in African, Asian and Eastern-European countries. 
It is optimistic about the potential of private food law to provide producers in 
developing countries access to western markets.
1.6.9 Private food advertisement law
In Chapter 9, ‘Towards the self-regulation code on beer advertising in Italy: Steps 
on the long lasting path of competition/co-operation of public and private food 
law’ Ferdinando Albisinni describes the history of the Italian Self-Regulation 
Code on Beer Advertising. Both the legislator and the private sector realised the 
importance of consumer protection in the context of sales of and publicity for 
alcoholic beverages. The Self-Regulation Code, discussed in more detail in Chapter 
10, has found an interesting balance between the different interests involved.
Allesandro Artom, in Chapter 10 ‘Self-Regulation Code on Beer Advertising’ 
elaborates on the previous chapter, presenting a case study on the ‘Self-Regulation 
Code on Beer Advertising’ in Italy. It shows communication from businesses to 
consumers as topic of a private standard and it shows a structure within the private 
scheme providing third parties – consumers – with a procedure to address cases 
of (perceived) non-compliance. The case thus provides a model that can prove 
valuable for private food law in general. One of the weak spots in private food law 
seems to be the legal protection of interested parties. It suffers, as Busch puts it 
in Chapter 2, from inadequate appeals mechanisms. Artom shows that this can 
be remedied within the private schemes.
1.6.10 Business format regulation
In Chapter 11 ‘Franchising strengthens the use of private food standards’ Esther 
Brons-Stikkelbroeck adds the topic ‘franchising’ to the discussion of private food 
law. This topic is of twofold relevance. Franchising in itself is a form of private 
food law. A form that on private law basis – franchising contracts – imposes strict 
requirements upon participating businesses on how to present themselves to the 
public and how to conduct business. A large proportion of the world’s population 
will recognise a McDonald’s restaurant from the outside and know what to expect 
on the inside. The margin for the owner of an individual outlet to do things 
differently is very small.
The chapter goes on to discuss how within the franchise framework private 
standards as understood in the other chapters play a role. It appears that in 
franchising we encounter two forms of private food law mutually reinforcing 
each other.
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1.6.11 Religious standards
Tetty Havinga in Chapter 12 ‘On the borderline between state law and religious law: 
regulatory arrangements connected to kosher and halal foods in the Netherlands 
and the United States’ addresses religious standards. The Netherlands, like other 
Western countries, is a growing market for halal food products, that is, food 
products that comply with Islamic food laws. Halal food is becoming more visible 
as Dutch supermarkets, hospitals and schools decide to include halal food in 
their supply. Havinga compares the regulation of halal food in the Netherlands 
to the regulation of kosher food in the Netherlands and the United States. She 
analyses the division of roles between state actors, the food industry, certification 
agencies and religious authorities in these regulatory arrangements. Contrary to 
expectation, the regulatory arrangements are rather state-centred in several US 
states (liberal market economy), whereas the Dutch corporatist welfare state plays 
a limited role by allowing religious slaughter and leaving the issue of halal and 
kosher certification entirely to commercial and religious organisations.
1.6.12 Organics
Organic agriculture is based on the philosophy that farms should function like 
organisms do with as little external inputs as possible and no use of chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides.20 In Chapter 13 ‘Organic food: a private concept’s take-over 
by government and the continued leading role of the private sector’, Hanspeter 
Schmidt discusses two developments. One is how the initially private initiative 
of organic agriculture in many countries was included in public legislation. This 
is what he calls ‘a friendly takeover’. This takeover provides status and protection 
to organic agriculture. Infringement on organic standards has become a matter of 
public law enforcement. Audits and certification in many countries remain with 
private organisations. The downside of the friendly takeover is that the legislator 
now holds the position to change with one stroke of a pen the meaning of the 
concept of organic.
The second development discussed by Schmidt is that the takeover is not complete. 
Whenever gaps emerge, private initiative fills them in. He argues this point at the 
example of chemical contamination. Standards laid down in legislation ban certain 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides from use in organic agriculture. They do not 
deal with presence of their residues in organic food due to external contamination. 
In Germany private norms have been developed to distinguish residues that do 
and from those that do not raise a suspicion of unauthorised use. In this way 
private norms continue to complement public organic food law.
20 It bears repeating that the label ‘organic’ in no way implies any suggestion that other foods would 
be ‘inorganic’.
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1.6.13 Digital food law
In Chapter 14 ‘Food online: reconnaissance into a consumer protection no-man’s 
land between food law and the Civil Code’ Lomme van der Veer takes us into 
cyberspace. In the Netherlands sale of food via the internet takes place in a 
contested area between Civil Code requirements on distance selling and public law 
requirements on food labelling. Due to the characteristics of food, the consumer 
usually cannot enjoy much of the additional protection the legislator provides 
her/him regarding distance contracts. Due to the characteristics of internet sales 
consumers cannot enjoy many of the rights conferred upon them in food labelling 
law to make informed choices. Private food law so far does not seem to be closing 
the gap.
The situation is not as bleak as it would seem at first sight. The disadvantages 
facing the consumer of food online, awaken the potentials of the general contract 
law requirements of conformity. If anywhere they apply to their fullest, it is in 
the specific context of food stores along the digital highway.
1.6.14 The public side of private food law
Chapter 15, ‘National public sector and private standards: cases in the Netherlands’ 
by Irene Scholten-Verheijen presents cases on current discussions in the Netherlands 
on the interplay between private standards and public law. What happens to the 
private law character of private standards if reference is made to them in legislation? 
What happens if public authorities refer to private standards in calls for tender 
under EU procurement law? And, to what extent can enforcement bodies in setting 
their priorities rely on the performance of private quality management systems? 
The answer to these questions is contested in Dutch case law and practices. It 
goes without saying that the relevance of these question reaches far beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Netherlands. Some courts took the position that reference in 
legislation to private standards endows them with public law status which cannot be 
done unless they are publicly available the same way as legislation. This position, 
however, has not been upheld in appeal. In public procurement of coffee provision 
to civil servants the Dutch version of Fair Trade certification (Max Havelaar) 
was required. This was contested by coffee suppliers certified against a different 
sustainability standard. Dutch courts so far accepted the use of private standards 
in public procurement, but the European Commission started an infringement 
procedure against the Netherlands. On this topic see also Appendix 2.
1.6.15 The outside of private food law
Chapter 16 ‘The outside of private food law: the case of braided private regulation 
in Dutch dairy viewed in the light of competition law’ by Maria Litjens, Harry 
Bremmers and myself presents a case study of the dairy sector in the Netherlands 
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– stretching upstream to include the chains supplying feed to dairy farms. The 
study shows that private regulatory systems externally (on their ‘outside’) relate 
to each other with such intensity that private food law can be seen as an inter-
regulated system of entangled systems. Individual systems consist of private 
standards fleshed out with private schemes for their operation and enforcement. 
They usually regulate practices of businesses upstream from the businesses setting 
the standards and operating the schemes.
The interconnectedness of systems strongly increases their coercive effect on 
regulated businesses. Initially the Netherlands’ competition authority set a limit 
to this development with a view to its exclusion of non-participating businesses 
from the market. While, if anything, the web of private systems has only become 
more tightly knitted, the competition authority has not continued its involvement. 
The analysis speculates on a likely explanation. Is the ultimate cause a change 
in competition law, a change in the formal policy or just loss of interest from the 
side the competition authority?
1.6.16 The limit of private food law
As indicated above, competition law likely presents the most important limit to 
private food law. In Chapter 17 ‘The limit of private food law: competition law in 
the food sector’ Fabian Stancke brings this limit to the lime light.
Despite intense competition, the food sector in Germany is currently faced with 
challenges from both competition authorities and courts. Dawn-raids conducted 
by the German Federal Competition Office (FCO) took place only recently and 
three-digit million Euro fines were imposed. Among the companies concerned 
were sugar producers, fruit importers, sweets producers, coffee roasters, traders in 
spices, dairy producers and retail chains. The European Commission and the FCO 
have announced that they intend to further intensify competition law enforcement 
in the food sector. Both agencies are led by a concern for free competition for the 
benefit of consumers.
1.6.17 New approach
In the last chapter of the book, Chapter 18 ‘EU ‘new approach’ also for food 
law?’, Nicole Coutrelis takes stock of the findings in this book. ‘New approach’ 
is a label applied to a policy dating back to the 1980s. According to Coutrelis this 
new approach can be summarised as follows:
• EU legislation should be limited to the adoption of essential requirements, 
regarding specifically safety or other requirements of general interest;
• The task of drawing up the technical specifications of products, in conformity 
with the essential requirements laid down in the legislation, is entrusted to 
organisations which are competent in the standardisation area;
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
48 Private food law
Chapter 1
• These technical specifications are not mandatory;
• However, products conforming to the standards are presumed to conform to 
the essential requirements.
The food sector has been excluded from this new approach. Coutrelis now askes 
the question in the light of the findings in this book – that private standards 
in minute detail elaborate safety requirements – if it has become possible or 
desirable to now fully apply this approach to the food sector. She answers this 
question to the negative. Not because private standards in the food sector would 
not be suitable for the task, but because public food law has meanwhile developed 
too far from being limited to the adoption of essential requirements, regarding 
specifically safety or other requirements of general interest leaving the details 
to the private sector.
Like rails on a railway track public food law has changed its course as much as 
private food law has and never the twain shall meet.
1.6.18 EU involvement
The book does not end there. Two communications from the European Commission 
addressing private food law have been added as Appendices. Appendix 1, the ‘EU 
best practice guidelines for voluntary certification schemes for agricultural products 
and foodstuffs’ from 2010 provides definitions and best practices as seen by the 
Commission.21 It elaborates on the limits from competition law. Appendix 2, is a 
communication from 2009 ‘Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role of 
Fair Trade and nongovernmental trade-related sustainability assurance schemes’. 
It is rich in information on private systems of a predominantly ethical nature.
1.7 Law and governance
In social sciences, a concept of governance has been introduced to account for the 
fact that the management of society no longer is a matter of government alone. 
The notion of ‘governance’ shifts attention from ‘who’ is managing society to ‘what’ 
is being done in social management. Legal theory often applies a distinction in 
public law and private law based on involvement of some form of government. 
Topics such as self-regulation are approached from the perspective of government. 
Do they provide alternatives? Should the government leave it to the market, 
etcetera. This approach may increasingly lose adequacy when – as Busch puts it 
in Chapter 2 – the distinction between public state agencies and non-governmental 
organisations becomes blurred.
21 EU, 2010. Commission communication – EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union C 341, 
16/12/2010: 5-11.
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This book may contribute to the realisation that private forms of governance may 
emerge outside the scope of government initiative or control. Even in areas where 
there is no or no effective government to manage stakeholders’ actions such as in 
weak states with weak regulatory compliance and enforcement structures and in 
international trade. International trading businesses are confronted by national 
governments covering only a part of the operations and therefore sometimes 
unable to effectively influence what goes on. There is no such as an international 
government. The international organisations such as the WTO set requirements 
on the role the national governments play in this context, not on the trading 
businesses. The authority of national governments largely ends at their borders. 
The only set of rules that trading partners at opposite sides of the world have 
in common, are the rules they created for themselves by contract including the 
private systems they include in their relation. Private law may bring forth more 
truly global law than public international law. It may introduce some form of rule 
of law where no government exists.
Legal scholarship may be well advised to consider including a governance concept 
in its analytical toolbox. For the authors from Wageningen University participating 
in this book it is a contribution to the development of legal theory in the Netherlands 
Institute for Law and Governance.22
1.8 Last but not least
A book is nothing if it is not read. We, the authors, believe that we have created a 
product worthy of your – the reader’s – attention. We hope you will enjoy it and 
benefit from it. We invite you to feel part of a global community developing and 
studying private food law. Your comments are welcome: bernd.vandermeulen@wur.nl.
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2.  Quasi-states? The unexpected rise of 
private food law
Lawrence Busch
2.1 Introduction
Ther ys the veray and true commyn wele; ther ys the most prosperouse and 
perfayt state, that in any cuntrey, cyte, or towne, by pollycy and wysdom, 
may be stablyschyd and set.23
When Thomas Starkey wrote the above description of the state in 1538, the earliest 
usage of the state in this context known in English, he clearly saw it as a singular 
phenomenon. Each country would have a singular, stabilised state that would 
serve the common weal, i.e. that would provide for common prosperity. The study 
and implementation of food law has been premised on that assumption. Hence, 
either one studied/implemented food law in a given nation, or one studied/
implemented the transnational arrangements and agreements facilitating trade 
in food. However, in recent decades, just as numerous pundits have discussed the 
‘hollowing out of the state’,24 the state has seemingly proliferated.
In this chapter I shall argue that what is variously called the ‘hollowing out of the 
state’, the shift from government to governance, or the devolution of the state, 
has actually resulted in the creation of a range of quasi- or even pseudo-states. 
This, in turn, has resulted in the proliferation of standards, rules, regulations, good 
practices, and other means of ordering and organising the production, processing, 
transport, retailing, and testing of food.
First, I examine several critical events associated with the rise of neoliberalism. 
Then, I relate the transformation of the global food economy. In the next section I 
examine the rise of what has been called the ‘Tripartite Standards Regime’. Finally, 
I ask whether the governance of food can, in fact, be plural.
2.2 Building neoliberalism
Under the theory and practice of classical liberalism a space was to be carved out 
and reserved for the market. Practitioners might debate the size of that space, 
what should be in it, and how it was to be organised, but its central feature was 
23 Starkey, T., 1878. England in the reign of Henry the Eighth, a dialogue between Cardinal Pole and 
Thomas Lupset. N, Trubner & Co, London, UK,. for the Early English Text Society, 1878 [1538] as cited 
in the Oxford English Dictionary.
24 See e.g. Peters, G. and Pierre, J., 1998. Governance without government? Rethinking public 
administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8(2): 223-243.
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that it was to be a laissez-faire space, a space to be left alone, where markets could 
develop without the interference of the state. Thus, for the classical liberals markets 
were spaces of liberty, places where tyrannical governments could be excluded 
and business could be conducted in an untrammelled manner. This view was 
arguably best articulated in the seminal works of Adam Smith.25
By the 1930s this vision was clearly under attack. On the one hand, the forces 
of Soviet communism, Nazism, and fascism controlled a considerable part of 
Europe. On the other hand, the welfare state had grown considerably in size in the 
United States as well as in the remaining democratically governed parts of Europe. 
Concerned about these developments, a French philosopher of mathematics, 
Louis Rougier, invited a selected group of intellectuals from around the world to 
the Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris.26 Over the course of a week in 1938 the 
participants were to analyse the ills of contemporary societies and to propose 
the renovation of liberalism, the creation of what Rougier called ‘neoliberalism’.
What came to be known as neoliberalism may be said to have had several founding 
documents. Walter Lippmann’s, The Good Society, the centrepiece of the Colloque, 
made a case for a more active form of liberalism.27 In that best-selling work, 
Lippmann voiced his concerns about totalitarian regimes as well as the New Deal 
in the USA. In particular, Lippmann was sceptical about the uncritical acceptance 
of central planning. He argued that, given the complexities of the modern state, 
such planning would always fall short of its promise. In contrast, the uncountable 
transactions that took place in markets, as defined in classical liberal philosophy, 
appeared to be a means by which the complexities of modern life might be better 
addressed. However, Lippmann was also concerned that the classical liberal principle 
of laissez-faire was simply too negative. It needed to be replaced by a more positive, 
active promotion of markets to be accomplished by a program of legal reform.
A much shorter work by University of Chicago economist Henry C. Simons, that 
curiously proposed a seemingly oxymoronic ‘positive program for laissez-faire’ was 
also important.28 Simons proposed nothing less than a complete overhaul of the 
economic system so as to reduce the ever-expanding role of the state. However, 
25 Smith, A., 1994 [1776]. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Modern Library, 
New York, NY, USA.
Smith, A., 1982 [1759]. The theory of moral sentiments. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN, USA.
26 Travaux du Centre International d’Etudes Pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme (ed.), 1939. Le Colloque 
Walter Lippmann. Cahier no. 1, Librairie de Médicis, Paris, France.
27 Lippmann, W., 1938. The good society. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, UK.
28 Simons, H.C., 1948 [1934]. A positive program for Laissez Faire: some proposals for a liberal economic 
policy, In economic policy for a free society. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, USA, pp. 40-77. 
Simons’s perspective deviated from that of many other neoliberals in that he favoured a sharp reduction 
of corporate power, a progressive tax system, and limits on advertising. For a more detailed discussion, 
see Foucault, M., 2008. The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79. Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, NY, USA.
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the program of work outlined at the Colloque, was not to be carried out as war 
soon intervened.
It was left to F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman to spell out the details of the 
neoliberal program. Hayek’s best selling, The road to serfdom, became a kind of 
manifesto for neoliberal policies.29 In particular, in it Hayek argued that there 
was a ‘slippery slope’ from the welfare state to totalitarianism. Planning was to 
be avoided unless it was aimed at enhancing competition and markets; in those 
instances it was to be encouraged. Moreover, other forms of state planning were to 
be restricted by creating a set of international organisations that would specifically 
limit state power.
After the war ended, Rougier’s project was resurrected by F.A. Hayek and others 
in the Mont Pelerin Society.30 The Society has since served to promote neoliberal 
ideals. But it was Hayek’s later trilogy and Friedman’s influential Capitalism and 
freedom that spelled out more clearly a neoliberal vision of the future.31 Space 
here does not permit a detailed review of even these works, let alone all the 
many other works generated in the last 70 years. But one can distil (admittedly 
with some distortions) a set of positions widely held among neoliberals and now 
largely enshrined in national and international law:
1. Markets should be actively promoted, since they allow goods and services to 
be distributed without recourse to a central authority. Indeed, governments 
must work to make markets fully competitive, i.e. to make them conform as 
much as possible to the mathematical model of the market.32
2. Governmental regulation of social, political, and economic affairs should itself 
be limited to support of the market mechanism whenever possible. Hence, 
public services and enterprises should be privatised as much as possible.
3. Individuals should be encouraged to be entrepreneurs of themselves.
4. Free trade should be promoted along with competitive exchange rates and 
market determination of prices. Moreover, global institutions that ensure free 
trade should also serve to limit state sovereignty.
All of this remained rather theoretical and far from practice (with the partial 
exception of Chile) until the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
in Great Britain and the United states, respectively. Both leaders were familiar 
29 Hayek, F.A., 2007 [1944]. The road to serfdom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, USA.
30 Mont Pelerin Society, http://www.montpelerin.org/. For a history, see: Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, 
D. (eds.), 2009. The road from Mont Pèlerin: the making of the neoliberal thought collective. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
31 Friedman, M., 1962. Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, USA; Hayek, 
F.A., 1973-1979.. Law, legislation and liberty, 3 vols. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, USA.
32 For Hayek, markets are forms of self-generating or ‘spontaneous order’. Hayek’s mentor, Ludwig 
von Mises, went further arguing that economic science is not empirical, but a priori. Put differently, 
the functioning of markets is prior to and independent of experience. See: von Mises, L., 1978 [1933]. 
Epistemological problems of economics. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, AL, USA.
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with and committed to (something akin to) neoliberal values and proceeded to put 
them into practice. In particular, they railed against what they saw as unnecessary 
regulation and the excesses of the welfare state.
Furthermore, commensurate with this new approach to governance, over the 
next several decades the ‘big four’ international governance institutions came 
into being or were greatly strengthened. The World Bank, initially created to help 
Europe rebuild after World War II, was reinvented after the debt crisis as a means of 
remaking governments in poor countries along neoliberal lines.33 The International 
Monetary Fund,34 working together with the bank, ensured that nations not 
following the recently invented rules of the ‘Washington Consensus’ would be 
forced into default.35 The World International Property Organization (WIPO) 
created a global forum where intellectual property rules could be extended and 
unified. But the major new global actor was the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
By limiting its mandate to trade, and avoiding thorny questions of environment, 
labour, and the like, the signatories to the WTO very nearly instantiated Hayek’s 
imaginary of 1944. Put differently, the WTO limited the role of member nations, 
put trade issues squarely at the centre of international negotiations, and promoted 
a market-led form of economic development. Indeed, when WIPO’s one-nation, 
one-vote approach to strengthening intellectual property rights proved too slow 
for some, shifting the venue to the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreement at the WTO proved more effective. Similarly, technoscientific 
issues were subordinated to trade through the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
agreement, while sanitary and phytosanitary issues were subordinated through 
the eponymous SPS agreement.
In sum, the last 30-40 years may be seen as a marked change in the form(s) of global 
governance. It involved a shift from (welfare) state-centred governance to market-led 
governance. Often food safety agencies and related government oversight of food 
and agriculture has been weakened or eliminated, to be replaced – according to 
its advocates – by private sector incentives of various sorts.36 Although performed 
33 For a critical review of bank policies, see: Goldman, M., 2005. Imperial nature: The World Bank and 
struggles for justice in the age of globalization. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, USA.
34 Insight into IMF decision making can be found in: Harper, R., 2000. The social organization of the 
IMF’s mission work. In: Strathern, M. (ed.). Audit cultures: anthropological studies in accountability, 
ethics, and the academy. Routledge, New York, NY, USA, pp. 21-53.
35 Williamson, J., 2005. The strange history of the Washington consensus. Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics 27(2): 195-206.
36 For a brief review of the US scene, see: Fortin, N.D., 2009. United States Food Law: consumers, 
controversies, current issues. European Journal of Consumer Law 2009(1): 15-42. A comprehensive 
review can be found in: Fortin, N.D., 2009. Food regulation: law, science, policy, and practice. John 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, USA.
For the EU, see: Allemanno, A., 2009. Solving the problem of scale: The European approach to import 
safety and security concerns. In: Coglianese, C., Finkel, A.M. and Zaring, D. (eds.). Import safety: 
regulatory governance in the global economy. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 
USA, pp. 171-189.
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differently in different nations, the neoliberal approach to governance advocated 
by Hayek, Friedman, and others was slowly but surely put into practice, eclipsing 
other forms of governance to varying degrees.
2.3 Transformation of the global economy
In large part as a result of the neoliberal reforms, the last one-third of the twentieth 
century marked a sea change in the global economy. Trade in food and agricultural 
products expanded at a rapid pace. Supermarkets began to operate across national 
boundaries. And, supply chain management (SCM) eclipsed business to business 
exchanges in spot markets. Let us examine each of these phenomena in turn.
2.3.1 Trade in food and agricultural products
The last 50 years has seen a rapid, indeed astonishing, growth in global trade in 
food and agricultural products. From 1961 to 2007 the value of global food imports 
rose from US$ 34,696 million to US$ 903,431 million. Similarly, the value of global 
food exports rose from US$ 32,118 million to US$ 876,410 million (Figure 2.1).37 
37 Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009. FAO Statistical Yearbook 2009, FAO, Statistics Division, 
Rome, Italy.
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Figure 2.1. World Agricultural Trade, 1961-2007.
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This extraordinary growth can be directly linked to the opening of world markets 
under the GATT and later the WTO.
2.3.2 The rise of transnational supermarket chains
The legal restructuring of global food and agricultural markets through the GATT 
and the World Trade Organization, and especially the SPS and TBT agreements, had 
another important consequence: They opened the door for the larger supermarket 
chains to penetrate previously closed markets.
Prior to that time, few supermarket chains operated across national boundaries. If 
they did, their operations in one nation were largely divorced from that in other 
nations, since tariffs and quotas, as well as different local laws and regulations on food 
products, made global sourcing and distribution expensive, difficult, or impossible.
However, this all changed with the new trade regime. Global sourcing of most fresh 
and processed products became possible. Moreover, different chains employed 
different strategies with respect to store format (e.g. big box, convenience store, 
small supermarket, etc.). More importantly, the various chains took different 
strategies with respect to regional penetration. On the one hand, some chains 
invaded the national territory of other chains, either by direct competition or by 
purchasing smaller national chains. For example, recently the British supermarket 
chain, Tesco, entered the US market by opening a group of upscale small format 
stores on the west coast under the name Fresh and easy. On the other hand, some 
chains ventured into the nations of the former Soviet bloc and/or the middle and 
even lower income nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America where supermarket 
chains were either weak or non-existent.38 And, at the same time, major firms 
consolidated their market shares in their home markets, such that a few firms 
dominate in most industrialised nations.39
2.3.3 Supply chain management
The growth in scale and geographical reach of supermarket chains was paralleled 
by a growth in their market power. While much of the twentieth century was 
marked by the dominance of large food manufacturers (e.g. Coca-Cola, Kraft, 
38 Dries, L., Reardon, T. and Swinnen, J.F.M., 2004. The rapid rise of supermarkets in central and eastern 
Europe: implications for the agrifood sector and rural development. Development Policy Review 22(5): 
525-556.
Reardon, T., Timmer, C.P., Barrett, C.B. and Berdegue, J., 2003. The rise of supermarkets in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(5): 1140-1146.
Weatherspoon, D.D. and Reardon, T., 2003. The rise of supermarkets in Africa: implications for agrifood 
systems and the rural poor. Development Policy Review 21(3): 1-17.
39 For trends in concentration see: Busch, L. and Bain, C., 2004. New! Improved? The transformation 
of the global agrifood system. Rural Sociology 69(3): 321-346.
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Nestlé), the current century has so far been marked by the growing dominance 
of food retailers. This is a consequence of several parallel developments. First, 
the sheer size of some of the larger retailers dwarfs anything found in the food 
processing sector. Wal-Mart, for example, now has annual sales of over $375 billion, 
making it the largest single company in the world.40 This can be compared to the 
annual sales of Nestlé, currently the world’s largest food processor. Its annual 
sales for 2008 were ca. $100 billion.41
Second, supermarkets have been at the forefront of organisational innovation. 
In particular, they have shifted their buying practices dramatically. As late as 
the 1960s, supermarkets tended to buy whatever products were available on the 
wholesale market, bringing them in through the back door, stacking them on 
shelves, and sending them out the front. Even the invention of bar codes had little 
effect on these practices. In addition to seasonal variations for fresh products, 
there were regular shortages of packaged products, the result of disruptions in 
shipping or availability of raw materials. This meant that supermarkets had to 
have large on-site storerooms where additional items for sale were kept ‘just in 
case’, or they had to have rather large numbers of ‘out of stock’ (OOS) items. 
Both were costly. Warehousing products for sale later required extra space (that 
might have otherwise been used for sales floors), while OOS items meant empty 
shelves and lost sales.
The favoured solution to this problem proved to be Supply Chain Management 
(SCM). Two somewhat different versions of the origins of SCM can be identified.42 
One places its origin in the systems literature of the 1950s; the other places it in 
the transformation of the Japanese automobile industry, especially at Toyota, in 
the 1970s.43 Regardless of its origins, SCM transformed the food industry. SCM was 
simultaneously a conceptual and a practical innovation. It involved the organisation 
of an entire supply chain such that goods would be delivered ‘just in time’, and 
that shelves would always be full. This involved paying much greater attention 
to all the details of logistics (i.e. the flow of goods, resources, and information 
within and across firms), as well as to the development of commensurate handling 
practices all the way through the chain. Moreover, it involved vertical coordination 
of most or all the actors in a supply chain by a ‘supply chain captain’, a company 
with sufficient marketing clout to discipline the other companies in the chain 
and to ensure that goods flowed smoothly through the entire chain.
40 Wal-Mart, 2008. Annual Report. Available at: http://walmartstores.com/sites/annualreport/2008/
message_from_lee_scott.html.
41 Nestlé, 2008. Management Report 2008. Nestlé, Geneva, Switzerland.
42 Croom, S., Romano, P. and Giannakis, M., 2000. Supply chain management: an analytical framework 
for critical literature review. European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 6: 67-83.
43 Importantly, Toyota was greatly influenced by the post-war work on quality control of J. Edwards 
Deming. See: Edwards Deming, W., 1982. Out of the crisis. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center 
for Advanced Engineering Study, Cambridge, MA, USA.
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What this has meant in practice is that large retailers have been able to specify 
standards for a wide range of product qualities and supplier practices. However, 
relations between suppliers and buyers in supply chains vary considerably. 
Kaplinsky suggests that there are:
‘… two contrasting paths of value chain standards in corporate-driven value 
chains. One involves close and high-trust relations along the chain, with cost-
reduction an outcome of largely cooperative efforts between lead-buyers and 
their tiers of suppliers. The second involves the use of standards to promote 
much more conflictive, arms-length relations along the chain.’44
At least with respect to the food industry, this distinction may be overdrawn. 
Instead, at one end of a rough continuum we find companies that employ the 
‘Toyota model’, directly working with suppliers to ensure that the qualities of 
what suppliers produce meet their quality standards in the most efficient and 
profitable manner. This may involve provision of various forms of advice (which 
is nearly impossible to ignore), as well as supplier investments (i.e. lock-in costs) 
in specialised capital equipment (e.g. packaging, varieties, delivery arrangements) 
in return for increased profits and long-term relationships. At the other end of the 
continuum are buyers who employ standards, but who remain at arms-length from 
their suppliers. As one auditor put it, ‘The objective is to push the responsibility 
for food safety and quality back down to the suppliers. Unfortunately, this is the 
reason why most companies are audited.’45 This allows those demanding audits 
to profit from competition among suppliers, while avoiding the costs incurred by 
working closely in long-term relationships. In point of fact, however, supermarket 
chains and fast food restaurants use a wide variety of approaches to link suppliers 
to buyers.
Thus, on the one hand, retailers have been able to specify the sizes and shapes 
of food packages, and, especially in the case of private label (also known as own 
brand, or store brand) products, the specific ingredients and processing techniques 
for the product. On the other hand, retailers have been able to intervene in 
supplier practices, including setting of standards for on-farm growing and handling, 
and even reorganising suppliers’ businesses so as to make them more efficient 
(thereby lowering costs for retailers). Some firms, such as Walmart, also link to 
their suppliers through Electronic Data Interchange (EDI); put differently, as 
products are sold at retail, orders are automatically sent electronically to suppliers, 
specifying timing and volume of replenishments.46
44 Kaplinsky, R., 2010. The role of standards in global value chains. The World Bank, International Trade 
Department, Washington, DC, USA, p. 5.
45 Stier, R.F., 2009. Third party audits: what the food industry really needs. Food Safety Magazine 15(5): 44.
46 See Walmart Corporate, Requirements: http://walmartstores.com/Suppliers/248.aspx.
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SCM has been spurred on by the neoliberal transformations of the market 
noted above. In particular, retailers have enjoyed and defended the ‘freedom 
to operate’ provided by relatively weakly regulated markets. But they have also 
been frightened by the ‘horror vacui’ of weakly regulated markets. SCM, combined 
with private standards, provided a solution to the problem. Put differently, SCM 
provided a means for developing and imposing private standards on suppliers. 
Yet, paradoxically, even as it avoided additional regulation, it depended heavily 
on nation-states’ legal systems for the enforcement of contract and criminal law.47
2.4 Rise of the Tripartite Standards Regime (TSR)
Another aspect of the growth in global trade was a major shift in its governance. 
While neoliberal and other proponents of ‘free trade’ were of the opinion that 
merely reducing and eventually eliminating tariffs and quotas would be sufficient to 
create a trade explosion, this left questions about specifications, standards, quality 
and safety unanswered. In short, even the most scrupulous firms engaged in trade 
needed to know, among other things, that (a) the terms they used in contracts 
(even those in a single language) had ‘the same’ meanings for both parties, (b) 
that a set of standards was shared by both seller and buyer, (c) that standards 
were adhered to by the seller, (d) that various legally-mandated quality and safety 
measures were taken, and (e) some recourse for breach of contract was available. 
Given that all contracts are incomplete,48 these were hardly matters to be taken 
lightly. The result was the creation of a new governance structure, what we call 
the Tripartite Standards Regime (TSR)49 consisting of standards, certifications, 
and accreditations. Let us examine each of these in turn.
2.4.1 Standards development organisations
Standards development organisations (SDOs) began to form in the late nineteenth 
century. Many were initially highly specialised, focused on specific problems 
found in a given industry. In addition, by the 1930s nearly every industrial nation 
had a general national SDO, partially the result of mishaps during World War I 
that were attributable to non-standard parts. However, in the last third of the 20th 
century, the number and scope of SDOs appears to have expanded, such that nearly 
every nation on the planet now has a national general SDO and many specialised 
ones. In the agro-food sector specifications and standards [(a) and (b) above] were 
delegated to this ever-expanding list of SDOs. These included both specialised 
and general international organisations established in mid-century [e.g. Codex 
47 Contract law is also essential to the ‘success’ of large-scale food animal processing companies in 
shifting risks and dictating management styles to their suppliers. It has been arguably most successfully 
used in the broiler industry. 
48 Williamson, O.E., 1975. Markets and hierarchies. Free Press, New York, NY, USA.
49 Loconto, A. and Busch, L., 2010. Standards, techno-economic networks, and playing fields: performing 
the global market economy. Review of International Political Economy 17(3): 507-536.
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Alimentarius, International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)], a few individual buyers large 
enough to set their own standards,50 as well as a wide range of newly established 
SDOs including GlobalGAP, COLEACP, the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), the British Retail Consortium (BRC), and Safe 
Quality Food (SQF). Importantly, these SDOs include industry consortia, private 
voluntary associations, and quasi-public organisations.51 In short, they blur the 
distinction between public, state agencies and non-governmental organisations.
2.4.2 Third party certifiers
In the past it was commonplace for relations between buyer and seller to be based 
largely on the buyer’s trust in the seller and the seller’s expectations for future 
sales. Moreover, in those instances where the trust was found to be misplaced, 
it was possible for the buyer to take the seller to court. However, the massive 
increase in global food trade combined with the withdrawal of the state from direct 
action posed a new set of problems. A buyer might be in the position of dealing 
with hundreds of sellers, who could offer goods at lower prices than domestic 
producers, but all of whom were located in other nations, had considerably different 
expectations as to quality than the buyer, and were – for reasons of cost, time, and/
or inadequate means for legal redress in that jurisdiction – impossible to bring to 
court in cases of non-compliance with the terms of a contract. The most common 
solution to this problem was the introduction of various forms of certification. 
This appeared to address points (c) and (d), and to remove the need for (e) above.
There are essentially three forms of certification.52 First party certification occurs 
when the producer certifies that products meet the standards in question. This 
works well in the case of products bearing the brand of the first party, since there 
are reputational issues at play. Second party certification involves the continuous 
inspection of the delivered product by the buyer. In short, it requires that the buyer 
police the seller continuously. Finally, third party certification involves the use 
of an allegedly neutral third party, i.e. not a party to the exchange in question, 
50 For example, Wal-Mart is sufficiently large that it can and does specify package sizes for many of the 
products it stocks.
51 Fulponi, L., 2006. Private voluntary standards in the food system: the perspective of major food 
retailers. Food Policy 31(1): 1-13.
52 See, for example: Busch, L., Thiagarajan, D., Hatanaka, M., Bain, C., Flores, L.G. and Frahm, M., 
2005. The relationship of third-party certification (TPC) to sanitary/phytosanitary (SPS) measures and 
the international agri-food trade: Final report. Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, DC, USA.
Deaton, B., 2004. A theoretical framework for examining the role of third-party certifiers. Food Control 
15: 615-619.
Gibbon, P. and Ponte, S., 2008. Global value chains: from governance to governmentality? Economy 
and Society 37(3): 365-392.
Hatanaka, M., Bain, C. and Busch, L., 2005. Third-party certification in the global agrifood system. Food 
Policy 30(3): 354-369.
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whose job it is to engage in ‘conformity assessment,’ i.e. to determine to what 
extent the seller’s products conform to the standards upon which an agreement 
had been reached. Given that the costs of this last form of certification can be 
imposed on the seller, and that it separated the policing role from that of the seller, 
it has become the most favoured form of certification worldwide.
It has also given rise to a vast, largely new, industry – that of certification. While 
certifiers were initially focused on particular industries and many still are, today 
many certifiers are more than happy to certify across industries. Hence, the largest 
certifying firms, e.g. Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), and Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV), certify everything from food products to steelworks. In contrast, 
medium and small certifying firms tend to stick with one domain such as food 
products (e.g. Quality Assurance International, NSF International).
However, the certification industry can hardly be said to be disinterested. Although 
there is no evidence of widespread fraud or deceit, certifiers find themselves 
between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Demand for certification services 
almost always originates with buyers of food products, but it is the firm that is 
to be certified that pays the certifier. Thus, failing to give a firm a passing score 
on a certification is tantamount to losing a customer. I return to this dilemma in 
section 2.5.2 below.
2.4.3 Accreditors
The increased interest by retailers in purchasing only goods certified to a given 
standard opened a global market for certification services. Initially, virtually 
anyone could hang out a sign that said that they were a certifier. Indeed, even 
today in most nations nothing prohibits one from so doing. However, it soon 
became apparent that some certifiers were more trustworthy than others. To 
resolve this problem, numerous national accreditation bodies were created; these 
national bodies range from public agencies to public-private partnerships, to private 
entities.53 Furthermore, two non-governmental organisations were developed 
that now accredit the national accreditors. Put differently, they certify (through 
peer evaluation) that accreditors can be trusted to certify that certifiers do their 
job correctly.
The International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) is, as the name 
suggests, a cooperation among national laboratory accreditors.54 It attempts to 
ensure that national accreditors employ the same standards of testing, specification, 
53 For a recent list, see Donaldson, J.L., 2005. Directory of National Accreditation Bodies. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA.
54 International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation, Welcome to ILAC, http://www.ilac.org/home.
html.
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accuracy, and precision in certifying the competence of national testing laboratories, 
ensuring that they meet minimum standards. The International Accreditation 
Forum (IAF), as it notes on its website, ‘is the world association of Conformity 
Assessment Accreditation Bodies in the fields of management systems, products, 
services, personnel and other similar programmes of conformity assessment’.55 
Importantly, neither of these organisations is a governmental body, although 
there is little doubt that they engage in governance activities.
2.4.4 The new private governance: TSRs
Together, SDOs, certifiers, and accreditors have formed a TSR, or perhaps more 
accurately, an assortment of TSRs, which – through markets – collectively govern 
global production and trade in agrifood and other goods and services. TSRs are 
perhaps best seen as a plethora of new law-making and enforcing entities. Although 
participation in a given TSR is nominally voluntary, each TSR produces/enforces 
its own private (i.e. non-state) codes, laws, rules, standards, specifications, and 
regulations that are binding on adherents to the TSR. Failure to comply is generally 
dealt with by market sanctions, by barring access to a particular (and usually 
lucrative) market. Moreover, TSRs extend beyond the borders of nation-states; 
indeed, they are not, at least in principle, geographical in scope. Hence, a given 
TSR may involve growers in Guatemala, Mexico, and Ghana, supermarket chains 
operating in Thailand, France, and Canada, and transporters shipping goods from 
growers’ farms to those supermarkets.
At the same time, it is important to note that all TSRs are ultimately dependent 
on the state. States provide vital services to TSRs including, most obviously, (1) 
corporate, contract, intellectual property, and anti-fraud laws, (2) appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms (beyond market sanctions) such as civil and criminal 
courts, police, and prosecutors, and (3) international agreements and organisations 
(e.g. the WTO). Without these state-sponsored and supported institutions, TSRs 
would be powerless to discipline errant participants.
2.5  Can governance be plural? Legitimacy and markets 
revisited
Nation-states took centuries to gain legitimacy. Even now, that legitimacy is 
still contested by various sub-national groups (e.g. Basque separatists, Scottish 
nationalists, the Michigan Militia). Yet, with the exception of a few rare jurisdictions 
with dual legal regimes, and a few places where states have lost control over both 
territory and population (e.g. Somalia) nation-states now cover the land area of the 
entire planet. To my knowledge, there are no places where citizens may choose 
among many legal regimes until they find one to their liking. Yet, this is precisely 
55 International Accreditation Forum, International Accreditation Forum, Inc., http://www.iaf.nu/.
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what one finds with respect to the private systems of governance described above. 
Consider the advantages and disadvantages of TSRs.
2.5.1 Advantages of TSRs
TSRs have several advantages for supply chain captains. First, and arguably most 
importantly, they are quite flexible, far more flexible than state-sponsored law. 
They are easily changed if (some) parties to the TSR decide that their current 
form is unacceptable for whatever reason. Furthermore, they are, or can be, quite 
proactive. Hence, in a time of short harvests, quality standards can be relaxed to 
ensure that processors and retailers are supplied; conversely, in a time of abundant 
harvests, standards can be more rigidly enforced, so as to exclude non-conforming 
goods. Third, TSRs can be tailored to specific situations to a much greater degree 
than legal regimes. Fourth, TSRs generally have an opt-out provision that is lacking 
in formal law. Indeed, it is these added flexibilities that attracted private actors 
– both corporate and private voluntary organisations – to TSRs in the first place.
At the same time, TSRs have the potential to provide advantages to other groups. 
Perhaps most importantly, TSRs may allow participation in (some) markets that 
would otherwise be closed to certain participants, especially those in developing 
nations.56 Moreover, TSRs may help such producers to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of their production practices as well. Finally, TSRs may be effective 
means of grappling with complex transnational environmental, labour, and human 
rights issues on which to date international agreement has been either lacking 
or unenforced.57
2.5.2 Problems associated with TSRs
At the same time, there are several major problems associated with TSRs. Perhaps 
the area of greatest concern with respect to TSRs is that they tend to behave like 
states, or perhaps better, like quasi-states. They are like states in that each TSR issues 
its own set of rules and regulations, and each has its own enforcement mechanism, 
generally relying on denial of market access to violators of the rules.58 While 
technically TSRs are voluntary, in many instances they are de facto mandatory, as 
no market actors outside the TSR exist in a given locale. But TSRs are unlike states 
56 In some instances this is a zero-sum game. Some get to participate as a result of the TSR, even as 
others are excluded.
57 For a positive view of the role of private voluntary organisations in promoting TSRs, see: Conroy, 
M.E., 2007. Branded! How the ‘certification revolution’ is transforming global corporations. New Society 
Publishers, Gabriola Island, Canada; for a more critical view, see Gereffi, G., Garcia-Johnson, R. and 
Sasser, E., 2001. The NGO-industrial complex. Foreign Relations 125(July-August): 56-65.
58 Denial of market access is arguably less consequential in industrialized nations, where other less 
discriminating buyers may be available. In contrast, in many poor nations, there are often local 
monopolies, making denial of market access tantamount to business failure.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
64 Private food law
Chapter 2
in that they generally have few or inadequate appeals mechanisms. They are also 
unlike states in that they are not territorial in their authority but extraterritorial. 
And, and as noted above, they depend on states for enforcement of certain legal 
obligations, but at the same time, they are often able to enforce rules far beyond 
the boundaries of any given state.
Moreover, they are certainly not like democratic states. They generally have little 
separation of powers, rarely represent more than a small fraction of those in 
a given supply chain (generally those who are most powerful), and they may 
apply their rules in a highly capricious manner. Some are reminiscent of George 
Orwell’s Animal Farm,59 where all animals are equal, but some animals are more 
equal than others.
The state-like character of TSRs, as well as their democratic deficit, poses a 
number of other problems as well. These include questions about accountability, 
effectiveness, transparency, innovation, fairness, and legitimacy.60 Let us consider 
each of these briefly in turn.
Accountability. It is not clear to whom the participants in TSRs are accountable. 
TSRs are designed such that they promote (a form of) trust among the private 
actors within a given supply chain.61 However, at the same time, TSRs perform 
functions traditionally reserved to states (e.g. food safety). As such, they are at 
least partially responsible for certain public goods. Moreover, as one observer has 
noted, ‘... most private safety regulation currently faces northward. It protects 
developed country interests, and has only haltingly and partially incorporated the 
voices and interests of developing country producers and publics’.62 In addition, 
the very plurality of standards tends to dilute accountability.
Effectiveness. As one observer notes, ‘… whether private standards benefit consumers 
and society ultimately depends on the actual improvement that they generate 
with respect to the previous situation’.63 The effectiveness of the now widespread 
59 Orwell, G., 1984 [1945]. Animal farm. Folio Society, London, UK.
60 In addition, there is some concern about the compatibility of private standards with the WTO and 
especially the SPS and TBT agreements. I leave it to others to address this issue. See, e.g. Schroder, H.Z., 
2009. Definition of the concept 'international standard' in the TBT Agreement. Journal of World Trade 
43(6): 1223-1254; see also Chapter 6 by Marinus Huige.
61 The IAF claims that promoting trust is central to its aims: International Accreditation Forum, Inc., 
http://www.iaf.nu/. Cf. O’Neill, O., 2002. A question of trust. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
62 Meidinger, E., 2009. Private import safety regulation and transnational new governance. In: 
Coglianese, C., Finkel, A.M. and Zaring, D. (eds.). Import safety: regulatory governance in the global 
economy, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, USA, p. 233.
63 Liu, P., 2009. Private standards in international trade: issues, opportunities and long-term prospects. 
In: Sarris, A. and Morrison, J. (eds.). The evolving structure of world agricultural trade: implications 
for trade policy and trade agreements. Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations, Trade 
and Markets Division, Rome, Italy, p. 218.
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use of HACCP, ISO 9000, and other management-oriented schemes assumes that 
the participants are competent and want to improve the quality and safety of 
their businesses. Clearly, if the control points chosen do not include all those 
of relevance, then HACCP is of little value. Indeed, in some quarters the initials 
HACCP are spelled out as ‘Have another cup of coffee and pray.’
One can make similar observations with respect to certification. The recent problems 
with salmonella in peanut butter in the United States provide a rare glimpse of 
the nature of the problem. The now-defunct Peanut Corporation of America was 
an ingredient supplier to a number of food manufacturers. It was inspected by 
Eugene A. Hatfield, who worked for the well-known and long-established food 
certifier, AIB International. According to its website, AIB International is accredited 
by ANSI and UKAS, the US and UK national accreditors.64 The company knew 
when the audit would take place and had plenty of time to prepare. Moreover, Mr. 
Hatfield had less than one day to review the large plant which processed several 
million pounds of peanuts each month.
Mr. Hatfield was hardly a novice, but at age 66 a seasoned plant inspector. 
Nevertheless, his expertise was in the fresh produce sector, not in groundnuts. 
He gave the plant a rating of ‘Superior’ in the certification process. Yet,
‘Federal investigators later discovered that the dilapidated plant was ravaged by 
Salmonella and had been shipping tainted peanuts and paste for at least nine 
months. But they were too late to prevent what has become one of the nation’s 
worst known outbreaks of food-borne disease in recent years, in which nine are 
believed to have died and an estimated 22,500 were sickened.’65
Firms buying the ingredients were also forced to recall potentially dangerous 
products. Although there was no evidence of any form of collusion or fraud, 
clearly the audit was woefully inadequate. But the problem goes further than this 
would suggest: ‘If the certifier is a for-profit company, it may have an interest in 
not interpreting the standard in too strict a manner, lest some clients switch to 
competitors who have a more flexible interpretation. Also, withdrawing certification 
in case of non-compliance means losing a customer.’66
Indeed, all of this took place in an industrial nation with a strong state and 
generally high relations of trust among both buyers and the general public. In 
64 AIB International, https://www.aibonline.org/.
65 The New York Times, 6 March 2009, A1. See also: Stier, R.F., 2009. Third party audits: what the food 
industry really needs. Food Safety Magazine 15(5): 43-44, 46, 48-49, 60.
66 Liu, P., 2009. Private standards in international trade: issues, opportunities and long-term prospects. 
In: Sarris, A. and Morrison, J. (eds.). The evolving structure of world agricultural trade: implications 
for trade policy and trade agreements. Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations, Trade 
and Markets Division, Rome, Italy, p. 224.
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nations with weak states and widespread distrust, the problem may be far greater. 
For example, one of the few studies of the effectiveness of a TSR in a weak state, 
the ‘safe vegetable production system’ in Vietnam, concludes that it is largely 
ineffective.67
It should also be noted that the very obverse situation may prevail, where – usually 
for reasons of non-price competition and/or due diligence – buyers will not only 
demand that high quality standards be met, but that safety standards exceed 
those deemed necessary by health authorities. This is especially problematic for 
producers of fresh fruits and vegetables, since they have little or no control over 
the (apparently harmless) small quantities of microorganisms that are commonly 
found on such items. Moreover, these are perishable products that must be sold 
before they lose value. For example, one study found that blueberry buyers were 
demanding seemingly arbitrary bacterial counts for organisms not implicated 
in disease outbreaks; moreover, in one instance one buyer’s threshold was 20 
times higher than another.68 This and similar demands certainly do not make 
the delivery of public or private goods more effective, but they do add to costs.
Transparency. While Kafkaesque legal regimes certainly exist, in most states, most 
commercial law is publicly available and known (or knowable) to all. But many 
standards regimes are deliberately made quite opaque.69 That opacity has several 
aspects. First, most SDOs sell their standards; indeed, that is their major source 
of income. Hence, they have a vested interest in limiting circulation to paying 
customers. Second, in some instances standards may actually be a trade secret, 
such that using them requires signing a non-disclosure agreement. Finally, the 
standards may regularly change based (usually) on the changing demands of the 
buyer. This lack of transparency is particularly troublesome.
Innovation. TSRs can and often do block innovation. This is particularly true 
when they are based on process standards. For example, many current TSRs 
in the agrifood sector demand that producers follow rigidly defined calendars 
for planting, spraying, fertilising, and harvesting crops, or similarly rigid rules 
for livestock management. While such rules certainly help to produce uniform 
products according to a fixed schedule, they are also quite inflexible with respect 
to innovation. They presume, often wrongly, that all innovation must come from 
those in charge of the supply chain; conversely, they limit the managerial capacities 
of suppliers. Similar problems may exist in the processing sector.
67 Pham Van Hoi, Mol, A.P.J. and Oosterveer, P.J.M., 2009. Market governance for safe food in developing 
countries: the case of low-pesticide vegetables in Vietnam. Journal of Environmental Management 
91(2): 380-388.
68 Bain, C. and Busch, L., 2004. Standards and strategies in the Michigan blueberry industry. Michigan 
Agricultural Experiment Station, East Lansing, MI, USA.
69 Kaplinsky, R., 2010. The role of standards in global value chains. The World Bank, International Trade 
Department, Washington, DC, USA.
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Fairness. One problem frequently noted in the literature is the negative impacts 
on small producers. Indeed, it is worth noting that both ends of the continuum are 
biased against small producers. On the one hand, small producers may lack the 
funds necessary to invest in specialised equipment; on the other hand, without 
technical help, they may find themselves squeezed out of the market. Many aid 
agencies, both public and private, have attempted to grapple with these issues, 
with a mixed record of success. In some instances producer cooperatives and 
similar organisations have been able to successfully meet buyer requirements,70 
while in other situations this goal has been unachievable. Furthermore, when the 
standards change rapidly or are rather opaque, they would seem to require the 
permanent presence of some advisory group to maintain fairness. This seems a 
highly unlikely prospect.
Legitimacy. TSRs pose a number of legitimacy problems. First, legitimacy is 
undermined when suppliers are required to meet ever higher specifications.71 
This is often the case as downstream actors usually have the ability to squeeze 
upstream actors.72 It is possible that in the future climate change and high oil 
prices will change this situation, but that remains to be seen. Moreover, it might 
have the unintended consequence of provoking food riots in poor nations.
Second, even so-called ethical standards (e.g. fair trade, sustainability) pose 
legitimacy problems. While the private voluntary organisations that promulgate 
these standards doubtless have noble goals in mind, they are often imposed on 
producers who have little say in their use and enforcement.73
Third, each TSR or each supply chain develops its own rules, and creates its own 
market with its own outcomes. These outcomes not only include those persons 
within a given TSR, but may also include those connected to, but not quite part 
of the TSR. Put differently, a TSR may (deliberately or inadvertently) create two 
classes of ‘citizens’ – those who are within the domain of the TSR and those who 
are excluded and hence ignored. For example, Bain has shown how contract labour 
is systematically excluded from labour protections in a Chilean table grape TSR.74 
Moreover, on a national scale, as standards pluralise law, they also make it more 
and more difficult to calculate, channel, or forecast the behaviour of markets. As 
such, they undermine national and even international policies.
70 In this book, see for example Chapter 8 by Margret Will.
71 This problem is exacerbated when there is little or no price premium for higher standards.
72 This point was officially recognised in Great Britain by the Competition Commission, 2000. 
Supermarkets: a report on the supply of groceries from multiple stores in the United Kingdom. Available 
at: http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2000/446super.htm. It noted that 
even as consumers benefitted from low prices, suppliers were often squeezed by supermarkets.
73 Gereffi, G., Garcia-Johnson, R. and Sasser, E., The NGO-industrial complex. Foreign Relations 
125(July-August): 56-65.
74 Bain, C., 2010. Structuring the flexible and feminized labor market: Globalgap standards for agricultural 
labor in Chile. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 35(2): 343-370.
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Finally, the proliferation of TSRs seems to have given state regulators the mistaken 
notion that they can now sit back and relax. The lack of adequate regulation of 
new food technologies, e.g. nanotechnologies, suggests that we now have (at least 
in some areas) a laissez-faire state, in which the normally reactive character of 
law is taken to the point of leaving things alone – or not having the wherewithal 
to act – even in the face of genuine concerns.75 Likely it will take a serious nano 
disaster to prod state agencies into serious action. In short, there are now legitimacy 
problems for both states and TSRs.
2.6 Conclusions
The ostensibly voluntary character of standards suggests that the resolution of the 
problems associated with standards, certifications, and accreditations lie neither in 
voice or loyalty, but in exit.76 Put differently, one might argue that those unable 
or unwilling to participate in marketing to the industrial world might still be able 
to sell their products to the middle and low income nations whose standards are 
lower. Doubtless, there are such opportunities at the present. And, given the rising 
purchasing power of nations such as India, China, and Brazil, one might see this 
as a reasonable alternative. Yet, both buyers and governments in these nations 
also appear to be rapidly adopting higher quality and safety standards because 
(1) these nations are also suppliers to the world market and are aware of the 
economic and safety advantages of higher quality products, and (2) articulate and 
well-educated middle class consumers in these nations are demanding protection 
from unscrupulous local producers in the light of various food scares.77
Of course, it would be naïve to think of state-led governance as always perfect. It 
is far from that. But plural governance by various quasi-states raises fundamental 
issues for democracy. It appears to me that there are, grosso modo, four options:
75 Busch, L., 2008. Nanotechnologies, food, and agriculture: next big thing or flash in the pan? Agriculture 
and Human Values 25(2): 215-218; House of Lords, 2010. Nanotechnologies and food: evidence. House 
of Lords, Committee on Science and Technology, London, UK; Institute for Food and Agricultural 
Standards, 2007. An issues landscape for nanotechnology standards: report of a workshop. Institute for 
Food and Agricultural Standards, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA; Taylor, M., 2006. 
Regulating the products of nanotechnology: Does FDA have the tools it needs? Woodrow Wilson Center 
for International Scholars, Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, Washington, DC, USA.
76 Hirschman, A.O.,1970. Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
77 In China quasi-private certification schemes are already being explored. See: Yamei, Q., Zhihua, Y., 
Weijun, Z., Heshan, T., Hongping, F. and Busch, L., 2008. Third-party certification of agro-products 
in China: a study of agro-product producers in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Qingdao. Food 
Protection Trends 28(11): 765-770. Moreover, the melamine scandal has caused the state to enhance its 
food safety laws and to encourage certification schemes.
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2.6.1 Return to unitary governance
Many would doubtless like a return to unitary governance within the confines of the 
system of nation-states. This would mean putting severe restrictions on the ability 
of non-state organisations to impose quality standards and the dismantling of the 
TSRs. Alternatively, it might mean a strengthening of international governance, 
e.g. by strengthening the WTO and the extension of the SPS and TBT agreements 
to many if not most otherwise private transactions. Indeed, some observers have 
suggested that these agreements should extend to the private sector.78 And, the 
expanding use of private standards to further state policies would seem to shift the 
policy scene in that direction. However, it appears unlikely that WTO members 
would agree on a reigning in of private standards.
2.6.2 Continued proliferation
Far more likely is a continuing proliferation of standards and of TSRs, especially as 
encouraged by the advantages for larger firms; these include non-price competition 
for final consumers, supplier lock-in, shifting of risks to suppliers, and just-in-time 
deliveries. However, this proliferation may be counteracted by both the growing 
concentration in the agrifood sector and decisions not to compete on certain types 
of standards. For example, the Global Food Safety Initiative is premised on the 
notion that food safety is an area to be excluded from competition.79
2.6.3 A new feudalism
A third possibility is a new form of feudalism in which the large food retailers act 
more and more like latter-day feudal lords, using their market power both to enact 
favourable state policies and to bind suppliers to their particular supply chains. 
Indeed, Thurman Arnold noted many years ago that corporations are the last 
vestiges of feudal institutions.80 More recently, Vladimir Shlapentokh has noted 
the feudal tendencies in contemporary society.81
78 See, e.g. Dankers, C., 2003. Environmental and social standards, certification and labelling for cash 
crops. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy.
79 Fulponi, L., 2006. Private voluntary standards in the food system: the perspective of major food 
retailers. Food Policy 31(1): 1-13; Global Food Safety Initiative, http://www.mygfsi.com/.
80 Arnold, T., 1937. The folklore of capitalism. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, USA.
81 Shlapentokh, V. and Woods, J., 2007. Contemporary Russia as a feudal society: a new perspective on 
the post-Soviet era. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, USA; Shlapentokh, V. and Woods, J., 2011. The 
Middle Ages in America: feudal elements in contemporary society. The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, University Park, PA, USA.
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2.6.4 A hybrid system
Finally, it is possible that some sort of hybrid arrangement will emerge. In such 
a system there would be state-run, fully private, and state-private standards and 
TSRs of various sorts. However, likely some would dominate in some substantive 
domains and other forms in other domains. For example, it might be decided that 
most aspects of food safety should be left to the state, while cosmetic qualities 
should be entirely left to the buyers’ discretion. Process standards for sellers might 
be demarcated by states, but administered by non-state actors. There are a nearly 
infinite number of such arrangements possible; which ones are instituted will 
be a matter of prolonged political, legal, and economic debate and conflict. The 
outcome of those debates and conflicts will affect nearly everyone on the planet.
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3. The anatomy of private food law
Bernd van der Meulen82
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Plan
This chapter elaborates the legal structure of private food law, its anatomy so 
to speak. To this end the next section (section 3.2) paints a picture of the way 
private food law has or might have developed. Sections 3.3 till 3.11 discuss the 
elements that together make up the structure of private food law: forms of chain 
orchestration (3.3), ownership of private schemes (3.4), enforcement of private 
food law (3.5), adjudication and conflict resolution (3.6), the role of audits (3.7), 
certification (3.8), accreditation (3.9), the emergence of private alternatives to 
accreditation (3.10) and standard setting (3.11). Section 3.12 summarises the 
findings in graphic form, which may well be seen as the skeleton of private 
food law. Sections 3.13 and 3.14 discuss connections among private schemes 
(3.13) and between private schemes and public law (3.14). Section 3.15 goes into 
motives underlying private food law. Sections 3.16 till 3.22 describe the content 
of the currently most important examples of private regulation: the underlying 
concepts of good agricultural practices, good manufacturing practices and HACCP 
(3.17); GlobalGAP (3.18), BRC (3.19), IFS (3.20), SQF (3.21) and ISO 22.000 (3.22). 
Section 3.23 addresses the attempts at harmonisation of private food law through 
the Global Food Safety Initiative. Sections 3.24 and 3.25 analyse the relevance of 
EU and WTO law respectively for private food law. This chapter ends with some 
concluding remarks in section 3.26.
3.1.2 Voluntary rules
In food law, one encounters several types of rules to which no legal obligation 
applies to comply with them; they are in other words not binding or at least not 
made binding by legislation. This is true for example for hygiene codes, for the 
codes of conduct elaborated by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and also for 
quite a lot of other texts on food.
A food business may choose to apply such rules thinking this is a good way to 
comply with the mandatory requirements from the law (e.g. apply hygiene codes 
to comply with HACCP), that this may improve the safety or other quality aspects 
of the product or for many other reasons.
82 This contribution is based on Chapter 17 ‘Private food law’ of Van der Meulen, B. and Van der 
Velde, M., 2008. European Food Law Handbook. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the 
Netherlands. Many thanks to Maria Litjens for ideas and inspiring discussion and to Geronda Klop for 
designing the figures. Comments are welcome at: bernd.vandermeulen@wur.nl.
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If the owner of a business decides to apply non-binding rules, this may establish 
an internal obligation: the premises owned by the concern and the people working 
there may come under the obligation to apply these rules. The legal mechanism 
behind such obligations are not in the rules themselves, but may be found in 
property law (the owner has a say over his business), corporate law (the articles of 
association bind the partners in the company) or labour law (the labour contract 
gives the employer a certain power to impose duties upon the employee).
If a business communicates to its trading partners – its customers in particular – 
that it applies certain rules in the production of its products,83 this may become 
part of the offer it makes in the market: a guarantee that the product meets a 
certain level of quality as expressed in the rules applied to it(s production). If 
this feature is important to the customer, it may become part of the contract 
between the producer and his customer. A contract is binding upon the parties to 
it. Therefore, if a set of rules not binding by themselves is included in a contract, 
it thus becomes binding for the parties to the contract.
Customers may require their suppliers to apply certain rules/meet certain 
standards.84 If the suppliers agree, again this becomes part of the contract and 
thus a binding obligation. A contract requires mutual agreement (‘a meeting of 
minds’). The specific content may be suggested by either party.
As long as there is no contract, there is no obligation to apply the non-binding 
rules. If most of the purchasers on the market (or a very powerful purchaser) 
make the application of certain rules a strict condition to enter into contractual 
relations, there still is no legal obligation for producers to apply these rules. They 
will know, however, that they can only acquire contracts if they are willing to 
accept the obligation. In a way the obligation is in the air. It is hovering over the 
contracts yet to be concluded. Legally there is no obligation to apply the rules, 
but if you do not apply them, you are out of business. In such a situation we may 
call the rules concerned ‘de facto’ binding. No obligation from the law (de jure) 
to apply, but such a necessity to apply from the facts in case (de facto) that in 
practice it feels like an obligation.
The combination of these elements – the power to create obligations by means 
of contracts and the power of certain players to dictate the terms of contract to 
such an extent that they have to be fulfilled even before the contract is concluded 
– forms the legal basis of a development where the private sector creates norms 
that apply to the food sector in addition to and even in competition with food law 
83 For example the rules on organic production. See Chapter 13 by Hanspeter Schmidt.
84 Such as Fair Trade.
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found in legislation e.g. in public law. Contract is a part of private (civil) law.85 
For this reason we have labelled the entirety of rules that in this way confront 
the food sector: ‘private food law’.
3.2 The history of private standards
Most accounts on public European food law start with an account of the BSE crisis 
and the measures that have since then been taken. Many aspects of food law 
can best be understood if we take into account how it has developed historically. 
Also for private food law it helps to take its development into consideration. This 
development, however, is scattered and as yet little recorded. For these reasons 
and for simplicity’s sake, in this section I will make a composition of developments 
that have taken place at divers times and places or that could have taken place 
and weld this into a ‘story’ of private food law that is only partly history, but that 
may help to understand in a similar way as history does.
One can imagine a development of contracts in the food chain from simple to 
complex. A simple contract states the identity, the quantity and price of the product 
to be sold by the vendor to the purchaser. The contract becomes more complex 
if it defines safety or other quality requirements like levels of contamination. 
Experience has shown that the safety of the product is influenced by the way it 
is handled (hygiene). The contract may therefore go beyond the product as such 
and include aspects of product handling, etcetera, etcetera.
Now one can imagine a second development. A company that has invested time and 
resources (maybe to pay for legal and technical advice) in elaborating a complex 
contract and is happy with the results, will try to use the same provisions again. 
If this company has the bargaining power to impose the contractual provisions 
on its partners, it may start to use this contract as a model or even as general 
provisions to all the contracts it concludes.
It takes a lot of expertise to develop a good model. Consultants may come to the 
market or businesses may cooperate to develop model contracts of ever increasing 
quality and complexity. And isn’t it much easier instead of exchanging huge stacks 
85 In this connection often the expression ‘self-regulation is applied’. EU, 2010. European Parliament, 
Council and Commission, The interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, Official Journal 
of the European Union C 321, 31/12/2003: 1-5, for example defines self-regulation as: ‘the possibility 
for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or associations to adopt 
amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at European level (particularly codes of 
practice or sectoral agreements).’ While this definitions applies to most of the private schemes discussed 
in this chapter, I avoid the expression ‘self-regulation’. In my opinion the word as well as the definition 
convey too much of an impression of harmony and mutual understanding while – as we will see – in 
practice the creation of private schemes may well be based on market power of some businesses and 
dependence of others. In such situations legal theory still recognises equality, but in common speech 
this word is likely to create an incorrect image.
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of paper every time a contract is concluded to simply indicate the model that 
applies? Today it is sufficient to indicate in the contract the identity, quantity and 
price of the product and to stipulate that it conforms to ISO 22000, BRC or SQF.86
3.3 Chain orchestration
3.3.1 Contracts
The impact of the private scheme can go beyond the immediate contractual 
relation. A contract is a relation between two parties. The safety and quality 
of a food product supplied by one business to the next, may largely depend, 
however, on the way it has been dealt with earlier up in the chain. So the customer 
depends on the agreements reached between her or his supplier and the previous 
supplier. S/he is, however, an outsider in this agreement. By demanding that in 
this relation a certain standard applies, a purchaser can exercise considerable 
influence on contractual relations upstream. A core issue, for example, in the Fair 
Trade scheme87 is that the workers at the very beginning of the chain (employees 
and smallholders in third world countries) receive reasonable remuneration for 
their efforts. The businesses expressing such wish often are not the ones who have 
financial relations with these people. For this reason they demand their suppliers 
to provide proof (through certification) of applying fair conditions.
In this way private standards can be used as an instrument for what is called 
‘chain orchestration’.
3.3.2 Vertical integration
Another approach to ensuring performance upstream in the chain – to which 
chain orchestration on the basis of contracts is the modern alternative – is through 
vertical integration. Businesses are vertically integrated if the different links of 
the chain are part of one concern. This can be achieved by setting up or acquiring 
businesses taking care of supply or to enter into a joint venture with a supplier. 
In such situations, the legal instrument of governance is found in property and/
or associations law.
3.4 Owning a standard
The models described above (and below) represent a certain value. Sometimes 
the texts are available for free.88 It can be in the interest of the businesses that 
86 The meaning of these abbreviations is explained hereafter. 
87 See: http://fairtrade.nl/EN/MainContent/Home.aspx. 
88 Like GlobalGAP. This conforms to Article 5.1(4) of EU, 2010. Commission communication – EU best 
practice guidelines for voluntary certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, Official 
Journal of the European Union C 341, 16/12/2010: 5-11.
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apply it if they are easily accessible. It is also possible that access to the standard 
is given only for payment.89 The legal instrument that makes it possible to claim 
ownership of the text of the standard is copyright. The copyright holder is entitled 
to decide on the conditions and price for circulation.
3.5 Enforcement
Generally speaking, legislation creates obligations towards the public authorities 
representing society as a whole. In case of non-compliance, sanctions may come 
as a consequence.90
Contracts create obligations between parties and provide these parties with 
instruments to deal with non-compliance by the other parties. In case of non-
compliance liability for damages arises, contractual relations may be ended and 
all kinds of consequences may arise that have been agreed upon in the contract 
(like contractual fines). The difference in consequence of non-conformity with 
public law and non-conformity with private law can make it sensible to create 
obligations by contract that are similar or even identical to obligations that are 
already present in public law. We see for instance that all the major private food 
law standards include the obligation to apply the Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point system (HACCP). This does not create an obligation for the supplier 
that s/he does not already have, but it turns it from an obligation towards society 
into an obligation towards the purchaser and provides the purchaser with civil 
law instruments to enforce this obligation.
3.6 Adjudication
Contractual rights and duties can be invoked in civil courts of law. However, the 
scheme at issue may also provide for other dispute settlement structures such 
as arbitration. In case of requirements in the interest of third parties such as 
consumers, complaint mechanisms for these third parties may be included.91
3.7 Audits
In the contractual relation it can be agreed that the customer has the right to visit 
the suppliers’ premises to check if the agreed practices are being applied with the 
agreed results. Such inspection visits are generally known as ‘audits’. It has been 
recorded that big production companies had special divisions where several people 
89 Like ISO.
90 Indeed according to Article 6.2 of EU, 2010. Commission communication – EU best practice guidelines for 
voluntary certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, Official Journal of the European 
Union C 341, 16/12/2010: 5-11, unsatisfactory inspection results should lead to appropriate action.
91 For an example, see Chapter 10 by Alessandro Artom on the Italian Self-Regulation Code on Beer 
Advertising.
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had full time jobs receiving auditors. In due course it was noted that all these 
auditors where checking for similar requirements. Along with the development 
described above where standard contracts were welded into harmonised and 
commonly used models, another development took place.
Instead of every customer of a certain producer auditing the producer, it became 
accepted that one player would audit on behalf of all.92 If the auditor considered 
the requirements of the applicable standard to be met, s/he would provide a 
certificate to the audited business to give it an instrument to communicate its 
compliance to its customers.
In case the audit shows non-compliance, no certification is provided and/or the 
right to use the mark representing the certification is withdrawn. By consequence 
the company can no longer do business with customers that demand certification.
In this way the formulation of norms (standard), the inspection of their fulfilment 
and the proof of their fulfilment in the form of a certificate and the sanction 
on non-compliance in the form of withdrawal of certification, developed into 
structures known as certification schemes (Figure 3.1). If the customers whom 
the certification communicates are other businesses, the certification scheme is 
called B2B (business to business). If the customers are the final consumers, the 
certification scheme is called B2C (business to consumer).
3.8 Certification mark
Connected to a certification scheme is often a symbol that is owned by the owner(s) 
of the scheme. This ownership usually takes the form of a trademark. The owner 
of a trademark has the right to allow or forbid its use by others. On this basis the 
owner (both of the scheme and the related trademark) has the legal power to 
impose compliance with the standard, to reward compliance or to sanction for 
non-compliance (Textbox 3.1).
3.9 Accreditation
It is considered of vital importance that certifying bodies can be trusted. To ensure 
this, schemes have been set up to certify the certifiers. Such schemes can be 
strictly private, but in many countries public authorities take an interest as well. 
92 This player would be an independent third party trusted by all parties concerned. Three types of 
audits can be distinguished: one (or first) party audits (self-controls or internal audits), second party 
audits (audits by the costumer) and third party audits (audits by auditors independent from both other 
parties). Generally in legalese, the expression ‘third’ is used to indicate parties outside the relation 
at issue. This applies regardless if the ‘we’ relation consists of two parties or more. Talking about a 
contractual relation, players outside this relation are ‘third’. Talking about the EU, states who are not 
members are ‘third’. Talking about the Cold War, the world outside the opposing political blocs is ‘third’. 
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Minor shortcomings 
Unsatisfactory 
Satisfactory 
1 FB prepares system sand elects CO 
3 Contract between FB and CO 
2 FB request certication from CO 
4 CO selects auditor and plans audit 
5 CO auditor checks documents, interviews 
   people and observes operations 
6 CO reports on auditor’s  ndings 
7 FB takes measures on reported shortcomings  
8 CO judges measures taken by FB 
9 CO ocial certication decisions + nal report 
Measures 
Shortcomings 
10 CO issues certicate 
8b CO positve certifcation recommendation 
Start 
End 
8a CO negatve certifcation 
      recommendation: 
      no certication 
Mayor shortcomings 
Figure 3.1. Steps in the certif ication process. FB = food business. CO = certifying organisation. 
(This figure has been adapted from Bergsma, N., 2010. Voedselveiligheid: certif icatie en 
overheidstoezicht. Praktijkgids Warenwet, Sdu, The Hague, the Netherlands, p. 40.)
Textbox 3.1. SQF on use of certif ication trade mark.
3 Conditions for using the SQF 2000 Certification Trade Mark
3.1  A producer shall, for the duration of its certification, prove to the satisfaction of SQFI1 or 
the LCB2 that its quality system satisfies the requirements set forth in the current edition 
of the SQF 2000 Code; and
3.2  A producer must only use the SQF 2000 Certification Trade Mark in accordance with its 
Certificate of Registration and these rules.
1 SQF Institute (footnote added).
2 Licensed certification Body (footnote added).
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In such countries, legislation is put in place setting standards for the recognition 
of certification. On the basis of such standards, certifiers can ask for accreditation 
to prove to their customers that the product they deliver (e.g. proof of compliance 
with private standards) is up to standard.
Accreditation therefore is the official certification of certifiers often by or with 
the consent of public authorities.
As from 1 January 2010, an EU framework for accreditation is place. Regulation 
(EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 
setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating 
to the marketing of products,93 requires the EU member states to appoint an 
independent national accreditation body. The national accreditation body shall 
issue an accreditation certificate when it evaluates that – what the regulation calls 
– a conformity assessment body is competent to carry out a specific conformity 
assessment activity (Article 5).
3.10 Beyond accreditation
Accreditation takes place independently from schemes and scheme owners. Not 
all scheme owners are fully satisfied that accreditation ensures that certifying 
bodies only certify businesses with a high level of compliance with their scheme.
For GlobalGAP questions arose regarding the efficacy of accreditation to ensure 
up to standards certification when GlobalGAP certified products appeared on the 
market not complying with the applicable maximum residue levels for pesticides. 
To improve the output of audits and the quality of certification, GlobalGAP set up 
an Integrity programme. The programme is governed by the Integrity Surveillance 
Committee (ISC) which was made operational in 2009.94 The Integrity programme 
consists of a Brand Integrity Programme (BIPRO) and a Certification Integrity 
Programme (CIPRO). BIPRO provides an online database of certified businesses 
with a publicly available search site. This enables businesses to ensure themselves 
if a claim to GlobalGAP certification is valid.
The aim of CIPRO is to ensure that each certified producer meets the same level 
and to make sure that the control of these producers has been done consistently and 
each certification body applied the GlobalGAP rules the same way. In addition to 
accreditation, certification bodies need approval. Results of the CIPRO assessment 
93 EU, 2008. Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 
2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing 
of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93. Official Journal of the European Union L 218, 
13/8/2008: 30-47.
94 See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=129.
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of certification bodies are available to accreditation bodies. Ultimately, the license of 
certification bodies can be cancelled if they do not perform up to CIPRO standard.
3.11 Standard setting
In the story described above the initiative to set up private schemes is placed with 
businesses holding a dominant position in the market. Initially these businesses 
were mainly the famous brand holders requiring B2B certification to be able to 
ensure a constant product quality in order to uphold the reputation of the brand. 
Such brand related quality schemes still play an important role. Of late, however, 
retailers brands (the so-called private labels) have acquired a position on the 
marked that has made them leading in the creation of private food law.95 Most 
of the examples discussed below originate in retailer initiative.
Private standards, however, are not always based on market power. They may also 
result from agreements reached with various stakeholders, for example in round 
tables.96 In particular schemes dealing with general interests like protection of the 
environment and corporate social responsibility take account of opinions of third 
parties (third from the point of view of the parties to the contract to which the 
scheme applies) including NGOs. Some schemes – such as GlobalGAP originated 
from a power base and are moving to more representative forms including other 
stakeholders in decision making.
3.12 Structure of private food law
The structure of private food law as set out in the above, is summarised in Figure 
3.2. Rules have been agreed upon in the context of the standard setting organisation. 
This organisation is the owner (copy right holder) of these rules. The standard 
setting organisation can consist of businesses using (or imposing) the standard, 
but it can also be independent. Connected to the rules can be a certification 
symbol protected as a trade mark. The standard setting organisation agrees (maybe 
through a license contract or – as far as the rules are concerned – by putting them 
in the public domain) to the use of these rules and the trademark by auditors 
and food businesses. One of the actors in the chain decides on applicability of 
the scheme. It includes the scheme in its contractual requirements and requires 
it to be included in contracts earlier in the chain as well. The auditor checks for 
95 On the power of private labels, see Bunte, F., Van Galen, M., De Winter, M., Dobson, P., Bergès-
Sennou, F., Monier-Dilhan, S., Juhász, A., Moro, D., Sckokai, P., Soregaroli, C., Van der Meulen, B. and 
Szajkowska, A., 2011. The impact of private labels on the competitiveness of the European food supply 
chain. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, Luxembourg.
96 See Chapter 7 by Otto Hospes. See also Hospes, O., 2009. Regulating biofuels in the name of 
sustainability or the right to food? In: Hospes, O. and Van der Meulen, B. (eds.) Fed up with the right to 
food? The Netherlands’ policies and practices regarding the human right to adequate food, Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands, pp. 121-135.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
84 Private food law
Chapter 3
compliance with the scheme, certifies (or refuses to certify) the audited business 
and decides to licence (or withhold) the right to use the certification mark. The 
quality of the auditor in turn is ensured through accreditation.97
3.13 Interconnected private schemes
Figure 3.2 shows two contractual relations (representing a longer chain) where in 
each link the same private scheme applies. In practice also examples are found 
where the scheme applied in one link, requires another link to apply another 
scheme. In the Dutch dairy sector for example, dairy producing businesses require 
dairy farmers to be certified (Textbox 3.2). The applicable certification scheme 
requires them to use as feed for milk producing animals only products obtained 
97 Most private schemes require accreditation as laid down in the International Standard ISO/IEC 
Guide 65.
Certication 
scheme 
= 
standard 
+ 
infrastructure 
 Primary producer (in country A)   
Complaints/appeals 
---------------------- 
Dispute settlement 
Accreditation
body 
Auditing 
body 
Intermediate businesses 
in various countries  
(processor, importer, 
wholesaler, etc.) 
Certied  
product 
Sales contract A 
requiring product to be 
certied as agreed in contract B
Sales contract B 
requiring product to be  
certied 
Contract 
audit and 
licence of 
certication 
mark 
Contract  
includes licence 
to use mark 
Retailer (in country B)     
Legend
Trade relations:          demand,          supply; Certication scheme:          scheme relations
Copy right 
Condition  
to contract 
Trade mark 
Standard setting 
organisation 
Figure 3.2. The structure of private food law.
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from businesses certified against a certain feed quality scheme.98 In this way 
private food law obtains a web-like structure of interrelated schemes.
3.14 Public – private interconnections
Private schemes are not only interconnected among themselves, but also with 
public law. The vast majority of private certification schemes refers to public law 
requirements that have to be complied with. Less common but also existing is the 
inverse where public law provisions require compliance with private schemes 
(Textbox 3.3 and 3.4).99 Legislation on community reference laboratories or on 
methods of sampling refer to private law technical standards.
98 For a detailed analysis of private regulation of the Dutch dairy sector see Chapter 16 by Maria Litjens, 
Harry Bremmers and myself.
99 On this issue see Chapter 15 by Irene Scholten-Verheijen, National public sector and private standards.
Textbox 3.2. Dutch HACCP on application of other schemes.
HACCP Certification Regulations 2006
Article 4
Where these regulations do not stipulate any other requirements with respect to the HACCP 
certification process, the certification bodies have to apply the procedures set in force for the 
certification of quality systems, that are accredited on the basis of EN 45012 or ISO/IEC Guide 
62, excepting article 3.3. of ISO/IEC Guide 62. This article is replaced by article 5.3 of ISO/IEC 
Guide 66:1998.
With the information/application phase of the certification process, these regulations have 
to be submitted by the certification body to anyone requesting HACCP certification in 
accordance with clause 3.1.1.1 of EN 45012:1998 and ISO/IEC Guide 62:1996.
Textbox 3.3. The official controls regulation referring to private CEN standards.
Regulation 882/2004 Article 11
Methods of sampling and analysis
1. Sampling and analysis methods used in the context of official controls shall comply with 
relevant Community rules or,
(a) if no such rules exist, with internationally recognised rules or protocols, for example those 
that the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) has accepted or those agreed in 
national legislation;
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Yet another public law approach to private regulation is where legislation imposes 
upon stakeholders the duty to regulate for themselves. The most notorious example 
is the HACCP requirement in Regulation 852/2004. The very essence of HACCP 
is that a business sets up rules for its own processes. In the case of HACCP it is 
not a voluntary choice but a public law obligation that will be enforced by public 
authorities. Such situations are known as imposed self-regulation or enforced 
self-regulation. An alternative for the application of HACCP, is the application 
of a hygiene code. The expression hygiene code is used to refer to the national 
or community guides of good practice.100 Member states approve the national 
guides. In this way this form of private regulation acquires status under public 
law. Compliance with the private standard is deemed to imply compliance with 
the legal HACCP requirement.
Some food safety inspection agencies acting on the basis of risk based policies 
reduce the intensity of inspections for businesses operating under private schemes 
that are trusted to provide good results in ensuring food safety.101 They mainly 
limit themselves to an assessment of the quality of the private scheme. Such 
controls of the quality of private control schemes are known as meta-controls.102
Finally we find examples where public authorities partake in private standard setting 
to achieve objectives in foreign countries that could not be achieved by means of 
public law instruments. Hospes for example analyses principles formulated by 
Dutch authorities for the sustainable production of biomass (in countries such 
100 Articles 8 and 9 of EU, 2004. Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs, Official Journal of the European Union L 139, 
30/4/2004: 1-54.
101 The official controls regulation (882/2004) takes such practices into account in Article 27(6): When, 
in view of own-check and tracing systems implemented by the feed or food business as well as of 
the level of compliance found during official controls, for a certain type of feed or food or activities, 
official controls are carried out with a reduced frequency or to take account of the criteria referred to in 
paragraph 5(b) to (d), Member States may set the official control fee below the minimum rates referred 
to in paragraph 4(b) (…).
EU, 2004. Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal 
health and animal welfare rules. Official Journal of the European Union L 65, 30/4/2004: 1-141. 
102 The Dutch ministry of agriculture is strongly in favour of such policies. Publications on this topic 
with a summary in English language are for example: Bondt, N., Deneux, S.D.C., Van Dijke, I., De Jong, 
O., Smelt, A., Splinter, G., Tromp, S.O. and De Vlieger, J.J., 2006. Voedselveiligheid, ketens en toezicht 
op controle. Rapport 5.06.01, LEI, The Hague, the Netherlands; Beekman, V., Kornelis, M., Pronk, B., 
Smelt, A. en Teeuw, J., 2006. Stimulering eigen verantwoordelijkheid. Zorgen dat producenten en 
consumenten zorgen voor voedselveiligheid, Rapport 5.06.05. LEI, The Hague, the Netherlands; De 
Bakker, E., Backus, G., Selnes, T., Meeusen, M., Ingenbleek, P. and Van Wagenberg C., 2010. Nieuwe 
rollen, nieuwe kansen? Een programmeringsstudie voor toezicht op controle in het agro-foodcomplex. 
Rapport 6.07.08. LEI, The Hague, the Netherlands.T
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as Brazil).103 These principles are operationalised through private certification 
schemes. The Netherlands consider requiring certification as condition for the 
import of biofuels.
3.15 Motives
What are the driving forces behind private food law? Probably they are too numerous 
to provide an exhaustive overview and motives may differ from stakeholder to 
stakeholder, but at least some points can be identified.
The motive mentioned in most private food schemes is food safety. Food safety 
is important for the protection of consumers, to comply with consumers wishes 
and also to comply with public law requirements.
Compliance with public law requirements can be a motive in itself.104 To comply 
with their own legal obligations, businesses depend on how the product has been 
dealt with upstream. Therefore they may want to ensure themselves with private 
law instruments that legal obligations are being complied with, or to impose these 
obligations on producers working in countries where different legal requirements 
apply, thus using private law to bridge the gap between different legal systems. 
Connected to compliance is liability. On the one hand businesses may try to 
pass on liability to other links in chain (some require insurance and guarantees 
from producers), on the other hand explicit agreements are a way to show that 
everything possible has been done to avoid non-compliance. In civil and criminal 
cases this may be used in what – in the UK – is called a due diligence defence.
Further private law is used to discourage the legislator from taking charge. If 
businesses solve problems there will be less urgency for the legislator to intervene. 
Businesses prefer private law to public law as it reflects their own wishes better 
and it is easier to change if the need arises. Also private law can be used to 
supplement or repair public law. For example public law on traceability (Article 
18 of Regulation 178/2002) is lacking in certainty whether internal traceability 
103 Hospes, O., 2009. Regulating biofuels in the name of sustainability or the right to food? In: Hospes, 
O. and Van der Meulen, B. (eds.) Fed up with the right to food? The Netherlands’ policies and practices 
regarding the human right to adequate food. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the 
Netherlands, pp. 121-135. See for another example of the use of private schemes by public authorities 
to influence behaviour abroad, Chapter 7 in this book.
104 Empirical research shows that private standards are helpful in complying with public law 
requirements. The explaining factor is probably the embeddedness of private standards in audit 
schemes that provide feedback on performance. See Van der Meulen, B., 2009. Reconciling food law to 
competitiveness. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
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(within a business) is required.105 ISO 22.000 explicitly requires internal traceability. 
While EU legislation exempts the primary sector from HACCP, private schemes 
such as GlobalGAP impose it on this sector as well.
On the basis of Regulation 882/204, official controls should be risk based and control 
intensity can be related to compliance history. As discussed above, certification 
may be an instrument to convince inspection agencies that the level of compliance 
is high and therefore the urgency for official controls low.106
Private standards that go beyond compliance, that is to say apply higher safety 
and/or quality standards than public law,107 may help a business to distinguish 
itself on the market and acquire a share of the (top end) market. Or, to phrase 
a similar thought differently, raising standards may be used to protect markets 
from competitors.
Finally moral considerations such as religion and corporate social responsibility 
is a driving factor of private regulation. With a view to showing their commitment 
to contributing their part to sustainable development, businesses bind themselves 
to private schemes that elaborate on these interests.
3.16 Examples
In the next sections some examples are presented of the private schemes that 
currently seem to be leading on the market.108 The discussion of the examples 
focuses mainly on the content of the standards and less on the governance and 
certification structure of the schemes. The objective of these examples is to make, 
in addition to the structure set out above, the content of private food law more 
concrete. The examples have all been taken from the area of private food safety 
105 The Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health has published a more or less official 
interpretation of the General Food Law, where they argue that ‘the Regulation does not expressly 
compel operators to establish a link (so called internal traceability) between incoming and outgoing 
products. Nor is there any requirement for records to be kept identifying how batches are split and 
combined within a business to create particular products or new batches’. See EU, 2010. Guidance on 
the Implementation of Articles 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Regulation (EC) N° 178/2002 on General 
Food Law. Conclusions of the standing committee on the food chain and animal health. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/guidance_rev_8_en.pdf.
106 On the stacking of private and official controls see: Van der Meulen, B.M.J. and Freriks, A.A., 2006. 
Millefeuille. The emergence of a multi-layered controls system in the European food sector. Utrecht 
Law Review 2(1): 156-176.
107 According to Article 5.2(3) of the EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification schemes 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs, it should be clearly indicated where this is the case. EU, 2010. 
Commission Communication – EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union C 341, 16/12/2010: 5-11. 
108 The overview is based on the information provided by the owners of these schemes. No critical 
comparison is intended at this stage of the research. A more elaborate overview can be found in Chapter 
4 by Theo Appelhof and Ronald van den Heuvel.
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law. As we have seen above, many other areas of concern are covered by private 
food law as well.
Public law requirements on food businesses can be distinguished109 in rules 
regarding the product (vertical standards, market approval requirements for certain 
ingredients and safety objectives in the form of maximum levels of contaminants 
and residues), rules regarding the process (hygiene, traceability and incident 
management), rules regarding the presentation (labelling and advertisement) and 
public powers (enforcement and incident management by authorities). In private 
food law we find similar ingredients, but in a different mix (see Figures 3.3 and 
3.4). Product related rules mainly concern safety and quality objectives. Rules on 
the process (hygiene, traceability and risk management) are the core. Labelling 
provisions will usually be limited to the use of the certification mark. The place 
public powers of inspection and enforcement hold in public food law, in private 
food law is taken by the powers granted by the businesses themselves to the 
auditors and certifiers. The most important additions to the types of food rules we 
have encountered in public law, are provisions governing business organisation 
and management systems including management commitment and provisions 
on information sharing within the food chain (so-called chain transparency).110
My first impression in comparing private standards to legislation is that the drafting 
is done sloppily. It seems that lawyers experienced in drafting legislation are 
not involved. Nevertheless, stakeholders seem to understand the meaning of 
private standards better than they do legislation.111 Maybe this can be explained 
by a different attitude towards private standards than towards legislation. Private 
standards have their place within a business relation that stakeholders intend 
to continue. This is a strong motivator to understand private standards the way 
they are meant. In case of legislation by contrast, misunderstanding may justify 
non-compliance to what the legislator envisaged. Lawyers are trained to search 
109 For this approach see: in general Van der Meulen, B. and Van der Velde, M., 2008. European Food Law 
Handbook. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands; and in particular: Van der, 
Meulen, B.M.J., 2009. The system of food law in the European Union. Deakin Law Review 14(2): 305-339.
See also: Van der Meulen, B. and Van der Velde, M., 2010. The general food law and EU food legislation. 
In: Oskam, A., Meester, G. and Silvis, H. (eds.) EU Policy for agriculture, food and rural areas. 
Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands, pp. 211-224.
110 On private schemes, see: Van Plaggenhoef, W., Batterink, M. and Trienekens, J.H., 2003. International 
trade and food safety. Overview of legislation and standards. Wageningen University, Wageningen, the 
Netherlands; Chia-Hui Lee, G., 2006. Private food standards and their impacts on developing countries. 
European Commission, DG Trade Unit G2; Will, M. and Guenther, D., 2007. Food quality and safety 
standards, as required by EU law and the private industry with special reference to the MEDA countries’ 
exports of fresh and processed fruits & vegetables, herbs & spices. A practitioners’ reference book. 2nd 
edition GTZ 2007; OECD, 2006. Working party on agricultural policies and markets, final report on 
private standards and the shaping of the agro-food system.
111 On this topic see: Van der Meulen, B., 2009. Reconciling food law to competitiveness. Report on 
the regulatory environment of the European food and dairy sector. Wageningen Academic Publishers, 
Wageningen, the Netherlands.
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for alternative meanings within the wording of the law, an attitude that would 
mean the end of the business relation if it were applied to contractual provisions 
prior to a conflict.
Interests of Consumers 
Framework of analysis for European Food Law 
Requirements for food Businesses Powers for public Authorities 
Product 
- Product standards 
- Agriculture quality 
- Verticals 
- Approval requirements 
- Food supplements 
- Food additives 
- GMOs 
- Novel foods 
- Food safety limits 
- Microbiological criteria 
- MRLs (pesticides; veterinary drugs) 
- Contaminants 
Process 
- Producer 
- Premises  
- Production 
- Hygiene 
- Trade 
-Traceability 
- Withdrawal/recall 
Presentation 
- Labelling 
- Publicity 
- Risk communication 
Miscellaneous 
- I.e. food contact materials 
Executive tasks 
- Scientic risk assessment (EFSA) 
- Implementing measures (EC/MS) 
- Decisions (EC/MS) 
- Information and risk 
 communication (EFSA/EC/MS) 
Enforcement 
- Ocial controls (MS) 
- Sanctions 
- Administrative (injunctions, nes) 
 (MS) 
- Criminal (nes, prison) (MS) 
- EU second line inspections on MS
 enforcement (FVO) 
Incident management 
- Communication (RASFF) 
- National measures (impose recall)
 (MS) 
- Emergency measures (European
 Commission) 
General principles 
Figure 3.3. Possible framework for the analysis of EU (public) food law.
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3.17 Underlying concepts
3.17.1 GAP/GMP
Many private food safety systems are based on HACCP and some form of good 
practices, like good agricultural practices (GAP) or good manufacturing practices 
(GMP). In the words of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization FAO,112 the 
concept of Good Agricultural Practices has evolved in recent years in the context of 
a rapidly changing and globalising food economy and as a result of the concerns and 
commitments of a wide range of stakeholders about food production and security, 
food safety and quality, and the environmental sustainability of agriculture. These 
stakeholders include governments, food processing and retailing industries, farmers, 
and consumers, who seek to meet specific objectives of food security, food quality, 
112 FAO Committee on Agriculture, Development of a Framework for Good Agricultural Practices, 
Seventeenth Session, Rome, 31 March-4 April 2003.
Framework of analysis for Private Food Law 
Requirements for food businesses Powers for third parties 
Product 
- Food safety limits 
• Microbiological criteria 
• MRLs  
  (pesticides; veterinary 
   drugs) 
• Contaminants 
Process 
- Production 
• Hygiene 
• HACCP 
- Trade 
• Traceability 
• Withdrawal/recall 
- Sustainability 
• Fair treatment 
Communication 
- Certi­cation 
Liability 
- Insurance 
Standard setting 
- Who decides?                          
Audit 
- Inspections 
- Certi­cation 
Accreditation 
- Controls 
Management 
- Commitment 
General aspects 
Figure 3.4. Possible framework for the analysis private food law.
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production efficiency, livelihoods and environmental benefits in both the medium 
and long term. GAP offers a means to help reach those objectives. Broadly defined, 
GAP applies available knowledge to addressing environmental, economic and 
social sustainability for on-farm production and post-production processes resulting 
in safe and healthy food (and non-food agricultural products). Many farmers 
in developed and developing countries already apply GAP through sustainable 
agricultural methods such as integrated pest management, integrated nutrient 
management and conservation agriculture. These methods are applied in a range 
of farming systems and scales of production units, including as a contribution 
to food security, facilitated by supportive government policies and programmes.
GAP represents the state of the art in sustainable agriculture. Something similar is 
true for GMP. For this reason, its content in terms of do’s and don’ts is continuously 
developing and cannot be caught in one lasting description. It is not law in itself,113 
but through private schemes it can acquire legal relevance.
3.17.2 HACCP
The version of HACCP mandatory for food business operators, is the one codified 
in Regulation 852/2004 of the European Union. The version referred to in private 
schemes is often the one laid down in the Codex Alimentarius.114 The former is 
based on the latter but it is not as elaborate. Through their inclusion in private 
schemes, the non-binding Codex acquires a measure of legal effect. Inclusion of 
HACCP in private schemes adds for European businesses applicability in sectors 
exempted from Regulation 852/2004 (the primary sector in particular), enforcement 
through private law instruments and visibility through certification.115 For non-
European businesses it brings an obligation that may not or not in the same way 
follow from their own public law system.
3.18 EurepGAP/GlobalGAP116
EurepGAP started in 1997 as an initiative by retailers belonging to the Euro-
Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP). British retailers in conjunction with 
supermarkets in continental Europe were the driving forces. They reacted to 
113 Luning, P.A., Marcelis, W.J. and Jongen, W.M.F., 2009, Food Quality Management. A techno-
managerial approach, Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands, p. 225 refer to 
Good Practices as ‘self-discipline’.
114 The Codex Basic Text on hygiene, 2009, is a standard work comprising of: Recommended International 
Code of Practice General Principles of Food Hygiene CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 4 (2003); Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Point (HACCP) System and Guidelines for its Application; Principles for the 
Establishment and Application of Microbiological Criteria for Foods CAC/GL 21 – 1997, and Principles 
and Guidelines for the Conduct of Microbiological Risk Assessment CAC/GL-30 (1999).
115 See for example the Dutch HACCP certification scheme (based in Apeldoorn, the Netherlands). See: 
http://www.foodsafetymanagement.info.
116 Information from the GlobalGAP website http://www.globalgap.org.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
94 Private food law
Chapter 3
growing concerns of consumers regarding product safety, environmental and 
labour standards and decided to harmonise their own often very different standards 
for agricultural products.
The development of common certification schemes was considered to also be 
in the interest of producers. Those with contractual relations to several retailers 
explained that they had to undergo multiple audits against different criteria every 
year. With this is in mind, EUREP started working on harmonised standards and 
procedures for the development of Good Agricultural Practices117 in conventional 
agriculture including highlighting the importance of Integrated Crop Management 
and a responsible approach to worker welfare. This resulted in what was initially 
called the European Retailers Protocol for Good Agricultural Practice (EurepGAP).
Over the next ten years a growing number of producers and retailers around the 
globe joined in with the idea as this matched the emerging pattern of globalised 
trading: EurepGAP began to gain in global significance. To align EurepGAP’s name 
with the proposition as the pre-eminent international GAP-standard and to prevent 
confusion with its growing range of public sector and civil society stakeholders, 
the Eurep Board decided to undertake the step to re-brand. It was considered a 
natural path and evolution that led EurepGAP to become GlobalGAP. The decision 
was announced in September 2007 at the 8th global conference in Bangkok.
GlobalGAP has established itself as a key reference for Good Agricultural Practices 
in the global market-place, by translating consumer requirements into agricultural 
production in a rapidly growing list of countries – currently more than 80 on 
every continent (Figure 3.5).
GlobalGAP is a private sector body that sets standards for the certification of 
agricultural products around the globe. The aim is to establish one single standard 
(the Integrated Farm Assurance (IFA) Standard) for Good Agricultural Practice with 
different product applications capable of fitting to the whole of global agriculture. 
Governance is by a Board whose decisions are based on a structured consultation 
process. In the board retailers and suppliers are represented. Sector specific 
interests and multi-stakeholder input are consolidated to ensure global acceptance. 
Sector Committees discuss and decide upon product and sector specific issues. 
All committees have 50% retailer and 50% producer/supplier representation.
GlobalGAP is a pre-farm-gate standard, which means that the certificate covers the 
process of the certified product from farm inputs like feed or seedlings and all the 
farming activities until the product leaves the farm. GlobalGAP is a business-to-
business (B2B) label and is therefore not directly visible to consumers. Its certification 
is carried out by more than 100 independent and accredited certification bodies in 
117 Hence the GAP part in the name.
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more than 80 countries. It is open to all producers worldwide. GlobalGAP includes 
annual inspections of the producers and additional unannounced inspections.
GlobalGAP consists of a set of normative documents. These documents cover the 
GlobalGAP General Regulations, the GlobalGAP Control Points (Textbox 3.5) and 
Compliance Criteria and the GlobalGAP Checklist.
As many other on-farm assurance systems have been in place for some time prior to 
the existence of GlobalGAP, a way had to be found to encourage the development of 
regionally adjusted management systems and so to prevent farmers from having to 
undergo multiple audits. Existing national or regional farm assurance schemes can 
seek recognition as equivalent to GlobalGAP through independent benchmarking.
The GlobalGAP standard is subject to a three year revision cycle of continuous 
improvement to take into account technological and market developments.
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Figure 3.5. GlobalGAP structure of the Integrated Farm Assurance Standard.(Source: http://www.
globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=176.)
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3.19 BRC118
In 1998 the British Retail Consortium (BRC based in London), responding to 
industry needs, developed and introduced the BRC Food Technical Standard to 
be used to evaluate manufacturers of retailers own brand food products. In BRC 
the British supermarkets Tesco, Sainsbury, Safeway and Summerfield participate. 
In early days each retailer inspected his own suppliers. These common efforts 
to inspect suppliers have huge cost advantages for retailers, because a supplier 
fulfils the requirements of all British retailers once.
BRC is designed to be used as a pillar to help retailers and brand owners with 
their ‘due diligence’ defence, should they be subject to a prosecution by the 
enforcement authorities. Under EU food law, retailers and brand owners have a 
legal responsibility for their brands.119
In a short space of time, the BRC Standard became invaluable to other organisations 
across the sector. It is regarded as a benchmark for best practice in the food 
industry. This and its use outside the UK has seen it evolve into a global standard 
used not just to assess retailer suppliers, but as a framework upon which many 
companies have based their supplier assessment programmes and manufacture 
of some branded products.
The majority of UK, and many continental European and global retailers, and brand 
owners will only consider business with suppliers who have gained certification 
to the appropriate BRC Global Standard (Textbox 3.6).
Following the success and widespread acceptance of the Global Standard – Food, 
the BRC published the first issue of the Packaging Standard in 2002, followed by 
Consumer Products Standard in August 2003, and by the BRC Global Standard 
– Storage and Distribution in August 2006. In 2009, the BRC partnered with the 
Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) to develop the Global Standard for 
Consumer Products North America edition. Each of these Standards is regularly 
reviewed and each standard is fully revised and updated at least every 3 years 
after extensive consultation with a wide range of stakeholders.
118 Information from BRC website http://www.brc.org.uk.
119 See for example Article 17(1) of Regulation 178/2002 (the General Food Law) and Directive 85/374 on 
product liability. EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the 
European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. Official Journal of 
the European Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24; EU, 1985. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
liability for defective products. Official Journal of the European Union L 210, 7/8/1985: 29-33.
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3.20 IFS120
In 2002, in order to create a common food safety standard, German food retailers 
from the HDE (Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels) have developed a 
common audit standard called International Food Standard or IFS. In 2003, French 
food retailers (and wholesalers) from the FCD (Fédération des entreprises du 
Commerce et de la Distribution) have joined the IFS Working Group.
The aim of the IFS (now based in Paris) is to create a consistent evaluation 
system for all companies supplying retailer branded food products with uniform 
formulations, uniform audit procedures and mutual acceptance of audits, which 
will create a high level of transparency throughout the supply chain. Its scope 
is now beyond the food sector alone: ‘IFS’ has become to mean: International 
Featured Standard. Among its standards IFS food still holds a prominent position.
The IFS food defines requirements in content, procedure and evaluation of audits 
and a requirement profile for the certification bodies and auditors. The IFS food 
standard (the so-called catalogue of requirements) consists of five parts called 
chapters:
• senior management responsibility;
• quality management system;
• resource management;
• product process;
• measurements, analyses and improvements.
120 The information in this section has been taken from the IFS website http://www.ifs-certification.com.
Textbox 3.6. BRC principle on management commitment (From BRC Global Standard for Food 
Safety, issue 5 2008, section 2.1 Principles of the Global Standard for Food Safety).
2.1.1 Senior Management Commitment
Within a food business, food safety must be seen as a cross-functional responsibility, 
including activities that draw on many departments using different skills and levels 
of management expertise in the organisation. Effective food safety management 
extends beyond technical departments and must involve commitment form 
production operations, engineering, distribution management, procurement of 
raw materials, customer feed back and human resource activity such as training.
The starting point for an effective food safety plan is the commitment of senior 
management to the development of an all-encompassing policy as a means to 
guide the activities that collectively assure food safety. The Global Standard 
for Food Safety places a high priority on clear evidence of senior management 
commitment.
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The auditor will audit against the IFS food standard which is divided into two 
levels plus recommendation on higher level. The chapter ‘Senior Management 
Responsibility’ deals with the responsibility of the management, the management 
commitment, the management review and the customer focus. In the chapter 
‘Quality Management System’ requirements concerning the HACCP system, the 
HACCP team and the HACCP analysis are defined. It also contains rules for a 
quality manual to be applied and the obligation to keep reports and documents. 
The chapter ‘Resource Management’ addresses personnel issues (hygiene, medical 
screening) and staff facilities. The chapter ‘Product Process’ is the most extensive 
one. It considers topics about e.g. specifications for products, factory environment, 
pest control, maintenance, traceability; GMOs and allergens. The last chapter, 
‘Measurements, Analyses and Improvements’, deals with e.g. internal audit, all 
kind of controls during production steps, product analysis and corrective actions.
The requirements for auditors and the certification bodies are strictly regulated. 
All certification bodies shall have an accreditation against EN 45011 on IFS food.121 
Only authorised auditors who have passed a written and oral examination can 
audit against the standard. The auditor shall have professional knowledge of the 
IFS food. The auditors can only audit against their competence in a certain sector 
(at least 2 years professional experience in the specific sector or at least 10 audits 
in this sector). Finally, auditors who comply with these requirements shall only 
work for one IFS certification body accredited for auditing against the IFS food.122
3.21 SQF123
Safe Quality Food (SQF; now based in Arlington, USA) is an Australian initiative. 
Taking over this system seems to have been the American answer to the mainly 
European initiatives described above.
Besides food safety, SQF focuses on product quality and stimulation of improvement 
strategies. The main goal of SQF is to control the whole chain. However, SQF 
believes that one standard does not work for all companies in the chain and that 
most other standards only work for big companies. Most procedures associated with 
the standards are considered too elaborate and laborious for small companies. So 
SQF developed two different norms, the SQF 1000 and the SQF 2000. The SQF 2000 
Code was developed in consultation with food industry and quality professionals. 
HACCP guidelines, as developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, form the 
basis of the Code. Unlike other well-recognised quality systems like BRC, HACCP 
121 Again an example of interconnected private schemes as discussed above.
122 The question if such requirement is compatible with competition law (Article 81 EC Treaty) is outside 
the scope of this chapter.
123 The information for this section has been taken from the SQF 2000 Code 6th edition issued August 
2008 (and update July 2010) and the SQF 2000 Certification Trade Mark rules for use 7th edition amended 
November 2005. See also http://www.sqfi.com.
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and ISO 9000,124 SQF combines a management quality system, like ISO 9000 and 
a food safety system (HACCP) with requirements for tracking and tracing. Besides 
the Critical Control Points (CCP) for food safety, Critical Quality Points are also 
identified, which makes SQF an integrated system.
The SQF codes (in particular the 1000 and 2000 Code) provide the food sector 
(primary producers, food manufacturers, retailers, agents and exporters) a 
food safety and quality management certification program that is tailored to its 
requirements and enables suppliers to meet regulatory, food safety and commercial 
quality criteria in a cost effective manner. In 1994 the Code was developed and 
pilot programs implemented to ensure its applicability to the food sector. It was 
circulated in draft form for comment to experts in quality management, food 
safety, and food regulation, food processing, agriculture production systems, food 
retailing, food distribution and HACCP.
The Food Marketing Institute (FMI) acquired the rights to the SQF Program in 
August 2003 and has established the SQF Institute (SQFI) Division to manage the 
program. The SQF 2000 Code is recognised by the Global Food Safety Initiative125 
as a standard that meets its benchmark requirements.
The SQF 2000 Code can be used by all sectors of the food industry. The Code is 
a HACCP based quality management system that encapsulates NACMCF126 and 
CODEX HACCP Principles and Guidelines, proven methods used by the food 
industry to reduce the incidence of unsafe food reaching the marketplace (Textbox 
3.7). It is designed to support industry or company branded product and to offer 
benefits to suppliers at all links in the food supply chain.
The SQF 2000 Code enables a supplier to demonstrate that they can supply food 
that is safe and that meets the quality specified by a customer. Certified SQF 2000 
suppliers receiving raw materials from suppliers who have implemented the SQF 
1000 Code can ensure that, through these complimentary systems, product is 
traceable from the producer to the consumer.127
The SQF 2000 Code also provides a mechanism for the food sectors of developing 
countries seeking to effectively enter the global food market to implement a 
management system that addresses their needs and the needs of their customers.
124 On quality management in general. See here after section 3.22 for ISO 22000 on food.
125 Discussed in section 3.23.
126 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods.
127 Here we find an example where a private scheme goes beyond compliance. Unlike EU food law, 
traceability is not mandatory in US food law.
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Textbox 3.7. SQF 2000 on HACCP (edition 6 August 2008, amended July 2010).
9. Principles and applications of HACCP
Table 1. A description of the 12 HACCP steps that comprise the HACCP method (Adapted 
from Codex Alimentarius Commisssion – recommended International Code of Practice 
Principles of Food Hygiene, CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 4-2003)
Preliminary Steps 1.  Assemble HACCP team with expertise in 
product and processes
2.  Describe product
3.  Identify intended use
4.  Construct flow diagram
5.  Confirm flow diagram against process in 
operation (or planned process)
HACCP Principle HACCP Application
1.  Conduct a hazard analysis. 6.  List all potential hazards associated with 
each step and consider any measures to 
control identified hazards.
2.  Determine Critical Control Points (CCPs). 7.  Determine CCPs.
3.  Establish critical limit(s). 8.  Establish critical limits and tolerance 
levels. Determine at what point critical 
limit is exceeded based on known limits or 
risk assessment if unknown.
4.  Establish system to monitor control of 
CCP(s).
9.  Establish a monitoring system for CCP 
that is able to detect loss of control 
i.e. when critical limits are exceeded. 
Consider continuous monitoring and/or 
periodic audit.
5.  Establish corrective action to be taken 
when monitoring indicates CCP(s) are not 
under control.
10.  Establish corrective actions that are able 
to deal with loss of control when it occurs 
and is capable of determining when CCP 
has been brought under control.
6.  Establish procedures for verification 
to confirm that the HACCP system is 
working effectively.
11.  Establish procedures for verification 
or audit that include review of HACCP 
system and records, records of deviations 
and actions taken in order to confirm that 
CCPs are kept under control.
7.  Establish documentation covering all 
procedures and records appropriate to 
these principles and their application.
12.  Documentation and record keeping should 
be appropriate to the nature and scale of 
the operation.
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3.22 FS22000128
The youngest of the main private food safety schemes is ISO 22000. When GFSI 
evaluated the ISO 22000 for approval, they determined that they wanted more 
requirements identified for Prerequisite Programs. To fill this gap, the British 
Standards Institution wrote a document called PAS 220. The combination of PAS 
220 and ISO 22000 has been approved by GFSI for a registration scheme, and is 
called FS22000 (previously FSSC 22000). This scheme is run by the Foundation 
for Food Safety Certification (FSSC).
The International Organization of Standardization (ISO) has decades of experience 
developing standards for many different types of applications. One of the most 
popular and most recognised is the Quality Management System standard ISO 
9001. This standard was developed to provide a uniform standard worldwide for 
quality management. A buyer in one part of the world would have a degree of 
confidence in the quality practices of a registered company in another part of 
the world. This standard was used as the basis for other more specific standards 
for quality management in the automotive industry, the medical device industry, 
and the aerospace industry.
Now this approach has been taken for food safety management. ISO and its 
member countries used the Quality Management System approach, and tailored 
it to apply to food safety, incorporating the HACCP principles into the quality 
management system. The resulting standard is ISO 22000. ISO 22000 requires that 
the business design and document a Food Safety Management System (FSMS). 
The standard contains the specific requirements to be addressed by the FSMS. 
Generally the standard addresses:
• Having an overall Food Safety Policy for the organisation, developed by top 
management.
• Setting objectives that will drive companies’ efforts to comply with this policy.
• Planning and designing a management system and documenting the system.
• Maintaining records of the performance of the system.
• Establishing a group of qualified individuals to make up a Food Safety Team.
• Defining communication procedures to ensure effective communication with 
important contacts outside the company (regulatory, customers, suppliers and 
others) and for effective internal communication.
• Having an emergency plan.
• Holding management review meetings to evaluate the performance of the FSMS.
• Providing adequate resources for the effective operation of the FSMS including 
appropriately trained and qualified personnel, sufficient infrastructure and 
appropriate work environment to ensure food safety.
• Following HACCP principles.
128 http://www.22000-tools.com.
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• Establishing a traceability system for identification of product.
• Establishing a corrective action system and control of nonconforming product.
• Maintaining a documented procedure for handling withdrawal of product.
• Controlling monitoring and measuring devices.
• Establishing and maintaining and internal audit program.
• Continually updating and improving the FSFM.
ISO 22000 provides brand holders with a quality system equivalent to the other 
systems mentioned in this chapter that have primarily been developed with a 
view to retailers’ brands.
3.23 GFSI129
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) co-ordinated by CIES (Comité International 
d’Entreprise à Succursales; The Food Business Forum), was launched in May 2000 
as a reaction to the proliferation of private standards. Much of the advantages of 
private food law will be lost, if every important player in the marketplace defines 
a separate set of private standards.
GFSI started to benchmark private standards. This gives businesses the opportunity 
to send out the message in the market that for them it does not matter which 
particular standard is applied, as long as it is GFSI endorsed. In this way GFSI is 
developing into the standard of standards. The most powerful retailers in Europe, 
Asia and the USA have agreed to demand GFSI compliant certification for their 
own private label products. The GFSI mission is: continuous improvement in 
food safety management systems to ensure confidence in the delivery of safe 
food to consumers.
The GFSI objectives are:
1. Convergence between food safety standards through maintaining a benchmarking 
process for food safety management schemes.
2.  To improve cost efficiency throughout the food supply chain through the 
common acceptance of GFSI recognised standards by retailers around the 
world.
3. To provide a unique international stakeholder platform for networking, 
knowledge exchange and sharing of best food safety practices and information.
In the light of the plethora of food safety standards, the GFSI Task Force decided 
not to write a new standard. Instead, they compiled a set of ‘Key Elements’ to 
serve as the requirements against which existing food safety standards will be 
benchmarked. The ‘Key Elements’ as defined by the Task Force are:
129 The information for this section has been taken from the GFSI pages on http://www.ciesnet.com 
and http://www.mygfsi.com/.
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1.  Food Safety Management Systems.
2.  Good Practices for Agriculture, Manufacturing and Distribution.
3.  HACCP.
Under the umbrella of the Global Food Safety Initiative, seven major retailers 
have come to a common acceptance of initially four GFSI benchmarked food 
safety schemes. Retailers accept certificates based on standards in order to be 
able to make an assessment of their suppliers of private-label products and fresh 
products and meat, to ensure that production is carried out in a safe manner. 
There are many of these standards and suppliers with many customers may be 
audited many times per year, at a high cost and with little added benefit.
The GFSI Guidance Document Sixth Edition (released January 2011), contains 
commonly agreed criteria for food safety standards, against which any food or 
farm assurance standard can be benchmarked. In addition to the ‘key elements’ 
the Guidance Document holds ‘requirements for the delivery of food safety 
management systems’ regarding certification and accreditation. GFSI does not 
undertake any accreditation or certification activities.
The benchmarking work undertaken by the standard owners and other key 
stakeholders on four food safety schemes (initially BRC, IFS, Dutch HACCP and 
SQF) has reached a point of convergence. Each scheme aligned itself with common 
criteria defined by food safety experts from the food business, with the objective 
of making food manufacture as safe as possible. As a result, this will also drive 
cost efficiency in the supply chain and reduce the duplication of audits.
The GFSI vision of ‘once certified, accepted everywhere’ has become a reality 
in the sense that Carrefour, Metro, Migros, Ahold, Wal-Mart and Delhaize have 
agreed to reduce duplication in the supply chain through the common acceptance 
of any of the GFSI benchmark schemes. Tesco, however, has withdrawn. It was 
unwilling to accept other schemes as equivalent to its own ‘Nature’s choice’. The 
number of schemes recognised by GFSI has continuously grown. See Table 3.1 
for an overview.
The GFSI Foundation Board, a retailer-driven group, with manufacturer advisory 
members, provides the strategic direction and oversees the daily management. 
Membership of the Board is by invitation only.
The GFSI Technical Committee was formed in September 2006 and is composed 
of retailers, manufacturers, standard owners, certification bodies, accreditation 
bodies, industry associations and other technical experts. It provides technical 
expertise and advice for the GFSI Board and replaces a previous GFSI retailer-
only Task Force. Membership of the Technical Committee is by invitation only.
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A crucial moment in its development was the entry of Wal-Mart into the scheme 
(February 2008). Noteworthy is Wal-Mart’s comment: ‘GFSI Standards provide real 
time details on where suppliers fall short in food safety on a plant-by-plant basis 
and go beyond the current FDA130 or USDA131 required audit process.’ Wal-Mart is 
the first US-based grocery chain to require GFSI, the company claims. The company 
has published a schedule to suppliers requiring completion of initial certification 
between July and December 2008, with full certification required by July 2009.
Through GFSI benchmarking private food law seems to be achieving what public 
food law (through the Codex Alimentarius) never could: truly global harmonisation 
of food safety standards.
3.24 Public law on private food law
The European Commission has reacted to the emergence of private food law. A 
study conducted for DG Agri identified 441 different schemes.132 The European 
130 Food and Drug Administration. The food regulatory agency in the USA.
131 The US Department of Agriculture.
132 See: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/index_en.htm.
Table 3.1. 7 GFSI Recognised Schemes.1
Manufacturing Schemes:
• BRC Global Standard Version 5
• Dutch HACCP (Option B)
• FSSC 22000
• Global Aquaculture Alliance BAP Issue 2 (GAA Seafood Processing Standard)
• Global Red Meat Standard Version 3
• International Food Standard Version 5
• SQF 2000 Level 2
• Synergy 22000
Primary Production Schemes:
• CanadaGAP
• GlobalGAP IFA Scheme V3
• General Regulations: V3.1_Nov09 (all scopes)
• Fruit and Vegetables: 3.0-2_Sep07
• Livestock Base: 3.0-4_Mar10
• Aquaculture: V1.02_March10
• SQF 1000 Level 2
Primary and Manufacturing Scheme:
• PrimusGFS
1As published on http://www.mygfsi.com/about-gfsi/gfsi-recognised-schemes.html.
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Commission decided that legislative action was not warranted to address the 
potential drawbacks in certification schemes at this stage. Instead, drawing on 
comments from stakeholders, the Commission undertook to develop guidelines for 
certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs. So on 16 December 
2010, it published ‘Commission Communication – EU best practice guidelines for 
voluntary certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs’ (2010/
OJ C 341/04).133
These guidelines are designed to describe the existing legal framework and to help 
improving the transparency, credibility and effectiveness of voluntary certification 
schemes and ensuring that they do not conflict with regulatory requirements. The 
guidelines warn the member states to respect the state aid rules when they give 
support to certain schemes. Businesses are reminded of the rules on competition. 
Certification schemes may not lead to anticompetitive behaviour.
From food law provisions are quoted that consumers may not be misled. I am 
mystified by the quote in full of Article 5(1) of Regulation 178/2002 ‘Food law 
shall pursue one or more of the general objectives of a high level of protection of 
human life and health and the protection of consumers’ interests, including fair 
practices in food trade, taking account of, where appropriate, the protection of 
animal health and welfare, plant health and the environment’. Is the Commission 
implying that private certification schemes are within the scope of the concept of 
‘food law’ and have to comply with the objectives of food law? It does not seem a 
very likely interpretation, but no other interpretation readily presents itself. In 
fact I would be inclined to believe that private regulation is not limited to serving 
the objectives listed in Article 5, but can also legitimately serve other interests 
even those of the business sector itself.134
The question about the public status of private food law also presents itself in 
the context of the WTO.
3.25 WTO
Private food law is rapidly replacing public law as the determining factor in 
international food chains. Within the WTO the question has been raised if private 
standards constitute a new generation of trade barriers that member states of the 
133 EU, 2010. Commission Communication – EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union C 341, 
16/12/2010: 5-11. See also Appendix I to this book. Also noteworthy is the Communication from the 
Commission Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role of Fair Trade and non-governmental 
trade-related sustainability schemes, Brussels 5.5.2009 COM(2009) 215 final, Appendix II to this book.
134 On Article 5 of Regulation 178/2002, see: Van der Meulen, B., 2010. The function of Food Law. On 
the objectives of food law, legitimate factors and interests taken into account. European Food and Feed 
Law Review 5(2): 83-90.
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WTO should take on.135 Two WTO agreements may be of relevance in this context; 
the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement.
3.25.1 TBT Agreement
In the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO members have set 
requirements for technical regulations and standards to ensure that they will 
not constitute unjustified barriers to international trade. WTO members are 
strongly encouraged to use international standards and to support international 
standardising bodies. In the agreement ISO/IEC is positioned as an overarching 
international standardising body. Other standardising bodies within the ambit of 
the TBT Agreement must be notified to ISO/IEC. This seems to imply that WTO 
members relying on ISO standards may believe to comply with TBT requirements.
3.25.2 SPS Agreement
The Agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (the 
SPS Agreement) deals with measures aiming to protect health of humans, animals 
and plants. Such measures are acceptable if the do not go beyond what is necessary 
and do not constitute disguised trade barriers. Measures to protect food safety are 
by definition SPS measures.
Some members of the WTO believe that private standards are within the ambit 
of the SPS Agreement and furthermore do not conform to the requirements. St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, supported by Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina, 
complained that ‘EurepGAP’ SPS standards imposed by the Euro-Retailer Produce 
Working Group, composed primarily of food retailers, were more strict than EU 
governments’ requirements. Referring to Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, which 
says that member governments ‘shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories 
(...) comply with the relevant provisions of this agreement,’ these countries argue 
that only the public law EU rules should apply to the private sector (Textbox 3.8).136
So far it is believed that Article 13 of the SPS Agreement aims at entities that in 
reality are governmental in a private law guise. The text, however, leaves room 
for the interpretation that it also applies to ‘real’ private actors, in particular when 
they take on the role of regulator traditionally reserved for governments.137 From a 
135 29-30 meeting of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures.
136 See ICTSD Bridges weekly news digest Volume 9 Number 24 6 July 2005 and Volume 7 Number 13, 
6 July 2007.
137 As we have seen above governments may participate in the formulation of private standards aiming 
to influence behaviour abroad. In such situation it is less evident that private standards originate from 
‘real’ private actors and applicability of the SPS Agreement becomes likely, even in its more limited 
interpretation
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legal point of view there is a fundamental difference between the situation where 
a product may not be brought to the market (because it does not comply with 
public law requirements) and the situation where a product legally brought to the 
market is not bought by its intended customers (because it does not comply with 
these customers’ private law requirements). From an economic point of view and 
for all practical purposes these two situations amount to the same thing where 
the customers concerned dominate the market.
This discussion pinpoints a weak aspect of private food law. It seems at present 
underdeveloped in checks and balances.138
3.26 Conclusions
The content of private food safety schemes, just as public food safety law, is based 
on HACCP. The private sector is in the process of achieving what the public sector 
never could: world wide harmonisation of food safety standards.
The underlying legal structure is straight forward. Contractual requirements – 
flanked with instruments from (intellectual) property and business law – are used 
by dominant players in the food chain to impose ‘voluntary’ requirements on 
all players upstream, regardless in which country they are situated. Contractual 
requirements, audits and certification can be applied across national borders. In 
this sense, private food law is more global than international food law (such as the 
138 See Chapter 6 by Marinus Huigen for more detail on this topic.
Textbox 3.8. Article 13 SPS Agreement.
Article 13
Implementation
Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all obligations 
set forth herein. Members shall formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms 
in support of the observance of the provisions of this Agreement by other than central 
government bodies. Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them 
to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well as regional bodies 
in which relevant entities within their territories are members, comply with the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement. In addition, Members shall not take measures which have the 
effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such regional or non-governmental 
entities, or local governmental bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement. Members shall ensure that they rely on the services of non-governmental 
entities for implementing sanitary or phytosanitary measures only if these entities comply with 
the provisions of this Agreement.
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SPS Agreement and the Codex Alimentarius). International (public) food law does 
not govern behaviour of stakeholders, but sets a meta-framework for (national) 
food law that in turn applies to stakeholders’ behaviour.139 Private food law does 
govern stakeholders’ behaviour and in this sense private food law is more law 
than international food law.
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4. Inventory of private food law
Theo Appelhof and Ronald van den Heuvel140
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Requirements of the General food Law
The development of private standards is initiated by the food industry. This 
does not exclude the ambition of the authorities to influence the process. The 
authorities actively stimulate the food industry and cooperate in the development 
of e.g. hygiene guides.
In Regulation 178/2002 (known as the ‘General Food Law’)141 the responsibilities 
on food safety of both authorities and food business are laid down. In Article 13, 
on international standards, the Union and Member States are stimulated among 
others to:
‘(a)  contribute to the development of international technical standards for 
food and feed and sanitary and phytosanitary standards;
(e)  promote consistency between international technical standards and 
food law while ensuring that the high level of protection adopted in the 
Community is not reduced.’
Article 17, in section 1, lays down the responsibilities of food businesses on food 
safety as follows:
‘Food and feed business operators at all stages of production, processing 
and distribution within the businesses under their control shall ensure that 
foods or feeds satisfy the requirements of food law which are relevant to 
their activities and shall verify that such requirements are met.’
In Article 18 is laid down that food businesses must be able to trace their products 
in all stages of the production chain so that in case of incidents unsafe products 
can be removed from the market (recall).
140 This chapter is based on a contribution in Scholten-Verheijen, I., Appelhof, T. and Van der Meulen, 
B., 2011. Roadmap to EU food law. Eleven International Publishers, the Hague, the Netherlands. 
The Roadmap provides a graphic overview of food legislation at European, global and private level 
accompanied by explanatory text.
141 EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
114 Private food law
Chapter 4
All food businesses are required to execute a risk analysis on their production 
(methods), implement control measures and document the results. This is laid 
down in detail in Article 5 of Regulation 852/2004.142
4.1.2 Hygiene guides
Small and medium sized companies can choose to follow the rules laid down in 
an appropriate hygiene guide to comply with food law. However, the use of a 
hygiene guide is not mandatory and companies are allowed to develop their own 
food safety plan. Hygiene guides are usually developed by trade organisations, 
but need to receive final approval by the minister responsible for the food safety 
policy. A risk analysis on the standard activities within the branch is included in 
each hygiene guide.
A hygiene guide provides instructions on how a food business can comply 
with all relevant legislation regarding food production, storage, transport and 
distribution. Often, next to legal requirements, and/or some additional branch 
specific requirements are included. The addition of specific requirements aims 
at improving the quality and by this improving public opinion on companies that 
form a part of the branch. The implementation of hygiene guides has developed 
itself in quite different ways within the different Member States. The Netherlands 
played a pioneering role in the development of hygiene guides. The first guide 
was published in 1995, many years before the General Food Law laid down this 
option as an alternative for a self-generated food safety plan. In total more than 
600 hygiene guides have been developed by the EU Member States.143 Some 
countries like Spain and Italy have developed over 100 guides, while others like 
Greece and Ireland do not have more than six or seven. Furthermore it should be 
remarked that the scope differs from country to country. In some countries the 
guides describe the complete production processes, while in others, e.g. Spain, 
many guides are limited to e.g. the implementation of traceability. Table 4.1 shows 
an overview of the number of hygiene guides per country at the time of writing.
4.1.3 Major food safety management systems and standards
Multinational corporations often choose to develop their own food safety 
management system. These systems do not only aim at compliance with the 
(international) law but also cover the requirements and expectations of suppliers 
and users in the production chain. For the users in the chain it is impossible to 
check all different management systems of their suppliers. In the last few decades 
142 EU, 2004. Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union L 139, 30/4/2004: 1-54.
143 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/hygienelegislation/register_national_guides_
en.pdf.
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united retailers and buying associations of agricultural produce therefore have 
developed ‘uniform’ food safety management systems (also known as standards 
or schemes), laying down in detail their requirements for producers and service 
providers. Every supplier needs to be able to demonstrate compliance with the 
quality management system and also obtain certification. Suppliers are furthermore 
obliged to let independent audits be performed to verify compliance with the 
standard(s). Compliance with legal requirements is one of the pre-requisites of 
all standards. In 2001 the Codex Alimentarius has provided guidelines on the 
design and use of certificates.144
Because of the many different standards and requirements asked for by the 
customers, suppliers often have to obtain multiple certificates to be able to supply 
all their customers. This situation can be very burdensome to many suppliers as 
standards do differ on certain parts; being developed with the same objectives, 
the principles of the standards are the same and differences are mainly of a 
bureaucratic nature. The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) aims at merging 
the different standards as much as possible by accepting only those standards 
that are of an adequate level.145
The GFSI is an initiative started in 2000 by international retailers as a benchmarking 
instrument for food safety standards. The GFSI is governed by the CIES (a worldwide 
144 Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2001. Guidelines for design, production, issuance and use of 
generic official certificates. CAC/GL 38-2001. FAO, Rome, Italy.
145 http://www.ciesnet.com/.
Table 4.1. The number of hygiene guides per country (2010).
Country Quantity Country Quantity
Austria 13 Italy 104
Belgium 24 Lithuania 9
Switzerland 2 Latvia 20
Cyprus 6 Luxembourg 9
Czech Republic 27 The Netherlands 40
Germany 47 Poland 8
Denmark 24 Portugal 31
Estonia 1 Romania 17
Greece 6 Sweden 4
Spain 126 Slovenia 6
France 34 Slovakia 9
Hungary 21 United Kingdom 11
Ireland 7
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food business forum that includes as members all major retailers such as Tesco, 
Marks & Spencers, Metro, Carrefour, Auchean, Casino and Royal Ahold) and 
plays an important role in the certification of food safety standards. All retailers 
together, that are members of the CIES, generate an annual turnover of more 
than € 2.1 trillion.
One of the main objectives of the GFSI is improving the efficiency of audits at 
the suppliers of the different standards. To achieve this, the GFSI has developed a 
model with which standards need to comply before they can receive approval by 
the CIES members. The GFSI thus focuses on harmonisation between countries 
and achieve efficiency for suppliers. Approval for certification schemes can be 
applied for at the GFSI. Approval by the GFSI acts as worldwide recognition and 
acceptance of the certification scheme (‘certified once, accepted everywhere’). 
On the time of writing the following standards were approved by the GFSI:146
Manufacturing:
• BRC (British Retail Consortium) Global Standard Version 5
• Dutch HACCP (option B)
• FSSC 22000 (Food Safety System Certification)
• Global Aquaculture Alliance BAP, issue 2 (GAA Seafood Processing Standard)
• Global Red Meat Standard Version 3
• IFS (International Featured Standards) Version 5
• SQF (Safe Quality Food) 2000 Level 2
• Synergy 22000
Primary production:
• GlobalGAP IFA Scheme Version 3
• Canada Gap
• SQF (Safe Quality Food) 1000 Level 2
Manufacturing and primary production:
• PrimusGFS
As mentioned before, national authorities are interested in the role of private 
standards in ensuring safe food. For example, the Dutch competent authority 
(nVWA), has started a supervision policy where certification by the manufacturers 
against GFSI standards is taken into account. The same goes for some regional 
standards drawn up by large food businesses, (e.g. Vion Food Group and IKB-egg) 
which have been proven transparent and of high quality.
146 See http://www.mygfsi.com/about-gfsi/gfsi-recognised-schemes.html.
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4.1.4 Additional standards
Besides the major internationally accepted food safety management systems many 
more standards have been developed in the EU that are less known. These standards 
are more focussed on the quality than the safety of foodstuffs; objectives include 
among others care for the environment and sustainability. Some standards are 
based on existing standards, such as GlobalGAP, while others have been developed 
independently, such as ‘Fruitnet’ developed in Belgium. Often, but not always, 
these standards have a local function to protect specific quality aspects of certain 
products (e.g. ‘Gepruefte Qualitaet Thüringen’). Products may carry a logo and/
or nomination, indicating that the product complies with the requirements of 
the standard. In recent years the number of this type of standards has exploded. 
Most standards are applied for ‘business to consumer’ (B2C) marketing and only 
a limited number find their way in ‘business to business’ (B2B) marketing.
In general the EU has a positive opinion on the development of certification 
schemes, but it seems that concern has been raised over the large number of 
schemes that have found their way to the market over the last few years in both 
the EU and the rest of the world. The EU has started a project with the objective to 
inventory all existing schemes for fruit and vegetables on the European market.147 
In 2010 a report148 summarising the results for agricultural products and foodstuffs 
was published. From Figure 4.1 follows that the schemes and standards focus on 
many politically important subjects, e.g. it already includes a standard on climate 
change.
The development of these standards varies greatly over the different Member 
States (Bulgaria had only a single scheme where Germany had as many as 107 at 
the time of writing). See Figure 4.2 on the distribution of the number of schemes 
by country of origin, also some non-EU countries have been included for reference.
When reading the report it should be kept in mind that typical food safety 
management systems, such as hygiene guides, as well as specific quality 
management systems, such as Amboa Quality Label (for Belgian chocolate), 
have been included in the results. There is therefore a clear overlap with the 
information on hygiene guides in the European database (see section 4.1.2 for 
more information). On the other hand it is clear that not all quality marks and 
labels are included in the research.
147 EU, Directorate L. Economic analysis, perspectives and evaluations: L.4. Evaluation of measures 
applicable to agriculture; studies Subject: Letter of Invitation to Tender – Contract Notice 2009/S 086-
123210. Ref: Marketing standards in the fruit and vegetable sector, AGRI-2009-EVAL-07. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/agriculture/tenderdocs/2009/72981/invite_en.pdf.
148 Anonymous, 2010. Inventory of certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs 
marketed in the EU Member States. Areté Research and Consulting in Economics, Bologna, Italy.
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We can elaborate on this by studying the results from the report on the Dutch 
market. A total of 13 schemes are mentioned including ‘IKB pork’, this scheme is 
also included in the table of hygiene guides presented in section 4.1.2. The hygiene 
guides ‘IKB egg’ and ‘IKB poultry’ are not included in this database but do enjoy 
the status of hygiene guide in the Netherlands. Of the 13 schemes mentioned in 
the report, six are actually hygiene guides. The other schemes that are mentioned 
are quality marks or labels on e.g. sustainability, environment, organic, quality 
and animal welfare. Many other quality marks have not been included at all in 
the report, such as for products that are halal, vegetarian and gluten free. The 
report therefore provides a general impression of the market in the EU Member 
States, but is not always accurate.
After having carefully assessed the situation, the Commission developed guidelines 
showing best practice for the operation and implementation of such schemes149. 
These guidelines were drawn up in consultation with stakeholders.
4.2  Controlling food safety by quality management 
system/standard
4.2.1 Contents of a standard
In this section the contents of a food safety standard is discussed in more detail. The 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) standard, developed by the big British supermarket 
chains and used by many thousands of food businesses will be used as a reference.
The BRC global standards for Food Safety contain several different chapters and 
sections. Some of those are seen as fundamental in the preparation of safe food, 
while others are given less importance. The following ten requirements are 
indicated as being fundamental:
1. Management commitment and continuous improvement clause
2. Food safety plan – hazard analysis and critical control points
3.5. Internal audits
3.8. Corrective action and preventative action
3.9. Traceability
4.3.1. Layout, product flow and segregation
4.9. Housekeeping and hygiene clause
5.2. Handling requirements for specific materials – materials containing allergens 
and identity preserved materials
6.1. Control of operations
7.1. Training
149 EU, 2010. Commission communication – EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union C 341, 
16/12/2010: 5-11. See Appendix 1.
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Other standards are structured differently but have similar or the same primary 
fundamental requirements. A good example is the International Featured Standard 
(IFS) for food developed by the German and French retailers. Both systems have 
been developed with the objective to be able to guarantee uniform and safe food 
products. BRC and IFS can be applied to different steps in the food production 
chain. Manufacturers, packaging or other types of businesses handling food can 
make use of these standards. In practice many companies will be certified against 
both standards to prevent trade restrictions. In both standards requirements are 
laid down in accordance to the European rules on production and packaging of 
foodstuffs. Securing food safety by implementation of HACCP ensures compliance 
with the requirements of the General Food Law. Furthermore the standards include 
rules that provide the specific requirements of the users on safety, quality and 
continuity.
4.2.2 Supervision
As mentioned before the practice of certification against good standards can be very 
interesting for national authorities. When good quality management systems have 
been implemented, authorities can reduce their supervision activities significantly. 
The condition for any reduction of supervision would be that authorities can trust 
the system to function in practice as is laid down in the standards. All organisations 
developing standards, apply a system of independent inspections (audits) to ensure 
the correct implementation of the standard by the food business operator. The 
audits are executed by certification bodies (Figure 4.3).
Certification bodies (CBs) receive their accreditation from Accreditation Bodies 
(ABs) when compliant with their requirements. Certification bodies exchange their 
experiences on the certification scheme with, for example, a Technical Committee 
or Board of Experts and the executive board of the standard.
The operational procedures of accreditation bodies in the EU are supervised by 
international Accreditation Bodies through peer assessment. ABs are accepted 
into Multilateral Agreements in Europe (EA-MLA) and outside of Europe (IAF-
MLA and ILAC-MRA).150 Regulation 765/2008 lays down the requirements on 
accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products151. 
In Article 4 of this Regulation the general principles for accreditation are laid 
down. Some examples are:
150 http://www.european-accreditation.org/content/mla/what.htm.
151 EU, 2008. Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 
2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing 
of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93. Official Journal of the European Union L 218, 
13/8/2008: 30-47.
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1. Each Member State shall appoint a single national accreditation body.
2. Where a Member State considers that it is not economically meaningful 
or sustainable to have a national accreditation body or to provide certain 
accreditation services, it shall, as far as possible, have recourse to the national 
accreditation body of another Member State.
3. A Member State shall inform the Commission and the other Member States 
where, in accordance with paragraph 2, recourse is given to the national 
accreditation body of another Member State.
6. The responsibilities and tasks of the national accreditation body shall be clearly 
distinguished from those of other national authorities.
7. The national accreditation body shall operate on a not-for profit basis.
8. The national accreditation body shall not offer or provide any activities or 
services that conformity assessment bodies provide, nor shall it provide 
consultancy services, own shares in or otherwise have a financial or managerial 
interest in a conformity assessment body.
Certication system’s 
administrator/owner
Certication scheme
Certication bodies
Board of experts
Auditor 2Auditor 1 Auditor 3
Producer/importer  
wholesaler’sPrimary producer
Retailer
Flow of products
Transport 
and storage
Transport 
and storage
Figure 4.3. A schematic overview of the certif ication process.
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An accreditation body shall act as an independent organisation. In deploying 
an auditing team it gives much attention to the independence of the auditors. 
Certification bodies that carry out audits and issue process/product certificates, 
are accredited against the standard ISO/IEC Guide 65 (1996) or ISO/IEC 17021. 
Certification bodies which carry out audits to certify food management systems are 
accredited against ISO/IEC 17021. Certification bodies, that inspect companies on 
e.g. hygiene guides, are accredited against ISO/IEC 17020. The scope of inspections 
is more limited compared to audits. During inspections, the emphasis lays more 
on meeting fixed requirements, while in an audit more attention is paid to how 
risks are identified and managed. The laboratories, which analyse food and raw 
materials, are accredited by the AB against ISO/IEC 17025.
With regard to the auditors, with the authority to perform work for a certification 
body, strict requirements are laid down in the norms mentioned above:
• General: auditors shall have competence in performing technical reviews and 
have clearly defined instructions, in which tasks and responsibilities are laid 
down.
• Certification bodies should establish minimum criteria for the qualification 
of the Auditors.
• Auditors must be contractually obliged to follow established rules and report 
any kind of previous or on-going cooperation with an auditee.
• Certification bodies must keep track of information on the right qualifications, 
training and experience of auditors on the different specialisms that are 
applicable. This information should also indicate the date from which this 
information is valid.
• Auditors shall not perform other audits than the audits for which they, on the 
basis of their training and experience, have authority.
The certification protocol ISO/TS 22003, laying down requirements on among 
others the auditor and duration of the audit, is available since February 2007.
4.2.3 Audit frequency
The major international systems have set different rules regarding auditing 
frequencies. BRC and IFS know an annual frequency while Dutch HACCP almost 
always keeps a bi-annual audit frequency. In other systems an audit is performed 
two or three times per year at the start. If a company has correctly implemented 
and controlled the system, the frequency may drop to a single audit per year. 
When non-conformities are found, additional audits are performed.
The results of an audit are reviewed by an expert panel at the certification body, 
before the certificate is issued. The auditor, on performing the audit, does therefore 
not determine the end result.
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4.2.4 The scope of a certificate
The scope (the scale of the activities concerning the control of food safety in the 
company that is being certified) can generally be divided into 3 parts:
• Pre-requisite programmes of Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP). These 
programs describe basic requirements for hygiene, establishment and such. 
It may also include requirements that are specific to the organisation that 
developed the standard.
• HACCP, in which the requirements are set for the risk analysis, as required by 
the General Food Law. Usually the model published by the Codex Alimentarius 
is applied.
• System management, where the requirements are laid down on a coherent 
quality system of the entire organisation, allowing better management of 
operational processes.
The standards that are used globally, benchmarked by the Global Food Safety 
Initiative, are based on these 3 elements. Less extensive systems mainly use the 
pre-requisite programmes combined with a risk analysis performed for the sector 
which is based on HACCP.
4.2.5 Sanctions policy of certification bodies
For certification systems that do not meet the requirements generally the following 
measures apply:
• Non-conformities are discussed with the auditee.
• A date is agreed upon which corrective measures shall have been introduced.
• Possibly a re-audit needs to be performed to establish the effectiveness of 
taken measures.
• If this proves to be insufficient, the causes will be discussed again.
• Disciplinary measures may be applied.
If non-conformity is not resolved within the agreed upon period, suspension 
of a certificate is usually the first disciplinarian measure, which is followed by 
revocation of the certificate. Depending on the severity of the non-conformity 
CBs may also decide on immediate revocation of the certificate.
Where non-conformity in the management system is related to only a specific part 
of the organisation, CBs can also consider a limitation of the scope of certification 
as an alternative to suspension. For example, an auditee may no longer be allowed 
to produce, but is allowed to sell. CBs can also choose to only give a warning to 
the food business operator before suspension is considered.
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4.3 Description of commonly used Standards
Table 4.2 shows where some commonly applied food safety standards are used in 
the food production chain. The different food safety standards are very diverse 
Table 4.2. Commonly used private food and feed systems and their place in the food production 
chain.
Scheme Stage of application in the food and feed chain Content
Primary 
production
Processing
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BRC X X X X safety
Carbon Trust X X sustainability
Dutch HACCP  X X X X safety
Fair Trade X X X social responsibility
Fami QS X safety
FSSC 22000 / ISO 
22000
X safety
Gluten free X X X safety
GlobalGAP X X X safety
GMP+ X safety
Halal X X X X X X X X religious
Hygiene guide X X X X X X X X X X X X X X safety
IFS X X X X safety
ISO 26000 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X social responsibility
Kosher  X X X X X X X religious
MSC  X X sustainability
Organic X X X X X X X X sustainability
QS X X safety
Rainforest alliance X sustainability
SGF/IQCS X X safety
SGF/IRMA  X safety/social 
responsibility
SQF 1000 X X X  safety
SQF 2000 X safety
TrusQ X safety
UTZ cert. X sustainability
Vegetarian X X X animal welfare
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in nature. Brief descriptions of the major international standards, applied by 
thousands of businesses worldwide, are given. These standards are often applicable 
to all sectors of the food chain and are often developed by groups of stakeholders 
in the food production and trade. Examples are BRC and IFS, developed by the 
united retailers from respectively the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
4.3.1 Primary production of food
GlobalGAP
GlobalGAP152 stands for Global Good Agricultural Practice. This standard lays 
down the worldwide requirements for farmers and horticulturists on food 
safety, sustainability and quality. A group of twenty-six European supermarket 
organisations has taken the initiative in 1997 to harmonise the requirements for 
their suppliers of fresh produce. The final goal is that GlobalGAP shall become 
an ‘umbrella’ standard for food safety in the primary production sector. A large 
number of quality systems from all parts of the world is being or expecting to be 
benchmarked against the GlobalGAP standard.
Food safety is the most important part of GlobalGAP. In addition, GlobalGAP also 
includes requirements for animal welfare, environment and working conditions. 
The ultimate goal is a single worldwide-accepted set of quality requirements, 
clarifying the ‘forest’ of quality systems currently used. Harmonisation should 
therefore take place first. GlobalGAP is the quality standard that can help. 
GlobalGAP is meant to become the quality system for all farmers in the world. 
Also transporters of animals shall have to comply with the requirements set by 
the GlobalGAP standard for animal transport.
The GlobalGAP standard is divided into several modules, where each module covers 
different areas or activity levels on a production site. There are scopes covering 
general subjects and sub-scopes covering more production specific details, such 
as bulk coffee, flowers and dairy cattle. GlobalGAP lays down requirements only 
to the primary production of food. It is a business to business quality mark, which 
should not appear on consumer packaging.
QS
QS153 stands for ‘Qualität und Sicherheit für Lebensmittel vom Erzeuger bis zum 
Verbraucher’. The administration of the scheme is held by the ‘Central Marketing 
Gesellschaft der Deutschen Agrarwirtschaft’. The QS-system was developed after 
the BSE scandal by the German food industry as a counterpart of EurepGAP (now 
152 http://www.globalgap.org.
153 http://www.q-s.de/.
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GlobalGAP). Initially it was developed as a certification system for meat and meat 
products, set up to provide security to the consumers on the origin of meat. A 
group of German business chains has enlarged the application of the standard to 
fruit and vegetables.
The QS-system requires quality controls for the meat sector over the entire 
production chain, from birth to slaughter and processing. Traceability of the 
raw materials and transparency of production are the key building blocks of the 
standard. Part of the standard forms the protection of animals. The rules apply 
for German products and for products which are imported by Germany.
For the fruit and vegetables sector the QS-system can be comparable to GlobalGAP. 
However, QS is a consumer label, with more concrete requirements than GlobalGAP, 
QS requirements for plant protection products and fertilisers fit the Western 
Europe situation better. The fruit and vegetables sector has more than 20,000 QS 
certified companies.
QS knows no borders. In an attempt to achieve a uniform level of food safety 
at the European level as well, QS puts its faith in international cooperation and 
integration. The aim is to avoid double auditing of the economic participants 
and to enable the flow of goods between the various quality assurance systems. 
For this reason, QS has already come to agreements with various standards in 
neighbouring European countries:
Austria: Pastus+
Belgium: Ovocom/Bemefa and Certus
Denmark: Global Red Meat Standard
The Netherlands: GMP+ and IKB+
SGF/IRMA and SGF/RQCS
SGF International eV, formerly known as the ‘Schutzgemeinschaft der 
Fruchtsaftindustrie’ is a model for industrial self-regulation in the fruit juice 
industry.154 It can also be applied in other sectors of the food industry. SGF stands 
for Sure Global Fair, which also describes the ‘Programm des Branchenverbandes’. 
SGF is a registered association with headquarters in Frankfurt am Main (Germany). 
SGF has grown to some 600 affiliated businesses in approximately 50 countries. 
SGF acts as a partner for business on all issues of safety and quality of fruit juices.
GSF/IRMA (International Raw Material Assurance) supervises the production of 
raw materials and fruit growers, mixing stations, distributors, (cold) storage and 
transportation companies, who participate in the standard on a voluntary basis. 
The standard uses a hygiene checklist, which among others is based on Regulation 
154 http://www.sgf.org/.
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852/2004155 and the AIJN-Guide of Good Hygiene Practice (Association of the 
Industry of Juices and Nectars from Fruits and Vegetables of the EU). The checklist 
is specifically designed to supervise the monitoring of all relevant aspects in the 
production of semi-finished products.
SGF has developed a Code of Conduct to support raw material suppliers, 
participating in the voluntary control system of SGF. This Code of Conduct supports 
the increasing awareness that generally accepted standards for ethical behaviour 
should be taken into account.
SQF 1000
SQF stands for Safe Quality Food.156 It is a management system developed by the 
West Australian Department of agriculture, it was introduced in 1994. Since 2004 
SQF is managed by the SQF Institute (SQFI), a division of the Food & Marketing 
Institute (FMI) in Washington. SQF is the only standard, which has its head office 
outside of Europe, which is accepted by the Global Food Safety Initiative.
SQF is a scheme that has many provisions on the quality aspects of products, 
on which it distinguishes itself from other standards. According to SQF a single 
standard for all businesses of the food production chain is not possible. The 
major international standards fit industrial producers, but for the primary sector 
is far too complicated and extensive. SQF has worked around this by using two 
customised standards:
• SQF 1000 is intended for the primary agricultural sector and small-scale 
processors and service providers. These players are often ‘chained’ in a product-
market organisation. The risks are mostly limited. The code is based on HACCP, 
but uses a simplified method.
• SQF 2000 is intended for the ‘larger’ supplying/processing industry, where 
the risks are greater. In this code HACCP is fully integrated.
SQF combines a quality management system (ISO 9001) with a food safety system 
(HACCP) and adds requirements on identification and traceability (tracking and 
tracing). This is secured using both the well-known CCPs (Critical Control Points) 
and CQP’s (Critical Quality Points). Using this approach, an integrated system 
was developed, that complies with the requirements of the Global Food Safety 
Initiative (GFSI). SQF 2000 can, on a voluntary basis, be supplemented with 
modules on environmental protection and corporate social responsibility. SQF 
is intended to be used by all types of food businesses. SQF plays an important 
role in the North American food industry. In addition, suppliers and retailers in 
155 EU, 2004. Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union L 139, 30/4/2004: 1-54.
156 http://www.sqfi.com/.
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Australia, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South America also use the standard. 
In Europe SQF still holds little foothold. Altogether more than 10,000 certificates 
have been issued to various food businesses.
4.3.2 Feed production
FAMI-QS Code of Practice for Feed Additive and Premixture Operators
FAMI-QS157 was officially and successfully assessed by the EU authorities in 
January 2007. They considered this Guide as practicable throughout the European 
Union and suitable for compliance with the requirements of Regulation 183/2005 
on Feed Hygiene158.
This official adoption established the formal FAMI-QS link with the Feed Hygiene 
Regulation, meaning that a feed additive or premixture operator who puts in place 
the FAMI-QS principles is meeting the requirements of this Regulation. FAMI-QS 
also expects that this will facilitate the work of the control authorities at national 
level. Positive signals are already received in this sense and it is expected that it 
will minimise the need for controls of FAMI-QS certified operators by national 
authorities and customers. A sense of complementarity with officials control is 
installing itself in an increasing number of EU countries.
The FAMI-QS Code of Practice is a public document and its content can be freely 
followed by any feed additive or premixture operator. The text of the Code is 
designed to set out general requirements. Questionnaires are included in order 
to further detail the requirements. In addition it can be used as a tool for the 
operators and in auditing operators. A guidance document is provided as annex to 
the Code. While the requirements of the Code are mandatory for every operator 
desiring certification, the guidance is not mandatory but provides information on 
how to deal with specific issues in a more detailed and practical way. The guidance 
documents provide support to the operator when implementing the Code.
The number of certified sites has considerably increased. Since December 2009, it 
exceeds 500 sites, while in December 2008 this numbered 298 sites, an important 
increase of 72.15%. Besides the unconditional support from the European Industry 
to the FAMI-QS Code, the international presence of FAMI-QS Code is shown as 
the number of certificates in third countries is actually higher than in the EU. 
Especially in China there are many participants (172).
157 http://www.fami-qs.org/documents/FAMI-QS%20Report%202009.pdf.
158 EU, 2005. Regulation (EC) No 183/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
January 2005 laying down requirements for feed hygiene. Official Journal of the European Union L 
35, 8/2/2005: 1-22.
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GMP+
GMP+159 standard (Good Manufacturing Practice) has been drawn up by the Dutch 
Animal Feed Sector Central College of Experts (CCvDD), who were responsible 
for the standard as owners. This College of Experts has representatives from the 
entire feed production chain. Product Board Animal Feed supports this college since 
1993. The latest version of this standard is GMP+ 2006. In 2010 the organisation 
has been transformed to a private foundation.
The basis of the GMP+ standard is formed by a combination of the standards EN-ISO 
9001: 2000, ISO 22000 and the HACCP principles, as laid down in the documents 
of the Codex Alimentarius and elaborated upon in the requirements for a HACCP 
based food safety system, supplemented with general GMP+ requirements.
The standard was initially intended for use in the Netherlands. Today, more 
than 11,000 companies in the feed sector from over 65 countries worldwide let 
their products and services be certified according to the GMP+ 2006 standard. 
Characteristic for the current scheme is that it provides an integral assurance 
system for all products and stages of the production in the animal feed chain. 
These stages are: farming, trade, production/processing, transport, laboratory 
research and feeding.
TrusQ
TrusQ160 started in 2003. It is an important collaboration in the area of food safety 
between Dutch and Belgian feed suppliers. The TrusQ partners deliver feed of 
guaranteed quality to cattle farmers. TrusQ is based on GMP+, but considers this 
insufficient to be able to guarantee the quality of all raw materials for feed used 
by the participants of the scheme. Also by-products, used in the production of 
feed, are within the TrusQ scope.
In particular with suppliers from abroad guaranteed quality regularly forms a 
problem. TrusQ therefore analyses many raw materials to reduce the risks of 
contamination for farmers. This leads to a high concentration of knowledge at 
TrusQ. As an additional security measure TrusQ uses a traffic light system to 
indicate the reliability of suppliers and products. The following indications are used:
• Green: product is in order; the supplier may supply.
• Orange: measures have been agreed upon (e.g. more controls) to ensure a 
product is safe.
• Red: business with the supplier is not allowed and its raw materials are not used.
159 http://www.gmpplus.org/en/.
160 http://www.trusq.nl/pages.php?cID=2&pID=&ln=2.
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In practice it may be so that a supplier cannot supply at all, but it is also possible 
that the supplier is not allowed to supply a certain raw material, but is allowed 
to supply another.
TrusQ is used by the participating feed production companies (the nine TrusQ 
companies) to ensure their requirements towards suppliers of raw materials 
and additives are being complied with, both at home and abroad. Cattle farmers 
participating in the scheme can therefore trust that the supplied feed is safe to use. 
Each of the nine TrusQ-companies supplies feed to thousands of cattle farmers 
in primarily the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.
4.3.3 Manufacturing sector
Dutch HACCP
Dutch HACCP161 is a certification scheme developed in 1996 by the National 
Board of Experts HACCP (NBE). Since its start, the standard is regularly adapted 
to new developments. On the initiative of the Central Body of Experts food safety 
and its affiliated certification bodies in 2004 founded the ‘Stichting Certificatie 
Voedselveiligheid’ (SCV). Dutch HACCP is the only standard developed by certifying 
bodies themselves. The Foundation was established to provide a legal entity to the 
NBE. SCV facilitates the board and is the legal owner of the standard ‘requirements 
for a HACCP based food safety system’ (Dutch HACCP) and manages the copyright 
on this standard through user agreements.
The standards has 2 versions: management/system certification (option A) and 
process/product certification (option B). A distinctive difference between the two 
versions is how the pre-requisites programme is implemented. There is also a 
difference in the auditing and reporting method by the certification body. Dutch 
HACCP option B is approved by the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI).
Dutch HACCP can be applied in the entire food production chain: primary 
production, processing and manufacturing industry, transport, storage, distribution 
and trade. The standard does not apply to supplying and service providers, such as 
suppliers of machinery, packing materials and cleaning companies. At the time of 
writing approximately 2,000 certificates were issued by the 12 certifying bodies.
BRC Global Standards
In the UK in the 1990s a number of supermarket chains (including Tesco, Sainsbury, 
Somerfield, and Safeway) united themselves on the area of quality and founded 
161 http://www.foodsafetymanagement.info.
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the British Retail Consortium (BRC).162 They developed a standard (the BRC 
Global Standard for Food Safety) and then made compliance with this standard a 
requirement for all suppliers (food businesses). The BRC Global Standard requires 
that a quality system is used, that HACCP is applied and that the establishment, 
the product, process and personnel are included into this system.
The BRC-scheme (see also section 4.2) consists of an inspection protocol and a 
technical standard. The inspection protocol was developed for inspecting bodies. 
The technical standard, an extensive checklist, is relevant to the suppliers of food. 
The technical standard was set up in 1998 and celebrated its 5th version in 2008. 
The BRC code was corrected and approved in 2008 by the GFSI. The 6th version 
is expected at the of 2011.
With a BRC-certificate a producer complies in principle at once with all the 
requirements of the British (and also other) international supermarkets. Because 
this is cost-saving for both the producers and users the BRC certificate is widely 
appreciated. Most British and many other European large supermarkets and brand 
owners only do business with suppliers certified for to BRC Global Standard for 
Food Safety.
IFS
In Germany and France a number of supermarket chains (among others Aldi and 
Metro) have developed a food safety standard and made it a requirement to their 
suppliers. This standard was called the International Food Standard (IFS), now 
International Featured Standards.163 In many ways, it is similar to the BRC Standard: 
there is an overlap of 90 to 95%. The first version of the IFS standard dates back 
to 2002 and was developed by the German retailers. The fourth version, launched 
in 2007, was published together with the French companies. The administration 
of IFS is held by the German retailers united in ‘Hauptverband des Deutschen 
Einzelhandels’ (HDE) and the French retailers united in the ‘Fédération des 
entreprises du Commerce et la Distribution’ (FCD). Just like the BRC standard, 
IFS requires a quality system to be present, in which HACCP is applied and that 
requirements on the establishment, product, process and personnel are included 
in the system.
IFS is applied by food businesses that supply mainly to retailers in Germany 
and France. The IFS standard can be applied in all sectors; there are no specific 
requirements for sectors of the chain or for specific product groups. Many retailers 
accept BRC and IFS as equivalent.
162 http://www.brc.org.uk.
163 http://www.ifs-online.eu.
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FSSC 22000, ISO 22000 and PAS 220
With the appearance of many large and small standards to ensure the safety of food 
over the last decades, the desire to stop the appearance of new standards and to 
develop a single uniformly accepted standard was expressed by the international 
food business community. Not less than thirty countries contributed to the 
development of the ISO 22000 standard.164 This has resulted in this standard 
being recognised by the ‘big brand’ holders and enjoys worldwide support and 
recognition. ISO 22000 therefore is an international, chain oriented standard 
for food safety published in September 2005 by ‘The International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO). The extent to which retailers will accept this standard 
is not yet clear. This is one of the reasons why at the end of 2008 the industry 
developed an additional module: PAS 220 (Publicly Available Specification). Early 
February 2009 the new standard FSSC (Food Safety System Certification) 22000 was 
developed by The Foundation for Food Safety Certification, the standard integrates 
ISO 22000 and PAS 220. In May 2009 the GFSI accepted this new FSSC 22000.
ISO 22000 follows the structure and approach of ISO 9001 and integrates these 
with food safety assurance based on the HACCP principles. ISO 22000 does not 
replace standards like ISO 9001. ISO 22000 includes only requirements on food 
safety while ISO 9001 also includes quality aspects. Since it is an ISO standard, 
requirements are less clearly described and defined as with BRC and IFS. The 
BRC and IFS standards include more requirements on GMP.
The additional PAS 220 specifies requirements on the establishment, implementation 
and maintenance of preconditions for food safety programs that food business 
operators have to comply with to keep food safety risks under control. PAS 220 is 
not designed or intended for use in other parts of the food supply chain.
ISO 22000 is applicable to all organisations that are directly or indirectly part 
of the food chain, regardless of the size or complexity of the organisation. The 
standard allows also for smaller and/or less-developed organisations (such as a 
small farm, a small packaging and distribution company or a small food shop) to 
implement a food safety management system. The standard allows small companies 
to implement an externally developed combination of management measures. 
This approach is similar to that used in hygiene guides, which also use generically 
developed measures to comply with the HACCP requirements. ISO 22000 is also 
suitable for organisations that are involved indirectly in the food production chain, 
such as suppliers of machinery and tools, cleaning and disinfection products and 
packaging materials. So far the standard is little used. There are also still relatively 
few qualified auditors.
164 http://www.FSSC22000.com.
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SQF 2000
The Safe Quality Food (SQF) 2000165 Code provides for the food supplier a food 
safety and quality management certification program. In 1994 the Code was 
developed and pilot programs implemented to ensure its applicability to the 
food industry. The Food Marketing Institute (FMI) acquired the rights to the SQF 
Program in August 2003 and has established the SQF Institute (SQFI) Division 
to manage the Program. The SQF 2000 Code is recognised by the Global Food 
Safety Initiative as a standard that meets its benchmark requirements. The SQFI 
Technical Advisory Council reviews and makes recommendations on changes to 
the Code in line with the current requirements and expectations of the global 
food sector and other comments received from stakeholders.
4.3.4 Packaging sector
As it is possible for foodstuffs to get contaminated with microbiological or chemical 
hazards when being packaged, authorities have put relevant legislation with 
appropriate norms into force. In the end quality management systems should 
protect all steps in the food production chain against unknown risks. From some 
food safety and quality management standards, such as Dutch HACCP, it is claimed 
that they are applicable to all steps of the production chain. Other international 
standards have developed special modules to fit this need.
BRC-IOP
For the specific details on BRC, see section 4.3.3. The BRC has developed the 
‘Global Standard for Packaging and Packaging Materials’ specifically for the food 
(packaging) industry. This standard is known as the BRC-IOP 166 and is approved 
as well by the GFSI.
4.3.5 Transport sector
Transporting foodstuffs also involve risks regarding safety and quality. This is 
especially true for fresh and deep frozen products. A well-known example is the 
famous nitrite incident of 1980. When a leaking pipe of the cooling unit caused 
contamination of a shipment of spinach with extremely high concentrations of 
nitrite, one of the consumers that ate from the spinach did not survive the incident.
Standards covering the whole chain can be applied to this sector, but sector specific 
standards also exist.
165 http://www.sqfi.com/wp-content/uploads/SQF-2000-Code.pdf.
166 http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/standards/packaging-and-packaging-materials/.
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BRC for Storage and Distribution
For the specific details on BRC, see section 4.3.3. The Global Standard for Storage 
and Distribution 167 has been developed specifically for the storage and distribution 
sector in 2006.
IFS/ILS
For the specific details on IFS, see section 4.3.3. Since May 2006 transporting 
companies can achieve certification against the IFS-transport standard, also known 
as the International Logistic Standard (ILS)168.
4.3.6 Other standards
Besides the previously discussed quality standards, with the main focus on the 
production, from raw materials to end product, of safe foods, some other standards 
and schemes exist that focus on quite other aspects in which consumers are 
highly interested.
ISO 26000
ISO 26000 is Guidance on Social Responsibility169. Companies that implement ISO 
26000 have, next to conventional business objectives, a set of specific company 
objectives on:
• environment;
• human rights;
• labour practices;
• organisational governance;
• fair operating practices;
• consumer issues;
• community involvement/society development.
ISO 26000 provides guidance to corporate social responsibility. It does not lay 
down specific requirements and it is therefore not possible, contrary to other ISO 
management standards, to achieve certification. The impossibility of obtaining a 
certificate is one of the principles of this standard.
The scope of ISO 26000 is to make social responsibility operational. ISO 26000 
provides guidance for all types of organisation, regardless of their size or location, on:
167 http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/standards/storage-and-distribution/.
168 http://www.gs1.org/transportlogistics/forum/work_groups/ll/.
169 http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_responsibility/
sr_discovering_iso26000.htm#std-1.
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1. Concepts, terms and definitions related to social responsibility;
2. Background, trends and characteristics of social responsibility;
3. Principles and practices relating to social responsibility;
4. Core subjects and issues of social responsibility;
5. Integrating, implementing and promoting socially responsible behaviour 
throughout the organisation and, through its policies and practices, within its 
sphere of influence;
6. Identifying and engaging with stakeholders;
7. Communicating commitments, performance and other information related to 
social responsibility.
ISO 26000 is intended to assist organisations in contributing to sustainable 
development. It is intended to encourage them to go beyond legal compliance, 
recognising that compliance with law is a fundamental duty of any organisation 
and an essential part of their social responsibility. It is intended to promote 
common understanding in the field of social responsibility, and to complement 
other instruments and initiatives for social responsibility, not to replace them.
ISO 26000 was approved on 12 September 2010 in Oslo with 93% of all votes and 
has now been published. Only 5 countries voted against.
Fair trade
Fair trade encourages sustainable development in international trade,170 most 
importantly the export from poor countries to richer Western countries. Fair trade 
means that e.g. coffee bean growers, cacao bean growers and banana growers in 
Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia receive an honest price for their export 
products. This is a price that is based on production costs rather than a price that 
is subject to the situation on the international commodities market. Fair trade 
products also need to comply with very strict environmental requirements.
Already in the 40’s and 50’s of last century some religious and non-profit 
organisations were actively promoting products from third world countries in 
the Western world. The Fair Trade organisation took its current shape in the 
sixties. In those years, fair trade practices were often seen as a political statement 
against neo-imperialism. Students opposed the multinational corporations and 
trade practices with the indigenous population. In that period the slogan ‘trade 
not aid’ was invented. Organisations such as UNCTAD and the British NGO 
Oxfam were involved in the foundation. In 1969 the first Dutch ‘Worldshop’ was 
opened, quickly followed by many others in the Benelux, Germany and many 
other Western European countries. At first, the products sold under the label were 
170 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_trade.
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mainly traditionally handcrafted; over time more and more foodstuffs were also 
included in the product range.
The credibility of Fair Trade is dependent on strict criteria and a permanent and 
good supervision of those criteria. Currently products sold under the Fair Trade 
label (Figure 4.4) are produced in 23 countries that are interconnected through the 
autonomous umbrella organisation: Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International 
eingetrager Verein (FLO-eV). This organisation determines the criteria and assists 
producers to comply with the requirements. The inspection body of the FLO-
eV operates totally independent. Fair Trade certification can be achieved after 
evaluation of a set of 250 criteria related to working conditions and investment 
in environmental friendly and economic development.
The following organisations are involved in the Fair trade movement:
• The World Fair Trade Organization (formerly the International Fair Trade 
Association) is a global association created in 1989 of fair trade producer 
cooperatives and associations, export marketing companies, importers, retailers, 
national, and regional fair trade networks and fair trade support organisations.
• The Network of European Worldshops, created in 1994, is the umbrella network 
of 15 national Worldshop associations in 13 different countries all over Europe.
• The European Fair Trade Association (EFTA), created in 1990, is a network 
of European alternative trading organisations which import products from 
some 400 economically disadvantaged producer groups in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America.
• FINE, created in 1998, an informal association171 whose goal is to harmonise 
fair trade standards and guidelines, increase the quality and efficiency of fair 
trade monitoring systems, and advocate fair trade politically,
171 FINE stands for (F) Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) (I) International Fair Trade 
Association, now the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) (N) Network of European Worldshops 
(NEWS!) and (E) European Fair Trade Association (EFTA).
Figure 4.4. The International Fair Trade certif ication mark.
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• The Fair Trade Federation (FTF), created in 1994, is an association of Canadian 
and American fair trade wholesalers, importers, and retailers. The organisation 
links its members to fair trade producer groups while acting as a clearinghouse for 
information on fair trade and providing resources and networking opportunities 
to its members.
• The Fair Trade Action Network, created in 2007, is an international fair trade 
volunteer web-based network. The association links volunteers from a dozen 
of European and North American countries, actively supports Fair Trade Towns 
initiatives and encourages grassroots networking at the international level.
The Carbon Trust Standard
The Carbon Trust Standard172 awards organisations for real carbon reduction. 
Carbon Trust certifies organisations that have measured, managed and genuinely 
reduced their carbon footprint and committed to making further reductions year on 
year. In March 2011 London Metropolitan University has officially been rewarded 
the Carbon Trust Standard, after reducing carbon emissions by nearly 12%.
The Carbon Trust Standard is the world’s first certification scheme designed to 
allow companies to measure the carbon footprint of their operations and facilitate 
an independent, specialist review of energy management practices. The use of the 
Carbon Trust Standard logo (Figure 4.5) allows companies to then communicate 
their commitment to combating climate change. The award requires organisations 
to provide evidence on real reductions in their own CO2 emissions rather than 
paying third parties to reduce emissions via off-setting, like planting trees or 
green tariffs.
The Carbon Trust is set up by government in response to the threat of climate 
change, to accelerate the move to a low carbon economy by working with 
172 http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/cut-carbon-reduce-costs/promote/carbon-trust-standard/Pages/
carbon-trust-standard.aspx.
Figure 4.5. The Carbon Trust Standard logo.
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organisations to reduce carbon emissions and develop commercial low carbon 
technologies. The Carbon Trust works with the UK business and public sector 
through its work in five complementary areas: insights, solutions, innovations, 
enterprises and investments. Together these help to explain, deliver, develop, 
create and finance low carbon enterprise. The Carbon Trust is funded by the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), the Scottish Government, 
the Welsh Assembly Government and Invest Northern Ireland.
Over 350 organisations have achieved the Standard with a total carbon footprint 
of nearly 35 million tonnes of CO2. Organisations awarded the Standard include 
well-known names such as First Direct, Tesco’s, O2 and public sector organisations 
such as HM Treasury, London Fire Brigade, DSM and Manchester University. To 
achieve certification against the Standard, an organisation will need to meet the 
requirements in three areas:
• measure the carbon footprint over 2-3 years;
• demonstrate a reduction in carbon emissions;
• provide evidence of good carbon management.
Rainforest Alliance
Rainforest Alliance173 is an environmental organisation based in the United States. 
Their main objective is to protect ecosystems and the people and animals that are 
depending on it. The Chiquita company collaborates with the Rainforest Alliance 
since 1992 and was rewarded with certification in 2005. This is shown by the 
little green frog next to famous blue sticker on Chiquita bananas. By obtaining 
the Rainforest Alliance certificate, Chiquita assures that its bananas are produced 
using sustainable methods on certified plantations. The quality mark can also be 
found on coffee and tea (Figure 4.6).
173 http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/.
Figure 4.6. The Rainforest Alliance quality mark.
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Inspections take place on farms or plantations. The inspections are performed by 
independent and accredited organisations, for this reason the Rainforest Alliance 
quality mark is considered reliable. To be allowed to use the Rainforest Alliance 
mark, farmers have to comply with 200 strict requirements. The requirements 
are divers: there are requirements on nature preservation, water preservation and 
forest management. The workforce on the plantations should receive the minimum 
wage and good secondary working conditions, including a safe environment to 
live. The Rainforest Alliance does not guarantee prices to farmers.
Marine Stewardship Council
The Marine Stewardship Council174 is one of the most important organisations 
promoting a sustainable fishing industry. Some other organisations are: Friends 
of the Sea (FOS), Marine Ecolabel Japan (MEL-Japan), Global Aquaculture 
Alliance (GAA), GlobalGAP, Naturland, DEWHA Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act and Thai Quality Shrimp (TQS). These are all 
organisations that issues certificates. There are also other organisations providing 
fish recommendations, producing ‘Sustainable Seafood Guides’ or providing 
information and recommendations to businesses and consumers on sustainable 
fisheries and aquaculture. Most of the schemes are improving their conformance 
with the FAO guidelines. Key attributes for these guidelines are Scope; Accuracy; 
Independence; Precision; Transparency; Standardisation; and Cost effectiveness.
Of the certification schemes, the MSC makes the most comprehensive, robust, 
and transparent assessment of performance.175 MSC is the only scheme that 
specifically requires the data and information to be sufficient for achieving the 
other objectives (stock status and ecosystem impacts). MSC uses the most recently 
available stock-specific assessment results directly from fishery managers and 
stock assessment scientists. MSC criteria require that the target population(s) and 
associated ecological community are maintained at high productivity relative to 
their potential productivity. The assessment of this considers outcome indicators 
(stock status, reference points and stock rebuilding) and harvest strategy indicators 
(the harvest strategy, control rules, monitoring and stock assessment procedures). 
The consideration of stock status includes a peer review of the stock assessment 
information. Certification by the MSC’s program is rather expensive (on average 
30,000 euro). For small businesses these costs usually are too high.
MSC evaluation is a cycle where one or more ships are audited by an independent 
commission (therefore not by the MSC itself) against the MSC standard. An 
174 http://www.msc.org/home-page?set_language=en.
175 Parkes, G., Walmsley, S., Cambridge, T., Trumble, R., Clarke, S., Lamberts, D., Souter, D. and White C., 
2009. Review of Fish Sustainability Information Schemes - Final Report, October 2009. MRAG, London, 
UK. Available at: http://cels.uri.edu/urissi/docs/FSIG_Report.pdf.
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evaluation cycle normally takes around 12-15 months, but longer periods are 
possible. The whole process is open to the public and any stakeholder (including 
fishing industry, scientists and environmental organisations) can participate in 
the evaluation cycle. There are possibilities for participation oriented approaches 
and grievance procedures. A certificate is issued for a period of five years with a 
minimum number of inspections of one per year.
The MSC’s fishery certification program and seafood ecolabel recognise and 
reward sustainable fishing (Figure 4.7). The Marine Stewardship Council is a 
global non-profit organisation working with fisheries, seafood companies, scientists, 
conservation groups and the public to promote the best environmental choice 
in seafood. Consumers can recognise MSC-certified products by the blue MSC-
logo. MSC was founded 1997 by Unilever and World Wildlife Fund as a result of 
concerns over the state of fisheries as expressed by a wide range of stakeholders. 
The total number of available MSC-certified products and countries involved is 
growing. Anno 2009 approximately 8% of the total world offshore fishing used 
for human consumption took place under the MSC-program.
The head office of the Marine Stewardship Council is located in London and 
has branches in Seattle and Sydney. Furthermore there are offices in Scotland 
(opened in 2008), Germany (2008), the Netherlands (2007), South Africa (2008), 
Japan (2007), France (2009), Sweden (2010) and Spain (2011) Worldwide more 
than 10,000 products certified under MSC are available in 74 countries. In total, 
over 240 fisheries are engaged in the MSC programme with 105 certified and over 
140 under full assessment.
The three main principles of the MSC standard for sustainable fishing are:
1. the stock status for fish or shellfish shall be and stay healthy;
2. the impact of the fishing industry shall be and stay small;
3. the supervision of the fishing sector shall be organised correctly, compliance 
shall be controlled and verified.
Figure 4.7. The Marine Stewardships Council certif icate trade mark.
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Irrespective of the size, range, the fished species and catch area, a fishery business 
can request to be audited by an independent certification body to the MSC 
environmental standard. If the business meets the requirements, it can achieve 
certification. Businesses that want to carry the MSC label on their products also 
have to obtain a certificate for chain control to ensure the traceability of the 
certified fish products.
UTZ certified
Started in 2002, UTZ Certified176 is dedicated to creating an open and transparent 
Marketplace for agricultural products. It offers coffee, tea and cocoa certification 
programs and manages traceability for RSPO certified palm oil. UTZ Certified’s 
vision is to achieve sustainable agricultural supply chains where farmers are 
professionals implementing good practices which lead to better business, where 
the food industry take responsibility by demanding and rewarding sustainable 
grown products, and where consumers buy products which meet their standard 
for social and environmental responsibility (Figure 4.8).
Until 2007 UTZ was known as UTZ Kapeh, which means ‘good coffee’ in Maya 
language from Guatemala. In just over five years UTZ Certified has grown to be 
one of the leading coffee certification programs worldwide, and is now expanding to 
become a multi-commodity program. UTZ Certified’s vision is to achieve sustainable 
agricultural supply chains, that meet the growing needs and expectations of farmers, 
the food industry and consumers alike.
In response to the urgent and pressing global call for sustainably produced palm 
oil, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was formed in 2004 with the 
objective promoting the growth and use of sustainable oil palm products through 
credible global standards and engagement of stakeholders. Its members accepted 
176 http://www.utzcertified.org/.
Figure 4.8. The UTZ Certif ied trade mark.
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its principles and criteria for sustainable production in November 2007, the time 
it contracted UTZ Certified as its provider for traceability services.
By the end of 2008 the first plantations were officially certified and the first 
sustainably produced palm oil was traced by UTZ. Since then the volume has been 
growing at an ever increasing pace. In 2009 the total volume of physically traced 
RSPO-certified palm oil was 100,000 metric tons. In 2010 it nearly quadrupled to 
almost 400,000 metric tons.
European logo for organic production
If a business operator wants to place organic products on the market he or she 
must comply with all relevant legislation. One of the requirements, to enable 
consumers to easily recognise the products as for what they are, is the use of the 
European logo for organic products (Figure 4.9). The logo communicates that the 
foodstuff is produced according to all requirements relevant to the production of 
organic production, processing and trade. Organic products are produced under 
the following conditions:
• The seeds are of organic origin.
• Fertilisers are of organic origin.
• The use of plant protection products is restricted and limited.
• Compound products are produced using (almost) uniquely raw materials 
of organic origins. An exception can be made for those ingredients that are 
temporarily unavailable.
• Transportation and trade took place under controlled conditions.
Logo for gluten free
Patients suffering from coeliac disease (food intolerance) cannot tolerate food 
containing gluten. Foodstuffs containing gluten cause damaging of the mucous 
membrane of the small intestine, this in turn causes the intestines to stop 
functioning correctly. Healthy small intestines have a large number of intestinal 
Figure 4.9. The European logo for Organic Farming.
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villi on the inside of the intestine. Altogether this results in a large surface area 
for the absorption of nutrients. The villi of coeliac patients do not tolerate gluten, 
resulting in a bad absorption of nutrients. The human body needs these nutrients 
to function correctly and in children they are also essential in growth.
Patients suffering from gluten intolerance require foodstuffs that do not contain 
gluten and are therefore identifiable as such. The authorities have laid down rules 
that aim to enable patients to make a well informed choice. Regulation 41/2009177 
states that a product is only seen as ‘gluten free’ when the concentration of gluten 
is not higher than 20 mg/kg in the foodstuff. If this criterion is met a logo (Figure 
4.10), indicating the foodstuff is gluten free, can be used with the product. When 
the concentration is higher than 20 mg/kg, but not higher than 100 mg/kg the 
term ‘very low gluten’ can be used. Products that contain gluten fall under the 
legislation concerning allergen labelling.
Logo for vegetarian products
Vegetarians do not consume meat, poultry and fish products. Most vegetarians do 
consume product of animal origin that are obtained without killing the animal, 
such as milk (products), cheese and eggs. Some vegetarians do consume fish. 
A healthy diet is possible without the consumption of meat. A vegetarian diet 
composed of sufficient vegetables, fruit, bread, potatoes wheat products, pulse 
crops, dairy products, eggs and meat replacers provide all the nutrients a human 
body requires.178 Vegans do not eat any products of animal origin, so also no 
dairy products or eggs.
177 EU, 2009. Commission Regulation (EC) No 41/2009 of 20 January 2009 concerning the composition 
and labelling of foodstuffs suitable for people intolerant to gluten. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 16, 21/01/2009: 3-5.
178 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FDE/is_3_25/ai_n26957000/.
Figure 4.10. The logo indicating a product is ‘gluten free’.
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The European V-label (Figure 4.11) is used as a logo indicating the product is 
‘suitable for vegetarians’, without limiting the product to vegetarians only. It is 
registered in 1985 by the European Vegetarian Union (EVU) and is recognised and 
used in more than 16 European countries. In all these countries the same logo 
is used. The logo is available in two versions: one for vegetarian products (that 
can still contain ingredients of animal origin such as dairy and eggs) and one for 
vegan products not containing any ingredient of animal origins.
Currently, the EVU label is displayed mostly on food products and in restaurants in 
Europe, although some products displaying the label may be exported to the United 
States. A website (V-label) containing information on vegetarian products, producers 
and restaurants that have accepted the criteria of the V-label is available.179
Halal food
In Arabic ‘halal’ stands for foodstuffs that are ‘clean’, ‘allowed’ or ‘permitted’. The 
term indicating the opposite is haram (in Arabic: ‘unclean’, ‘not allowed’), some 
examples are alcohol and pork. The definitions apply to both activities and foodstuffs. 
Halal products are prepared according to religious requirements set by Islam. 
Halal refers to food law laying down rules for Muslims.180 Halal food is prepared 
in compliance with the carefully laid down Islamic food laws. As food plays an 
important role in the daily life, Islamic food law plays a very important role in the 
life of a Muslim. Meat can only be Halal if the animal was slaughtered according 
to religious rituals and has lived a dignified life with as little stress as possible.
Food businesses producing Halal products can achieve certification by the Halal 
International Control.181 HIC is an international organisation based in Cairo, 
Egypt, providing services to clients in the Middle-East and Europe.
179 http://www.v-label.info/en/home/start.html.
180 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halal. For more details see Chapter 12 by Tetty Havinga.
181 http://www.hic-quality.com/.
Figure 4.11. The European V-label.
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HIC ensures that raw materials and ingredients used in the production of Halal 
foodstuffs come from companies that perform ritual slaughtering and respect the 
general Halal rules. Before any meat is purchased, the supplier is evaluated and it 
is assessed if the criteria set by HIC are being met. Also herbs and spices require 
being Halal. HIC controls the herbs and spices for the presence of animal meat 
extracts and for E-numbers that are not Halal.
HIC can issue Halal certificates for the following processes:
• ritual slaughtering of poultry or other animals;
• manufacturing, from raw materials to final or intermediate products;
• processing of intermediate products;
• preparation of readymade foods (including catering and other large kitchens);
• retail and out of home market (restaurants, fast food chains, take aways, 
canteens);
• export (as might be requested by customers from e.g. Saudi Arabia or Malaysia);
• storage (distribution centres, warehouses, harbours);
• transport (e.g. fluids such as liquids, such as medicines).
Similar certification bodies exist in other parts of the world such as Asia (Malaysia), 
United States, Canada:
• INFANCA, Illinois, USA;
• ISNA, Ontario, Canada;
• Malaysian Halal Certification (Figure 4.12).
In 2010 the Malaysian Halal Certification has prepared an overview of 49 different 
certification bodies in many countries from all over the world.182 Harmonisation 
is attempted by the International Halal Integrity Alliance (IHIA).
182 http://www.halal.gov.my/v2/cms/content/editor/files/File/Badan%20Islam/badan_islam_update_
may2010%5B1%5D.pdf.
Figure 4.12. The Malaysian Halal certif ication stamp.
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Kosher food
The basic for ‘kashrut’, the food law of Jewish religion,183 is written in the Torah, 
to be more specific in the books known in the Christian Bible as Leviticus en 
Deuteronomium 14:3-21. In Deuteronomium 14:6 is written: ‘You may eat any 
animal that has completely split hooves and chews the cud’. Fish must have fins 
and scales and not all birds are allowed to be eaten. Furthermore, it is forbidden 
to eat carrion and insects with wings.
It is therefore allowed to eat beef, sheep, goat and deer. It is not allowed to eat 
camel, pork, horse or rabbit. Finally, it is also not allowed to eat eel, shrimp and 
lobster. Also in the application of additives there are specific conditions. There 
are few conditions in the food law regarding the usage of colours. A problem may 
exist with the colour red made from scale insects (cochenille red). According to 
the Jewish law it is not allowed to eat insects. Food that is not in accordance with 
the kashrut is called ‘trefah’.
According to the rules of the Kashrut, approved animals shall be slaughtered using 
unstunned and ritual methods. This is called sjechita. Knives should be razor sharp 
and straight to instantly kill the animal. After the blood has been drained from 
the carotid artery, the remaining blood is removed by heavily salting the meat. 
Besides rules on the slaughtering of animals, other rules on the consumption 
of kosher foods exist. It is not allowed to use dairy and meat products together 
in a product or meal. Fish and meat can be used within a single meal but not 
within the same dish. These rules have implications also to the machinery used 
to produce or store the foodstuffs.
Hechher (sometimes Anglicized as hechsher) is the Hebrew word for a declaration 
of kashrut issued by a rabbi (kosher certification)184. All kosher shops (except 
for supermarkets) should have a Teudat Hechsher (Kosher certificate). A rabbi 
or rabbinical court/organisation can issue certificates that are valid for a limited 
period of time. Businesses that require a Teudat Hechsher include: (fast food) 
restaurants and bakeries. Especially in Israel, but increasingly in the United States, 
a small symbol, usually the logo of the rabbi or rabbinate is placed on prepacked 
products. Just placing the word kosher alone is not sufficient as multiple levels 
in kosher certification exist. Most orthodox Jews only eat food labelled with the 
hechsher of a selected group of hechsherim; the most widely accepted hechsherim 
is that of Edah HaChareidis. Some other well-known hechsherim from Israel are, 
among others, those of Rechovot; the rabbinical court of Chassam Sofer from Bnei 
Brak; the rabbinical court of rabbi Ovadia Yosef; Machzikei HaDas of the chassidish 
movement Belz, Shearis Yisroel of the Litvaks and the sephardic rabbi Shlomo 
183 http://www.oukosher.org/index.php/basics/what.
184 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hechsher.
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Machpoud. More than 800 hechher images have been gathered in a database185 
According to the Talmud the practice of certification has been applied since the 
second century before the existence of a calendar in the time of Chanoeka in the 
year 1964 before the current era.
In the United States the best known organisations are the Orthodox Union (OU), 
Organized Kashrus (OK) and the Central Rabbinical Congress (CRC). Over the past 
decades, the demand for kosher food products in the United States and around the 
world has greatly impacted the food industry. Established in 1935, the OK Kosher 
Certification is one of the world’s most respected symbols of kosher approval 
(Figure 4.13). The OK provides certification for food giants and products such as 
IFF, Kraft, ConAgra and Tropicana. Operating on six continents and supported by 
more than 350 of the world’s leading kosher experts, the OK certifies more than 
500,000 products, produced by over 2,500 companies.
4.4 To conclude
At this moment in time, proliferation of private schemes in the food sector is 
such that an all-encompassing inventory is no longer possible. However, what this 
chapter did achieve is to provide an overview of the systems that are currently 
most important and to show the richness and diversity of private regulation of 
the food sector.
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Figure 4.13. Logo of Organized Kashrus (OK) certif ication.
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the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. 
Official Journal of the European Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24.
EU, 2004. Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union L 139, 
30/4/2004: 1-54.
EU, 2005. Regulation (EC) No 183/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
January 2005 laying down requirements for feed hygiene. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 35, 8/2/2005: 1-22.
EU, 2008. Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 
2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the 
marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93. Official Journal of the 
European Union L 218, 13/8/2008: 30-47.
EU, 2010. Commission communication – EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union 
C 341, 16/12/2010: 5-11.
Parkes, G., Walmsley, S., Cambridge, T., Trumble, R., Clarke, S., Lamberts, D., Souter, D. and 
White C., 2009. Review of Fish Sustainability Information Schemes - Final Report, October 
2009. MRAG, London, UK. Available at: http://cels.uri.edu/urissi/docs/FSIG_Report.pdf.
Scholten-Verheijen, I., Appelhof, T. and Van der Meulen, B., 2011. Roadmap to EU food law. 
Eleven International Publishers, the Hague, the Netherlands.
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5. Codex Alimentarius and private standards
Spencer Henson and John Humphrey
5.1 Background
A key trend in the governance of global agri-food value chains in the last 10 to 
15 years is the increasing prevalence of private standards.186 Private firms and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have progressively laid down standards 
for food safety, food quality and environmental and social aspects of agri-food 
production, which are generally linked in turn to processes of second or third 
party certification.187 While not subject to the same legal processes of enforcement 
as public regulations, it is argued that market forces can make compliance with 
private standards mandatory in practice.188 Thus, in the sphere of food safety 
on which we focus here, many global agri-food value chains are governed by an 
array of public and private standards, which are variously interconnected and 
play a leadership role in driving the implementation of food safety controls.189
The evolution of private food safety standards has raised profound questions about 
the role of public and private institutions in governing food safety. Embedded in 
this dialogue are concerns about the legitimacy of private modes of governance 
where public regulation has been the dominant institution190 with accusations 
that they are not risk-based and fail to adhere to basic democratic norms.191 More 
generally, there are concerns that private standards could undermine processes 
of public policy-making in the area of food safety, both within nation states and 
trans-nationally.
186 Jaffee, S. and Henson, S.J., 2004. Standards and agri-food exports from developing countries: 
rebalancing the debate. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3348, The World Bank, Washington, 
DC, USA; OECD, 2004. Private standards and the shaping of the agri-food system. OECD, Paris, France.
187 Busch, L., Thiagarajan, D., Hatanaka, M., Bain, C., Flores, L. and Frahm, M., 2005. The relationship of 
third-party certification (TPC) to sanitary/phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the international agri-food 
trade: final report. RAISE SPS Global Analytical Report 9, USAID, Washington, DC, USA. 
188 Henson, S.J., 2007. The role of public and private standards in regulating international food markets. 
Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development 4(1): 52-66.
189 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on the public standards-setting process. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part 
II, Rome, Codex Alimentarius Commission; Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2010. Understanding the 
complexities of private standards in global agri-food chains as they impact developing countries. Journal 
of Development Studies 46(9): 1628-1646.
190 Henson, S.J. and Caswell, J.A., 1999. Food safety regulation: an overview of contemporary issues. 
Food Policy 24(6): 589-603.
191 See for example, Fuchs, D. and Kalfagianni, A., 2010. The democratic legitimacy of private authority in 
the food chain. In: Porter, T. and Ronit, K. (eds.) The challenges of global business authority: democratic 
renewal, stalemate or decay? State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, USA, pp. 65-88. 
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In the global context, the rise of private standards has been seen as a challenge 
to the position of established international institutions that lay down rules for 
the promulgation of public food safety regulations, notably the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC).192 While the 
trade effects of private standards have been raised within the WTO, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to whether it has any legal jurisdiction over private 
standardisation activities.193 Within Codex, significant anxiety has been expressed 
that the rapid pervasion of private food safety standards is serving to undermine 
the Commission’s role in establishing science-based standards, guidelines and 
recommendations that guide national rule-making and provide the legal reference 
point for the SPS Agreement.194 A number of developing country members of the 
WTO and/or Codex, have been the predominant ‘voice’ behind these concerns. 
Thus, private standards have been discussed at each of the last three sessions of 
the CAC195, for example, although no clear conclusions have been reached and 
action around this issue appears to have stalled.
Private standards are remarkably varied with respect to who they are developed by, 
who adopts them, the parameters of agri-food systems they address, etc. Reflecting 
this diversity, there has been a lack of clarity about which standards count as 
‘private’, the functions they perform and the potential impacts that they have.196 
There is often also a failure to appreciate the distinctions and inter-relationships 
between public regulations and private standards. This lack of clarity has served to 
cloud debates about the impacts of private standards and the trajectory we might 
expect in their future evolution, and has tended to throw all private standards into 
the same (often negative) basket. This chapter attempts to add some coherence 
to this debate, by providing a reasoned analysis of how and why private standards 
have evolved and, in particular, reflecting on the implications for the role of 
the international standards promulgated by organisations such as Codex.197 The 
particular focus is on private standards relating to food safety, whilst recognising 
that private standards also govern other attributes of agri-food products.
192 Henson, S.J., 2007. The role of public and private standards in regulating international food markets. 
Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development 4(1): 52-66.
193 Roberts, M.T., 2009. Private standards and multilateral trade rules. Paper prepared for FAO, Rome, Italy.
194 See for example Roberts, D. and Unnevehr, L.J., 2005. Resolving trade disputes arising from trends 
in food safety regulation: the role of the multilateral governance framework. World Trade Review 4(3): 
469-497.
195 CAC, 2008. Report of the 31st Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 08/31/
REP. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy; CAC, 2009. Report of the 32nd Session of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 09/32/REP. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy; CAC, 
2010. Report of the 33rd Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 10/33/REP. Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
196 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2010. Understanding the complexities of private standards in global 
agri-food chains as they impact developing countries. Journal of Development Studies 46(9): 1628-1646.
197 In so doing, it draws heavily on a report by Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts 
of private food safety standards on the food chain and on the public standards-setting process. Paper 
prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
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5.2 Nature of private food safety standards
Before reflecting on what private standards mean for Codex, it is important to 
recognise the institutional forms they take and how and why they have evolved 
over time. Private standards have emerged as an important mode of market 
governance in many industrialised countries.198 This is particularly true of the 
agri-food sector, where they have increasingly pervaded both domestic business and 
international trade. These standards may relate to food safety and the integrity of 
food safety systems, but can also refer to other food attributes, such as provenance, 
environmental impact, animal welfare, etc.
One of the defining characteristics of these private standards, particularly as 
they relate to food safety, is an increasing focus on the processes by which food 
is produced. Such ‘process’ standards necessarily involve the following:
• They provide a basis for making claims about processes and practices relating 
to how food is produced, transported or processed.
• They necessarily involve some form of monitoring and enforcement, through 
second or (increasingly) third party certification.
• They are codified into a written statement that sets out rules and procedures and 
provides clear instructions as to how rules are to be implemented, monitored 
and enforced.
• They include some form of traceability to link particular food products at some 
point downstream in the value chain to the point of at which the standard 
specifies and controls processes.
Critically, private standards involve not only a specification of what outcomes are 
to be achieved, but also sets of rules to show how this should be accomplished, a 
governance structure of certification and enforcement, as well as systems to generate 
and approve changes to each of these elements as the standards evolve over time. It 
is for this reason that some bodies involved in setting and/or administering private 
standards, such as the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), refer to ‘schemes’ rather 
than standards. This has important implications for Codex and, more generally, 
the relationship between public regulations and private standards.
198 See for example: Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2010. Understanding the complexities of private 
standards in global agri-food chains as they impact developing countries. Journal of Development 
Studies 46(9): 1628-1646; Humphrey, J., 2008. Private standards, small farmers and donor policy: 
EUREPGAP in Kenya. IDS Working Paper 308, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK; Jaffee, 
S. and Henson, S.J., 2004. Standards and agri-food exports from developing countries: rebalancing the 
debate. Policy Research Working Paper 3348, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA; OECD, 2004. 
Private standards and the shaping of the agri-food system, Paris, France; World Bank, 2005. Food safety 
and agricultural health standards: challenges and opportunities for developing country exports. Report 
31207, The World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Trade Unit, Washington, DC, 
USA.
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In the literature, the terms ‘private standards’ and ‘voluntary standards’ are 
frequently used interchangeably. Indeed, private standards developed collectively 
by private sector actors are frequently referred to as ‘private voluntary standards’.199 
Implicitly this equates the actions of public authorities with rules backed by legal 
sanctions,200 leaving the territory of voluntary standards to non-governmental 
entities.201 In practice, this distinction is not so stark. Governments may promulgate 
standards with which compliance is voluntary, or conversely, they may require 
compliance with private standards. Indeed, there is a decided ‘blurring’ of traditional 
governance roles in the agri-food system, suggesting the emergence of a continuum 
between public and private modes of regulation.202
To provide clarification, Table 5.1 distinguishes between mandatory and voluntary 
standards, and between standards set by public and private entities.203 Here, private 
standards are represented by the right-hand column; they are standards that are 
set by commercial or non-commercial private entities, including firms, industry 
organisations and NGOs. In turn, the extent to which private standards are truly 
voluntary depends on the form and level of power wielded by the entities adopting 
those standards; that is the nature of the entities requiring that the standard be 
implemented by other value chain actors.204 Private standards can be adopted by 
non-state (private) actors; even if they become de facto mandatory in a commercial 
sense through adoption by dominant market actors, there is no legal penalty from 
199 See for example OECD, 2004. Private standards and the shaping of the agri-food system, Paris, France.
200 Black, J., 2002. Critical reflections on regulation, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK; Havinga, T., 2006. Private regulation of food 
safety by supermarkets. Law and Policy 28(4): 515-533.
201 The distinction between single-company private standards and private standards developed by 
coalitions of private actors will be discussed below.
202 Havinga, T., 2006. Private regulation of food safety by supermarkets. Law and Policy 28(4): 515-533; 
Havinga, T., 2008. Actors in private food regulation: taking responsibility or passing the buck to someone 
else? Paper presented at the symposium Private Governance in the Global Agro-Food System, Munster, 
Germany, 23-25 April 2008.
203 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2008. Understanding the complexities of private standards in global 
agri-food chains. Paper presented at the workshop Globalization, Global Governance and Private Standards, 
University of Leuven, Belgium, November 2008; Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of 
private food safety standards on the food chain and on the public standards-setting process. Paper prepared 
for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
204 Brunsson, N. and Jacobsson, B., 2000. The contemporary expansion of standardization. In: Brunsson, 
N. and Jacobsson, B. (eds.) A world of standards. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 1-17.
Table 5.1. Forms of standards.
Public Private
Mandatory regulations legally-mandated private standards
Voluntary public voluntary standards private voluntary standards
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non-compliance. However, private standards can also be adopted by state actors 
and invested with statutory power. In this case, compliance is mandatory. We 
refer to these as legally-mandated private standards.205
With respect to the middle column in Table 5.1, public standards, the most familiar 
form is the regulations promulgated by governments that are mandatory within 
the sphere of competence of the government. However, governments also promote 
standards that are voluntary, which have elsewhere been termed ‘optional laws’.206 
The Food Safety Enhancement Programme (FSEP) in Canada is one example.207 
While governments may put in place compelling incentives for compliance with 
such public voluntary standards, including the threat of regulation should an 
industry not ‘regulate itself’ through their implementation, in a legal sense there 
is no compulsion.208
Following the classification of the WTO with respect to private (voluntary) standards, 
three forms of private agri-food standard are distinguished in Table 5.2 according 
to the institutional and geographical characteristics of the entities that generate 
them.209 This table provides a non-exhaustive list of private standards in four 
European countries as illustration:
• Individual company standards. These are set by individual firms, predominantly 
large food retailers, and adopted across their global supply chains. They are 
frequently communicated to consumers as sub-brands on own label products. 
Examples include Tesco’s Nature’s Choice and Carrefour’s Filières Qualité. 
These standards frequently include food safety elements, but when presented 
to consumers they tend to emphasise non-safety aspects, such as environmental 
impact.
• Collective national standards. These standards are set by collective organisations 
that operate within the boundaries of individual countries. These organisations 
can represent the interests of commercial entities (for example food retailers, 
processors or producers) or be NGOs. These and other entities are then free 
to adopt the established standards if they so wish. It is important to note that 
205 This process is seen, for example, with the referencing of ISO 9000 in EU directives covering CE 
marking for telecommunications and electronic products.
206 Brunsson, N. and Jacobsson, B., 2000. The contemporary expansion of standardization. In: Brunsson, 
N. and Jacobsson, B. (eds.) A world of standards. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 1-17.
207 Martinez, M.G., Fearne, A., Caswell, J.A. and Henson, S.J., 2007. Co-regulation as a possible model 
for food safety governance: opportunities for public-private partnerships. Food Policy 32(2): 299-314.
208 The position of a particular standard within the grid in Table 4.1 may change over time. It is not 
uncommon for standards to migrate between cells. For example, the Safe Quality Food (SQF) series of 
standards was originally developed by the Government of Western Australia, which we would categorise 
as a public voluntary standard, but these were subsequently acquired by the Food Marketing Institute, 
an industry organisation representing the US food retail and wholesale sectors, implying reclassification 
as a private voluntary standard.
209 This typology aims to present the dominant forms of private standards, but given the various forms 
taken by private standards, is necessarily incomplete.
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some of these standards are inherently national, while others have international 
reach. Collective national standards may be specifically designed to establish 
claims about food from particular countries or regions. For example, the UK 
Farm Assured British Beef and Lamb scheme sustains claims about the superior 
attributes (safety, quality, environmental impact, etc.) of conforming products 
as a means of differentiation against imports. As a result, they are usually 
‘visible’ to the consumer though labels and trademarks. Other standards are 
national in character only because they have been developed by national 
agencies, but may have international reach through the global supply chains 
of their adopters. An example is the British Retail Consortium (BRC) Global 
Standard for Food Safety.
• Collective international standards: This category of private standard is often 
defined by its reach; that it is intentionally designed to be adopted by firms or 
other entities in different countries. This frequently means that the organisation 
that sets the standard has international membership. For example, GlobalGAP 
(formerly EurepGAP) was initially created by an international coalition of 
Table 5.2. Examples of private standards in agri-food chains.1
Individual firm 
standards
Collective national 
standards
Collective international 
standards
• Nature’s Choice (Tesco)
• Filières Qualité (Carrefour) 
– version applied in multiple 
countries
• Field-to-Fork (Marks & 
Spencer)
• Filière Controlleé (Auchan) 
– version applied in multiple 
countries
• P.Q.C. (Percorso Qualità 
Conad)
• Albert Heijn BV: AH 
Excellent
• Assured Food Standards 
(UK)
• British Retail Consortium 
Global Standard
• Freedom Food (UK)
• Qualität Sicherheit (QS)
• Assured Combinable Crops 
Scheme (UK)
• Farm Assured British Beef 
and Lamb
• Sachsens Ahrenwort
• Sachsen 
Qualitätslammfleisch
• QC Emilia Romagna
• Stichting Streekproduction 
Vlaams Brabant
• GlobalGAP
• International Food Standard
• Safe Quality Food (SQF) 
1000/ 2000
• Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC)
• Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC)
1 Based on WTO, 2007. Private standards and the SPS agreement, note by the Secretariat, G/SPS/GEN/746, 
WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Geneva, Switzerland, with additional examples 
from Aragrande, M., Segre, A., Gentile, E., Malorgio, G., Giraud Heraud, E., Robles, R., Halicka, E., Loi, A. 
and Bruni, M., 2005. Food supply chains dynamics and quality certification, final report. EU DG Joint Research 
Centre, Brussels, Belgium.
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European retailers, whilst the International Food Standard (IFS) is set by German 
and French retailers. Such standard-setting organisations may have non-business 
actors, as with the Forest Stewardship Council.
Critically, the private standards landscape is highly dynamic, with new forms of 
standard emerging, which in turn induce changes in the relative importance of 
particular forms of standard. For example, a number of large UK food retailers 
established their own private standards in the early 1990s and employed second or 
third party audits of their suppliers in order to assess compliance.210 Later, many 
of these retailers participated in the promulgation of a collective national standard, 
the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety. More recently, the scope of collective 
private standards has tended to become international rather than national, as is 
seen with GlobalGAP and the International Food Standard (IFS), and at the same 
time national firm or collective standards are increasingly benchmarked through the 
GFSI. While these processes have driven broad trends of collective action and the 
internationalisation of private standards, at the same time individual firm standards 
have emerged in new spaces of product and process attribute standardisation.
While it is important to recognise the institutional nature of the entities involved in 
establishing private standards in the agri-food sector, comprehending the different 
functions involved in making a standard operational is perhaps more critical. In 
this regard, we can define five specific functions:
• Standard-setting. The introduction and operationalisation of a standard through 
the formulation of written rules and procedures.
• Adoption. A decision by an entity to adopt the standard. This can take various 
forms. A private company can adopt a standard by requiring implementation 
by its suppliers. This could be a standard developed by the company itself, or 
one it helped to develop, for example as part of a standards-setting coalition, 
or a standard created by another body. Equally, groups of producers can 
develop a standard which they themselves adopt. The decision to adopt is an 
important driver of the spread and influence of private standards. This stage of 
standards development is sometimes under-emphasised in the categorisation of 
standards. For example, recent typologies of standards that identify the actors 
that define and implement standards211, but not actors that adopt them, do 
not sufficiently recognise the way in which standards are integrally related to 
increasing globalised agribusiness value chains.
• Implementation. The implementation of the rule is carried out by the organisation 
that is conforming to the standard. This will not be the standards-setter. In the 
210 Henson, S.J. and Northen, J.R., 1998. Economic determinants of food safety controls in the supply 
of retailer own-branded products in the UK. Agribusiness 14(2): 113-126.
211 See for example WTO, 2007. Considerations relevant to private standards in the field of animal health, 
food safety and animal welfare. Submission by the World Organisation for Animal Health, G/SPS/
GEN/822, WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Geneva, Switzerland.
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case of a standard like the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, the implementer 
is the company that applies the standard in its own operations.
• Conformity assessment. This involves the procedures employed to verify that 
those claiming to comply with the standard and provide documented evidence 
to show that this is the case. There are various means of assessing conformity, 
including self-declaration by the implementer of the standard, inspection by 
the standards adopter (so-called second-party certification) and inspection by a 
third party (so-called third party certification). Third-party certification carried 
out by independent certification bodies has become the norm for many private 
food safety standards. We term these certification-based private standards. 
Standards schemes include processes for recognising the certification bodies 
that are allowed to verify compliance.
• Enforcement. This refers to the approaches employed in response to non-
compliance and sanctions if corrective action is not taken. The standard setter 
has to have some procedure for responding to the results of the conformity 
assessment, either by invoking corrective action or withdrawing the recognition 
of the organisation as conforming to the standard.
These functions may be carried out by public or private entities according to the 
nature of the standard (Table 5.3). In the case of regulations, all of the functions 
(aside from implementation) are typically undertaken by the public sector. With 
voluntary public standards and mandatory private standards, these functions can 
be divided between the public and private sectors. Such divisions, however, are 
Table 5.3. Functions associated with standards schemes.
Function Regulations Public 
voluntary 
standards
Legally-
mandated 
private 
standards
Private 
voluntary 
standards
Standard-setting legislature and/or 
public regulator
legislature and/or 
public regulator
commercial or 
non-commercial 
private body
commercial or 
non-commercial 
private body
Adoption legislature and/or 
public regulator
private firms or 
organisations
legislature and/or 
public regulator
private firms or 
organisations
Implementation private firms and 
public bodies
private firms private firms private firms
Conformity 
assessment
official 
inspectorate
public/private 
auditor
public/private 
auditor
private auditor
Enforcement criminal or 
administrative 
courts
public/private 
certification body
criminal or 
administrative 
courts
private 
certification body
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not hard and fast. Thus, new conceptualisations of regulation are ceding a role 
for the private sector, for example through private firms undertaking conformity 
assessment on their own compliance with public regulations.212 Even private 
standards, for which these functions are predominantly undertaken by non-state 
entities, may build on the public standards infrastructure through their use of 
accreditation bodies to govern certifiers and the specification of public laboratories 
to be used in product testing.213
The distinction between standard setting and adoption also clarifies the issue 
of compulsion and obligation. First, it is possible for private standards to be 
made mandatory by public bodies. This is the situation with legally-mandated 
private standards. An example is obligations placed on companies to have relevant 
production processes certified to ISO 9000 before products can be imported into 
the European Union (EU). Second, there are situations where companies freely 
adopt private standards, either because they see this as a signal to potential buyers 
or because it promotes firm efficiency. Third, while private standards not adopted 
by public bodies remain voluntary in that there is no legal compulsion to comply, 
they can become quasi-mandatory if powerful companies, alone or en masse, 
make the standard a condition of entry to their supply chains. Concentration in 
global food retailing and processing may increase this tendency. It is this type 
of relationship along the value chain that drives much of the development of 
private standards.
5.3  Trends in the development and functions of private 
food safety standards
Having recognised the diversity of private standards and the often blurred 
distinctions between regulations and private standards, we now turn to the 
questions of why private standards have emerged as an increasingly dominant 
mode of governance of attributes such as food safety and what has driven this 
process. There appear to be four key factors here:214
• Business responses to increasing consumer and government concerns about food 
safety, notably in the wake of a history of food safety scares that have undermined 
public confidence in established controls in many industrialised countries.215
212 Havinga, T., 2006. Private regulation of food safety by supermarkets. Law and Policy 28(4): 515-533.
213 Further, standards such as GlobalGAP involve selected national certification bodies for processes 
involved in benchmarking of national standards to the global standard (Sheehan, K., 2007. Benchmarking 
of Gap schemes, EUREPGAP Asia conference, Bangkok, 6-7 September 2007. Available at: http://www.
globalgap.org/cms/upload/Resources/Presentations/Bangkok/3_K_Sheehan.pdf).
214 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2010. Understanding the complexities of private standards in global 
agri-food chains as they impact developing countries. Journal of Development Studies 46(9): 1628-1646. 
215 Jaffee, S. and Henson, S.J., 2004. Standards and agri-food exports from developing countries: 
rebalancing the debate. Policy Research Working Paper 3348, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.
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• Progressive changes in the expectations and demands of consumers with respect 
to the safety and quality attributes of food, reflecting broader demographic 
and social trends.216 These attributes include the manner in which products 
are produced and the existence of substances in food that are perceived to 
be risky, including those purposefully used in food production (for example 
pesticides) and contaminants (for example dioxins). Thus, food safety is no 
longer defined simply as ‘fit for human consumption’, but rather in terms of 
a wider array of safety and quality attributes that range from search, through 
experience, to credence attributes.217
• The globalisation of agri-food chains whereby supply chains for agricultural 
and food products increasingly extend beyond national boundaries, in part 
facilitated by new food, communications and transportation technologies and a 
more liberal trade environment.218 Global sourcing creates new sources of risk 
as food is subject to greater transformation and transportation, while supply 
chains are increasingly fragmented across enterprises, production systems, 
environments and regulatory frameworks.
• The shift in responsibility for food safety from the public to the private sector, 
which has both driven and ceded a space for private ‘regulation’.219 This reflects 
a broad political trend towards more liberalised markets in many industrialised 
countries, and also a change in the philosophy of food regulation.220
These four trends have combined to create an environment in which businesses 
are under increasing pressure to deliver food safety and to maintain the integrity 
of their brands. They need to do this in the face of increasingly globalised and 
216 Buzby, J., Frenzen, P.D. and Rasco, B., 2001. Product liability and microbial food-borne illness. 
Agricultural Economic Report 828, United States Department of Agriculture, Economics Research 
Service, Washington, DC, USA; Jaffee, S. and Henson, S.J., 2004. Standards and agri-food exports from 
developing countries: rebalancing the debate. Policy Research Working Paper 3348, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC, USA.
217 Reardon, T., Codron, J.-M., Busch, L., Bingen, J. and Harris, C., 2001. Global change in agrifood 
grades and standards: agribusiness strategic responses in developing countries. International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Review 2(3): 421-435.
218 Nadvi, K. and Waltring, F., 2003. Making sense of global standards. In: Schmitz, H. (ed.), Local 
enterprises in the global economy: issues of governance and upgrading. Elgar, Cheltenham, UK; OECD, 
2004. Private standards and the shaping of the agri-food system. OECD, Paris, France; Henson, S.J. and 
Reardon, T., 2005. Private agri-food standards: implications for food policy and the agri-food system. Food 
Policy 30(3): 241-253; Fulponi, L., 2005. Private voluntary standards in the food system: the perspective 
of major food retailers in OECD countries. Food Policy 30(2): 115-128.
219 EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of 
Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of 
Food Safety. Official Journal of the European Communities, 1 February 2002.
220 For example, the preamble to the European Union’s General Food Law states that: ‘a food business 
operator is best placed to devise a safe system for supplying food and ensuring that the food it supplies 
is safe; thus, it should have primary legal responsibility for ensuring food safety.’ (EU, 2002. Regulation 
(EC) No 178/2002 Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing 
the European Food Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety. Official 
Journal of the European Communities, 1 February 2002).
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complex food supply chains. Private standards are part of the response to this 
challenge. The key role of standards, whether public or private, mandatory or 
voluntary, is to facilitate the coordination of agri-food value chains across space 
and between producers/firms and, in so doing, to transmit credible information 
on the nature of products and the conditions under which they are produced, 
processed and transported.221 In other words, one of the primary functions of 
private standards relating to food safety is risk management. This means providing 
a level of assurance that a product is in compliance with defined minimum product 
and/or process requirements.
Many of the assurances over food safety that firms strive to deliver are defined 
by regulations. This is particularly the case with levels of contaminants such as 
pesticides, where critical limits are defined by legal Maximum Residue Levels 
(MRLs), but also more general aspects of hygiene where legal norms allocate 
liability in the event of food safety failures. Further, private standards can only 
operate in an environment of credible infrastructure (for example laboratories) and 
recognised processes (for example HACCP) that are built around public standards 
at the national and/or international levels. Which begs the question, why are 
private standards needed at all? And perhaps more critically, why have profit-
oriented firms invested resources in their design, adoption, implementation and 
enforcement?
One explanation for this effort, which ironically is also why national regulators 
and international standards-setting bodies such as Codex are concerned about 
their rise, is that private standards lay down requirements that are in some way 
in excess of legal requirements. Thus, it is important to understand precisely in 
which respects this is the case in practice. We would suggest that there are three 
dimensions to this:
• The standard sets stricter requirements with respect to particular food product 
attributes, whether by extending these requirements and/or by setting lower 
thresholds. For example, the Field to Fork standard of the UK retailer Marks 
and Spencer specifically prohibits residues of around 70 pesticides in fruit and 
vegetables that are sold fresh or used as ingredients in the manufacture of 
prepared foods to be sold under the firm’s own label.222 This is the dimension 
on which critics of private standards tend to focus.
221 Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H., 2000. Governance and upgrading: linking industrial cluster and 
global value chain research. IDS Working Paper 120, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK; 
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H., 2001. Governance in global value chains. IDS Bulletin 32(3): 19-29; 
Humphrey, J., 2008. Private standards, small farmers and donor policy: EUREPGAP in Kenya, IDS 
Working Paper 308, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK; Henson, S.J. and Jaffee, S., 2008 
Understanding developing country strategic responses to the enhancement of food safety standards. 
The World Economy 31(1): 1-15.
222 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on the public standards-setting process. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part 
II, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy. 
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• The standard lays down more specific instructions as to how to achieve 
desired end-product attributes and/or how to operationalise particular 
process parameters. We would argue that this is the most important function 
of private standards in the area of food safety. In many cases regulations and/
or international standards lay down the basic parameters of a food safety 
control system, while private standards elaborate on what this system should 
‘look like’ in order to be effective. For example, the Codes of Practice and 
Guidelines of Codex specify what controls need to be in place in food processing 
operations, but do not provide specific instructions on what these might look 
like in practice and/or how they might be monitored so as to ensure effective 
enforcement. This ‘gap’ is filled by the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, 
IFS and SQF 2000 (for example) that lay down very detailed and auditable 
instructions on the specific controls to be in place. Here, the predominant 
aim of private standards is to provide for a level of protection against food 
safety failures beyond that inherent in regulations and associated systems 
of enforcement, and in a way that is consistent across supply chains that are 
increasingly global and so traverse regulatory jurisdictions.
• The standard extends the range of process controls beyond that required by 
regulations, vertically and/or horizontally. Increased vertical coverage, for 
example, might mean extending traceability requirements beyond the ‘one 
up, one down’ requirement of legislation. Alternatively, standards can extend 
requirements horizontally. Thus, GlobalGAP not only lays down requirements 
for food safety, but also sustainability and worker rights, which lay outside of 
the purview of current regulatory requirements.
Implementing a system of conformity assessment that provides a greater level of 
oversight than is afforded by prevailing systems of regulatory enforcement involves 
two elements. First, the predominant use of third party certification that takes 
both the standards adopter and the standards implementer out of the conformity 
assessment process.223 This allows for an independent system of conformity 
assessment against an agreed and objective protocol. Second, the application 
of a governance structure and support system that ensures this system of third 
party certification works effectively. Examples include processes for certifier 
approval, complaint handling, compliance monitoring, etc. The parameters for 
this governance structure are largely laid down by the international standards 
developed by ISO.
Thus, we see that private standards in the realm of risk management are multi-
layered ‘schemes’ consisting of the standard per se, systems of certification and 
a standards and conformity assessment governance structure. While private 
223 There are some exceptions here. In the case of private standards organisations and companies (see 
below), conformity assessment tends to be undertaken through second party certification, which is 
using the certifier’s own auditing staff.
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standards, notably for food safety, do lay down requirements that are ‘additional’ 
to legal requirements, the predominant focus of these is regulatory compliance. 
At the same time, standards directed at risk management are progressively 
encompassing a broader range of attributes that may lie outside of the realm of 
regulatory requirements.
These concerns with regulatory compliance and the mechanisms to achieve them 
are not, in fact, restricted to the private sector. The EU establishes specific conditions 
for importing food from Third Countries that require the competent authority 
in these countries to demonstrate that their food safety systems offer equivalent 
levels of safety to those provided by EU legislation224. In so doing, the EU is also 
going beyond Codex norms. Inspections and subsequent recommendations by 
the EU Food and Veterinary Office provide for monitoring of the efficacy of the 
enforcement system in Third Countries and impose penalties for non-compliance. 
Here, as with many private standards, the issue is not the process standards 
themselves, but how effectively compliance is monitored and enforced.
However, private standards can address issues that are not covered at all by public 
regulations. One motive for doing this is product differentiation. Standards can 
be adopted to support claims to consumers that products have certain desirable 
characteristics. Generally speaking, claims about credence characteristics225 are 
backed up by standards which provide a credible basis for these claims. Examples 
include fair trade, animal welfare, etc. There is relatively little evidence, however, 
that private standards aim to achieve product differentiation on the basis of food 
safety, except perhaps as part of a blend of product and process attributes cutting 
across environmental protection, ethical and social issues and food safety. Most of 
the major European food retailers, for example, recognise that market competition 
on the basis of food safety is likely to erode consumer confidence. More often, 
food safety claims are bundled with other claims. For example, Tesco’s Nature’s 
Choice standard is being used to support a broader branding strategy ‘Nurture’ that 
differentiates fresh fruit and vegetables from those sold by other UK food retailers, 
predominantly on the basis of environmental protection.226 At the same time, 
private standards can be employed to present additional guarantees to consumers 
about the safety of the food at the sectoral rather than the firm level. Thus, the 
origin of produce-origin standards, such as the UK’s ‘Red Tractor’ label, lies in the 
damage to consumer confidence caused by previous food scares.
224 See for example, EU, 2004. Corrigendum to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on Official Controls Performed to Ensure the Verification of 
Compliance with Feed and Food Law, Animal Health and Animal Welfare Rules. Official Journal of the 
European Union, 28 May 2004, Article 48.
225 Attributes of a product that cannot be verified through direct examination pre or post-consumption.
226 See http://www.tesco.com/nurture/?page=nurturevalues.
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The foregoing discussion suggests that the predominant focus of private standards 
in the realm of food safety is risk management, predominantly motivated by the 
need of dominant players in the value chain to achieve a higher level of assurance 
with respect to regulatory compliance. This generally involves the development 
and/or adoption of private standards that drive the implementation of more rigorous 
process controls, either reinforcing regulatory requirements at a particular level 
of the value chain or extending process controls along the value chain. The main 
adopters of these private standards are dominant buyers, predominantly large 
food retailers and food service companies. Where attempts to differentiate on the 
basis of food safety are observed, private standards are generally developed and 
implemented further up the value chain, notably in production, as a means to 
communicate to consumers that food of a particular origin or from a particular 
system of production is safe. It is not unsurprising, therefore, that private food 
safety standards have come to be developed collectively.
5.4 Role of Codex in the context of private standards
Having set out the ways in which private standards have evolved and the roles 
these perform in the governance of food safety, we now turn to the functions of 
Codex in general and specifically in the context of private standards. It is only 
through an understanding of the work that Codex does that we can begin to 
assess whether private standards do indeed undermine established international 
standards, as some fear.
While the work of Codex is generally described in terms of standards-setting, it 
is more useful to think about its activities as defining a set of rules within which 
national governments establish their own regulatory requirements.227 It is possible 
to discern three distinct types of rule in this regard (Table 5.4). Thus, Codex 
standards, guidelines and recommendations both provide guidance to governments 
and also act as the reference point for compliance with obligations under the 
WTO. ISO standards play a similar and often complementary role. At the same 
time, Codex principles provide guidance, and set rules, for the development and 
implementation of private standards. Indeed, many private food safety standards 
make explicit reference to Codex Standards, guidelines and recommendations 
(for example SQF 2000).
The first group in Table 5.4 refers to rules about products. For example, Codex has 
established a rule on veterinary drugs in meat that provides recommendations 
on maximum residue levels for veterinary drugs.228 This product standard can 
227 Humphrey, J., 2008. Private standards, small farmers and donor policy: EUREPGAP in Kenya, IDS 
Working Paper 308, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK.
228 CAC, 2006. Maximum residue limits for veterinary drugs in foods: updated as at the 29th session of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy. 
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also be thought of as an outcome standard; the outputs of a food safety system 
should result in a residue of this particular veterinary drug being no greater than 
the recommended limit. Note also that Codex defines rules (or recommendations) 
about methods of analysis and sampling for veterinary drugs in food. In other 
words, as well as defining rules about product characteristics, it also suggests ways 
in which these rules should be implemented through testing procedures. These 
rules have no direct legal force. They are recommendations aimed primarily at 
governments to guide their own rule-making. The legal implications of these 
recommendations lie in the SPS Agreement, which leaves regulations not based 
on these recommendations open to challenge within the WTO if they cannot be 
demonstrated to be justified by science-based risk assessment.
Within this first group of rules, Codex also has set product standards that are more 
concerned with establishing common reference points.229 The issue here is not 
whether one reference point is better than another, but that everyone uses the 
same reference point in order to facilitate transactions, interfaces between products, 
etc. These can include definitions of products and terminology, for example.
229 David, P.A., 1995. standardization policies for network technologies: the flux between freedom 
and order revisited. In: Hawkins, R., Mansell, R. and Skea, J. (eds.), Standards, innovation, and 
competitiveness: the politics and economics of standards in national and technical environments. 
Edward Elgar, Aldershot, UK, pp. 15-35.
Table 5.4. Three types of rules promulgated by Codex Alimentarius.1
Codex standards
• Referring to specific commodities – standards for specific products
• Referring to ranges of commodities – standards for ranges of products
• Methods of sampling and analysis
Codex codes of practice for production, processing, manufacturing, 
transport and storage
• For individual foods
• For groups of foods
• General principles for all products, such as the Codex General Principles of Food Hygiene
Codex guidelines
• Principles that set out policy in key areas
• Guidelines for the interpretation of these principles or for the interpretation of other 
Codex standards
• Interpretative Codex guidelines for labelling and claims about food
• Guidelines for interpreting Codex principles for food import and export inspection and 
certification, etc.
1 CAC, 1997. Understanding the Codex Alimentarius. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
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The second group in Table 5.4 refers to Codex codes of practice for production, 
processing, manufacturing, transport and storage. These are the meta-standards 
that are incorporated into specific standards that relate to processes; the means by 
which products are produced, handled and processed along the value chain. Process 
controls have three main objectives. First, they provide a means of controlling 
quality and safety in a way that is more efficacious and cost-efficient than testing.230 
Second, process standards are a means of controlling for food safety hazards 
that are either impossible or very difficult to detect, such that the most effective 
approach is to implement food safety and hygiene controls at source to reduce 
the risk of contamination. Third, they facilitate the monitoring and control of 
characteristics that are extrinsic to the product; which have no physical presence 
in the product and so are not revealed by inspection.
The Codex codes of practice for production, processing, manufacturing, transport 
and storage referred to in Table 5.4 are frequently expressed in guidelines that have 
been drawn from best practice on food safety, codified by Codex and incorporated 
into numerous specific standards. These meta-standards include Good Agricultural 
Practice (GAP) and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), which are then adopted by 
both private standards setters and governments.231 For example, the Recommended 
International Code of Practice – General Principles of Food Hygiene has evidently 
formed the basis of many private food safety standards for food processing232, 
including the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, IFS and SQF 2000, and also 
the GFSI Guidance Document for the benchmarking of such standards. Likewise, 
ISO 22000 substantively defines a HACCP-based food safety management system 
in accordance with Codex guidelines.233
The third group of Codex guidelines listed in Table4.4 are more general, setting 
out principles and providing guidelines for interpreting principles. In effect, these 
are rules that specify the ways in which food safety rules are formulated and 
implemented; for example, inspection and controls on imports and/or exports. 
They are addressed to governments, but many private food safety standards are 
constructed around these same principles. There are at least three reasons for this. 
First, these guidelines represent best practice, and private firms often participate in 
230 Unnevehr, L., 2000. Food safety issues and fresh food product exports from LDCs. Agricultural 
Economics 23(3): 231-240.
231 Busch, L., Thiagarajan, D., Hatanaka, M., Bain, C., Flores, L. and Frahm, M., 2005. The relationship 
of third-party certification (TPC) to sanitary/phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the international agri-
food trade: Final Report, RAISE SPS Global Analytical Report 9, USAID, Washington, DC, USA; Henson, 
S.J., 2007. The role of public and private standards in regulating international food markets. Journal of 
International Agricultural Trade and Development 4(1): 52-66.
232 WTO, 2007. Private Standards and the SPS Agreement, note by the Secretariat, G/SPS/GEN/746. 
WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Geneva, Switzerland.
233 WTO, 2007. Submission by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) to the SPS 
Committee Meeting 28 February, 1 March 2007, G/SPS/GEN/750, WTO, Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Geneva, Switzerland.
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their formulation through their membership of bodies such as the ISO or through 
their participation in national Codex committees and/or International NGOs 
recognised by Codex that participate in Commission meetings. Second, private 
voluntary standards for food safety are often responses to government regulations 
and are aimed at the same outcome. Third, by building on the framework of 
regulations rather than ‘reinventing the wheel’, the cost of formulating and 
enforcing private standards is reduced. Thus, private standards can use the facilities 
provided by public regulatory and standards infrastructures, for example recognition 
of laboratories or rules regulating certification bodies.
5.5 Do private standards jeopardise the work of Codex?
The rapid rise of private food safety standards has apparently sent ‘shock waves’ 
though public policy-makers, and especially those engaged in establishing 
international standards through organisations such as Codex234 and in the WTO. 
As noted above, private standards have been discussed extensively within Codex 
and the WTO’s SPS Committee. Further, Codex has commissioned two papers 
on the implications of private standards, with a particular focus on developing 
countries, and their compatibility with international standards.235
The concern is that private food safety standards are acting to supplant or weaken 
Codex’s role in establishing standards for food safety, and in turn the functioning 
of the SPS Agreement within the WTO. It is important here to recognise the 
wider context, with wider debates about the legitimacy of Codex and the extent 
to which its current governance structures are compatible with defining legal 
benchmarks for the purposes of the WTO, facilitating inclusiveness of decision-
making processes and elaborating standards in a timely manner.236 However, 
while it is understandable that public regulators may feel some discomfort at 
234 See for example: CAC, 2008. Report of the 31st Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
ALINORM 08/31/REP, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy; CAC, 2009. Report of the 32nd 
Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 09/32/REP, Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
Rome, Italy; CAC, 2010. Report of the 33rd Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 
10/33/REP, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy; WTO, 2008. Private Standards and the SPS 
Agreement, note by the Secretariat, G/SPS/GEN/746, WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Geneva, Switzerland; WTO, 2008. Report of the STDF Information Session on Private 
Standards, G/SPS/R/50, WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Geneva, Switzerland.
235 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on the public standards-setting process. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part 
II, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy; CAC, 2010. Consideration of the impact of private 
standards, CX/CAC 10/33/13. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
236 Henson, S.J., Preibisch, K.L. and Masakure, O., 2001. Enhancing developing country participation 
in international standards-setting organizations. Department for International Development London, 
UK; Rosman, L., 1993. Public participation in international pesticide regulation: when the Codex 
Commission decides, who will listen? Virginia Environmental Law Journal 12: 329-365; Livermore, 
M.A., 2006. Authority and legitimacy in global governance: deliberation, institutional differentiation 
and the Codex Alimentarius. New York University Law Review 81: 766-801.
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seeing their traditional monopoly over food safety governance being challenged, 
is there any real evidence that private standards are undermining international 
standards? We would argue that such concerns have their basis in false premises 
regarding why private standards have emerged as mechanisms of food safety 
governance, and the roles that national regulations and international standards 
play in this context.
Seeing Codex as an organisation that defines rules for the elaboration of public 
and private standards by other entities – member governments, firms and NGOs– 
suggests that Codex has, perhaps ironically, had a role in guiding the development 
of private standards. It has set out both a framework and common vocabulary 
that enables the developers and adopters of private standards across the globe 
to communicate with one another and to agree on what these standards should 
strive to achieve. More generally, Codex standards reflect current international 
consensus on food safety issues. In the same way that national regulations are 
formulated to build on and elaborate Codex guidelines, through turning rules 
into standards schemes, private standards setters interpret and elaborate Codex 
standards, guidelines and recommendations. Thus, Codex arguably serves to 
promote the legitimacy of private food safety standards and at the same time 
reduces the costs of standards development.
Private standards setters can thus be seen as translating the rules of Codex into 
standards that provide sufficient guidance for implementers to know what they are 
required to do in order to comply and also for conformity assessors to undertake an 
objective assessment of when compliance has been achieved. Indeed, this process 
of translation is necessary in order that such standards can be audited in a manner 
that is compatible with ISO guidelines.237 For example, Codex’s Recommended 
International Code of Practice – General Principles of Food Hygiene stipulates that 
a food safety system should enable traceability, while private standards such as the 
BRC Global Standard for Food Safety and IFS specify the substantive elements this 
system should contain, how this system should perform and how the effectiveness 
of this system should be monitored. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the 
report on private standards prepared for Codex by FAO and which was discussed 
at the Commission meeting in 2010 concluded that collective private food safety 
standards were largely consistent with Codex.238,239
It is important to recognise that the scope of many private food safety standards 
extends beyond single Codex standards, guidelines and recommendations, at 
237 For example, Guide 65 on General Requirements for Bodies Operating Product Certification Systems.
238 CAC, 2010. Consideration of the impact of private standards, CX/CAC 10/33/13, Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, Rome, Italy.
239 This report did, however, conclude that there was a tendency for private company standards to be 
more stringent than Codex standards, specifically with respect to numerical limits, for example on 
pesticide residues.
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times making it difficult to discern where and the extent to which there is a 
disconnect between the two. Thus, it is more accurate to see private food safety 
standard as substantively packaging multiple Codex standards, guidelines and 
recommendations, along with national legislation that will variously be based 
on these Codex documents. For example, the GFSI Guidance Document contains 
substantive elements of all of the following:240, 241
• Recommended International Code of Practice-General Principles of Food 
Hygiene 1969 Rev 4 2003.
• Principles for Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification, 1969.
• Guidelines for the Validation of Food Safety Control Measures, 2008.
• Principles for Traceability/Product Tracing as a Tool within a Food Inspection 
and Certification System, 2006.
Private food safety standards can be seen as defining a system around these core 
principles in terms of their substantive elements and how these are managed, 
and related systems of conformity assessment. The international standards of ISO 
provide many of the key principles (or rules) underlying these systems.
Of course private food safety standards do not confine themselves to areas where 
Codex has defined international standards, guidelines and recommendations. 
Here, private standards can be seen as filling a ‘void’ in international rules. This 
is seen, for example, with the GlobalGAP standard that defines requirements for 
GAP in primary production where international and national regulatory standards 
are scarce. It should be recognised, however, that a major driver behind pre-farm-
gate standards is regulatory requirements, for example with respect to MRLs for 
pesticides in fresh produce. Collective private standards generally do not define 
such parameters. Rather, target levels for pesticides residues in the end product 
tend to be stipulated by national governments, which may or may not be based on 
Codex MRLs.242 To the extent that national governments do or do not base their 
legal requirements on Codex MRLs, private standards will or will not be directed 
at complying with Codex MRLs. Similarly, private food safety standards for food 
240 Swoffer, K., 2009. GFSI and the relationship with Codex. Presentation to CIES International Food 
Safety Conference, Paris, France.
241 The GFSI clearly recognises the importance of Codex as a global reference point and is anxious to 
demonstrate where its Guidance Document and Codex standards, guidelines and recommendations 
coalesce. Thus, it is currently cross-referencing the Guidance Document and the four recognised post-
farm-gate standards with Codex standards. 
242 A number of individual company standards do specify MRLs for pesticides in fresh fruit and 
vegetables, often at levels that are stricter than Codex standards and/or national legislation. Thus, limits 
may be set at the Limit of Detection (LOD) or as a proportion of the regulatory MRL. Likewise, individual 
company standards may set limits for microbial pathogens or veterinary drugs that are stricter than 
Codex standards and/or national legislation or where no such limit has otherwise been established. This 
is the key area where private standards set stricter requirements than Codex standards according to the 
recent report on private standards prepared by FAO for Codex (CAC, 2010. Consideration of the impact 
of private standards, CX/CAC 10/33/13, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy). 
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processing, such as the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety and IFS, incorporate 
requirements that are not integral to the Recommended International Code of 
Practice-General Principles of Food Hygiene, for example on product analysis, 
internal audit, purchasing procedures, etc.
Finally, it is important to recognise that private food safety standards are far 
from universal. There are many areas where Codex standards, guidelines and 
recommendations, and national legislation, has been laid down and private 
standards are less important, or indeed do not exist at all. Thus, there are significant 
differences in the importance of private food safety standards across sectors (for 
example fresh fruit and vegetables versus dairy products), between levels of the 
value chains (for example food processing versus production) and geographically 
(for example Northern Europe versus the US or Japan). At the same time, it must 
not be forgotten that private standards are only relevant to the extent that they are 
adopted in agri-food value chains. While there is an evident increase in the use 
of private standards, this is far from universal. Despite the great attention given 
to these standards, at the current time more global markets make no reference 
to private standards than require strict compliance.
5.6 Challenges and opportunities for Codex
While there appears to be little compelling evidence that private food safety 
standards are appreciably undermining the role of Codex, their emergence as an 
increasingly dominant mechanism of governance in global agri-food value chains 
does raise certain challenges and opportunities. These relate predominantly to 
the speed and inclusiveness of the standards-setting process; an ongoing issue 
that predates the emergence of private standards and on which Codex is rather 
sensitive. Private food safety standards illustrate the ability and willingness of 
private sector stakeholders to bring about new governance institutions where 
existing arrangements are not deemed to provide the required level of protection, 
both against non-compliance with legal food safety requirements and against 
losses to market share and brand capital. While private standards operate within 
the framework of rules defined by Codex243, they are also able to step outside of 
this framework when it is perceived that this is required. The challenge for Codex, 
thus, is to continue to elaborate standards, guidelines and recommendations that 
are relevant to adopters, both in the public and private sectors.
The speed and complexity of the standards-setting process within Codex has long 
been a cause of concern,244 including by the official evaluation of Codex concluded 
243 As well as (for example) ISO and the International Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).
244 Henson, S.J., Preibisch, K.L. and Masakure, O., 2001. Enhancing developing country participation in 
international standards-setting organizations. Department for International Development, London, UK.
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in 2002.245 The concern here is that Codex is not able to elaborate new or revised 
standards at the rate that adopters require them. This is in contrast to the relatively 
rapid development of private standards,246 reflecting the limited membership, 
narrower focus and more common interests of the firms and organisations involved. 
For example, the Recommended International Code of Practice – General Principles 
of Food Hygiene has been revised four times since its original adoption in 1969, 
while the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety has been revised five times since 
its initial implementation in 1998. Many Codex standards take appreciably longer 
than this to be established and/or revised. While the emergence of private food 
safety standards arguably provides scope for Codex’s influence within the global 
food safety system to be enhanced (rather than diminished as has been implied by 
some), this will be dependent on its ability to elaborate standards, guidelines and 
recommendations at a faster rate as new issues emerge, established approaches 
and practices change, etc.
The rise of private food safety standards also implies that the clientele of Codex is 
changing, or perhaps more accurately is expanding. Traditionally, the role of Codex 
has been to establish rules for the implementation of official food control systems, 
suggesting that the main beneficiaries are public regulators. Private standards 
have added an additional layer to food safety governance and Codex needs to take 
account of this in directing its work programme and in elaborating standards. It 
must be remembered that Codex’s influence and relevance is dependent on the 
adoption of its standards, guidelines and recommendations, both by governments 
and private standards setters. This latter group are not bound by the rules of 
the WTO; they will base their standards on Codex to the extent that it reflects 
recognised good practice, but will look elsewhere if not. Private standards provide 
considerable scope for Codex to have more influence, provided it meets the needs 
of the full range of adopters. Just as an increasing number of regulatory authorities 
in member countries are embracing private food safety standards as a means 
towards achieving higher levels of compliance and/or reducing costs,247 Codex 
needs to see the adopters and setters of these standards as ‘legitimate’ clients.
While Codex remains the main international body for the elaboration of standards, 
guidelines and recommendations related to food safety, the emergence of 
organisations such as GlobalGAP and GFSI is serving to put a spotlight on Codex 
245 CAC, 2002. Report of the evaluation of the Codex Alimentarius commission and other FAO and WHO 
food Standards work, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
246 Henson S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on the public standards-setting process. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part 
II, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
247 For example, the UK Food Standards Agency tiers inspection of primary production facilities 
according to certification against approved private farm assurance standards (Henson, S.J. and 
Humphrey, J., 2008. Understanding the complexities of private standards in global agri-food chains. 
Paper presented at the workshop: globalization, global governance and private standards, University of 
Leuven, Belgium, November 2008). 
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in terms of the representation of stakeholders, globally and especially from 
developing countries.248 The decision-making process of Codex is essentially 
driven by governments, which variously take account of national stakeholder 
interests. International NGOs can be recognised as observers at Codex, but have 
no decision-making power. The ‘voice’ of developing countries at the Codex table 
is also appreciated to be limited.249 While the range of interests that typically 
feed into the elaboration of private food safety standards is much narrower than 
with Codex, the organisations involved have become significantly more open 
over time, and begun to incorporate a wider range of stakeholders. This is seen 
with the membership of GlobalGAP and of the GFSI, both of which have moved 
appreciably away from their original core of major European food retailers.250 
Certainly there are concerns about the legitimacy of decision-making processes 
underlying private standards.251 However somewhat paradoxically, the private 
sector may have considerable interest in opening up the standards-setting process 
to an increasingly wide range of stakeholders, aimed at deflecting criticism and 
building the legitimacy of their standards.
5.7 Conclusions
A key trend in global agri-food systems in recent years has been the emergence 
of private standards. This trend has sparked a vigorous debate on the role of 
private governance of food safety and the degree to which this might act to 
undermine established (public) regulatory systems and transnational norms, the 
latter predominantly established through the work of Codex and the WTO. Critics 
argue that private standards need to be ‘reined in’ whilst at the same time fearing 
that the WTO has little or no jurisdiction such that these standards will multiply 
and evolve unchecked. More generally, public regulators are uncomfortable at 
seeing their traditional monopoly in the governance of food safety being challenged.
There is little doubt that private food safety standards do raise questions about 
the role of governmental and intergovernmental institutions in the regulation of 
food safety, and in an international context specifically the position of Codex. 
However, much of the debate about private food safety standards has been fuelled 
by misunderstandings of why such standards have evolved and the functions they 
perform. Key here is a failure to recognise that private food safety standards are 
248 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on the public standards-setting process. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part 
II, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
249 Henson, S.J., 2002. The current status and future directions of Codex Alimentarius. World Health 
Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland.
250 It could be argued, perhaps provocatively, that the interests of developing country producers are 
heard more loudly in GlobalGAP than in Codex.
251 Fuchs, D. and Kalfagianni, A., 2010. The democratic legitimacy of private authority in the food chain. 
In: Porter, T. and Ronit, K. (eds.) The challenges of global business authority: democratic renewal, 
stalemate or decay? State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, USA, pp. 65-88.
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quite closely attuned to regulatory requirements; at times private food safety 
standards do extend beyond the requirements of public mandatory standards, but 
in many cases their key functions is to provide assurances to buyers in global agri-
food value chains that regulatory requirements have been satisfied. Further, the 
great diversity of private food safety standards, in their institutional form, scope 
and prevalence across value chains, belies attempts to draw general conclusions.
The increasing adoption of private food safety standards in global agri-food value 
chains clearly raises important questions about the role played by Codex, both 
broadly and within the context of the SPS Agreement. There has been an undue 
tendency, however, to see private food safety standards as threatening the status 
of Codex standards, guidelines and recommendations, and undermining the 
Commission’s mandate to promote consumer protection and fair agri-food trade. 
However, there is limited evidence to support this contention. Where private 
food safety standards exist, they predominantly appear to take Codex standards, 
guidelines and recommendations, alongside national regulatory requirements, as 
their starting point and build a system of process requirements and conformity 
assessment around these. There are also many commodities and markets where 
private food safety standards have not been elaborated and Codex remains the 
key driver of international food safety standards.
Evidently, Codex needs to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented 
by private food safety standards. There is certainly a need for an informed debate 
within Codex about the implications for its mandate and work programme. 
Admittedly this is difficult; the records of discussions at recent meetings of the 
Commission suggest established positions and misinformation persist amongst 
Codex members.252 In the meantime, ways need to be found for Codex to engage 
more effectively with the organisations involved in setting and/or adopting private 
food safety standards in order to build trust and mutual understanding. A natural 
starting point here seems to be the GFSI. 253 There would appear to be more to 
gain from a cooperative relationship between international standards organisations 
such as Codex and private standards organisations than conflict.
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WTO, 2007a. Considerations relevant to private standards in the field of animal health, food 
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Committee Meeting 28 February, 1 March 2007, G/SPS/GEN/750, WTO, Committee on 
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6.  Private retail standards and the law of 
the World Trade Organisation
Marinus Huige
6.1 Introduction
Standards are meant to facilitate trade. However listening to discussions in 
international forums about standards, and more specifically private standards, 
one might get the idea the opposite is true. With the growing use of private 
standards by retailers, debate in international trade and standard setting bodies 
has emerged. In these discussions on private standards the trade facilitating aspect 
of the standards is particularly disputed.
At the international public level, harmonised food safety, animal health and plant 
health standards are established by organisations like the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission,254 the International Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)255 and 
the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)256. The use of international 
standards is encouraged by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) based on the 
logic that trade will flow if everybody adheres to uniform measures.257
The most relevant WTO agreement for agri-food standards is the Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)258 which particularly deals with 
animal health, plant health and food safety. It refers explicitly to the standards 
of Codex Alimentarius, OIE and IPPC. The SPS Agreement disciplines the use of 
requirements and standards in international trade in order to ensure that food 
safety and quality requirements are not misused as protectionist measures.
Apart from public standards, the so-called private standards have grown considerably 
in importance and are now a significant factor to take into account when dealing 
with market access issues. Market access is about trade and trade is governed and 
regulated by the WTO. WTO rules however, in principle only apply in government 
254 The Codex Alimentarius Commission is a United Nations organization that develops international 
standards for food safety.
255 The International Organisation for Animal Health is known by its French acronym OIE (Office 
International des Epizooties) and develops international standards for animal health and welfare.
256 The International Plant Protection Convention is a United Nations organisation that develops 
international standards for plant health.
257 WTO, 1995. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. WTO, Geneva, 
Switzerland, Article 3.
258 WTO, 1995. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. WTO, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
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to government relations,259 where the private standard is typically an issue between 
private parties. Because of their increased importance in international trade and 
their possible trade impact, private standards are subject to debate in the above 
mentioned organisations. Since 2005, the debate is particularly animated in the 
WTO SPS Committee. The main question in this Committee is whether and how 
amongst others, food safety requirements demanded by the private sector should 
be dealt with at the multilateral level.260
This chapter will focus on the debate in the WTO SPS Committee and the legal 
aspects of private standards from a WTO perspective.
6.2 What are private standards?
Private standards are sets of rules on how to produce, developed by private 
companies. There are different categories of standards, varying from so-called 
‘individual firm schemes’ such as Tesco’s Nature’s Choice, to 'collective national 
and international schemes’ such as GlobalGAP. The latter is a pan-European 
organisation of which most of the large European retailers are members. They 
may also be categorised according to pre-farm (i.e. GlobalGAP) versus post-farm 
gate standards (i.e. British Retail Consortium).261 Coverage normally extends 
beyond food safety issues to include quality, environment, animal welfare and 
other societal issues. The SPS Committee has no mandate to deal with issues 
other than food safety.262
In the case of an individual firm scheme it is moreover questionable whether 
one can speak of a standard in a sense that it is used by a significant number of 
participants in the industry.
Finally, private schemes are mainly based on process control using the HACCP263 
system and rely on third party auditing by accredited certifying bodies for their 
implementation.
259 See: Van der Meulen, B., 2010. The global arena of food law. Emerging contours of a meta-framework. 
Erasmus Law Review 3(4).
260 WTO, 2007. Private Standards and the SPS Agreement, Note by the Secretariat, G/SPS/GEN/822. 
WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Geneva, Switzerland.
261 See Chapter 3 Codex Alimentarius and Private Standards, by Henson and Humphrey for examples 
of different types of private standards.
262 And of course human, animal and plant health.
263 HACCP: Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) is a systematic preventive approach 
to food safety and pharmaceutical safety that addresses physical, chemical, and biological hazards as 
a means of prevention rather than finished product inspection. HACCP is used in the food industry to 
identify potential food safety hazards, so that key actions, known as Critical Control Points (CCPs) can 
be taken to reduce or eliminate the risk of the hazards being realised. The system is used at all stages 
of food production and preparation
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6.3 Private standards, what drives them?
Since the nineties, the concentration of retail chains has resulted in a small number 
of large supermarket chains with enormous market and purchasing power with 
more control over the entire supply chain. These concentrations tend to by-pass 
wholesalers to source directly from domestic and foreign suppliers.
Apart from this consolidation of power in the supply chain, consumer expectations 
have changed. The more wealthy the consumers, the more importance they attach 
to social, ethical and environmental values. Increased consumer awareness is also 
a direct consequence of food scares such as BSE in Europe and the US, dioxins in 
Belgium and melamine in dairy products in China.264 Consequently, governments 
have shifted food safety controls from the testing on final retail products to the 
production and distribution process. This approach is also known as the ‘farm-to-
fork’ or ‘stable-to-table’ approach. An approach like this requires the food industry 
to put in place risk management systems that ensure food safety at all stages of 
the chain – from the farm level to final retail sale.
The introduction of the General Food Law265 in the EU in 2002 has also been 
important for the development of private standards. The Regulation establishes 
the basic principle that the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with 
food law, and in particular food safety, rests with the food business (companies, 
supermarkets). To complement and support this principle, there must be adequate 
and effective controls organised by the competent authorities of the Member States 
and operators must amongst others: work transparently, use a traceability system 
to identify suppliers and have an emergency system to be able to immediately 
withdraw food from the market. This Regulation requires all players along the 
supply chain to be able to prove that they have undertaken all possible steps to 
ensure that their product is safe and will not cause harm. To be able to provide 
proof of this so-called ‘due diligence’, the food industry developed systems of 
self-regulation. These started with codes of practice, such as Good Agricultural 
Practices (GAP) schemes, and a protocol of good hygiene practices (later the 
British Retailer Consortium Global Standard), and with that the phenomenon of 
private standards was born.
Technically these standards are voluntary as they are not required by law. However, 
in the case when there would be no choice but to sell your produce via a private 
264 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J, 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on public standard-setting processes. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II, 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy, pp. 9-11.
265 EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24. 
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standard, these can effectively set the conditions for the import or sale of products, 
which makes them more mandatory in practice.
6.4 Private standards and the WTO SPS Committee
The SPS Agreement strikes a balance between the right of Members to protect 
human, animal and plant life or health and trade rules they have committed 
themselves to. Each WTO Member country is entitled to maintain a level of 
protection it considers appropriate to protect life or health within its territory. 
But when SPS measures directly or indirectly affect trade, members have the 
obligation to minimise negative impacts of such measures on international trade. 
This means that SPS measures must:
• be applied only to the extent necessary to protect life or health and not be 
more trade restrictive than required;
• be based on scientific principles and not be maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence; and
• not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable treatment or a disguised restriction 
on trade.
The preferred way of meeting the core principle of scientific justification is 
through the use of internationally developed food safety, plant and animal health 
protection standards – that is, those adopted by the Codex, IPPC and the OIE. 
The harmonisation of national requirements, on the basis of these international 
standards, facilitates trade by reducing the proliferation of distinct national 
requirements. The SPS Agreement allows only for national standards or measures 
beyond the above mentioned international standards if they can be justified on 
the basis of an appropriate risk assessment and if they meet the criterion of least 
trade restrictiveness to achieve the desired level of health protection.
The SPS Agreement also requires in Annex C that there be no unjustified costs in 
testing, certification or approval procedures, to ensure that these do not function 
as barriers to trade. Furthermore SPS measures or standards of individual WTO 
members need to be notified via the WTO secretariat to other members. Finally, 
the WTO agreement ensures that SPS requirements can be challenged by other 
trading partners, through the use of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.
While public SPS measures and standards need to fit the above mentioned criteria, 
private standards which address a mix of SPS and other objectives – including social 
and environmental concerns that are not related to food safety or plant/animal health 
protection – may have no scientific justification and may not be notified in a timely 
fashion. Together with a proliferation of the schemes without much harmonisation 
between them, it is understandable, that governments and international organisations 
get curious about the relationship between private standards and the standards set 
by the so called three sisters (OIE, CODEX, and IPPC).
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The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) monitors 
the way Members implement their SPS-measures. If this is not done in conformity 
with the rules of the SPS Agreement and the measures affect trade, other Members 
can bring this up for discussion in the Committee (under the agenda item: specific 
trade concerns), which meets three times a year at WTO headquarters in Geneva.
The issue of private standards was introduced at the WTO as a specific trade 
concern by St. Vincent and the Grenadines complaining at a meeting of the June 
2005 SPS Committee about the negative impact on its banana exports of EurepGAP 
(now GlobalGap) standards for pesticides. The European Commission rejected 
the complaint by stating that it did not concern any official requirement of the 
EU. After that however the issue of private standards has been on the agenda of 
the Committee as a general issue, not pointing to one specific WTO-member.266
The discussions so far have focused on three main concerns:267
1. Market access. It is acknowledged that private standards can help producers 
and traders by providing step-by-step guidelines showing what needs to be 
done to meet (government) regulations and market conditions. Several studies 
have shown that following the risk management approach defined by some 
of the private standards schemes results in better overall farm and business 
management as well as increased efficiency and profitability. However it is 
also recognised that these standards can have negative effects. Producers 
must be certified as meeting the private standards, and becoming certified 
is a very expensive business. Also it is argued that private standards can be 
both more restrictive (e.g. requiring lower levels of pesticide residues) and 
more prescriptive (accepting only one way of achieving a desired food safety 
outcome) than official import requirements, thus acting as additional barriers 
to market access.
2. Development. The costs of certification and compliance with private standards, 
can make the development of export-oriented schemes virtually impossible 
for small-scale producers in developing countries.
3. WTO law. While some are of the view that setting standards for the products 
they purchase is a legitimate private sector activity with which governments 
should not interfere, others are of the view that the SPS Agreement makes 
governments in importing countries responsible for the standards set by their 
private sectors. The latter maintain that the private standards do not meet WTO 
requirements such as transparency and scientific justification of food safety 
measures and are more trade-restrictive than necessary to protect health.
266 Stanton, G.H. and Wolff, C., 2008. Private voluntary standards and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Fresh Perspectives 2008.
267 WTO, 2007. Private standards and the SPS Agreement, note by the Secretariat of 24 January 2007. 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO Doc. No. G/SPS/GEN/746. 
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WTO Members have had numerous debates on what problems private standards 
can potentially cause (some members identified concrete examples) and whether 
and how the SPS committee should deal with this phenomenon. The tendency 
is to focus on discussing the scope of the SPS Agreement (under point 3 above). 
A number of Members (mostly developing countries) follow the interpretation 
that the SPS Agreement is applicable to private standards while other Members 
(mostly developed countries) deny the applicability beyond public standards or 
government regulations. A discussion essentially concerned with the interpretation 
of the scope of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement. In June 2010 the SPS committee 
identified possible actions regarding SPS related private standards.268
Article 13 of the SPS Agreement indicates that:
Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of 
all obligations set forth herein. Members shall formulate and implement 
positive measures and mechanisms in support of the observance of the 
provisions of this Agreement by other than central government bodies. 
Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them 
to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well as 
regional bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are members, 
comply with the relevant provisions of this Agreement. In addition, Members 
shall not take measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, 
requiring or encouraging such regional or non-governmental entities, or local 
governmental bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement. Members shall ensure that they rely on the services of non-
governmental entities for implementing sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
only if these entities comply with the provisions of this Agreement.
The perception of most WTO Members in the SPS committee is that private 
standards go beyond the standards set up by international standard setting bodies 
that are referenced in the SPS Agreement. The question is then: what is meant 
by ‘going beyond’? The private standards extend to ethics, environment, animal 
welfare and social accountability and they are much more specific about how to 
structure the production process.269 Looking purely at the SPS aspects however 
there is little proof of many private standards going beyond public standards in 
terms of setting, for example, higher maximum residue levels.270 Strictly speaking 
from an SPS point of view in most cases there would be no interference with the 
268 WTO, 2010. Possible actions for the SPS Committee regarding SPS-related private standards. 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.2.
269 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on public standard-setting processes. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II, 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy, p. 12. 
270 Rau, M.L., 2009. Public and private standards and certification in agri-food trade. Small assignment 
report prepared for the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, The Hague, the Netherlands.
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international standards as it seems that in most cases private standards take the 
official national requirements or standards, or the international standards as a 
basis to build upon.271 If you look at for example the Codex Alimentarius Hygiene 
Code, which is very broad, it is only logical that private entities implement this 
Code with specific regulations for their industry.272
While the debate in the SPS committee focuses mainly on the question whether the 
scope of private standards go beyond the scope of public international standards, 
the discussion should better be driven by concerns about ‘real’ issues such as the 
costs of compliance, proliferation without enough harmonisation between the 
standards, transparency and the lack of stakeholder involvement.
Some of the private standard setting bodies have themselves recognised the problem 
of proliferation and efforts are now underway to ‘benchmark’ or accept other private 
standard schemes as equivalent. The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)273 is 
playing an active role in this. GlobalGAP is a good example of a private standard 
setting body that has developed initiatives to ensure stakeholder inclusiveness, 
and has taken into account the specific needs of smallholders in defining their 
own standards. For example it has appointed an ‘Ambassador’ for Africa. They 
also work with committees with representatives from different sectors.274
Obviously private standards give rise to concern, but the question is whether the 
SPS committee is addressing these concerns in the right way. By focussing too 
much on applicability of the SPS Agreement, WTO members risk wasting their 
time without progressing in any way towards solving real questions.
6.5  The current discussion on applicability of the SPS 
Agreement
National civil law in principle contains nothing that prevents buyers from 
demanding the supplier to comply with specific technical requirements to the 
271 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on public standard-setting processes. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II, 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy, par 3 p. 12 and p. 39. See also Smith, G., 2009. Interaction 
of public and private standards in the food chain. OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, 
No. 15. OECD Publishing, Paris, France, par 51.
272 Van Exel, L.D., 2009. Public vs. Private Standards. Does GlobalGAP exceed the international standard 
requirements, and if so, to what extent? Report for the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands, Geneva, 
Switzerland.
273 The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) is a collaboration between some of the world’s leading food 
safety experts from retailer, manufacturer and food service companies, as well as service providers 
associated with the food supply chain.
274 Henson, S.J. and Humphrey, J., 2009. The impacts of private food safety standards on the food chain 
and on public standard-setting processes. Paper prepared for FAO/WHO, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II, 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, Italy.
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products they want to purchase. Especially for retailers who have to manage 
complex business risks, there are many good reasons to justify such requirements. 
If retailers use private standards as an instrument to abuse a dominant position, 
then domestic competition regulations may be applicable. 275
Desirable or not, for the moment most of the attention is focused on the SPS 
Agreement as far as food safety aspects of private standards are concerned. The 
legal question which then rises: do private standards fall within the scope of the 
SPS Agreement?
The SPS Agreement is applicable to ‘all sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade’. The definition of a 
‘sanitary or phytosanitary measure’276 therefore does not (seem to) exclude the 
types of measures imposed by private standards. But the obligations under the 
SPS Agreement are addressed to WTO Members only (which are national states). 
As we have seen above, Article 13 of the SPS Agreement states that Members shall 
take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-
governmental entities within their territories comply with the relevant provisions of 
this Agreement. But the term ‘non-governmental entities’ is not defined anywhere. 
While some argue that it covers private standard setting bodies, others are of the 
view that only those entities mandated by a government to carry out certain tasks 
are covered under this provision. Moreover, it is important to realise that some 
private standard setting bodies are ‘multinational’. The question then arises which 
government can be held accountable if Article 13 would be applicable.
Who is right? Does Article 13 include actions taken by the private sector, or 
only those taken by governments (at national or sub-national levels)? Or more 
specificly can national governments, the Contracting Parties in WTO terms, be 
held accountable for actions of private parties?
One of the few legal analyses existing today on the relationship between Article 
13 and private standards has been performed by Digby Cascoine.277 According 
to Cascoine, very limited WTO case law exists in relation to Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement and there is no case law in relation to non-governmental entities.278 
Some indications however can be drawn from the panel report in the case Australia 
275 On this issue, see Chapter 17 by Fabian Stancke.
276 SPS measures are all measures whose purpose is to protect: human or animal health from food borne 
risks; human health from, animal or plant carried diseases; animals and plants from pests or diseases. 
277 Gascoine, D. and O’Connor and Company, 2006. Private voluntary standards within the wto 
multilateral framework. Report prepared for the Department for International Development, London, 
UK. Available at: http://www.handelenduurzaamheid.nl/web/index.php?page=agenda
278 Gascoine, D. and O’Connor and Company, 2006. Private voluntary standards within the wto 
multilateral framework. Report prepared for the Department for International Development, London, 
UK, p. 10.
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– Measures affecting the importation of salmon279 from which he concludes 
that, when asked to analyse a possible violation of the SPS Agreement by a non-
governmental body, a Panel would:
1. Look at Article 13 of the SPS Agreement to determine whether there is 
‘responsibility’ of a WTO Member;
2. Establish in light of Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement whether the measure at 
stake is an SPS measure;
3. Decide whether there is a violation of the SPS Agreement.
According to the Panel in Japan – measures affecting consumer photographic 
film,280 there is need for a degree of government involvement to put a measure 
under the scrutiny of the WTO Agreements.281 Furthermore Cascoine states: 
‘… case law282 on the entrustment and direction provisions of another WTO 
Agreement (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures) concluded 
that the ordinary meaning of the words ‘entrusts’ and ‘directs’ requires an ‘explicit 
and affirmative action of delegation of command’. This does not seem to be the 
case with private standards. Also, the negotiation history of the SPS Agreement 
in the WTO does not provide for any interpretative guidance other than that 
at the time of the negotiations there were no propositions made by individual 
member countries that the SPS Agreement would/should have an application to 
the activities of the private sector.283
Amendment of, or even reaching agreement by WTO Members on the interpretation 
of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement to get clarity on the applicability to private 
standards, is impossible with 153 Members clearly divided in 2 opposite camps.
279 Panel Report, Australia – Measures affecting importation of salmon – recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Canada, WT/DS18/RW of 18 February 2000.
280 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R 
of 31 March 1998, par 10.52 and Panel Report, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples, WT/
DS44/R, Par. 10.56 of 22 June 1989.
281 Gascoine, D. and O’Connor and Company, 2006. Private voluntary standards within the wto 
multilateral framework. Report prepared for the Department for International Development, London, 
UK, p. 10, par 16(ii) and p. 80.
282 Panel Report, European Communities – countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Chips from Korea, WT/DS299/R of 3 August 2005, par 7.18-146. and Appellate Body Report, 
United States Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/ AB/R, par 102-197 and Panel Report, United States – Countervailing 
Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, 
WT/DS296/R of 20 July 2005, par 7.10-178 and Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in 
Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R of 7 March 2005, par 7.350-426 and Panel Report, United –States – 
Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R of 29 June, par 8.15-75.
283 Gascoine, D. and O’Connor and Company, 2006. Private voluntary standards within the wto 
multilateral framework. Report prepared for the Department for International Development, London, 
UK, p. 10, par 16.
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And as Cascoine concludes: ‘In any event, the perceived problem is not yet so 
significant as to warrant such a major step, especially since other initiatives, both 
within the framework of the WTO and amongst the private bodies concerned, 
may be able to ameliorate particular difficulties more conveniently’.284
One thing is clear: the applicability through Article 13 of the WTO/SPS-rules to 
private standards would turn the civil law systems of many countries upside down. 
It would, for example, make governments responsible for the ‘deals’ buyers and 
sellers make with one another.
6.6 Food for thought
It is apparent from the debate in the WTO (and other organisations) that there 
are real concerns regarding the relationship between public and private standards 
and market access, the development and the credibility of the SPS system. The 
proliferation of private standards creates a certain risk of undermining the progress 
made in regulating sanitary and phytosanitary measures through adoption and 
implementation of the SPS agreement. Nevertheless, the question remains whether 
a focus on the legal issue of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement will be effective 
enough to address these concerns.
A better approach might be to look for cooperation models between public and 
private standard setters, to develop more synergies between them, and also to 
look at the phenomenon of private standards in light of increasing public concerns 
about food safety. It is clear that increased public awareness is placing more 
pressure on government agencies to be more prescriptive and proactive in their 
regulation of the food industry. Given the scarcity of public sector resources and 
other concerns about the impact of regulation on competitiveness and the scale 
of the task at hand, there is also a growing interest in cooperation between public 
and private sectors to deliver safer food at lower (regulatory) cost.
To conclude, what is really needed is a regular dialogue between the public standard 
setting organisations (Codex, IPPC and OIE) and the private standard setters. 
Although some preliminary contacts have taken place, to date we still have two 
different worlds that speak different languages. There is therefore ample need 
for a better understanding of each others roles. This might really help the debate 
further.
284 Gascoine, D. and O’Connor and Company, 2006. Private voluntary standards within the wto 
multilateral framework. Report prepared for the Department for International Development, London, 
UK, p. 7.
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7.  Private law making at the round table on 
sustainable palm oil
Otto Hospes
7.1 Introduction
Palm oil is used in nearly every kitchen or bathroom in the world. It is a key 
ingredient of margarines and fats and is also widely used for frying. Popular non-
edible uses of palm oil include soaps and cosmetics. Palm oil is not only used at 
home but also in restaurants and during the mass production of fried potatoes, 
French fries, pies, pastries and doughnuts. Palm oil is the leading tropical vegetable 
oil of the world.
The production of palm oil is much more concentrated: Indonesia and Malaysia 
each produce more than 40% of the world production and, not surprisingly, these 
two countries are the two major palm oil exporters of the world. The main importing 
countries are the EU, China and India. Palm oil is a highly globalised commodity.285
The global and increasing demand of palm oil has led to a rapid growth in palm 
oil production and trade. This has generated income and employment to millions 
of people as well as foreign currency for palm oil producing countries. At the 
same time, the expansion of palm oil production has caused different kinds of 
problems. These include increasing food and income insecurity, land conflicts, 
and social-political unrest at community level. Next to these social problems, 
palm oil production at plantations and mills has induced negative environmental 
effects. These effects include deforestation, loss of biodiversity, carbon dioxide 
emissions through deforestation and the exploitation of peat soils, and pollution of 
watersheds due to the use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides and discharges from 
processors.286 These effects and the many global-local links that connect production, 
285 Product board for margarines, fats and oils, 2010. Fact sheet palm oil.
United States Department of Agriculture, 2010. Indonesia: rising global demand fuels palm oil expansion. 
Commodity Intelligence Report, Foreign Agricultural Service, Washington, DC, USA. Available at: http://
www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2010/10/Indonesia/.
286 McCarthy, J. and Cramb, R.A., 2009. Policy narratives, landholder engagement, and oil palm 
expansion on the Malaysian and Indonesian frontiers. The Geographical Journal 175(2): 112-123.
McCarthy, J., 2010. Processes of inclusion and adverse incorporation: oil palm and agrarian change in 
Sumatra, Indonesia. Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4): 821-850.
Danielsen, F., Beukema, H., Burgess, N., Parish, F., Bruhl, C.A., Donald, P.F., Murdiyarso, D., Phalan, 
B., Reijnders, L., Struebig, M. and Fitzherbert, E.B., 2009. Biofuel plantations on forested lands: double 
jeopardy for biodiversity and climate. Conservation Biology 23(2): 348-358. 
McCarthy, J. and Zen, Z., 2010. Regulating the oil palm boom: assessing the effectiveness of environmental 
governance approaches to agro-industrial pollution in Indonesia. Law and Policy 32(1): 153-179. 
Reijnders, L. and Huijbregts, M.A.J., 2008. Palm oil and the emission of carbon-based greenhouse gases. 
Journal of Cleaner Production 16(4): 477-482.
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processing and consumption, have increasingly globalised the challenges of the 
palm oil sector.287
In the absence of intergovernmental initiatives and institutions to address and 
regulate these problems, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Unilever started to 
explore the possibilities for organising a new form of private governance at the 
global level in 2002. One year later they organised the first RSPO conference. In 
2004 they officially launched the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). The 
main purpose of this round table has been to develop a set of principles and criteria 
for sustainable production of palm oil on the basis of a series of worldwide multi-
stakeholder consultations. In 2010 the eighth annual RSPO conference was held.
The RSPO is not the only initiative of non-governmental organisations and 
multinational companies to develop private sustainability law for the production of 
global commodities. In the 1990s and even more so in the 2000s similar initiatives 
have been taken to regulate sustainable production of forest, fisheries, soy, cotton, 
sugar, beef and aquaculture by private standards. WWF is a founding member 
of seven multi-stakeholder initiatives directed at standard setting for sustainable 
production of a global commodity.288 Unilever is founding member of two initiatives. 
Each of these two initiatives concerns one of the two most traded oil crops: the 
RSPO and the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS).
This chapter has two objectives. The first objective is to analyse the RSPO as a law 
making process. For this purpose, the normative contents, actors and instruments 
of the RSPO will be described in relation to market power, public law and state 
authorities. To assess whether the RSPO principles and criteria are (increasingly or 
decreasingly) de jure or de facto binding, I will consider the power of sustainability 
as a market driver and the role of state actors in the standard setting process. The 
second objective is to assess to what extent the RSPO standard setting process has 
contributed to the development of new public standards on sustainable palm oil. 
For this purpose, I want to describe the different ways in which the governments 
of Indonesia and the Netherlands have each responded to the establishment of 
the RSPO principles and criteria. I have selected Indonesia and the Netherlands 
because non-state actors from these countries are well represented in the RSPO 
membership. This makes one wonder how their governments who, like any other 
government, are not member of the RSPO, treat the RSPO and its global, private 
standard. The comparative review of the two countries will show that one cannot 
287 Teoh, C.H., 2010. Key sustainability issues in the palm oil sector: a discussion paper for multi-
stakeholders consultations (commissioned by the World Bank Group). IFC, World Bank, Washington, 
DC, USA. Available at: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/agriconsultation.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
Discussion+Paper/$FILE/Discussion+Paper_FINAL.pdf.
288 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 2010. Certification and roundtables: do they work? WWF review 
of multi-stakeholder sustainability initiatives. WWF, Gland, Switzerland. Available at: http://assets.wwf.
org.uk/downloads/wwf_certification_and_roundtables_briefing.
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generalise about ‘the government’ when discussing the making and meaning of 
transboundary private food law.
7.2 The normative content of the RSPO
The opening paragraph of the Preamble of ‘Principles and Criteria for Sustainable 
Production of Palm Oil’ (2007) presents the key issue of the RSPO and the kind 
of activity that the RSPO wants to change and regulate:
Sustainable palm oil production is comprised of legal, economically viable, 
environmentally appropriate and socially beneficial management and 
operations. This is delivered through the application of the following set 
of principles and criteria, and the accompanying indicators and guidance.
The key issue is about sustainability, which does not only consist of economic, 
environmental and social dimensions but also legal ones. The activity is about 
palm oil production.
The document (from now on named as: ‘RSPO Principles and Criteria’) lists eight 
principles (Table 7.1).289 Three principles (2, 3 and 5) exclusively relate to one of 
the four dimensions of sustainability as referred to in the Preamble. The inclusion 
289 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2007. RSPO principles and criteria for sustainable 
production of palm oil, including indicators and guidance. Available at: http://www.rspo.org/files/
resource_centre/RSPO%20Principles%20&%20Criteria%20Document.pdf. 
Table 7.1. RSPO principles.
RSPO principles Sustainability 
dimension
1. Commitment to transparency -
2. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations Legal
3. Commitment to long-term economic and financial viability Economic
4. Use of appropriate best practices by growers and millers Environmental, social
5. Environmental responsibility and conservation of natural 
resources and biodiversity
Environmental
6. Responsible consideration of employees and of individuals and 
communities affected by growers and mills
Social, legal
7. Responsible development of new plantings Environmental, social, legal 
8. Commitment to continuous improvement in key areas of 
activity
-
Source: RSPO 2007. RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Production of Palm Oil.
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of a legal dimension of sustainability is remarkable. Many sustainability debates 
and documents focus on economic, environmental and social dimensions, leaving 
out legal ones.
The framing of the legal criterion of sustainable palm oil is both comprehensive 
and vague. Palm oil is considered sustainable if the production complies with ‘all 
applicable local, national and ratified international laws and regulations’ and if 
‘use of the land for oil palm does not diminish the legal rights, or customary rights, 
of other users, without their free, prior and informed consent’. Annex 1 of the 
‘RSPO Principles and Criteria’ lists applicable international laws and conventions, 
including 15 different ILO conventions, the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007) and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). 
The document provides no guidance on how to define and identify what are ‘legal’ 
or ‘customary’ rights, and on how to deal with possible tensions or contradictions 
between international, national and local laws.
Three other principles (4, 6 and 7) have been specified into a mix of environmental, 
social and/or legal indicators. The use of best practices by growers and millers 
(principle 4) includes health criteria. The commitment to transparency (principle 1) 
and the commitment to continuous improvement in key areas of activity (principle 
8) are of a different nature: they specify criteria for information management 
and monitoring and can be seen as preconditions for auditing and enforcement.
The eight principles cannot be categorised into the categories of public law 
requirements for food businesses as discussed in the first chapter of this book: 
product, process, presentation and public power. On the one hand, not a single 
principle or indicator defines the bio-physical quality of palm oil as a product. On 
the other hand, all principles define what turns palm oil into sustainable palm oil.
To provide further guidance to the eight principles, they have been specified into 
a total of 35 criteria. For every criterion, different indicators are distinguished. 
The indicators of principles 4, 5 and 7 refer to (best) agricultural practices (like 
integrative pest management techniques, ground cover management, recycling 
and re-use of nutrients) whereas the indicators of principles 4 and 6 refer to Best 
Management Practices, safe working practices or non-discriminatory practices. 
For best practices related to storage of chemicals, the RSPO principles refer to 
the ‘FAO or GIFAP Code of Practice’.
The issue of presentation is not covered in the ‘RSPO Principles and Criteria’ but 
in the document ‘RSPO guidelines on communication and claims’ (2009).290 This 
document provides instructions and restrictions on the use of the RSPO logo in 
290 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2009. RSPO guidelines on communication and claims. 
Available at: http://www.americanpalmoil.com/publications/RSPO_cc_guidelines%20(oct%2009).pdf.
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corporate, on-pack and about-product communication. Only RSPO members can 
receive written authorisation to apply the logo after they have agreed to comply 
with the rules set forth in the document.
In corporate communication, members may report their membership of the RSPO. 
They may use the RSPO logo and/or RSPO web address together with such a 
membership claim. In on-pack and about-product communication, members may 
use the RSPO logo and/or RSPO web address only if combined with an approved 
claim on the use or the advancement of sustainable palm oil. The RSPO has 
approved four supply chain certification systems: identity preserved, segregated, 
mass balance, and book and claim.291 For each of them, communication rules and 
approved story telling have been specified. The proportion of plantations certified 
defines how producers should communicate about their RSPO membership. Three 
different claims have been approved (Table 7.2).
Finally, the issue of public power is also not covered in the ‘RSPO Principles and 
Criteria’. However, the document does include an implicit reference to public 
power. One of the criteria of principle 6 is:
Any negotiations concerning compensation for loss of legal or customary 
rights are dealt with through a documented system that enables indigenous 
peoples, local communities and other stakeholders to express their views 
through their own representative institutions [italics, OH].
However, the indicators of this criterion do not explicitly refer to state authorities 
or public law to explain what is meant with ‘own’ representative institutions. 
Something similar can be concluded from another criterion of principle 6: ‘There 
291 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2009. Supply chain systems: overview. Available at: 
http://www.rspo.org/sites/default/files/RSPO_Supply%20Chain%20Systems%20Overview.pdf.
Table 7.2. How producers should communicate about their RSPO membership.
Producer status Approved claim in corporate communication
RSPO member, no 
plantations certified
‘[Company X] is a member of the RSPO’
RSPO member, some 
plantations certified
‘[Company Y] is a member of the RSPO and x% of its production 
capacity has been RSPO-certified’
RSPO member, all 
plantations certified
‘[Company Z] is a member of the RSPO and produces only RSPO 
certified sustainable palm oil’
Source: RSPO 2009, RSPO Guidelines on Communication and Claims.
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is a mutually agreed and documented system for dealing with complaints and 
grievances, which is implemented and accepted by all parties’. The indicators 
of this criterion do not refer to state authorities or public law but to ‘dispute 
resolution mechanisms that should be established through open and consensual 
agreements with relevant affected parties’.
For the RSPO categorisation of RSPO principles, criteria and indicators, different 
P’s can be distinguished: plan, policy, procedure, practice. Of the total of 35 
indicators, 17 refer to plans to be developed, 4 refer to policies to be established, 
and 10 to procedures to be put in place. There are 17 indicators that explicitly 
refer to agricultural, management or other kinds of (best) practices.
7.3 Principle(d) actors
The Preamble of the ‘RSPO Principles and Criteria’ does not explicitly mention 
who is to meet the principles and criteria. The production of palm oil can be 
defined in a narrow way to refer to palm oil growers but also to include millers, 
who produce palm oil out of fresh fruit bunches harvested from the oil palm trees. 
However, the naming of principles 4 and 6 clearly suggests that these principles 
concern both growers and millers. The specification of principles 1, 3, 5 and 8 
into criteria and indicators reveals that these principles relate to both growers 
and millers. Principles 2 and 7 seem to concern growers only, also when reading 
the criteria and indicators.
The ‘RSPO Principles and Criteria’ are not specifically geared towards smallholders. 
The Preamble mentions that, ‘The development of more detailed guidance for 
application of the principles and criteria by smallholders … is still on-going’. 
The principles and criteria are basically meant for plantations, defined by ILO 
(Convention 110, article 1/1) as: an agricultural undertaking regularly employing 
hired workers… concerned with the cultivation or production of … [inter alia] palm 
oil….’, but commonly understood as large-scale production. Principles 5, 6 and 7 
explicitly refer to ‘plantations’, ‘plantation area’ and/or ‘plantation development’.
Whereas the producers of palm oil are the ones to adopt the principles and 
criteria and to get certified (see below), they have not played a leading role in 
the establishment of the RSPO, the membership, the standard setting process and 
the national interpretations of the global RSPO principles and guidelines.
The RSPO was an initiative of the WWF and Unilever. In 2002 they started to explore 
possibilities for establishing a business partnership model for sustainable palm oil. 
In 2004 the RSPO was registered as a foundation under Swiss law, starting with 10 
members. In November 2008, membership consisted of 261 members. Membership 
had grown to 380 members in October 2010. Whereas the RSPO distinguishes seven 
categories of members, they can be regrouped into three main categories (Table 7.3): 
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value chain actors (palm oil processors, traders, consumer goods manufacturers, 
retailers, banks and investors), oil palm growers and civil society organisations 
(environmental and nature conservation organisations, social and development 
organisations). As per October 2010, membership consisted of 276 value chain 
actors, 84 oil palm growers and 20 civil society organisations (Table 7.3).
Whereas palm oil is mainly produced in Indonesia and Malaysia, the membership 
of the RSPO is not limited to business or civil society organisations from these 
two countries. The RSPO is a truly international organisation, with membership 
coming from 42 countries all over the world. Malaysia (87) and Indonesia (75) 
do provide the largest number of members but companies and NGOs from the 
United Kingdom (66), the Netherlands (37), Germany (31) and United States (26) 
cannot be easily overlooked.292
The highest authority of the RSPO is the annual General Assembly of members. 
This assembly has the power to establish the principle guidelines for the general 
policy of the RSPO. The decisions are taken by a simple majority vote of the 
members present or represented. Oil palm growers represent a minority of the 
membership. Palm oil processors, traders and consumer goods manufacturers 
together form a majority of the membership. The General Assembly also has the 
power to elect the members of the Executive Board within their own sector and 
292 See: http://www.rspo.org (as per January 2011). 
Table 7.3. Membership of the RSPO as per October 2010.
Type of member Number Percentage of 
membership
A. Value chain actors 276 72.6
Palm oil processors and traders 151 39.7
Consumer goods manufacturers 94 24.7
Retailers 23 6.1
Banks and investors 8 2.1
B. Oil palm growers 84 22.1
C. Civil society organizations 20 5.3
Environmental and nature conservation organizations 11 2.9
Social and development organizations (NGOs) 9 2.4
Total 380 100
Source:www.rspo.org as per October 19th of 2010.
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to make recommendations to the Executive Board in view of the establishment 
of any useful Committee or Working Group (as specified in the RSPO by-laws).293
In 2005 the General Assembly adopted a set of general principles and criteria for 
sustainable production of palm to be field tested for two years. The document 
was prepared by the RSPO Criteria Working Group (CWG), which has played a 
key role in the standard setting process. The working group consisted of nine 
representatives of producers, six supply chain and investors, three environmental 
organisations and three social organisations. Major Indonesian palm oil companies, 
however, were not represented. The category of producers included two semi-
public bodies and two research institutes. Eight members of the RSPO, including 
four members of the Executive Board of the RSPO, were appointed as observers 
of the CWG. The consultative process of discussing draft principles and criteria 
was facilitated by ProForest, an environmental NGO.294 After field-testing and 
further consultations, the ‘Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Production of 
Sustainable Palm Oil’ were adopted by the General Assembly in 2007.
After the adoption of the global and generic principles and criteria, ‘national 
implementation and interpretation teams’ were organised in seven palm oil 
producing countries. The national implementation and interpretation teams do not 
only consist of non-state actors but also of state actors: about one fifth to one third 
of the membership of these teams consists of representatives of ministries. The 
membership includes public or semi-public bodies that are supposed to articulate 
interests of the plantation sector, like the Indonesian Palm Oil Commission (IPOC) 
and the Malaysian Palm Oil Association (MPOA). Representatives from industry 
form between one and two thirds of the membership, whereas NGOs do not reach 
more than one fifth.
The main purpose of every national team has been to ensure that the implementation 
of the global principles and criteria is ‘congruent or compatible with the norms, 
laws and values of countries, or sovereign states’. With this test in mind, each 
team distinguished ‘major non-conformities’ and ‘minor non-conformities’. The 
first ones refer to indicators that are considered critical in a specific country; the 
latter ones refer to indicators that are not very appropriate or relevant in a specific 
country. At the same time, not all global indicators could be simply disregarded 
293 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2004. RSPO statues, by-laws and codes of conduct. 
Available at: http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/896.
294 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2004. Minutes of the first meeting of the RSPO Criteria 
Working Group. Compiled by ProForest and Andrew Ng. Available at: http://www.rspo.org/files/
resource_centre/CWG%201%20minutes.pdf.
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or considered less important in the national context: ‘At least 45% all indicators 
must be identified as compulsory’.295
7.4 Compliance and complaints
Without third party verification and certification, no public claims relating to 
compliance with the RSPO principles and criteria can be made. The third party 
has to be a RSPO approved independent certification body. The RSPO will use 
a mechanism for approving certification bodies that is based on accreditation 
against ISO/IEC Guide 65 (‘General requirements for bodies operating product 
certification systems’) and/or ISO/IEC Guide 66 (‘General requirements for bodies 
operating assessment and certification/registration of environmental management 
systems’), where the generic accreditation is also supplemented by a set of specific 
RSPO certification process requirements. Certification bodies must be accredited 
by national or international accreditation bodies, such that their organisation, 
systems and procedures conform to ISO Guide 65 and/or ISO Guide 66. RSPO 
certification assessments need to be initiated by palm oil producers, by contacting 
one of the approved certification bodies. Growers will be assessed for certification 
once every five years, and if certified, will be annually assessed for continued 
compliance.296
Downstream processors or users of RSPO certified sustainable palm oil can 
claim the use (or support) of RSPO certified palm oil when they adhere to the 
intent and requirements of the RSPO Supply Chain Certification Systems. This is 
independently verified by an RSPO approved and accredited certification body. 
Palm oil can be traded through one of the four supply chain models that are 
approved by RSPO to be able to preserve the claim to sustainable production: 
identity preserved, segregation, mass balance, or book and claim.297
Complaints and grievances can be submitted by any interested party, where 
the interested party has a legitimate interest in, or is directly affected by, the 
operations of the organisation which has been assessed for compliance against the 
RSPO Criteria or by the certification decision. This includes complaints relating 
to the process and the outcome of a certification assessment or concerning other 
aspects relating to implementation of the RSPO certification systems. A complaint 
or grievance can be made either through the certification body’s mechanism for 
complaints (which will include subsequent referral to the accreditation body, and 
295 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2007. RSPO principles and criteria for sustainable 
production of palm oil, including indicators and guidance. Annex 3. Available at: http://www.rspo.org/
files/resource_centre/RSPO%20Principles%20&%20Criteria%20Document.pdf.
296 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2011. ‘How to be RSPO certified’. Available at: http://
www.rspo.org/?q=page/510. 
297 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2009. Supply chain systems: overview. Available at: 
http://www.rspo.org/sites/default/files/RSPO_Supply%20Chain%20Systems%20Overview.pdf.
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then to RSPO, if the complainant remains unsatisfied by the outcome), or directly 
to the RSPO Executive Board. In the latter situation, the RSPO Executive Board 
will then determine whether the complaint or grievance should firstly follow 
the certification body’s mechanism, or whether it can be referred directly to the 
RSPO Certification Complaints Committee. The Executive Board will appoint 
the members of the complaints committee, which has to consist of at least four 
individuals from the following RSPO sectors: producers, supply chain and investors, 
social organisations and environmental organisations. The committee is to decide 
on the complaint by consensus. The RSPO Secretary General is responsible for 
the implementation of any follow up action as required, and for informing the 
parties to the complaint, in writing, of the decision, not later than ten days after 
date of decision.298
The RSPO has also organised a focal point for official complaints against RSPO 
members: a grievance panel (of five members) is to deliberate and to decide on the 
legitimacy of any given grievance or complaint made against RSPO members.299 
Potential complainants include non-members of the RSPO but also non-residents 
of the home country of the RSPO member to whom the complaint is addressed. 
Any RSPO member could be subjected to a complaint. However, complaints 
will most likely concern palm oil producers as they are the ones to get certified 
and to stick to the RSPO criteria. The head of the grievance panel used to be the 
president of the RSPO from Unilever. Recently, the Netherlands-based Oxfam 
Novib became the head of the grievance panel to handle complaints against 
members of the RSPO.
7.5 How voluntary are the RSPO principles and criteria?
Legally speaking, there is no obligation for palm oil producers to apply for RSPO 
certification. RSPO principles and criteria are not de jure binding. Generally 
speaking, palm oil producers have two options to sell their commodity to: they 
can sell to traders, processors and countries that want certified sustainable palm 
oil, or to traders, processors and countries that do not require CPO. Having noted 
this, the conclusion could be that RSPO principles and criteria are not de facto 
binding. However, this conclusion is too quickly drawn.
Whereas the market share of certified sustainable palm oil is still quite modest 
(estimated at only 7%of global palm oil production of 45 million tons in 2009), 
its growth from zero till 7% in a few years’ time has been quite impressive. This 
growth figure and the more fundamental commitment of corporate and political 
298 Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2007. RSPO certification systems. Final document 
approved by RSPO Executive Board. Available at: http://www.rspo.org/sites/default/files/RSPO%20
P&C%20certification%20system.pdf.
299 See: Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 2011. RSPO grievance procedure. Available at: 
http://www.rspo.org/files/resource_centre/RSPO%20Grievance%20Procedure.pdf.
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leadership to the promotion of sustainable production, as the only way forward, 
have increasingly made palm oil producers wonder whether they have a choice at 
all. What if not only Europe but also China and India start to formulate guidelines, 
criteria or even directives for import of sustainable palm oil? ‘Sustainability is the 
current hottest issue faced by the industry’, said the chairman of the Indonesian 
Palm Oil Association (GAPKI) during his welcome address at the Indonesian palm 
oil conference in December 2010, describing sustainability as ‘a new market driver’.
Market powers increasingly show their sustainability ‘muscles’. Multinationals, 
retailers and banks announce that they will only purchase trade or invest in 
certified sustainable palm oil in a few years from now: as per 2015 Unilever 
only wants to buy sustainably produced palm oil. Retailer Ahold and agricultural 
investor Rabobank have made similar commitments. This way the application 
for certification feels more and more like an obligation.
Multinationals, traders, retailers and bankers cannot simply impose their will 
on producers but the majority of their membership certainly gives them extra 
weight. Decisions in the General Assembly are taken by simple majority vote. 
From the very beginning till now the producers have not been behind the steering 
wheel of the RSPO. The RSPO was an initiative of Unilever, together with WWF; 
the Executive Board has never been chaired by a representative of the producers 
but by Unilever. Major Indonesian palm oil companies were not represented in 
the RSPO Criteria Working Group. Unilever headed the RSPO Grievance Panel.
Next to the dominant role of market power, the importance of public law in 
the RSPO standard and the increasing role of state authorities in the standard 
process are salient. ‘Compliance with applicable laws and regulations’, including 
international, national and local ones, is one of the main principles of the RSPO. 
This way the RSPO reproduces and reinforces existing state laws. After the 
adoption of the global principles in 2007, representatives of ministries of palm 
oil producing countries were invited to participate in the ‘national interpretation 
and implementation teams’. The main purpose of these teams is to make the 
global RSPO standard compatible and congruent with norms, laws or values of ‘a 
country or sovereign state’. The participation of government officials in the process 
of national interpretation, which can be seen as a specific or new phase of the 
standard setting process, is quite remarkable: until 2007 state actors had not been 
invited or involved in the RSPO standard setting process; more generally speaking, 
state actors are simply assumed not to play an active role in the interpretation 
and adjustment of ‘private’ law to regulate sustainable production of global food 
commodities.
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7.6  Governments as consultative cheerleaders or 
competitive law makers
Whereas de facto the RSPO principles and criteria may increasingly be binding, 
governments have insisted on the voluntary character of membership and 
certification by the RSPO. However, they have not done so for the same reasons. 
Their own reactions and initiatives differ much, as can be seen from the cases of 
the Netherlands and Indonesia.
The Netherlands’ government is one of the greatest moral supporters of the RSPO. 
This has to do with two related things. First, the way in which the RSPO has been 
organised much reflects Dutch values on social order, emphasising the importance 
of multi-stakeholder consultations to address common threats or problems. The 
RSPO may even be seen as a Dutch cultural product and global expression of the 
‘poldermodel’, with representatives of business and civil society from different 
parts of the world collaborating not to prevent polders from flooding but forests 
from palm oil.
One of the great supporters of the RSPO is the Dutch Product Board for Margarines, 
Fats and Oils (MVO), a more local expression of the deeply rooted Dutch culture 
of multi-stakeholder consultation. Whereas the board presents itself as an industry 
association, it has been created by law and is endowed with statutory powers. 
As a statutory public body, the MVO is to serve the common interests of all 
business actors in the production chain of oils and fats which carry out activities 
in the Netherlands, and to facilitate deliberations with authorities and societal 
organisations. The MVO is a member of the RSPO, that actively contributes to 
discussions at annual meetings and is willing to take a leading role in working 
groups. Currently, the MVO chairs the working group on trade and traceability 
and for that reason is invited to meetings of the RSPO Executive Board.
Second, the Netherlands’ government insists on the voluntary character of RSPO 
certification because it is hesitant to develop or support initiatives that could be 
seen as new trade barriers. Sustainability initiatives should be WTO-proof. From this 
perspective, the Netherlands wants the RSPO to remain a voluntary private sector 
initiative, characterised by non-binding rules. Together with the UK government, 
the Netherlands’ government has convened meetings with palm oil leadership to 
commit them to ‘continued rapid growth in the production and use of RSPO-certified 
palm oil’. At the ‘Palm Oil Leadership Group Meeting’ of July 2010 in London, 
a ‘Sustainable Palm Oil Declaration’ was formulated, acknowledging ‘the RSPO 
as the fundamental and credible platform for defining acceptable sustainability 
standards and as the forum for multi-stakeholder engagement’.300
300 Proforest, 2010. Palm oil leadership group meeting: global business of biodiversity conference. Excel 
conference centre, London, UK, 13 July 2010. Summary report. 
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The Indonesian government also emphasises the voluntary character of the RSPO 
standard. However, it finds the RSPO insufficient and has started to develop an 
own standard, which should be binding for all palm oil producers in Indonesia: 
the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). The standard was announced by the 
Indonesian Minister of Agriculture in his opening address of the eight round table 
RSPO conference of November 2010 in Jakarta. At the same conference, the chair 
of the Indonesian Palm Oil Commission (IPOC) further explained the plans of the 
minister: oil palm plantations will be classified into five categories according to 
Decree no. 17 of 2009 of the Ministry of Agriculture; the plantations that will be 
classified under categories I, II and III can seek certification under the Indonesian 
Certification System, using ISPO as a standard; independent certification bodies 
will assess the application and plantation company. The Ministry wants to offer 
companies that are already RSPO-certified, the possibility to get ISPO-certified as 
well. To be eligible for this, the company should also be classified under category 
I, II or III by the Ministry of Agriculture. In that case, the last audit report will be 
studied in a selective way, provided this audit ‘complies with regulations’. The 
chair of the IPOC said that an ISPO approved certified body will only audit those 
criteria that ‘do not follow Indonesian regulations’. However, it is still unclear how 
an ISPO certified body will determine what RSPO criteria do not follow Indonesian 
regulations, how such criteria will be audited and what ‘weight’ will be given to 
performance on these criteria.
Like the Dutch government, the Indonesian government wants food law or 
sustainability standards not to interfere with WTO law. Unlike the Dutch 
government, the Indonesian government is preparing notification of its own 
standard under the WTO. The chair of the IPOC referred to compatibility with 
‘Codex’ and approval by the ‘International Organization for Standardization’ (ISO) 
during her presentation at the eighth RSPO conference. At the same time, the 
Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture explores the possibility of organising Multilateral 
Agreements with accreditation bodies in palm oil importing countries (EU member 
states, USA, etc.) to enable acceptance of the ISPO certificates. Finally, the Ministry 
seeks bilateral cooperation with buyers’ countries.
7.7 Conclusion
The law making process of the RSPO can be divided into three phases. The first 
phase is the phase in which multinationals, retailers and international NGOs – 
mainly from buyers’ countries – formulated principles and criteria for sustainable 
palm oil in producers’ countries. This phase began with the first exploratory talks 
of WWF and Unilever on a business partnership model in 2002 and ended with 
the adoption of the sustainability principles and criteria at the General Assembly 
of the RSPO in 2007. One of the key principles is compliance with all applicable 
laws and regulations.
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The second phase is the phase in which government officials of producers’ countries 
were invited to develop a national interpretation of the global RSPO principles 
and criteria, together with representatives of business and civil society. Strictly 
speaking, one could argue that this was not a phase of standard setting. However, 
during this phase ‘minor’ and ‘major’ non-conformities were distinguished. Some 
RSPO indicators were defined as more relevant than others in a specific national 
context. Also, the members of the national teams made explicit references to state 
laws during the ‘interpretation’ of the RSPO principles and criteria. This all suggests 
that it is more appropriate to speak of a re-setting of the normative contents of the 
RSPO standard. The second phase began in 2007. For some producers’ countries 
this phase has already ended with the approval of national interpretations by the 
Executive Board of the RSPO (in 2008 for Indonesia and Papua New Guinea and 
in 2010 for Malaysia and Columbia). Other producers’ countries (Ghana, Thailand 
and Salomon Islands) are still working on the national interpretation.
The third phase is the phase in which governments of producers’ countries start 
to develop their own standard for sustainable production of palm oil. In the case 
of Indonesia, it is not unlikely that the RSPO standard setting process and the 
involvement of government officials in the national interpretation have challenged 
the Indonesian government to develop an own standard. The government was 
excluded from the RSPO standard setting process and observed that Indonesian 
plantation owners were not represented in the RSPO Working Group on Principles 
and Criteria. They also noted that the approval of the Indonesian national 
interpretation of the RSPO standard did not prevent a series of incidents to cause bad 
press for Indonesian RSPO-certified plantation owners (like Wilmar and Sinar Mas, 
Indonesia’s biggest palm oil producer) and food giants to stop buying from these 
growers. Greenpeace alleged that Sinar Mas has been responsible for widespread 
deforestation and peat lead clearance practices, which release vast amounts of 
carbon dioxide. The environmental NGO has submitted a complaint about PT 
Smart, which is part of Sinar Mas Group, to the RSPO Grievance Panel. Currently, 
this panel is headed by the Dutch development organisation Oxfam Novib.
Unlike the Dutch government, the Indonesian government has given up its role 
as cheerleader of the RSPO. It is now actively developing its own standard, and 
more importantly, trying to challenge the RSPO as the single, legitimate power 
to define sustainability law for the production of palm oil on its own territory. 
A similar initiative has been taken by the Malaysian government. Whether the 
new and active role of governments of producers’ countries in the development 
of national standards, marks the beginning of the end of the RSPO as a global 
standard setting body and grievance panel, remains to be seen. Market power of 
global value chain actors and moral power of international NGOs should not be 
underestimated. They will not easily give up a global forum and standard where 
they can sell sustainability. National governments of producers’ countries will not 
quickly do away with the RSPO but at the same time try to make global private law 
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subordinate to national public law. The rivalling of private and public standards 
at different levels, may contribute to intensification, joining and widening of 
efforts to make production of palm oil more sustainable, but also to new ‘shopping’ 
behaviour, inefficiencies, confusion and frictions.
At the last RSPO conference, held in Jakarta in November 2010, the new initiatives 
of the Indonesian and Malaysian government were presented at a workshop 
entitled ‘external developments’. The framing is telling: own, national initiatives 
are considered ‘external’ in the eyes of the international organisers of the RSPO 
conference. This looks like the worst invitation to the Indonesian or Malaysian 
government, who will not feel challenged to explore how legal diversity and 
mixing can be ingredients for sustainable food production.
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8.  GlobalGAP smallholder group certification
Challenge and opportunity for smallholder inclusion into 
global value chains301
Margret Will
8.1  Challenge or opportunity? An introduction to 
GlobalGAP option 2 smallholder certification
8.1.1  Localising global market opportunities means localising global 
challenges
Overseas markets for fresh and processed high-value agricultural and especially 
horticultural produce are attractive outlets for many developing countries. 
Effective exploitation of such opportunities, however, entails the requirement of 
complying with public mandatory and private voluntary food safety and quality 
standards ruling market access. These requirements have been considerably 
tightened since the turn of the Millennium, mainly for two reasons: firstly, the 
harmonisation of national regulatory frameworks under the guidance of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) aiming at facilitating the internationalisation of trade; 
and secondly, numerous food hazard incidences and food scandals that forced 
legislators in industrialised countries to revise their national or, in the case of the 
European Union, their supranational food laws.
Alongside tightening of legal provisions and restructuring of public risk management 
and food inspection systems, the principle of due diligence was established, placing 
the primary responsibility for food safety with the business operators along the 
food supply chain; that is, with importers in the case of foreign country supplies. 
As a consequence, trade and industry introduced self-regulatory schemes, ranging 
from legally mandated and publicly inspected hygiene management and quality 
assurance systems to private voluntary standards (PVS).
Aiming at managing supply side risks in response to due diligence obligations, a 
plethora of PVS emerged, often going beyond formal market access requirements. 
At the same time, PVS were introduced for marketing reasons: to homogenise 
product attributes with a view to making market transactions more transparent 
and cost-efficient; and to label products as a means to differentiating from the 
offer of competitors.
301 This contribution is an abridged and slightly revised version of Will, M., 2010. Integrating smallholders 
into global supply chains: GlobalGAP option 2 smallholder group certification generic manual: lessons 
learnt in pilot projects in Kenya, Ghana, Thailand and Macedonia. GTZ Sector Project Agricultural Trade, 
Eschborn, Germany. This contribution is published with kind permission of the editor, the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Eschborn, Germany. 
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In the light of rising concerns over food safety, food security, climate change, 
growing competition for arable land between food, feed and bioenergy crops, 
standards will in all probability gain further importance. Especially, if positive 
impacts can be expected on the sustainable use of water and soil resources, the 
conservation of biodiversity, the preservation of traditional knowledge and, last 
but not least, on productivity, farmers’ welfare, workers‘ health and consumer 
protection. Against this background, public mandatory and private voluntary 
standards are of growing relevance to smallholders in developing countries. Already 
now, compliance with standards is not anymore an issue only for farmers exporting 
overseas but increasingly also for smallholders competing for shares in domestic 
and sub-regional markets.
GlobalGAP certification, for example, is required by a considerable number of 
retailers, especially supermarkets, worldwide. On the one hand, this represents 
a real threat for many farmers in developing countries, as non-compliance may 
lead to their exclusion. On the other hand, if appropriately managed, compliance 
does not only offer income opportunities but as well the chance to introducing 
sustainable agricultural practices with positive impacts on farm economics, the 
environment and social networks. Various stakeholders report that investments 
into good agricultural practices (GAP) and quality assurance systems along the 
food supply chain are justifiable and result in reasonable returns on investment, 
for example through productivity gains, reduction of production and transaction 
costs, improved market access, and ultimately, improved consumer protection. 
However, two questions still remain unanswered: to what extent are small-scale 
farmers in developing countries likely to be squeezed out of global value chains 
and which capacities need to be built to enable smallholders to seize opportunities 
from access to higher value markets ruled by PVS such as GlobalGAP.
In so far, the question of ‘challenge or opportunity’ may have to be changed into 
the question, on how the challenges posed by standards in general and private 
voluntary standards in particular can be turned into opportunities for small-scale 
farmers in developing countries. The following citations stand for the current 
discussion on ‘challenge or opportunity’ for smallholder inclusion into global 
value chains:
From challenge …
‘Farmers do perceive codes often as … imposed externally … they are required 
to follow to improve market access. This is understandable as it seems that 
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codes often have been designed with insufficient involvement of farmers and 
in particular smallholder farmers reflecting on their typical environment’.302
‘The ability of smallholders to access the high-value markets dominated 
by supermarkets has declined dramatically since the implementation of 
GlobalGAP’.303
‘One obstacle standing in the way of more extensive dissemination of the 
certification … are the associated costs for small-scale farmers’.304
‘Private standards will not go away. Therefore the solution is evolution and 
adaptation of standards rather than demanding their abolishment’.305
‘The actual challenge consists of tapping the advantages of GlobalGAP (good 
agricultural practices) in such a way that long-term economic sustainability 
is ensured for goods produced by small-scale farmers…’306
… to opportunity!
‘In this globalised world, GlobalGAP certification provides an opportunity to 
smallholder groups to play on an equal ground with other bigger suppliers 
in the world, and be connected to international buyers’307
‘The most successful GlobalGAP-compliant smallholder schemes are highly 
committed to a commercial farming approach, well organised in strongly-
managed producer groups, and linked to a large, well-resourced export 
company’308
302 Opitz, M., Potts, J. and Wunderlich, C., 2007. Closing the gaps in GAPS: a preliminary appraisal of 
the measures and costs associated with adopting commonly recognised ‘good agricultural practices’ in 
three coffee growing regions, appendices. International Institute for Sustainable Development (iisd) 
and Sustainable Coffee Partnership, Winnipeg, Canada, p. 67.
303 Legge, A., Orchard, J., Graffham, A., Greenhalgh, P., Kleih, U. and MacGregor, J., 2009. Mapping 
different supply chains of fresh produce exports from Africa to the UK. In: Borot de Batisti, A., 
MacGregor, J. and Graffham, A. (eds.) Standard bearers: horticultural exports and private standards in 
Africa. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Winnipeg, Canada, pp. 40-44.
304 BMZ [Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development], 2008. Introduction of voluntary 
social and ecological standards in developing countries, summary version of the evaluation. Evaluation 
Report 043, BMZ, Bonn, Germany, p. 15.
305 Wainwright, H. and Labuschagne, L., 2009. Private standards: a personal perspective from a training 
service provider. In: Borot de Batisti, A., MacGregor, J. and Graffham, A. (eds.) Standard bearers: 
horticultural exports and private standards in Africa. International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), Winnipeg, Canada, pp. 154-157.
306 BMZ [Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development], 2008. Introduction of voluntary 
social and ecological standards in developing countries, summary version of the evaluation. Evaluation 
Report 043, BMZ, Bonn, Germany, p. 15.
307 Enomoto, R., 2009. GlobalGAP Smallholder Support Kit. GlobalGAP Tour 2009 Good Agricultural 
Practice, Nairobi, Kenya, 16 September 2009.
308 Graffham, A. and Cooper, J., 2009. Making GlobalGAP smallholder-friendly: can GlobalGAP be made 
simpler and less costly without compromising integrity? In: Borot de Batisti, A., MacGregor, J. and 
Graffham, A. (eds.) Standard bearers: horticultural exports and private standards in Africa. International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Winnipeg, Canada, pp. 83-88.
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‘While the existing literature documents how both the non-recurring and the 
recurring costs of compliance with GlobalGAP can be considerable, our results 
demonstrate that the returns on the associated investments in terms of export 
sales growth are considerable. … we might reasonably expect appreciable 
‘knock-on’ benefits to small producers’309
8.1.2 The GlobalGAP standard
GlobalGAP (formerly EurepGAP) has emerged as the leading private voluntary 
standard for the access of agricultural products to major import markets. Initiated 
in 1997 by retailers united in the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP), 
the pre-farm-gate standard Good Agricultural Practices covers all on-farm processes 
from inputs through farming until the product leaves the farm.
While ‘retailer and supplier representatives are equally responsible for decision 
making in the different GlobalGAP committees’ (GlobalGAP, 2009), GlobalGAP 
with support of the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and 
the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, initiated 
an ‘Africa Observer’ project in 2007 with a view to also representing the interests 
of African smallholders in standard setting processes. The Africa Observer 
furthermore collects global best practices to facilitate standard implementation 
by small-scale farmers worldwide.310
In addition to its relevance for accessing major export markets, GlobalGAP gains 
importance in developing countries’ domestic markets. Kenya may serve as 
an example, where the private Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya 
(FPEAK) promotes KenyaGAP, which is fully benchmarked with GlobalGAP. The 
Kenyan supermarkets recently started establishing preferred supplier schemes 
that oblige farmers to comply with KenyaGAP. Even if the shares of supermarkets 
in the commercialisation of horticultural produce in most parts of Africa are still 
small and will not grow fast, without question, there is a trickle-down effect of 
GlobalGAP into the local market.
8.1.3 The GlobalGAP option 2 group certification
With a view to easing compliance for small-scale farmers, GlobalGAP offers options 
for group certification (for an overview of different certification options see Table 
8.1). The advantage compared to individual certification (option 1) is that under 
group certification (option 2), qualified staff within the farmer group (optionally 
309 Henson, S., Masakure, O. and Cranfield, J., 2009. Do fresh produce exporters in sub-Saharan Africa 
benefit from GlobalGAP certification? International Food Economy Research Group, InFERG Working 
Paper No. 2_FT, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada, p. 23.
310 See http://www.africa-observer.info.
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a subcontracted service provider) acts as internal auditor of the individual group 
members. The task of external certification is hence reduced to examine the 
proper working of the group’s Internal Quality Management and Control System 
(ICS) accompanied by an external inspection of only a random sample of farmers. 
This ‘system check’, which nevertheless remains the major recurrent cost factor, 
allows the external Certification Body to certify the entire group rather than each 
individual farmer.
Compared with individual certification, a group certificate under option 2 implies 
some advantages: auditing costs and centralised investments (e.g. pesticide store) 
can be shared among group members; exchange of information and capacity 
building can be delivered more straightforward through the groups; and, the 
motivation to comply is boosted by the groups’ peer pressure on members since 
failure of one member would affect the entire group. It can well be assumed 
that group certification is more feasible for small-scale producers and can hence 
contribute to reducing the risk of smallholders’ exclusion from (global) value chains.
For achieving GlobalGAP option 2 group certification, four key requirements have 
to be met by the farmer groups311:
• The group has to operate an Internal Quality Management and Control System 
(ICS) consisting of (a) a Quality Management System (QMS) with a documented 
management structure and a written control and procedures manual as well as 
(b) a Central Administration and Management of the group responsible for the 
implementation of the control and sanction system across all member farms.
311 Günther, D. and Neuendorff, J., 2006. EurepGAP smallholder manual: understanding EurepGAP. 
Powerpoint presentation held at the occasion of the Kick-off workshops.
Table 8.1. GlobalGAP certif ication options.
Individual certification Group certification
GlobalGAP option 1 option 2
Benchmarked scheme option 3 option 4
An individual farmer owns 
the certificate.
Verification of compliance 
through one external 
inspection per year.
A farmer group owns the certificate.
Verification through Quality 
Management System, internal 
inspections and audits plus one external 
inspection and audit per year.
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• Since the ICS does not replace the internal self-inspection, each farmer registered 
as group member has to implement a Farmer Internal Self Assessment based 
on the GlobalGAP checklist and to be undertaken by the farmer himself. The 
findings must be available for review by either the internal or the external 
inspector.
• Based on the GlobalGAP checklist, the Farmer Group has to realise a Farmer 
Group Internal Control aimed at inspecting each registered farm and all declared 
produce handling sites at least once per year. This audit can be realised by 
qualified staff within the Farmer Group (Internal Farmer Group Inspector) or 
can be subcontracted to an external verification body as long as it is different 
from the external Certification Body.
• The Farmer Group registers with a GlobalGAP approved Certification Body 
(CB)312 and signs a sub-licence agreement with the CB. The External Verification 
undertaken by the CB consists of two parts: the audit of the ICS (‘System 
Check’) and the inspection of a random sample of farms.
8.1.4 The challenges
Even though small-scale farmers contribute major shares to fresh produce destined 
for export and for the local processing industry in many developing countries 
and even if they derive significant levels of income in return, smallholders are 
especially challenged with achieving GlobalGAP certification. The main concern 
is that the costs of compliance render smallholder production unfeasible. As a 
consequence, customers who previously bought from small-scale farmers, may 
switch to either sourcing from larger farms or from fully-integrated own production. 
The special challenge of option 2 certification is to build the necessary technical 
and managerial capacities within farmer groups and to generate the financial 
means for realising necessary investments and perhaps subcontracting service 
providers capable of supporting the operation of the ICS.
8.2  Challenge and opportunity! The GlobalGAP 
smallholder pilot project
8.2.1 The objective of the pilot project
The overall objective of the smallholder pilot project was to identify ways, in which 
the GlobalGAP standard can become more inclusive for smallholder farmers in 
developing countries and to assist GlobalGAP to develop new and adjust existing 
technical standards and tools appropriate for smallholder certification. The pilot 
project was designed to develop a generic ‘GlobalGAP smallholder QMS manual’ 
serving smallholder producer groups to lower the costs for creating their own 
312 List of approved CB available online at: http://www.globalgap.org.
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Internal Quality Management and Control System (ICS) as the main prerequisite 
for getting certified under GlobalGAP Option 2.
Furthermore, the ‘GlobalGAP Smallholder QMS Manual’ was pilot-tested in four 
countries, thereof two in Africa and one country each in Asia and South East 
Europe, with the purpose of:
• identifying critical aspects of success and failure in GlobalGAP option 2 group 
certification and developing practical solutions;
• adapting the generic manual to local conditions to develop a simple public-
domain local shareware QMS manual readily usable for adaptation by 
smallholder groups; and
• developing standard training packages and qualifying local public and private 
service providers for training and auditing of farmer groups.
Finally, the generic ‘GlobalGAP smallholder QMS manual’ was made available 
as public shareware.313
8.2.1 The partners of the pilot project
The GlobalGAP smallholder pilot project was jointly implemented by the 
sector project Agricultural Trade of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH and the Gesellschaft für Ressourcenschutz (GfRS) 
in cooperation with GlobalGAP (by then still EurepGAP) and various development 
programmes implemented in the four pilot countries by the GTZ (Germany), the 
UK Department for International Development (DfID), the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank financed Horticulture 
Export Industry Initiative (HEII in Ghana).
8.2.2 The generic GlobalGAP QMS smallholder manual
The ‘smallholder manual’ serves as a practical guidance on how to make the 
complex system requirements for certification as laid down in the GlobalGAP 
general regulations for fruit and vegetables manageable for smallholder groups. The 
generic guidance document provides a systemised compilation of all information 
relevant for farmer groups to prepare and achieve GlobalGAP certification under 
Option 2.
More precisely, the ‘smallholder manual’ introduces the GlobalGAP scheme, 
explains the certification process, discusses critical success factors for group 
certification and imparts practical guidance to group representatives on how to 
313 See: GTZ, 2010. GlobalGAP smallholder QMS set-up guide – How to establish QMS in your group. 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn, Germany. Based on: GlobalGAP IFA 
Ver. 3.02 QMS checklist_Mar 08, English Version, 2010.
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establish and document an Internal Control System in full compliance with the 
general regulations of GlobalGAP. The manual provides a template of a handbook 
for a Quality Management System (QMS) including standard operating procedures 
and recording forms modelled for a fictional farmer group.
Not to be understood as a one-size-fits-all solution, the applicant smallholder groups 
can use this practical guide for creating their own QMS by adapting procedures 
and forms to the specific situation of their groups and members. The manual 
does not give guidance on how to implement the GlobalGAP standard at farm 
level, but leaves this task intentionally to the group managers, to expert farmers, 
agricultural extensionists or other specialists who are familiar with the specific 
crops as well as the local production systems and farming practices.
To support smallholder groups in designing their own group-specific QMS, the 
smallholder QMS guidelines had to be adapted to the prevailing conditions of the 
pilot groups. The development of these local generic QMS manuals was guided 
by the following tasks:
• definition of methods for risk assessments;
• definition of the organisational and administrative set-up;
• development of a quality policy;
• development of standard operating procedures;
• development of recording forms (templates, e.g. model contracts and control 
sheets).
After validation by international experts and the certification body, the draft local 
generic QMS manuals were discussed with the end users (growers, exporters) 
in the four pilot countries whose feedback was taken into consideration for the 
development of the respective final versions.
8.2.3 The four pilot projects in Africa, Asia and Europe
The draft version of the ‘smallholder manual’ was tested with several smallholder 
farmer groups in Kenya, Ghana, Thailand and Macedonia. In all four countries, 
pilot testing of the manual complemented activities of development programmes 
implemented by GTZ, DfID, USAID and the World Bank and some countries’ 
Ministries respectively, aiming at integrating smallholder farmers into food supply 
chains (usually referred to as ‘value chains’ in the development context).
Pilot testing was implemented in a stepwise action-oriented approach to provide 
for evaluation and reflection loops allowing the project partners to adapt the 
implementation to the progress of farmer groups and group instructors involved 
in advice and training. In general, the implementation of the pilot projects was 
guided by the following sequence of actions:
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• group profiling and selection of farmer groups according to pre-established 
eligibility criteria (see below);
• assignment of a local coordinator for managing the pilot project and instructors 
for assisting the farmer groups in adapting the groups’ QMS manuals and ICS 
to their situation;
• kick-off workshop implemented by GTZ with development partners, the local 
coordinator, the farmer groups’ managers, the instructors aimed at introducing 
the stakeholders to the smallholder manual;
• group work implemented by the management of the farmer groups with 
assistance by the group instructors and accompanied by a training needs 
assessment and tailor-made training courses;
• mid-term review jointly implemented by GTZ, GlobalGAP, development 
partners, the local coordinator, the farmer groups’ managers and the instructors 
to review the draft group QMS manuals;
• implementation of the ICS by the groups (mainly training of farmers, internal 
inspections, pesticide testing, produce handling) to test, review and finalise 
the documented group QMS manuals;
• final workshop jointly implemented by GTZ, development partners, the local 
coordinator, the farmer groups’ managers and the instructors to feed the practical 
experiences into the final version of the documented QMS of the farmer groups 
to be submitted to the certification body for approval.
The project used the following eligibility criteria for the selection of the pilot groups:
• the group shall be a smallholder group as defined below;
• the group wishes to apply for certification under option 2 of GlobalGAP;
• the group shall be a legal entity;
• the group must be large enough to sustain an ICS (minimum of 30 to 50 
smallholders);
• the group shall have sufficient human and financial resources to maintain 
the ICS;
• the group shall share all experiences in an open and transparent way internally 
and with the technical advisors who will assist them in adapting their ICS 
documentation.
The ICS guidance document of the EU Commission (2000) defines smallholder 
farmer groups as follows:
• The cost of individual certification is disproportionally high in relation to the 
sales value of the product sold (higher than 2% of sales).
• Farm units are mainly managed by family labour.
• There is homogeneity of members in terms of geographical location, production 
system, size of holdings and common marketing system.
• Only smallholder farmers shall be members of the group. Under certain 
conditions, larger farmers, processors and exporters can be part of the structure 
of the group.
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The characteristics of the four pilot projects are briefly described in Table 8.2. A 
detailed description of the four pilot projects has been published.314
314 Will, M., 2010. Integrating smallholders into global supply chains: GlobalGAP option 2 smallholder 
group certification generic manual: lessons learnt in pilot projects in Kenya, Ghana, Thailand and 
Macedonia, GTZ Sector Project Agricultural Trade, Eschborn, Germany.
Table 8.2. Characteristics of the four GlobalGAP smallholder pilot projects.
Kenya
Crops and target markets french beans (fresh and canned) destined for exports
Number of farmer groups 9 farmer groups, thereof 6 certified by October 2006
Partners
• Private sector 455 farmers, 3 exporters, 1 PMO1, service providers 
• Public sector Ministry of Agriculture extension services, research centre
• Dev. partners GTZ, DfID
A glance on the way 
forward
‘The process of benchmarking KenyaGAP to EurepGAP 
[GlobalGAP] is the unique opportunity for our small-holders to 
demonstrate that they are world class producers’.2
Ghana
Crops and target markets pineapples (fresh and fresh-cut) destined for exports
Number of farmer groups 6 farmer groups; all certified by mid 2007
Partners
• Private sector 142 farmers; no linkage to exporters or other buyers
• Public sector Ministry of Food and Agriculture with different departments
• Dev. partners GTZ, USAID, HEII (World Bank financed)
A glance on the way 
forward
‘Ghana must face the challenges of quality … This development 
must be seen as part of a full-service marketing proposition, 
which would stem from its current position of low-cost spot 
supplier to the European … market’.3
Thailand 
Crops and target markets asparagus exported to Japan/Taiwan/EU; durian exported to 
China/ASEAN
Number of farmer groups 6 farmer groups, thereof 3 certified by 2007
Partners
• Private sector 240 farmers, 1 exporter/2 collectors, 1 association 
• Public sector 1 university as service provider
• Dev. partners GTZ
A glance on the way 
forward
‘We need to think about how we can focus on globalisation, yet 
remain locally accountable’.4 
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8.3  Turning challenges into opportunities: conclusions 
from the GlobalGAP smallholder pilot project
8.3.1 Results intended ... results achieved
By building technical and managerial capacities of farmers, group managers and 
service providers as well as institutional capacities of farmer groups to jointly 
manage GlobalGAP option 2 certification, the pilot project attained significant 
impacts with regard to economic viability, environmental sustainability and social 
advancement (Table 8.3). Seventeen pilot farmer groups achieved certification, 
representing 75% of all groups having participated in the pilot project.
While some weaker smallholders dropped out of the programme (Table 8.4) there 
is evidence from a recent post-pilot evaluation in Ghana that the majority of 
pilot farmers increased their incomes through increased productivity, reduced 
production costs and rejects and that the membership in several pilot groups 
increased (trickle-down effect).
As a further result, the generic ‘smallholder manual’ has been revised in the light 
of the experiences gained from the pilot projects. The manual is now available as 
Macedonia
Crops and target markets fruit and vegetables (pepper); partly destined for exports
Number of farmer groups 2 farmer groups, both certified in 2006
Partners
• Private sector 125 farmers, 1 consultant
• Public sector Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)
• Dev. partners GTZ, USAID
A glance on the way 
forward
In Macedonia, the ‘greatest food system weaknesses [are rooted 
in the] inadequate supply of uniform quality primary products for 
the fresh and processed product markets’.5
1 PMO = Produce Marketing Organisation or Primary Marketing Organisation.
2 Shah, H., 2005. The global partnership for safe and sustainable agriculture. In: EurepGAP global report, p. 8.
3 Danielou, M. and Ravry, C., 2005. The rise of Ghana’s pineapple industry: from successful takeoff to 
sustainable expansion. ESSD Africa Working Paper Series No. 93, p. 42.
4 Thai Deputy Prime Minister Kosit Pupienmrat, 2007, http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?ida
rt=372&idcat=46&lang=1&client=1.
5 Scott, W., 2006. Linking producers to increased horticultural exports from Macedonia. Presentation at the 
Regional Consultation on Linking Producers to Markets, Cairo, Egypt, 29 January to 2 February 2006.
Table 8.2. Continued.
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a public shareware315. Additionally, the lessons learnt in elaborating the generic 
QMS manual and implementing the pilot projects have fed into the GlobalGAP 
315 See: GTZ, 2010. GlobalGAP smallholder QMS set-up guide – How to establish QMS in your group. 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn, Germany. Based on: GlobalGAP IFA 
Ver. 3.02 QMS checklist_Mar 08, English Version, 2010.
Table 8.3. Positive results according to sustainability criteria.
Achievements
Economic 
viability
• Productivity increased; input costs and rejects reduced; income stabilised/
increased1
• Crop risk (yield fluctuations) reduced through application of GAP/better 
quality inputs
• Market/price risks (volatility) reduced for groups that are integrated into 
supply chains
• Access also improved to local, regional upmarket segments not requiring 
certification
• Financial assets generated enabling farmers to re-invest and to access 
(trade) credits
• Infrastructure improved on farms and at group level
• Capacities of service providers (extension/training) improved
• Access to a more reliable supply of required qualities improved for PMOs/
exporters
Environmental 
sustainability
• Protection of natural resources improved through reduced use of 
chemicals
• Efficiency of the use of natural resources increased through reduced waste 
(rejects)
Social 
advancement
• Management/technological capacities for compliance/QMS management 
built among farmers and group managers; with positive effects on wider 
farm/group management
• Farmer groups strengthened (growth in membership e.g. in Ghana; even 
if this is also owed to longer-term (post-pilot) assistance in farmer group 
development)
• Supply chain governance2 has become more transparent and trustful with 
more equitable relationships assuring fairer compensation for smallholders
• Farm worker and family health improved through improved handling of 
pesticides and better knowledge on food safety and hygiene issues
1 Evidence mainly anecdotic, apart from the on-going post-pilot evaluation in Ghana, which confirms 
assumptions made in numerous recent publications.
2 Supply chain governance: power relations, information exchange/transparency and distribution of gains 
between operators along the supply chain.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
Private food law 215 
 GlobalGAP smallholder group certification
Africa Observer project, which represents the interests of the smallholder farmer 
community in and beyond Africa, and the GlobalGAP smallholder task force. As 
a major result, initial steps have been taken to make the standard as well as the 
conformity assessment more smallholder-friendly.
8.3.2 Critical success factors
The following citation of Graffham and Cooper316 perfectly depicts the lessons, 
which have as well been learnt in the pilot projects: ‘The most successful GlobalGAP-
compliant smallholder schemes are highly committed to a commercial farming 
approach, well organised in strongly-managed producer groups, and linked to a 
large, well-resourced export company’.
The results achieved illustrate the ambiguous effects inherent to smallholder group 
certification: compliance with GlobalGAP can advance the integration of responsive 
farmer groups into global supply chains but may drive weaker small-scale farmers 
316 Graffham, A. and Cooper, J., 2009. Making GlobalGAP smallholder-friendly: can GlobalGAP be made 
simpler and less costly without compromising integrity? In: Borot de Batisti, A., MacGregor, J. and 
Graffham, A. (eds.) Standard bearers: horticultural exports and private standards in Africa. International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Winnipeg, Canada, pp. 83-88.
Table 8.4. Negative unintended results.
Economic viability Unsatisfactory first-time certification/retention rates1 in some pilot 
projects, mainly due to:
• weak groups (partly in Kenya)
• wrong groups not (yet) requiring certification (durian group in 
Thailand)
• wrong expectations about price premiums paid for certified produce
• inadequate approaches for building required farmer and group 
capacities
• insufficient time for training of smallholder farmers not meeting their 
requirements
• insufficient/lacking group-exporter linkages, partly too donor-driven
• questionable ownership and hence sustainability (especially in Thailand)
Social advancement • Dropout of weaker group members prior to the first post-pilot 
certification in most cases (e.g. -14% in Ghana); however, this decrease 
was at least in Ghana more than compensated by an increase in group 
membership of +52% one year later (retention rate and membership 
are expected to grow further).
1 Retention rate: rate of satisfaction with and renewal of the certification.
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out of export markets. ‘In principle, smallholders … recognise the need to adhere to 
international market standards because this enhances trade confidence with their 
buyers. In particular, GlobalGAP has shown to enhance market access, especially 
for producers in [countries] where official control (government) systems are under-
developed and hence less assuring. … [However,] the main concerns on GlobalGAP 
… are the high cost of certification and the complexity of implementation’.317
There is no simple solution to these two critical issues. Rather, the following 
success factors illustrate the need for a situation-specific (country, supply chain, 
groups, products) system’s approach to promoting smallholder group certification 
(see also Table 8.5):
1.  Smallholder capacities (group performance and farmers’ skills): ‘The social cohesion 
of the … groups involved in group certification is one key success factor for 
sustainable certification and concurrently one of the core challenges for group 
certification … Hence, capacity development is essential. A common need must 
be identified within the group … This can be common marketing, common 
production, common training – but never certification as the only purpose … 
The most important challenges identified are capacity development at both 
individual farmer level and farmer group level … and strong engagement in 
group cohesion … Therefore, for sustainable group certification the focus … 
[needs to be] placed on group selection and group development’.318
2.  Incentives, financial viability and market prospects: For up-scaling group 
certification, it is necessary to identify (a) realistic incentives based on a 
cost-benefit analysis along the entire supply chain to convince supply chain 
operators to committing required resources; (b) viable solutions for sustainable 
financing of initial investments and recurrent costs of compliance; and (c) 
buyers (traders, exporters, processors or PMOs) capable to assuring access to 
markets, committed to contracting smallholder farmer groups and willing to 
supporting certification through embedded services.
3.  Supply chain governance (fair partnership and industry commitment): Given that 
‘GlobalGAP certification can hardly be achieved by smallholder groups alone 
…, intense support from exporters [or other customers] is one core element of 
success. [Furthermore,] … the advantages of strong exporter support are that 
standard implementation is performed quickly and effectively’.319 In the same 
line of thinking, the International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED) and the Natural Resources Institute (NRI) argue that there is a ‘… need 
to rethink the concept of ‘costs’. On average, farmers pay 14% of recurrent 
costs associated with [GlobalGAP] and exporters (and/or) donors pay the rest. 
317 Mbithi, S., 2009. GlobalGAP – report on smallholder taskforce consultations – smallholder ambassador. 
Nairobi, 21st June 2009. GlobalGAP Africa Observer, p. 2.
318 GTZ, GlobalGAP and Marktkontor Obst und Gemüse Baden e.V., 2008. GlobalGAP group certification: 
a challenge for smallholders in Europe and developing countries. International Workshop, 28- 29 April 
2008, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, p. 7.
319 Ibid., p. 6.
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Rather than labelling exporter investments as unsustainable, it can be argued 
that this illustrates a healthy and functioning system with the two private 
sector investors sharing the costs and benefits as part of a sustainable business 
model.’320
4.  Adaptation to smallholder capacities (standard complexity and certification costs): 
Experience shows that the main challenges are more related to certification 
than to compliance as such. Hence, it will be essential to find ways of adapting 
the costs of certification and the implementation of the Control Points and 
Compliance Criteria (CPCC) to the capacities of smallholder groups without 
compromising essential GlobalGAP requirements. ‘On the cost, it is true that 
the main part (at least 85%) … is audit fees paid to CBs [Certification Bodies], 
with the rest being standard fees. In order to enhance more compliance amongst 
smallholders, it will be necessary to initiate discussions with CBs on how credible 
but cost effective audit structures can be implemented. On complexity, apart 
from reducing CPCCs, GlobalGAP will need to work with farmers … and other 
organisations to translate/simplify implementation of the standard’.321 In this 
context, the establishment of AfriCert, a Kenya-based/Ghana-represented CB 
is worth mentioning. As a local CB, AfriCert cannot only bring down costs but 
its inspectors also have a better understanding of how CPCCs can be reached 
under local conditions.
5.  Support services and framework conditions: Last but not least, the public and 
private sectors play a crucial role in, firstly, establishing (public task) and 
lobbying for (private task) enabling framework conditions (policies, legislation, 
enforcement, appropriate infrastructure) and, secondly, offering appropriate, 
competent, affordable and accountable financial and non-financial services.
8.3.3  Improving the smallholder-orientation of option 2 certification
Until recently, discussions on the effects of standards on small-scale farmers centred 
on the risks of exclusion, nurtured by figures from Kenya showing dramatic declines 
in smallholder participation in vegetable exports. But evidence is growing that 
compliance with GlobalGAP can as well enhance competitiveness of smallholders 
and support their participation in global supply chains. Even if data are not yet 
available, reports on increased productivity as well as reduced input costs and 
rejects are not any more only anecdotic. These findings of the pilot project can 
be confirmed by recent studies reporting for example that ‘… the returns on the 
associated investments in terms of export sales growth are considerable. … Given 
that firms in the survey tended to procure a significant proportion … from small 
320 IIED [International Institute for Environment and Development] and NRI [Natural Resources 
Institute], undated. Costs and benefits of EurepGAP compliance for African smallholders: a synthesis 
of surveys in three countries. Fresh Insights 13, p. 20.
321 Mbithi, S., 2009. GlobalGAP – report on smallholder taskforce consultations – smallholder ambassador. 
Nairobi, 21st June 2009. GlobalGAP Africa Observer, p. 2.
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outgrowers, … we might reasonably expect appreciable ‘knock-on’ benefits to 
small producers’.322
322 Henson, S., Masakure, O. and Cranfield, J., 2009. Do fresh produce exporters in sub-Saharan Africa 
benefit from GlobalGAP certification? International Food Economy Research Group, InFERG Working 
Paper No. 2_FT, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada, p. 23.
Table 8.5. Critical success factors in GlobalGAP option 2 group certif ication.
Smallholder capacities 
sufficient to achieve group 
certification:
Market prospects promising 
for certified smallholder 
supplies:
Incentives for the 
commitment of supply chain 
partners:
Group performance:
• Group cohesion
• Capacities for ICS/QMS 
management
• Exporter/PMO linkages
Farmers’ skills:
• Technological skills (e.g. 
GAP)
• Financial assets
Market potential:
• Market volume and growth
• Lucrative price segments
• Significance of smallholder 
shares in overall supplies
Distribution systems:
• Supply chain organisation
• Transport/logistics 
capacities
Income generation:
• Profitability for all supply 
chain partners
• Fair distribution of gains 
along the supply chain (win-
win)
Broad understanding of 
benefits:
• Cost cuts, productivity 
gains
• Worker and consumer 
health
Issue: How to up-scale 
capacity building to achieve 
broad impact
Issue: How to up-scale 
marketing skills of 
smallholders
Issue: Which cost-benefit 
ratio irrespective of pilot 
conditions
Supply chain governance 
conducive for smallholder 
integration:
Promising product features for 
GlobalGAP certification1:
• High-value
• Low-cost
• Labour-intensive
• Existing demand
Financial viability/financing for 
sustaining certification:
Fair partnership:
• Mutual trust/contract-
abiding
• Fair distribution of profits 
and costs along the supply 
chain
• Industry commitment:
• Contracting farmer groups
• Supporting certification (e.g. 
through embedded services)
Access to finance via:
• Industry embedded service
• Private financial sector
• Government/donor funds
Low-cost solutions for:
• Initial investments 
(infrastructure, training, 
certification)
• Recurrent compliance costs
Issue: How to promote CSR 
for fair partnerships in local 
firms
Issue: Which solutions for 
smallholder low-risk attitudes
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‘While standards compliance (or non-compliance) can bring about changes 
that harm the livelihoods of the poor, advantages may accrue to those 
able to participate in evolving supply chains. This can certainly apply to 
smallholders, especially those operating in suitable locations with adequate 
infrastructure and in the context of effective producer organisations and long-
term relationships with buyers. Smallholder farmers can frequently adopt 
the necessary technical measures and investments to comply with emerging 
standards. A key challenge is thus to reduce, through collective action, the 
transaction costs associated with monitoring and certifying compliance. Public 
policy and investment can make a difference in the pattern of ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’.’323
323 Jaffee, S., 2005. Food safety and agricultural health standards: challenges and opportunities for 
developing country exports. The Worldbank, Washington, DC, USA. January 10, p.112.
Adaptation to smallholder 
capacities (precondition for 
up-scaling):
Support services competent 
and affordable for farmer 
groups:
Framework conditions 
enabling smallholder 
compliance:
Adaptation of the standard:
• Simplified traceability
• Simplified record-keeping
• Risk-based CCPCs
Certification costs:
• Solutions for CB costs
• Revision of standard fees
Embedded services for:
• Training/advice/supervision
• QMS management
• Financing
3rd party public/private 
services:
• Extension/training
• Laboratories/CBs
• Financing
Enabling policies and 
legislation:
• Conducive sector policies
• Adequate food/company 
laws
Reliable/unbiased 
enforcement:
• inspections, contracts, etc.
Appropriate infrastructure, 
e.g.:
• roads, logistic centres
• public utilities (water/
power)
Issue: How to assure food 
safety while adapting to 
smallholders
Issue: How to build viable and 
accountable service systems
Issue: Which strategic 
partners to advocate for 
necessary changes
1 This list of promising product features for GlobalGAP certification does not imply that other products 
cannot or should not be certified. However, the first three product features represent typical competitive 
advantages of smallholder over large-scale production systems. The fourth product feature may not be relevant 
in cases where supply chain operators intend to diversify products or markets respectively and prospects are 
promising for creating demand.
Table 8.5 continued.
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Concluding, group certification is not an easy process and the pilot project has 
shown that smallholders cannot achieve certification on their own. The main issue 
is not whether small-scale farmers are able to achieve certification and integrate 
into up-market supply chains; the question is rather how the weak service sector 
and business environment can be compensated for so as to enable smallholders 
to achieve certification without compromising supply chain competitiveness.
Experience suggests that (a) standard regulations have to be adapted to the actual 
risks of smallholder production; (b) technical and managerial capacities need to 
be built; and (c) initial investments as well as recurrent costs of compliance need 
to be made affordable for smallholders or, at least partly, be borne by business 
partners reaping fruit from smallholders’ low-cost, labour-intensive production 
or by other stakeholders committed to integrating smallholders into food supply 
chains.
Selected initiatives supporting better smallholder-orientation of GlobalGAP Option 2 …
• GlobalGAP Africa Observer/Smallholder Ambassador project. A GlobalGAP 
initiative supported by DfID and GTZ for strengthening the representation of 
smallholder interests in standard setting processes.324
• International Workshop ‘GlobalGAP Group Certification. A challenge for 
smallholders in Europe and developing countries’.325
• GlobalGAP Tour 2009. Initiatives for assuring stakeholder participation in 
standard revision.326
• GlobalGAP Smallholder Support Kit. A GlobalGAP initiative for making the best 
practices developed in capacity building for QMS development and management 
as well as good agricultural practices available to the public.
• Strengthening the national quality infrastructure through the establishment 
of local Certification Bodies. A GTZ (Ghana) and AfriCert (Kenya) initiative 
for opening a branch office of AfriCert in Ghana with a view to reducing 
certification costs.
• Up-scaling KenyaGAP in the local market. An initiative of the Fresh Produce 
Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) in cooperation with supermarkets for 
upgrading local market supplies to the (‘domesticated’) GlobalGAP-benchmarked 
KenyaGAP standard.327
… and the key role of standard owners
A regular update of the generic manual by the standard owner to follow both, 
the revision of the GlobalGAP standard and developments in production systems 
324 See http://www.africa-observer.info/index.html.
325 See http://africa-observer.info/docs_sub1.html.
326 See http://www.tour2009.org.
327 See http://www.fpeak.org/code.html.
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and local framework conditions will be of essential help for any smallholder 
farmer group interested to establish a Quality Management System for option 2 
certification.
8.4  GlobalGAP: challenge and opportunity! Conclusions 
and recommendations
While the pilot cases clearly suggest that small-scale farmers are capable of 
achieving GlobalGAP certification under option 2, it became obvious that the 
viability and sustainability of group certification depends on several key conditions: 
together with technical capacities, due attention needs to be paid to developing 
group structures, management capacities and leadership skills in order to achieve 
and sustain group cohesion, an indispensable precondition for maintaining group 
certification; simplified handouts have to be developed to adapt the generic QMS 
to the capacities of smallholder farmers; depending on the previous technical 
knowledge, management skills and group performance, sufficient time needs 
to be provided to enable farmer groups to adopt relevant technologies as well as 
attitudes necessary for achieving compliance. A major issue in the promotion 
of GlobalGAP certification is that the benefits are difficult to predict while costs 
incur immediately. However, aspiring to promote certification, it is necessary to 
inform farmers on probable benefits and costs of group certification to assist them 
take informed business and investment decisions. This especially holds true for 
resource-poor and risk-averse smallholders.
8.4.1 Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the lessons learnt in the four pilot 
projects:
In well-managed schemes, opportunities outweigh challenges of GlobalGAP certification. 
The pilot projects in Kenya, Ghana, Thailand and Macedonia confirm that costs 
of compliance with GlobalGAP are usually considerable. But at the same time, 
certification offers a wide range of economic and social benefits to smallholder 
farmer groups and their trade partners seeking to maintain and expand market 
shares in an ever-more competitive global market. In addition to the broad range 
of economic impacts attained, which directly or indirectly translate into financial 
benefits, farmer groups also realised considerable non-financial benefits. As 
reported in other studies, benefits of GlobalGAP ‘include the production of quality 
produce, improved field hygiene, better knowledge of pesticide use, and wider 
farm management benefits. In truth, many of these so-called non-financial benefits 
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are quantifiable; access to trade credit or higher quality inputs will improve farm 
efficiency and yields’.328
Furthermore, ‘many farmers said that they were using [GlobalGAP] records to 
understand their financial viability and run their farms more commercially. 
Proper handling of pesticides and improved food safety and hygiene had health 
benefits on the farms, and in addition most farmers said that they had transferred 
hygiene messages to the homestead with positive implications for family health. 
… Further benefits have been gained through supply chain relationships that 
might accompany [GlobalGAP] certification. For example, contracts enable some 
[smallholder groups] to access trade credit through designated input sellers for 
seeds, fertiliser or chemicals’.329
There is an obvious need to change from a smallholder-centred to a supply chain-
oriented perspective of costs and benefits. To assess the overall benefits of GlobalGAP 
certification, costs and benefits need to be measured along the entire supply 
(value) chain since costs and returns on investments into compliance accrue at all 
nodes of the supply chain. Just like their suppliers, PMOs, exporters and retailers 
have to invest into managing quality with major costs incurred when procuring 
from fragmented supplier networks, namely the costs for training, advice and 
supervision of smallholder groups.
It is obvious that, where firms procure from smallholders, a fair share of returns 
on smallholder compliance should trickle down to the farmers as incentive to 
renew the certification and maintain long-term and reliable contract relations. 
In many cases, this fair share of returns on investments is already realised at the 
farm level through the increase in yields and reduction of input costs thanks to the 
application of GAP; in other cases, where the returns on smallholders’ investments 
into certification are mainly or only realised at the downstream end of the supply 
chain, PMOs, exporters and in some instances retailers may consider paying price 
premiums for certified produce (e.g. in the case of asparagus in Thailand). In 
cases where demand outstrips supplies of certified produce, buyers may also pay 
premiums (e.g. pepper in Macedonia). However, reality shows that the potential 
for premium prices paid to smallholder farmers usually pales in comparison to 
the benefits achieved through the income increased thanks to increased yields, 
reduced input costs and reliable market access.
The complexity of the mission that aims at integrating smallholders into (global) supply 
chains requires a system’s approach coordinating diverse stakeholders. In summary, 
328 IIED [International Institute for Environment and Development] and NRI [Natural Resources 
Institute], undated. Costs and benefits of EurepGAP compliance for African smallholders: A synthesis 
of surveys in three countries. Fresh Insights 13, p. 11.
329 Ibid.
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the GlobalGAP Smallholder Pilot Project achieved its intended results, even if 
it took longer than initially planned. This was mainly due to the ignorance of 
the comprehensive needs for capacity building and change of attitudes among 
farmers (technical and entrepreneurial), groups (general group and specific QMS 
management, leadership, cohesion and joint commercial activities) and their 
buyers (contractual relations and embedded services). Furthermore, the need to 
orient certification efforts to market opportunities; the importance of reducing 
transaction costs through the promotion of consistent and reliable supplier-
buyer linkages; and the complexity of the supply chain systems, into which the 
smallholder groups have to integrate were initially largely underestimated. Last 
but not least, the efficiency and effectiveness of support structures (private and 
public service systems) and conducive framework conditions (policies, laws and 
regulations as well as economic and social infrastructure) are likewise determinant 
for success or failure.
As the lessons learnt suggest, smallholder group certification is subject to 
multifaceted challenges. Accordingly, quite complex strategies have to be developed 
depending on the prevailing situation with regard to the access requirements in 
target markets, the governance structures in the supply chain, the features of 
the smallholder groups, the performance of the service sector as well as the in-
country and export market framework conditions.
There is a need to define and coordinate the different roles of the private sector, the 
public sector and development partners. Obviously, the private sector, the public 
sector and development partners play critical roles in promoting a better market-
integration of smallholders without compromising supply chain competitiveness. 
Roles and responsibilities have to be defined to foster synergies and avoid inefficient 
isolated approaches: ‘The private sector drives the organisation of value chains 
that bring the market to smallholders and commercial farms. The state – through 
enhanced capacity and new forms of governance – corrects market failures, 
regulates competition, and engages strategically in public-private partnerships 
to promote competitiveness in the agribusiness sector and support the greater 
inclusion of smallholders and rural workers’.330
Private sector leadership will be essential: with farmers committing resources 
to the certification process and owning the QMS and with PMOs, exporters and 
processors respectively playing a key role in supporting their supplier networks. 
Despite the important responsibilities the public sector and development partners 
assume in fostering smallholder integration, both have to abstain from distorting 
existing private initiatives and commitment since they cannot replace the actual 
business partners of smallholders in the supply chain. Public-private partnerships 
330 The World Bank, 2007. World development report 2008 – Agriculture for development. The World 
Bank, Washington, DC, USA, p. 8.
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(PPP), though, can serve as an appropriate tool for promoting smallholder inclusion 
into global supply chains by adding public (governments, donors) value to private 
initiatives.
8.4.2 Highlights on some key recommendations
In Chapter 2 ‘Quasi-states? The Unexpected Rise of Private Food Law’, Lawrence 
Busch argues that ‘the neoliberal project of limiting the role of the state has led to 
the rise [of] a wide range of ‘quasi-states’ consisting of individual firms, industry 
groups, and private voluntary organisations, each pursuing their own aims and 
interests through the production of private codes, laws, rules, and regulations. 
Whether some or all of these quasi-states are able to achieve legitimacy and 
develop democratic modes of governance remains to be seen.’
Busch further argues that ‘The state-like character of TSRs [Tripartite Standards 
Regimes], as well as their democratic deficit, poses a number of ... problems ... These 
include questions about accountability, effectiveness, transparency, innovation, 
fairness, and legitimacy.’ The following recommendations for up-scaling option 2 
certification are guided by the line of thinking of Bush and the criteria proposed 
in his chapter.331 Given the importance for success or failure of investments into 
any efforts for achieving compliance or certification respectively, viability has 
been added to the list of criteria proposed by Bush.
Viability can be achieved through e.g.:
• the selection of products that promise to be viable for smallholder farming and 
of producer groups capable of upgrading (farm/group management, production 
technologies);
• the facilitation of bridging the finance gap between short-term costs of 
compliance/certification and medium to long-term return on investments;
• the support by governments, donors or non-governmental organisations (e.g. 
subsidies for compliance and/or certification, bank guarantees), however only 
as a solution of last resort.
Effectiveness can be achieved through e.g.:
• the assurance of smallholder compliance (not necessarily certification) through 
the realisation of cost-benefit-’plus’, working as incentives;
• the recognition of increased productivity, reduced production and transaction 
costs, market access, etc. as benefits/incentives (don’t count (only) on price 
premiums!);
331 For more detailed recommendations see Will, M., 2010. Integrating smallholders into global supply 
chains: GlobalGAP option 2 smallholder group certification generic manual: lessons learnt in pilot 
projects in Kenya, Ghana, Thailand and Macedonia. GTZ Sector Project Agricultural Trade, Eschborn, 
Germany, pp. 32-33.
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 GlobalGAP smallholder group certification
• the integration of embedded services into the supplier-customer business 
relation with traders/processors providing advisory, training, input, credit 
services to their suppliers.
Innovations (increased adoption rates of innovations) can be achieved through e.g.:
• the ex-ante assessment of realistic benefits (essential for achieving commitment);
• the development of capacities (individual farmers’ and group management 
capacities);
• the upgrading of local infrastructure (e.g. access roads, telecommunication, 
water, power).
Fairness can be achieved through e.g.:
• the development of capacities for fair distribution of costs and benefits along 
the chain;
• the development of negotiation skills of smallholders (e.g. prices, outgrower 
contracts);
• the promotion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) among downstream 
customers;
• the granting of commensurate producer prices.
Transparency can be achieved through e.g.:
• the consideration of smallholder capacities and requirements in standard 
development and standard revision (GlobalGAP assures smallholder participation 
through e.g. the Africa Observer/Smallholder Ambassador project and worldwide 
stakeholder consultations).
Legitimacy can be achieved through e.g.:
• the recognition of country-specific standards to facilitate spill-over to local/
regional markets in parallel to full benchmarking (e.g. KenyaGAP domestic scope).
Accountability can be achieved through e.g.:
• the development of co-regulation systems combining industry self-regulation 
(responsibility of food operators) with government risk-based control systems 
(e.g. as initiated in Kenya through the joint private-public effort to up-scale 
KenyaGAP).
8.4.3 Final conclusions
With a view on the topic of this publication ‘Private food law – non-regulatory 
dimensions of food law’, the following citation may give guidance on the role of 
private voluntary standards (PVS) such as GlobalGAP: ‘It is easy to get tangled in the 
standards and eco-labels as a fixed end in themselves. It would be wiser to realise h
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that they can better be understood as a starting point for improved efficiencies, 
better quality, and an increased awareness of social and environmental issues.’332
It should be added that PVS are a matter of fact and are needed, since public law 
is not complete as many fields are not regulated given the complicated process of 
harmonising the interests and regulations of 27 Member States in the European 
Union.333 Furthermore, public inspection cannot control the entire industry and 
every final product, neither in industrialised nor in developing countries. The EU 
General Food Law therefore provides for the following principles that oblige the 
private sector to take responsibility for food safety: (a) the farm to table approach; 
(b) the primary responsibility of food operators; (c) the traceability concept; and 
(d) coherent concepts for food safety including imported food (due diligence).
In this setting, PVS such as GlobalGAP already start serving as a vehicle for 
upgrading currently largely inefficient supply chains in developing countries. 
While the main incentives for the private sector are to achieve competitiveness in 
local, regional and international markets, the public sector strives for smallholder 
integration, consumer protection and assurance of public health.
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9.  Towards the self-regulation code on beer 
advertising in Italy
Steps on the long lasting path of competition/
co-operation of public and private food law
Ferdinando Albisinni
9.1 The peculiar relation between innovation and food law
Innovation and food law share a peculiar relation, characterised by reciprocal 
strong influence and interference.334 Technological innovation, mainly from 19th 
century and starting with the revolutionary ideas of the famous French chef Appert 
– as it is well known – has radically changed the techniques applied to food, in all 
phases from production, to processing, to distribution. As a consequence, Food 
law is often under strong pressure to find adequate regulatory answers to the 
challenges of technological innovations. In Europe, the Novel Foods legislation,335 
the introduction of rules on the traceability of beef after the explosion of the ‘mad 
cow’ crisis,336 and the general adoption of the precautionary principle,337 may be 
cited among the many significant examples of an approach of the food legislator, 
aimed to answer to needs and demands coming from innovation and not finding 
sufficient regulatory tools in the already existing legislation. But the impact of 
technological innovation is not limited to the substantive aspects of food, as it 
deals largely – in an always more pervasive way – to immaterial aspects, first 
of all those related to the communication on the market, thus forcing the food 
legislator to deal both with substantive and immaterial issues in regulating food 
production and marketing.
On the other side, juridical innovation is not only an answer to techniques; it 
is also by itself an expression of the elaboration of new and original models 
and institutions, through an experimental approach, which may develop in what 
334 See Jongen, W.M.F. and Meulenberg, M.T.G. (eds.), 2005. Innovation in agri-food systems. 
Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
On the peculiar relation between innovation and food law see Albisinni, F., 2009. Strumentario di diritto 
alimentare Europeo. Utet, Torino, Italy.
335 Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 
concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients. Official Journal of the European Union L 43:. 1-6. 
336 Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97 of 21 April 1997 establishing a system for the identification and 
registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products. Official Journal of 
the European Union L 117: 1-8.
337 See Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the 
European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. Official Journal 
of the European Union L 31: 1-24.
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some German scholars effectively defined as Rechtsreform in Permanenz.338 In this 
complex and articulated process, which enriches the armoury of legal tools with 
new additions, and in the same time enhances consolidation and simplification 
of existing rules,339 the traditional borders between public and private law are 
assuming new contents. Protected interests typically classified as ‘public goods’ 
– like consumer’s protection and fair competition – increasingly rely on new 
tools which utilise private models, like contracts, voluntary acceptance of rules 
and standards, and civil compensation as enforcement tool instead of criminal 
or administrative sanctions. In the field of control and surveillance, certification 
bodies of private nature are chosen to perform duties which are traditionally 
considered ‘public’.340
9.2 Private regulatory law
Along this path, Private Regulatory Law is anticipating and/or integrating 
Public and State Law. In the specific field of communication on the market, the 
traditional answers of European legal systems relied largely on public law. In Italy, 
criminal sanctions, already established in the Penal Code of 1930,341 punish fraud 
in trademarks and commercial signs,342 fraud in trade,343 sale of non-genuine 
food,344 and more recent legislation introduced specific provisions of criminal 
sanctions in case of illicit use of international and European PDO and PGI.345 
Other sanctions, provided by the general law on safety rules for food products and 
materials,346 punish with a fine, originally of criminal nature and lately weakened 
to administrative nature, the use of misleading labelling and advertising.347 In 
338 See, with reference to company law, Noack, U. and Zetzsche, D.A., 2005. Corporate governance 
reform in Germany: the second decade. Center for Business & Corporate Law Research Paper Series 
No. 0010, Düsseldorf, Germany.
339 See, e.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common 
organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single 
CMO Regulation). Official Journal of the European Union L 299: 1-149. 
340 See, e.g. Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and 
food law, animal health and animal welfare rules. Official Journal of the European Union L 165: 1-141.
Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the 
European Union L 93: 12-25.
Article 118(7) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common 
organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single 
CMO Regulation). Official Journal of the European Union L 299: 1-149.
341 Royal.Decree No. 1389, 19 October 1930. Italian legislation, in original and updated text, is published 
at http://www.normattiva.it. 
342 Ibid. at Article 514.
343 Ibid. at Article 515.
344 Ibid. at Article 516.
345 Article 517-quater, added to the Penal Code by L. No. 99, 23 July 2009.
346 L. No. 283, 30 April 1962.
347 Ibid. at Article 8.
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both cases, nevertheless, there was lack of specific attention for protecting ‘goods’ 
different from bona fides in marketing, labelling and business communication.
Even when dealing with immaterial aspects of food products, law (public law) 
was looking to the substantive aspects of the products per se considered, and to 
the fairness of communication, advertising and labelling by comparison to what is 
promised to the consumer, neglecting other relevant aspects pertaining to general 
expectations of consumer and to social behaviour. This gap has been filled by 
private regulatory rules, looking to new needs and to new disciplinary areas, and 
implementing new tools of regulation and enforcement.
9.3  The IAP – Institute of self-regulation in Marketing 
Communication (1963)
The first significant experience in Italy of a self-regulatory system on marketing 
communication was set up in 1963, on the basis of the following principles:
‘(...) having established that the function of advertising is equally in the 
interest of enterprises and consumers, having acknowledged the requirement 
that the principles of morality and loyalty underlying the profession are 
enhanced, (...) as a further concrete impediment to marginal degenerative 
forms of advertising, commits advertisers, artists, producers and the media, 
through their respective associations to work out and collect under a single moral 
Code of Advertising the rules that are to govern all advertising activities in defence of 
entrepreneurial activities and of the fundamental interests of consumers; moreover 
it commits such associations to appropriate themselves of such Code and 
ensure its application by their members.’348
The IAP – Istituto dell’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria, as regulated in its own Statute, 
is a non-profit organisation. It aims to collect in one single voluntary organisation, 
together with all subjects operating along the food chain, also artists, producers and 
the media, adopting an inclusive approach, which does not limit competences for 
a fair market communication to producers and sellers of the products, but assigns 
responsibilities in the process of establishing, maintaining, and respecting adequate 
standards, to all subjects in any way engaged in communication. The shift is from 
the liability approach of public law, aimed to prohibit and sanction illicit acts, and 
therefore addressed mainly to producers and resellers of substantive products, 
to a responsibility approach characteristic of private regulatory law, aimed to 
assure voluntary (and, whenever possible, preventive) compliance and therefore 
addressed to all subjects who in any way play a role (i.e. assume responsibility) 
in the communication process.
348 Agreement approved at the Conference of Ischia on October 3 to 6, 1963.
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Amongst the main tasks of IAP are the formulation and updating of the rules of 
the Code of Self-Regulation, and the establishing of a Jury and a Review Board, 
having the task to decide ‘according to the provisions of the Code’349 on any form 
of advertising, both prior to and after the publication. The Code of Self-Regulation 
was first published on 12 May 1966 and has been constantly updated. At present 
time it is in force the 50th edition, effective from 18 January 2010.350 Decisions 
are published, posted on the website and filed in the database of the IAP.351 The 
media through which marketing communication is disseminated, ‘which directly 
or through their trade associations accept the self-regulatory code, even if not involved 
in the proceedings before the Jury’, are obliged to observe its decisions;352 therefore 
going well beyond the borders and limits usually assigned to public law decisions. 
Through this way, the Code marked a significant innovation regarding subjects 
involved, roles assigned, effects of decisions.
Even with reference to the content of regulation, the Code marked a step in the 
path, broadening the discipline of fair market communication, from rules limited to 
specific illicit behaviours (as happened under the criminal provisions of the Penal 
Code) to a more general consideration of misleading marketing communication, 
including overall fairness in trade and taking into account behaviour, values and 
habits of the consumers.
Inter alia, provisions of the Code:
• Hold a broad and open definition of what is covered by the Code.
‘Preliminary and General Rules – (e) Definitions.
The term ‘message’ refers to any form of public presentation of the product 
and therefore includes the outer packaging, wrapping, labelling, etc.’
‘Article 2 – Misleading marketing communication
Marketing communication must avoid statements or representations that 
could mislead consumers, including omissions, ambiguity or exaggeration 
that are not obviously hyperbolical, particularly regarding the characteristics 
and effects of the product, prices, free offers, conditions of sale, distribution, 
the identity of persons depicted, prizes or awards.’
• Expressly mention ideal values, which obtain further protection, added to the 
protection of economic interests already recognised by public law.
‘Article 10 – Moral, Civil, and Religious Beliefs and Human Dignity
Marketing communication should not offend moral, civil and religious 
beliefs. Marketing communication should respect human dignity in every 
form and expression and should avoid any form of discrimination.’
349 Article 32 of the Code of Self-Regulation.
350 Published at: http://www.iap.it. 
351 Ibid. at Article 40.
352 Ibid. at Article 41.
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• Operate distinct evaluation of messages by reason of their destination to adult 
consumers or to children and young people.
‘Article 11 – Children and young people
Special care should be taken in messages directed to children and young 
people or to which they may be exposed. Such messages should avoid 
material that could cause psychological, moral or physical harm, and should 
not exploit the credulity, inexperience or sense of loyalty of children or 
young people.
In particular, such marketing communication must not suggest:
 − violating generally accepted rules of social behaviour;
 − acting dangerously or seeking exposure to dangerous situations;
 − that failure to posses the promoted product means either their own 
inferiority or their parents’ failure to fulfil their duties;
 − that the role of parents and educators is inadequate in supplying healthy 
nutritional advice;
 − adopting poor eating habits or neglecting the need for a healthy lifestyle;
 − soliciting other people to purchase the promoted product.
The portrayal of children and young people in marketing communication 
must avoid playing on the natural sentiments of adults towards the young.’
• Include specific rules for specific categories of products, among which spirits, 
cosmetics, food supplements and alia.
‘Article 22 – Alcoholic Beverages
Marketing communication concerning alcoholic beverages should not be 
in contrast with the obligation to depict styles of drinking behaviour that 
project moderation, wholesomeness and responsibility. This principle aims to 
safeguard the primary interest of the population in general, and of children 
and young people in particular, in a family, social and working environment 
safeguarded from the negative consequences of alcohol abuse.’.
We may therefore reasonably assume that, in the Italian legal experience, the 
voluntary creation of IAP, and its operation using tools proper of private regulatory 
law, largely anticipated lines and themes of regulations, which have found place 
in public law only much later.
9.4  Legislative reforms in the 1990’s: cooperative 
competition between public and private law
The last decade of 20th century has seen significant legislative reforms in Italy in 
the areas of market regulation and of commercial communication, mainly under 
the influence (directly or indirectly) of the European Community. The institution 
of the Anti-trust Authority in 1990353 gave express and formal recognition to the 
353 L. No. 287, of 10 October 1990, establishing the AGCM – Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato.
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European principles against agreements in any form having the effect of restriction 
or distortion of competition, against abuses of dominant position, and in favour 
of effective free competition between undertakings. Two years later, in 1992, 
the implementation of European directives led to the introduction of new rules 
on labelling, presentation and advertising of food products,354 and on deceptive 
advertising.355
Those reforms crossed and interacted each other, and their application offered 
an original framework to rules on commercial communication, especially with 
reference to food products. The D. Leg.vo No. 74/1992 on deceptive advertising 
had to identify competences and procedure for the effective implementation of 
the new regulation. The Anti-trust Authority created in 1990, with its recognised 
skill and qualification, appeared to the Italian legislator of 1992 to be the natural 
choice for an independent body called to investigate and decide on the compliance 
with the newly introduced rules.356 The underlining (and largely shared) idea was 
that advertising is a decisive part of market competition and that assuring non 
deceptive advertising is essential both to protect consumers, and to guarantee 
full and fair competition among undertakings.
On the basis of the new competence received, the Anti-trust Authority largely 
expanded the field of its review, adopting a very broad definition of advertising and 
assuming that within this expression must be included any form of commercial 
communication, with any means, therefore including labels.357 So arguing, the 
Italian Anti-trust Authority expressed by way of interpretation as general rule, 
even in the field of public law, the principle, originally introduced by IAP in the 
field of private regulatory law, that the discipline of commercial communication in 
the market may not be divided in separate chapters, subject to different rules, on 
the basis of means and media utilised, but must be considered in an unified and 
uniform perspective.358 Moreover, the Anti-trust Authority affirmed the principle 
(lately accepted also by the courts of justice) that the existence of trade marks 
duly registered under the laws applicable at the time of registration does not 
allow the trade mark owner to reproduce this mark on the labels, when this use 
may induce the consumer to a deceptive understanding of the characteristics of 
the product. This principle has been recognised primarily in the area of Food 
Law. With specific reference to the true origin of a food product, the Anti-trust 
Authority in a long and coherent series of decisions declared that the true origin 
354 D. Leg.vo No. 109, of 27 January 1992, implementing Directives 79/112/EEC, 89/395/CEE, 89/396/
EEC.
355 D. Leg.vo No. 74, of 25 January 1992, implementing Directives 84/450/EEC and 97/55/EC.
356 Article 7 of D. Leg.vo No. 74/1992.
357 See dec. No. 1078, 21 April 1993, Oleificio Viola, at http://www.agcm.it. 
358 On competence and powers of the AGCM in cases of consumers’ protection, with specific reference 
to food law, see Astazi, A., 2008. Pratiche commerciali scorrette nell’ambito dei contratti del consumo 
alimentare e tutela dei consumatori. Revista di Diritto Alimentare 2(2): 1-9.
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of olive oil is that of the place where olives have been picked and that a trade 
mark containing a reference to a geographic place cannot be used on the label of 
a bottle of olive oil when the olives come from a geographic place different from 
that mentioned in the trade-mark.359
With these conclusions, the Anti-trust Authority, operating as a powerful independent 
Authority with effective decision-making powers, anticipated criteria which will 
find official legislative recognition in Europe only later, through Regulation (EC) 
No. 1019/2002 of 13 June 2002.360 The reciprocal influence and interference within 
rules, criteria and arguments among private regulatory bodies, public bodies, 
and formal rules of law, expanded in those cases from a domestic dimension to 
a larger European sphere.
The above mentioned D. Leg.vo No. 74/1992, in addition to the public law 
competences attributed to the Anti-trust Authority to investigate and sanction 
cases of deceptive advertising, introduced a relevant and original example of co-
operative competition mechanism between public and private law (and between 
public and private institutions and bodies). Article 8 stated that, in case of deceptive 
advertising, interested parties may turn to self-regulation voluntary bodies and in 
this case may agree to postpone any application to the Anti-trust Authority until 
the private body adopts its final decision. Under the same Article 8, even when 
the application is previously deposited before the Anti-trust Authority, any party 
may ask the Authority to suspend its procedure waiting for the decision of the 
private body. In this hypothesis the Authority may suspend the procedure for a 
term up to thirty days.
This rule has been afterwards confirmed with a larger application area by the 
Consumers’ Code.361 Article 27-ter362 of the Code states that consumers and 
competitors, even through their associations or organisations, may agree in general 
terms with trade operators and producers that, before making any petition to the 
Anti-trust Authority or to the courts of justice, they will turn to self-regulation 
voluntary bodies to stop unfair commercial practices (including but not limited 
to deceptive advertising). Along the steps and with the peculiarities mentioned 
359 See among others, dec. No. 4970, 30 April 1997, Bertolli-Lucca; dec. No. 5562, 18 December 1997, 
Olio Carapelli Firenze; dec. No. 5563, 18 December 1997, Olio Carli Oneglia; dec. No. 5564, 18 December 
1997, Olio Monini Spoleto; dec. No. 5713, 19 February 1998, Olearia del Garda; dec. No. 7619, 13 October 
1999, Cooperativa agricola Trevi, published at http://www.agcm.it. For a comment of the decisions of 
the AGCM see: Albisinni, F., 2010. Etichettatura dei prodotti alimentari. In: Albisinni, F. (ed.) Diritto 
alimentare. Mercato, Sicurezza. Wolters Kluwer, Milano, Italy.
360 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1019/2002 of 13 June 2002 on marketing standards for olive oil. 
Official Journal of the European Union L 155: 27-31. Amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 
182/2009 of 6 March 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1019/2002 on marketing standards for olive 
oil. Official Journal of the European Union L 63: 6-8.
361 D. Leg.vo No. 206, 6 September 2005.
362 Introduced by D. Leg.vo No. 146, 2 August 2007, article 1.
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above, largely moving from experiences and cases in Food Law, public and 
private regulatory bodies have therefore been expressly recognised in the Italian 
Consumers’ Code as an arena of co-operative competition, offering to undertakings 
and consumers a large armoury of possible tools and remedies, concurrent but 
harmonised in their content and in their operational procedures.
9.5  The Beer Advertising Code: private regulation as tool 
to expand and anticipate consumer protection
The new Beer Advertising Code, adopted in 2010 by the Italian Brewers Association 
(see Alessandro Artom’s detailed discussion of the Code in Chapter 10 of this 
volume), locates itself within this long lasting path of competition/co-operation 
of public and private food law, getting inspiration from previous private and 
public experiences and in the meantime introducing some provisions having 
innovative character. In the Code363 special attention is given to young people 
and to minors and more generally to the declared fundamental goal to avoid any 
sort of commercial communication, which could in any way induce consumers 
to drink in a ‘non-responsible way’.
The inspiration of the Code is expressly derived from Directive No. 1989/552/
EEC364, of 3 October 1989, on television broadcasting activities, whose Article 15 
states, with reference to alcoholic beverages:
‘Article 15.
Television advertising for alcoholic beverages shall comply with the following 
criteria:
(a) it may not be aimed specifically at minors or, in particular, depict minors 
consuming these beverages;
(b) it shall not link the consumption of alcohol to enhanced physical 
performance or to driving;
(c) it shall not create the impression that the consumption of alcohol 
contributes towards social or sexual success;
(d) it shall not claim that alcohol has therapeutic qualities or that it is a 
stimulant, a sedative or a means of resolving personal conflicts;
(e) it shall not encourage immoderate consumption of alcohol or present 
abstinence or moderation in a negative light;
(f) it shall not place emphasis on high alcoholic content as being a positive 
quality of the beverages.’
363 Published at http://www.assobirra.it.
364 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television 
broadcasting activities. Official Journal of the European Union L 298: 23-30. 
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Those provisions has been later amended365:
• by Directive No. 97/36/EC, of 30 June 1997, which extended to ‘teleshopping’ 
the application of the mentioned rules;
• and by Directive No. 2007/65/EC, of 11 December 2007, which introduced 
Article 3(e), stating at par. 1(e):
‘audiovisual commercial communication for alcoholic beverages shall not be 
aimed specifically at minors and shall not encourage immoderate consumption 
of such beverages’.
The entire Directive of 1989 has been finally repealed by Directive No. 2010/13/
EU, of 10 March 2010, concerning the provision of audiovisual media services, 
which confirmed the above mentioned provisions.366
Comparison of the provisions of these Directives with the content of the Beer 
Advertising Code clearly shows the innovative approach of the Code. In the directive 
of 1989 the scope of regulation was initially limited to television advertising, only 
later extended to teleshopping and recently to general audiovisual commercial 
communication, while we have seen that already back in 1963 the IAP (whose 
model inspired the Beer Advertising Code) adopted an inclusive and comprehensive 
approach considering any form of commercial communication as subject to the 
Code of Self-regulation. And even with the last amendments, the public European 
legislation above mentioned, on advertising of alcoholic beverages, is applicable 
only to ‘audiovisual commercial communication’, with a scope much narrower 
than that of the private Beer Advertising Code. Moreover the Code, on the basis of 
the experience of IAP, inter alia:
• pays special attention to the mode and form of the commercial communication, 
e.g. adopting specific rules regarding the use of comics or animated figures, 
considered as addressed to young people by their nature and therefore evaluated 
on the basis of strict criteria;
• adopts a very broad definition of ‘dangerous activities’ which in any case 
cannot be associated with the use of beer, including in the definition even 
simple domestic activities;
365 Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities. 
Official Journal of the European Union L 202: 60-70.
Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities. 
Official Journal of the European Union L 332: 27-45.
366 See Article 9(e) and Article 22 of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive). Official Journal of the European Union L 95: 1-24.
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• excludes any association of beer with the use of any vehicle, on the assumption 
that all vehicles require in any case full attention from the driver.
Summing up, even on the basis of a brief examination of this new private Code and 
comparison with public rules applicable to the same products, the consideration 
which may be shared is that the private Code expands and anticipates consumer 
protection through recourse to self-regulation, i.e. to a regulation which is introduced 
and managed by the same subjects who are called to apply it. The duty to respect 
is the result of voluntary acceptance, as part of the collective participation to the 
Brewers Association. It is a case of private food law, which is distinguished by its 
nature of being collective food law, whose strength and effectiveness is mainly 
based in its being a shared regulation, not imposed by a stronger contracting party 
(as happens in some instances of private standards fixed by powerful market 
players), but created by the same parties that assume the obligation to respect it.
9.6 Some open questions
Even after placing the self-regulation Code within the comprehensive concept of 
private collective food law above mentioned, some relevant questions remain open. 
Which kind of formal (or informal) relation may be construed between private and 
public regulation in the final evaluation of commercial communication on food? 
Which effects on the liability/responsibility of food producers at public law, may 
have the compliance with private established Code rules? In particular, may a food 
producer evoke as protection against public law sanctions the circumstance that 
the discussed commercial communication has been verified by the jury of the Code 
prior to its use? Which is the status of the jury? Is it the same of private arbitrators, 
which cannot be held responsible for errors at law? Or must it be compared to 
certification bodies, responsible for not having checked the violation of applicable 
rules? In an area of regulation, like Food Law, where rules of responsibility may in 
some cases operate even in absence of any fault criteria,367 any possible answer 
to those questions involves crucial issues, both for the producers involved and 
for the viability of the system proposed.
In the past century legal scholars analysed, along opposite perspectives, the 
competition between modern State monopoly of law sources368, and social 
experiences vindicating a territory outside the State regulation369. In this century we 
have to deal with a multilevel and pluralistic situation, with many competing and 
367 See, e.g. Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 on the duty to withdraw, and see Court of Justice, 
23 November 2006, C-315/05, Lidl Italia, on the liability of distributors.
368 See the fundamental contribution of Kelsen, H., 1945. General theory of law and state. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
369 It is sufficient here to remember: Romano, S., 1945 [1918]. L’ordinamento giuridico. 2nd ed. Firenze, 
Italy.
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overlapping sources of regulation, with still no clear rules of effective supremacy 
and with a sort of pendulum among different sources.
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10. Self-regulation code on beer advertising
Alessandro Artom
10.1 Introduction
The Italian Code on Beer Advertising provides an interesting example of private 
food law addressing communication practices of food business operators. The 
idea of adopting a self-regulation code on beer advertising comes from the need 
to improve on public law, including both national and EU law, through the private 
instrument of self-regulation and the voluntary respect by all parts concerned.
The aim of such private activity is to integrate public law in this field with the 
adoption of simple and fast rules, voluntarily adopted by the companies, to properly 
market alcoholic products, such as beer, and to promote those products to the 
consumer in ways encouraging safer consumption.
In this regard, the rules of the Italian self-regulation Code represent a considerable 
progress in the field of commercial advertising’s self-regulation, because both 
regulatory and procedural provisions have been conceived not only to regulate 
brewers and distributors’ marketing activities, but also to make consumers 
more aware of important social matters, related to the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages. In addition, the self-regulation makes the consumer able to use free, 
fast and efficient instruments of private justice, in order to prevent immediately 
the spread of unfair advertising.
The Code is therefore the instrument by which the companies associated to 
Assobirra370 show, on one hand, their will to be bound by the principles commonly 
shared by the brewers of Europe, and on the other hand, the need to educate the 
public on a responsible consumption of alcohol. This principle constitutes the 
common ground adopted by all European beer producers.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 introduces the principles that 
have been elaborated in the Code, directly but also via the more general Italian 
Code of Self-Regulation of Marketing Communication. Section 10.2.1 addresses 
principles derived from EU legislation. Section 10.2.2 presents seven operational 
standards that the association of Brewers of Europe has agreed upon which are 
operationalised in the Code. Section 10.3 analyses the content of the Code. This 
section starts in 10.3.1 with a discussion of purpose and obligations, followed by 
370 Assobirra – Associazione degli industriali della Birra e del Malto. Assobirra is the Italian association 
of beer and malt producers/distributors, based in Rome (viale di Val fiorita n. 90). Assobirra is associated 
with Confindustria (Confederation of Italian industry) and with the European Association Brewers of 
Europe (BOE), embracing in full the ethical code of the latter. It carries out institutional, promotional 
and technological development tasks.
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Section 10.3.2 on conduct rules. Procedural rules are set out in Section 10.3.3 and 
an instrument of compliance assistance called ‘copy advice’ in Section 10.3.4. 
Section 10.3.5 presents cases illustrating how the Code may work in practice. 
The final section, Section 10.4, concludes this chapter with a discussion of the 
relevance of the Code in the wider context of private food law.
10.2 Underlying principles
10.2.1 The European principles
On the European level, the principles concerning the alcohol advertising were 
set for the first time in 1989 by the Directive no. 552371 and then confirmed in 
the Directive 2007/65/CE concerning television broadcasting activities, which 
has been recently transposed into Italian law by the Decree 15/3/2010, no. 44.372 
Now, those principles are laid down in the Directive no. 13 of 10 March 2010, 
concerning television advertising and teleshopping for alcoholic beverages373 and 
the Italian Beer Advertising Code fully complies with the Directive’s purposes.
First of all, the new Directive stresses the importance of the self-regulation 
instruments in the field of alcoholic products’ advertising. In recital no. 44, they 
state that self-regulation instruments can play an important role in delivering 
a high level of consumer protection and that Member States should recognise 
this role as a complement to the legislative and judicial and/or administrative 
371 Council Directive 89/552/CEE of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by Law, Regulation and Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television 
broadcasting activities. Official Journal of the European Union L 298, 17.10.1989, 23-30.
372 Decreto Legislativo 15/03/2010, no. 44 implementing Directive no. 2007/65/CE on the coordination 
of certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation and Administrative Action in Member States 
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities. Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 73 del 29.03.2010.
373 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation and administrative action in Member 
States concerning the provisions of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive). 
Official Journal of the European Union L 95, 15.4.2010, 1-24. 
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mechanisms in place.374 In addition, the recital no. 89 of the Directive foresees that 
it is necessary to lay down strict criteria relating to the television advertising of 
alcoholic beverages, in order to safeguard the consumer against unfair commercial 
communication.375
These criteria are laid down in Article 22 of the Directive376 and they have been 
implemented in our self-regulation Code on Beer Advertising.
In particular, the advertising of beer may not be aimed at minors or depict minors 
consuming these beverages; it shall not link the consumption of alcohol to enhanced 
physical performance or to driving; it shall not create the impression that the 
consumption of alcohol contributes towards social or sexual success; it shall not 
claim that alcohol has therapeutic qualities or that it is a stimulant, a sedative 
or a means of resolving personal conflicts; it shall not encourage immoderate 
374 Directive 2010/13/EU, recital no. 44: ‘In its Communication to the European Parliament and to the 
Council on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, the Commission stressed 
that a careful analysis of the appropriate regulatory approach is necessary, in particular, in order to 
establish whether legislation is preferable for the relevant sector and problem, or whether alternatives 
such as co-regulation or self-regulation should be considered. Furthermore, experience has shown 
that both co-regulation and self-regulation instruments, implemented in accordance with the different 
legal traditions of the Member States, can play an important role in delivering a high level of consumer 
protection. Measures aimed at achieving public interest objectives in the emerging audiovisual media 
services sector are more effective if they are taken with the active support of the service providers 
themselves. Thus self-regulation constitutes a type of voluntary initiative which enables economic 
operators, social partners, non-governmental organisations or associations to adopt common guidelines 
amongst themselves and for themselves.
Member States should, in accordance with their different legal traditions, recognise the role which 
effective self-regulation can play as a complement to the legislative and judicial and/or administrative 
mechanisms in place and its useful contribution to the achievement of the objectives of this Directive. 
However, while self-regulation might be a complementary method of implementing certain provisions 
of this Directive, it should not constitute a substitute for the obligations of the national legislator. 
Co-regulation gives, in its minimal form, a legal link between self-regulation and the national legislator 
in accordance with the legal traditions of the Member States. Co-regulation should allow for the 
possibility of State intervention in the event of its objectives not being met. Without prejudice to 
formal obligations of the Member States regarding transposition, this Directive encourages the use of 
co-regulation and self-regulation. This should neither oblige Member States to set up co-regulation and/
or self-regulatory regimes nor disrupt or jeopardise current co-regulation or self-regulatory initiatives 
which are already in place within Member States and which are working effectively’.
375 Directive 2010/13/EU, recital no. 89: ‘It is also necessary to prohibit all audiovisual commercial 
communication for medicinal products and medical treatment available only on prescription in the 
Member State within whose jurisdiction the media service provider falls and to lay down strict criteria 
relating to the television advertising of alcoholic products’.
376 Directive 2010/13/EU, Article 22: ‘Television advertising and teleshopping for alcoholic beverages 
shall comply with the following criteria: (a) it may not be aimed specifically at minors or, in particular, 
depict minors consuming these beverages; (b) it shall not link the consumption of alcohol to enhanced 
physical performance or to driving; (c) it shall not create the impression that the consumption of alcohol 
contributes towards social or sexual success; (d) it shall not claim that alcohol has therapeutic qualities 
or that it is a stimulant, a sedative or a means of resolving personal conflicts; (e) it shall not encourage 
immoderate consumption of alcohol or present abstinence or moderation in a negative light; (f) it shall 
not place emphasis on high alcoholic content as being a positive quality of the beverages’. 
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consumption of alcohol or present abstinence or moderation in a negative light 
and, finally, it shall not place emphasis on high alcohol content as being a positive 
quality of the beverages.
Our Code reflects also the provisions of the Italian Code of self-regulation of 
Marketing Communication, that is a private standard voluntarily adopted in Italy 
since 1966 by all producers, advertising agencies and media, concerning the 
advertising in all fields. Article 22 of this Code refers to alcoholic beverages and 
affirms that the marketing communication concerning such beverages should not 
be in contrast with the principle to invite a responsible consumption of alcohol. 
This principle aims to safeguard the primary interest of the consumers in general, 
especially children and young people, in a family, social and working environment 
protected from negative consequences of alcohol abuse.377
Regarding beer, in application of Article 22, the jury has decided some cases. One 
of the most interesting cases recently decided by the jury on alcohol advertising 
was about a TV advertising of ‘Birra Nastro Azzurro’ of April 2008.378
This TV advertising shows a cargo ship full of beer boxes that leaves the harbour. 
The captain does not realise that a group of young people are going after the boat, 
on board dinghy, because he’s listening to the music with earphones. The guys 
manage to reach the boat, start a big party where all the people on board dance 
and drink beer all night long. At sunrise, the cargo ship arrives to the harbour of 
destination and from the pier one guy ask the captain where the Italian party is. 
The captain is surprised and realises what happened during the night: the guys 
drank all beers and wrote ‘Thanks Italy!’ on the cargo ship. The captain and the 
boy laugh and drink the last two beers. The TV advertising finishes with a claim 
‘Nastro Azzurro. C’è più gusto a essere italiani’ and the image of some empty 
bottles of beers.
377 Italian Code of Self-Regulation of Marketing Communication, Article 22 ‘Alcoholic beverages’: 
‘Marketing communication concerning alcoholic beverages should not be in contrast with the obligation 
to depict styles of drinking behaviour that project moderation, wholesomeness and responsibility. 
This principle aims to safeguard the primary interest of the population in general, social and working 
environment safeguarded from negative consequences of alcohol abuse. In particular, such marketing 
communication should not: – encourage an excessive, uncontrolled, and hence harmful consumption 
of alcoholic beverages; – depict an unhealthy attachment or addiction to alcohol, or the belief that 
resorting to alcohol can solve personal problems; – target or refer to minors, even only indirectly, or 
depict minors consuming alcohol; – associate the consumption of alcoholic beverages with the driving 
of motorised vehicles; – encourage the belief that that the consumption of alcoholic beverages promotes 
clear thinking and enhanced physical and sexual performance, or that the failure to consume alcohol 
implies physical, mental or social inferiority; – depict sobriety and abstemiousness as negative values; 
– induce the public to disregard different drinking styles associated with specific features of individual 
beverages and the personal conditions of consumers; – stress high alcoholic strength as being the 
principal feature of a beverage’(official English translation of Istituto dell’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria – 
Advertising Self-Regulation Institute. Available at: http://www.iap.it/en/code.htm).
378 Decision no. 54/2008 of 26.5.2008 – Comitato di Controllo vs Birra Peroni spa.
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On this advertising, the Jury, appointed by the Review Board, stresses the strong 
psychological impact that marketing communication on alcoholic beverages could 
have on consumers, if alcohol is depicted as a means to satisfy unreasonable needs 
and behaviours. On the other hand, Article 22 of the Code (CAP) on alcoholic 
beverages doesn’t have the function to give a teaching direction to advertising 
agency’s creativity. In the TV advertising examined, the jury considers that the 
story shown put the event on unreal basis because it’s unlikely that a group of 
young people attacks a cargo ship, makes a noisy party without any reaction 
from the captain. In addition the TV advertising shows only few bottles of beer 
inside a box full of ice. Consequently there are no messages that suggest an 
irresponsible consumption of alcohol. For these reasons, the jury has considered 
that the message complies with Article 22 of CAP.
The specific improvement made by our Code is that to emphasise a moderate and 
responsible consumption of beer, as an alcoholic beverage. Despite the importance 
of such rules, there was no specific and independent regulation on beer advertising 
in Europe. Therefore Brewers of Europe, with the adoption of Seven Operational 
Standards, has satisfied this need.
10.2.2 Seven Operational Standards of the ‘Brewers of Europe’
The Association of the Brewers of Europe379 currently represents 27 national 
brewing associations and producers of around 95% of the beer brewed in the EU 
and is a founding member of the EU Alcohol and Health Forum and is committed 
to being part of the solution when it comes to tackling alcohol misuse.
The Brewers of Europe has adopted uniform criteria for the institution in the 
Member States of self-regulation systems for the commercial communication of 
beer.380 The Seven Operational Standards, agreed upon by the Brewers of Europe 
in 2007, have been adopted in order to optimise, in the field of the beer advertising, 
the effectiveness of the national mechanisms of self-regulation and to guarantee 
responsible commercial communications in the EU.381 These particular guidelines 
would have to be implemented by April 2010 and Italy has fulfilled the task trough 
the adoption of the Code. At the moment, we have implemented all the Seven 
Operational Standard, fixed by the Brewers of Europe.
379 Website: www.brewersofeurope.org. 
380 On May 26th 2010 the association of the Brewers of Europe has published a report on the Seven 
Operational Standards: ‘Responsible beer advertising through self-regulation’. The report offers, both 
from an EU-wide and a national perspective, an overview of the background, baseline, progress and 
next steps in relation to the full implementation of the Seven Operational Standards by the membership 
of the Brewers of Europe. 
381 Operational Standards for National Self-Regulatory Action Plan: (1) Full code coverage; (2) Increased 
code compliance; (3) Impartial judgements; (4) Fast procedure; (5) Effective sanctions; (6) Consumer 
awareness; (7) Own-initiative compliance monitoring. 
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The first Standard deals with ‘code coverage’. The objective is that all the commercial 
communications on beer, regardless of their form and source, have to be covered 
by the Code, as well as all brewers and all distributors and all practitioners (for 
example advertising agencies, promotional commercial agencies, points of sale 
involved on promotional operations).
The second Operational Standard deals with ‘code compliance’. It’s essential that there 
is the maximum compliance with both the letter (that’s to say, formal rules) and the 
spirit (which are the principles not formally written down) of the code, in order to 
prevent that irresponsible commercial communications on beer reach the public 
sphere. In addition, it’s important that the ‘copy advice’ is provided on a confidential 
and free basis, making this mechanism easily available to every beer producer.
The third Operational Standard requests an impartial judgement in the commercial 
communications. The private judicial body is composed by three independent 
and qualified members including the chairman. ‘Independent’ means that the 
individual should be independent not just from the company whose advertisement 
is being investigated, but also independent from the brewing and advertising 
industries as a whole.
The fourth Operational Standard requests a fast procedure, in order to have a speedy 
decision if the advertising is in breach of the Code and consequently the Jury may 
order to interrupt immediately the advertising or promotional activities in breach.
The fifth Operational Standard deals with ‘Sanctions’. It is necessary that sanctions 
act as a deterrent to prevent brewers from launching unfair communications or 
promotional activities. The strength of such sanctions must show both the regulator 
and the consumer that self-regulation is an efficient and effective system.
The sixth Operational Standard stresses the importance to guarantee and increase 
the consumer’s awareness of the self-regulatory system and its functioning. Such 
knowledge is reachable by the publication of the jury decisions.
The last Operational Standard deals with the monitoring, time to time, of the 
Code by the judicial body: the jury. Such system has to be based on planned and 
systematic check of the jury’s activity, as well as on a continue up-dating of the 
code through a regular review.
10.3 The Code
10.3.1 Purposes and obligations
The Italian self-regulation Code on Beer Advertising is composed of two parts: 
the first one deals with general purposes, the obligations undertaken by all Italian 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
Private food law 247 
Self-regulation code on beer advertising
beer producers associated to Assobirra, the field of application and the definitions 
commonly accepted; the second one is about conduct rules, procedural and judicial 
rules.
Concerning the purposes, the Code aims to ensure that any kind of marketing 
communication on beer (that’s to say all media, TV, radio, cinema, web, press, 
public bills, promotional activities in the points of sale … and including labels and 
packaging) must comply with the principle of ‘responsible drinking’.
The subjects bound by the Code are all the Assobirra’s associated companies 
(producers and distributors) and their marketing agencies, including advertising 
agencies, advertising dealers and media advertising managers and the point of 
sale of HoReCa (Hotel restaurant café sale channel) and large distribution dealers, 
where promotional activities are made.
In particular, the brewers and the practitioners voluntarily undertake to observe 
the code and its rules, to ensure compliance by their members, to efficiently 
disseminate the rulings of the jury and to adopt appropriate measures towards 
members who fail to comply with/or repeatedly disregard the jury’s decisions.
In the part dedicated to definitions, the key terms of the Code are explicated. The 
principal terms contain definitions for: acceptance clause, agency, Assobirra, beer, 
code, copy advice, hazardous activities, jury, marketing communication, minors, 
point of sale, sanctions and secretariat.382
One of the most important definitions refers to the acceptance clause. In this 
regard, Italian brewers undertake to ensure that their members and associates 
shall include a special clause in the contracts subscribed with their advertising 
agencies, specifying acceptance of the provisions of the Code, its Regulations and 
382 Some of the most relevant definitions: Agency – Advertising agencies, advertising and marketing 
advisors, exclusive dealer advertising, advertising managing agents and promotional commercial 
agencies, points of sale involved on promotional operation in Italy; Point of sale – Location of supply 
and/or sale of beer including sales free of charge, to the consumer that belongs to HoReCa channel 
or to the large organised distribution or to exhibitions opened to public, to promote beer, in the latter 
case that such promotion will be made directly by the brewer itself, with or without distribution of free 
beer samples; Sanctions – The sanctions imposed by the jury to the beer company are as follows: (a) at 
the first stage the interruption of marketing communication on beer i.e. desist order should marketing 
communication submitted for examination appear to clearly violate one or more articles of the self-
regulation code, the jury may order to the beer company and agencies to desist from publishing it, 
and the condemnation of jury’s costs of procedure; (b) at the second stage, in case of non-compliance 
of the desist order, a fine will imposed through a compulsory contribution from a minimum of € 1000 
to a maximum of € 10,000 devolved to scientific research, in the field of the prevention of alcohol 
abuse accompanied by the publication of the jury’s decisions on Assobirra’s website; Secretariat – The 
jury’s secretariat is the independent office competent to receive the consumers petition on marketing 
communication about beer. The jury’s secretariat, will examine the consumers petition and will perform 
the inquiring tasks for the jury. The jury’s secretariat is the competent office to realise the copy advice.
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the rulings of the jury including publication of the latter, as well as acceptance of 
final desist orders issued by the jury. The desist order consists in the immediate 
interruption of marketing communication on beer.
Another important definition refers to the Copy Advice. In fact, it consists of an 
advisory and confidential service given from the jury’s secretariat to the brewers 
companies or relative agencies. The legal advice delivered by the jury’s secretariat 
concerns the compliance or the non-compliance with the Code of a scheduled 
advertising campaign. The advertising is submitted in advance and in a confidential 
way by the brewers producers or agencies before its broadcast or publication.
Finally, the jury is defined. The jury is judging body and it is composed of three 
independent and qualified members chosen among experts in law, consumer 
affairs and communication. The expert in law (lawyer and/or university professor 
in law) holds the office of chief of justice, the expert of communication holds the 
office of reporter, the expert of consumerism is the third private judge.
10.3.2 Conduct rules
The crucial point of the Code is represented by the conduct rules, in accordance 
to the provisions of the mentioned Article 22 of Directive no. 13 of 2010. These 
rules are included in articles from 1 to 8 of the Code and their purpose is to 
address any kind of marketing communication and/or promotional activities 
towards principles of moderation and responsibility in the alcohol consumption, 
in relation to the standards established by the Brewers of Europe.
According to Article 1, the marketing communication about beer must not 
encourage excessive or irresponsible consumption of beer, nor present abstinence 
or moderation in a negative way; it must not be connected with violent, aggressive 
or anti-social behaviour and it must not show people who appear to be intoxicated 
or in any way present intoxication in a positive way.
In this regard, Assobirra has focused its attention on the social matters connected 
with an irresponsible consumption of alcohol and it has promoted a specific 
information and awareness campaign concerning the abuse of alcoholic beverages, 
in order to make the public more aware of the importance of a moderate and 
responsible consumption in our society.
The program is called ‘Guida tu la vita. Bevi responsabilmente’ (Drive your life. 
Drink responsible)383 and it focuses on specific situations, like alcohol and driving, 
alcohol and pregnancy, alcohol and young people.
383 There is also a website dedicated to the program, http://www.beviresponsabilmente.it.
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On the matter dealing with alcohol and pregnancy, Assobirra wants the 
gynaecologists and women to be more aware of the risks connected with alcohol 
consumption during the pregnancy, especially for the future child. The Italian 
beer producers initiative on this problem has been recognised by the EU Alcohol 
& Health Forum as the first initiative promoted on this field in Europe by an 
alcohol company.
Regarding young people, Assobirra promotes some initiatives in cooperation with 
the Italian private radio, called ‘Radio 105’, one of the most popular radio station 
among young Italians. Young people are asked to talk together about alcohol and 
promote a correct behaviour in relation to alcohol consumption.
In the Code special attention is dedicated to minors. According to Article 2, the 
marketing communication about beer must not be aimed at minors, it must not 
show minors consuming beer, it must not be promoted in media, programs or at 
events where the majority of the audience is composed by minors. In particular, 
marketing communication must not address to minors through graphic pictures 
and/or cartoons on beer and it should not use testimonials whose normal working 
activity is addressed to minors.384
Article 3 of the conduct rules deals with driving. The advertising about beer 
must not associate, directly or indirectly, the consumption of beer with the act of 
driving vehicles of any kind. In this regard, the mentioned Assobirra’s advertising 
campaign on alcohol, ‘Drive your life. Drink responsible’, is focused on the problems 
connected with alcohol and driving.
This clause of the Code is in accordance with the new provisions recently adopted 
in the Italian legislation. From August 13th it is in force the new Driving code 
(codice della strada), L. 29 July 2010 no. 120.385 According to the Article 53, it 
is forbidden to sell alcoholic beverages in the highway stops between 2:00 and 
6:00 a.m., in order to fight road accidents caused by alcohol consumption. For 
bars, discos, pubs and clubs the prohibition is valid between 3:00 and 6:00 a.m., 
according to Article 54 of the new legislation. A fixed level of 0.5 grams per litre 
is considered ‘driving under the influence of alcohol’ and forbidden by the new 
Driving code.
The other conduct rules of the Code refer to hazardous activities, therapeutic 
properties, alcohol content, performances and promotional activities. In particular, 
Article 4 establishes that marketing communication about beer must not associate 
384 Recently the new Decree 15.3.2010 no. 44 on audiovisual media services has increased minors’ 
protection. In particular, Article 9 bans TV transmissions that could damage the physical, psychological 
and moral development of minors or show scenes of violence or pornography. Article 9 also introduces 
a protection system against any kind of transmission that could damage minors.
385 L. 29.7.2010 n. 120 published in Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 175 del 29.7.2010.
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consumption of beer with the performance of hazardous activities (all the human 
activities that involve a particular attention and/or physical effort), nor portray 
the act of consumption prior to or during such activities.
On therapeutic properties, Article 5 says that marketing communication must not 
lead to believe that beer has properties of preventing, treating or curing human 
diseases. Article 6 stresses the importance that beer advertising must not create 
any confusion as to the nature and strength of beer and it must not present the 
high alcoholic content of beer as a positive quality of the beverage or as a good 
reason for choosing it.
In accordance to Article 7, the beer advertising must not connect the consumption 
of beer to better physical abilities and it must not lead people to believe that 
consumption of beer enhances social or sexual success.
The last conduct rule, Article 8, underlines that promotional activities on beer 
in the point of sale must not drive to irresponsible or anti-social behaviour or 
encourage an excessive consumption of beer. In addition, the distribution of free 
beer samples must not be made out of the points of sale and no sampling of beer 
must be offered to minors.
10.3.3 Procedural rules
The competent bodies for beer advertising and promotional activities are the 
jury and the secretariat. The first one is the judging body and the second one is 
the independent office competent to receive the consumer’s petitions and the 
requests of copy advice. The articles of the Code dedicated to the bodies and the 
procedures are from 9 to 18.
The procedure of monitoring starts with a petition, through which the consumer 
or the consumer’s association make the jury’s secretariat aware of an advertising 
which is probably infringing on the Code.
The secretariat evaluates the petition and in the term of 5 workdays it can act in 
three alternative ways:
• It can accept the petition and send it to the jury with a brief report and, 
simultaneously inform both the consumer and the beer company that the 
procedure is started. The beer company is invited to present pleadings to the 
jury in the successive 5 workdays.
• The secretariat can refuse the petition with a brief explanatory note to the 
consumer.
• It can consider the petition incomplete and so ask the consumer further 
information and, in case of refusal, the secretariat files the petition in the 
successive 10 workdays.
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In case of acceptance of the consumer’s petition, the jury within 10 workdays judges 
the submitted marketing communication and after the evaluation of pleadings 
eventually submitted by the beer company, it can decide in two alternative ways:
• It can order the company to stop immediately the advertising, which is called 
‘desist order’, warning that in case of non-compliance a sanction will be imposed.
• It can consider the company’s pleadings worthy to be discussed before the 
jury in a public hearing in the successive 10 workdays.
During the discussion before the jury, the secretariat will report on the case. The 
petitioner consumer and the beer company may explain their opinions on the 
matter, also through a nominee named for the purpose. At the end of the discussion, 
the jury takes a decision. The jury’s decisions have a binding effect not only for 
the company involved in the procedure introduced by the consumer, but also for 
all the agencies and the points of sale which have accepted the Code’s provisions 
with the acceptance clause. The decisions are also published on Assobirra’s website.
10.3.4 Copy advice
The request of copy advice is examined confidentially by the secretariat with the 
story board, the graphic production completed by texts of marketing communication 
on beer. In the term of 7 workdays the secretariat gives its legal advice to the 
asking beer company or advertising agency. In particular, the secretariat can 
provide in three alternative ways:
• It can approve the marketing communication and if a consumer makes a petition 
on that advertising, the Secretariat will not accept the petition, in accordance to 
its previous copy advice, unless the consumer’s petition concerns the ways of 
spread used for the advertising (for example: spread in programs for minors);
• It can find some infringements to the Code and order the beer company 
to remove them and to prepare a written commitment in the successive 5 
workdays. If the commitment is received correctly and in time by the Secretariat, 
the marketing communication will be approved in the modified version;
• It can refuse the submitted marketing communication, considering it in breach 
of the Code. In case of successive broadcast or publication of this advertising, 
the Secretariat will alert immediately the Jury. In this case, the beer company 
involved can argue the copy advice before the Jury, which decides in the 
successive 10 workdays, in a private session.
10.3.5 Cases
To better understand the functioning of the procedures followed by the jury and 
the secretariat, it seems advisable to illustrate two practical cases:
• Case A is about a TV advertising.
• Case B is about promotional activities at points of sale.
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Case A
The first case refers to a TV beer advertising broadcasted during the afternoon, a 
particular and protected time slot which is typically aimed at minors. According to 
Article 13 Italian L. 125/2001,386 the advertising of alcoholic beverages is forbidden 
in programs aimed at minors, especially in the 15 minutes that come before and 
after the transmission of such programs.
First of all, the consumer communicates the secretariat (by mail or e-mail) the 
advertising he wants to submit to the jury, explaining his reasons and attaching 
the required documents. Then the jury’s secretariat examines the petition sent 
by the consumer and in the term of 5 workdays …
• It can accept the petition and send it to the jury with a report and, at the same 
time, inform both the consumer and the beer company that the procedure is 
started. The beer company is invited to present pleadings to the jury in the 
successive 5 workdays.
OR
• It can, on the contrary, refuse the petition with a brief explanatory note to 
the consumer.
OR
• Finally, it can consider the petition incomplete and so ask the consumer 
further information and, in case of refusal, the secretariat files the petition in 
the successive 10 workdays.
When the consumer’s petition is sent to the Jury, the Jury within 10 workdays 
judges the marketing communication and after the evaluation of pleadings 
eventually submitted by the beer company
• It can order the company to stop immediately the TV beer advertising in 
question (‘desist order’), warning that in case of non-compliance a sanction 
will be imposed as a compulsory contribution to be devolved to the scientific 
research, accompanied by the publication of the jury’s decision on Assobirra 
website and the condemnation of Jury’s costs of procedure.
• On the contrary, the jury can consider the company’s pleadings worthy to be 
discussed before the jury in the successive 10 workdays.
During the discussion before the jury, the secretariat will report on the case. 
The petitioner consumer and the beer company may explain their opinions on 
the matter, also through a nominee named for the purpose. At the end of the 
discussion, the jury takes a decision.
386 L. 30.03.2001, no. 125 on alcohol problems (Gazzetta Ufficiale no. 90 del 18.04.2001).
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Self-regulation code on beer advertising
Case B
The second case deals with promotion and sampling within points of sale with 
distribution of leaflets to the consumer which lead to an irresponsible consumption 
of beer because of their content and pictures. In this case the consumer warns 
the Secretariat of the promotional activity at the point of sale and he explains 
his reasons, supporting them with the required documents. If the procedure 
starts before the jury, the secretariat asks the point of sale to send a brief report 
concerning the ways used for the promotion impeached, in the term of 5 workdays.
After having examined the pleadings submitted by the beer company and by the 
point of sale, the Jury in the term of 10 workdays…
• Can order the company and the point of sale to stop immediately the promotional 
activities in breach with the Code, warning that in case of non-compliance 
of such order, a sanction will be imposed as a compulsory contribution to be 
devolved to the scientific research, accompanied by the publication of the 
jury’s decision on Assobirra website and the condemnation of Jury’s costs of 
procedure.
• On the contrary, the jury can consider the company’s pleadings and the brief 
sent by the point of sale worthy to be discussed before the jury in the successive 
10 workdays.
During the discussion before the jury, the secretariat will report on the case. 
The petitioner consumer and the beer company may explain their opinions on 
the matter, also through a nominee named for the purpose. At the end of the 
discussion, the Jury takes a decision.
Finally, it is important to remember that whenever the Jury is involved in such 
cases, it has to inform the Italian Antitrust Authority (AGCM)387 for the purpose 
of foreclosure and of stay of proceedings foreseen by the Italian Consumer Code, 
Article 27 ter par. 3,388 and by the Regulation on the inquiry procedures concerning 
the unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, Article 20.
10.4 The Code as Private Food Law
The Italian self-regulation Code on Beer Advertising shows a form of private 
food law not designed to regulate conduct within the food chain like most of 
the other examples presented in this book, but to regulate the communication 
387 Website: http://www.agcm.it. 
388 Decreto Legislativo 06.09.2005, no. 206 (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 235 del 08.10.2005). Article 27-ter 
(Self-Regulation): paragraph 3 – when a procedure starts before a self-regulation body, the parties can 
decide not to refer to the Authority until the final decision of the body, or they can ask the Authority 
to suspend the proceeding, whenever the it has been introduced by another person entitled to do so, 
waiting for the self-regulation body to decide.
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towards consumers. By consequence, it is less embedded in contractual relations 
regarding the sale and purchase of food products and more in agreement on 
the topic as such. The Code operationalises principles derived from public law 
sources – EU directives – as well as from civil law sources – the Brewers of Europe. 
For its enforcement and dispute settlement, it does not fully rely on the general 
instruments of civil procedure, but it is endowed with its own jury empowered to 
take decisions accepted by stakeholders as binding, but also to provide compliance 
assistance in the form of ‘copy advice’. The obvious advantage of combining 
litigation and compliance assistance in one hand, is that it brings expertise and 
legal certainty to the ‘copy advice’. The obvious disadvantage is that in providing 
‘copy advice’ the jury limits its room for manoeuvre to decide upon consumer 
complaints before it has heard the consumer’s arguments.
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11.  Franchising strengthens the use of 
private food standards
Esther Brons-Stikkelbroeck
11.1 Introduction
The distinctive character of a business becomes more important every day, as 
well as concepts of sustainability and authenticity. Businesses are distinguishing 
from each other by offering sustainable products or ecologically sound business 
methods and fair trade labelled products.389 Some of them are setting the standard 
not only for themselves, but also for their competitors in trade, that way creating a 
level playing field. They formulate codes of conduct or standards to be applied not 
only within their own business organisation, but also within the organisations of 
their suppliers and partners, within the entire supply chain. What is the influence 
of these supply chains, especially of the business method ‘franchising’, for the 
supposedly growing impact of private standards in the food sector?
The emphasis of this chapter is on the use of private food standards within 
franchise organisations and the influence of franchising according to Dutch Law 
on the effect of private standards. The first question to be answered is the meaning 
of the words private food standards. What are private standards and to what 
extent and with what purpose are they used? Having determined that, several 
cooperation agreements within supply chains are addressed and narrowed down to 
the ones that are supposed to have the most control over the execution of private 
food standards. How do franchise organisations operate in respect to private 
food standards and how do they handle with compliance-issues? Do franchise 
organisations strengthen the use of private food standards?
11.2 Private food standards
Global brand producers and retailers increasingly require their suppliers and 
also their cooperation partners to comply with certain social, environmental 
and safety norms.390 These norms are referred to as ‘private standards’. Private 
standards are not the same as technical regulations and national, regional or 
international voluntary standards such as might be encountered in trading with 
any partner. Private standards focus on social, safety and environmental issues and 
389 Franchise organisation Subway for instance increased its success by using health claims like: ‘eat 
fresh live green’ obliging its franchisees to comply with this claim. 
390 Before coming to terms with the matter of private standards, a supplier will need to fulfill some basic 
qualifications in order to qualify as a potential supplier to these brands and retailers. The enterprise 
must respect local and national legislation, needs certain scale and capacity, quality, competitive 
prices, volume and timely delivery and should comply with technical regulations and management 
qualifications. The same qualifications can be applied to cooperation partners such as franchisees. 
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are required by brand producers and retailers when they source their products. 
These standards come in various shapes and sizes. Standards may be applicable 
to the production site or the product itself.
Private standards can be divided into several categories. There are consortia 
standards, which are often developed by a sector-specific consortium (i.e. BRC or 
GlobalGAP391). There are civil society standards, established as an initiative by a non-
profit organisation usually as a response to concerns over social and environmental 
conditions (e.g. MSC,392 FSC,393 GreenPalm or RSPO394) and there are company-
specific standards, which are developed internally and apply to the whole supply 
chain of a company (i.e. codes of conduct). All of them are becoming increasingly 
popular tools to address sustainability issues across all types of organisations.
Franchisors like IKEA for instance require compliance with their code of conduct.395 
Suppliers of the franchisor IKEA and all franchisees are requested to adhere to the 
requirements outlined in such a code of conduct. As a result, compliance is often 
a prerequisite for having a business relationship with such franchise organisation. 
Others, like the Dutch franchise formula WAAR, require their franchisees to sell 
only labelled product (Fair Trade) and use only certificated shop interior (FSC-
wood).396 Some make it their goal, like General Mills who states: ‘Our goal is to 
be among the most socially responsible food companies in the world’.
While private sector firms and consortia have been the driving force behind 
the formulation of management and product standards, the multitude of private 
standards and retailer requirements have a growing impact. There are probably 
a variety of reasons for this growing impact.
Firstly, there is more awareness about standards and regulations in general, 
also because of the availability of and easy access to information. Secondly, 
the building-up of health and safety concerns in industrialised countries (such 
as food safety, chemicals, allergens, working conditions, etc.) resulted in an 
environment where not only the government regulations have become stricter, 
but the retailers/supermarket chains have started to drive the trend for stringent 
standards due to consumer awareness. Consumers in developed economies are 
showing growing concerns about the social and environmental conditions prevailing 
391 Global Good Agricultural Practice.
392 Marine Stewardship Council.
393 Forest Stewardship Council.
394 The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. 
395 IKEA has formulated formal social and environmental requirements for its suppliers in the IWAY 
standard, which is applicable to all external suppliers and service providers. IKEA includes these 
standards in its basic contracts. If non-compliance is encountered IKEA will stop delivery immediately 
and without adjustment the contract may be terminated. 
396 WAAR is a hard franchise formula that has accepted the fair trade principles. Besides the sales of 
fair trade products, WAAR has formulated specific environmental requirements for the suppliers of the 
shop interior from its franchisees. 
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in countries participating in the supply chains of products that are sold into their 
markets. As cases of severe breaches of workers’ rights, human rights violations 
and environmental degradation caused by corporate activity reach the public, 
consumer confidence in the responsible conduct of the major brands and retailer’s 
decreases. Furthermore the desirability of differentiation in the market place in 
relation to social and environmental production criteria also increases.
These developments have contributed to the response from large brands and 
retailers who are setting stricter standards within their supply chain with the aim 
of improving the social and ecological performance of developing producers along 
the whole length of these chains. In essence, many multinationals use private 
standards as an instrument of supply chain management, franchisors use private 
standards to influence their franchisees and as a mechanism to gain marketing 
advantage over rivals. Of course, reputation and brand protection, global sourcing, 
differentiation in the marketplace, and control and rationalisation of supply have 
been important drivers for private standards.
Private standards are known within vertical agreements as well, either expressed 
directly or indirectly. Directly, by requiring standards or conditions for the 
production or handling of food in order to meet the requested quality standards. 
This being part of the specific characteristics of the supply chain or supplied 
product. Indirectly, by stimulating the use of regulatory requirements, in order to 
guarantee food safety or a healthy food production. For instance by requiring the 
use of skilled personnel to accomplish hygienic working methods. The question is 
whether this cooperation form and the various methods of it are of any influence 
to the effect of private food standards.
11.3 Vertical agreements and franchising
Vertical agreements are agreements or concerted practices entered into between 
two or more undertakings each of which operates, for the purposes of the agreement 
or the concerted practice, at a different level of the production or distribution 
chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell 
or resell certain goods or services.397 These conditions often contain vertical 
restraints, some of which are prohibited under EU competition rules.398
397 EU, 2002. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle 
sector. Official Journal of the European Union L 203, 01/08/2002: 30–41 and EU, 2010. Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints. Official Journal of the European Union C 130, 19/05/2010: 1-46.
398 Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies to vertical agreements 
that may affect trade between Member States and that prevent, restrict or distort competition. Article 
101 provides a legal framework for the assessment of vertical restraints, which takes into consideration 
the distinction between anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects. Article 101(1) prohibits those 
agreements which appreciably restrict or distort competition, while Article 101(3) exempts those 
agreements which confer sufficient benefits to outweigh the anti-competitive effects.
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It is generally recognised that vertical restraints may have positive effects such 
as, in particular, the improvement of the quality of goods and services. After all, 
when a company has no market power, it can only try to increase its profits by 
optimising its distribution processes for instance by optimising its quality. In 
a number of situations vertical restraints may be helpful in this respect since 
the usual arm’s length dealings between supplier and buyer, determining only 
price and quantity of a certain transaction, can lead to a sub-optimal level of 
investments and sales.
A recognised and justified use of vertical restraints is the positive effect of quality 
standardisation: ‘a vertical restraint may help to create a brand image by imposing 
a certain measure of uniformity and quality standardisation on the distributors, 
thereby increasing the attractiveness of the product to the final consumer and 
increasing its sales. This can for instance be found in selective distribution and 
franchising’.399
There are several types of vertical agreements. The growing impact of private 
standards is best to be seen within the so-called qualitative selective distribution 
agreement and franchising agreement.
Selective distribution agreements restrict the number of authorised distributors 
on the one hand and the possibilities of resale on the other. It is a different kind of 
distribution method than exclusive distribution. The difference is that the restriction 
of the number of distributors does not depend on the number of territories but 
on selection criteria linked in the first place to the nature of the product. These 
selection criteria could be found in private standards. Selective distribution is 
almost always used to distribute branded final products. Private standards used 
in this kind of setting is therefore mostly limited to indirect requirements, such 
as the use of certain transport methods or hygienic working methods.
Franchise agreements are a species of distribution agreements;400 a commercial 
cooperation agreement between independent entrepreneurs. According to the 
definition stated within EU competition rules, franchise agreements contain 
licenses of intellectual property rights relating in particular to trade marks or 
signs and know-how for the use and distribution of goods or services. In addition 
to the license, the franchisor usually provides the franchisee during the life span 
of the agreement with commercial or technical assistance. The license and the 
assistance are integral components of the business method being franchised. The 
399 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (the guidelines describe the vertical agreements that generally do 
not fall within Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: agreements of minor 
importance, agreements between small and medium-sized firms and agency agreements).
400 The existence of a distribution component is not necessary. The franchise agreement can also 
be limited to the use of a business concept, without transferring services from franchisor through 
franchisee to purchasers. 
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franchisor is in general paid a franchise fee by the franchisee for the use of the 
particular business method. Franchising may enable the franchisor to establish, 
with limited investments, a uniform network for the distribution of its products. 
In addition to the provision of the business method, franchise agreements usually 
contain a combination of different vertical restraints concerning the products 
being distributed, in particular selective distribution and/or non-compete and/
or exclusive distribution or weaker forms thereof.
The purpose of a franchise agreement is the expansion of a well tested, proven 
and commercially successful business concept through franchisees, without large 
investments by the franchisor as the owner of the business concept. The investments 
are instead paid for by the franchisee who is looking for a way to make his business 
more profitable and is willing to do so by using this proven business concept.
Franchise is not an unambiguous word. People use the word ‘franchise’ or the 
phrase ‘franchise business concept’ in different manners to denote the concept 
of franchise. This is to be explained because of a non-legal use of the word. In 
that perspective franchise can be divided into three different business methods: 
distribution franchise, services franchise and industrial/production franchise.401
Distribution franchise is the classical method of franchising. These agreements 
aim to distribute goods that are being sold by the franchisor to franchisees and 
through them to consumers or other users of the products. Franchisor can be 
the one selecting and buying the product before selling them to the franchisees, 
he can be the manufacturer of the products himself or he could be the one 
selecting the suppliers. The first franchise organisation often mentioned is the 
organisation behind the distribution of Singer sewing machines. The sale of the 
product by franchisor (or at his advice) is combined with certain services, such 
as the knowhow of the best possible selection of products.
Services franchise is a method for a quick expansion of a business concept within 
the services industry without the necessity of large investments. The services 
provided for within the method are leading. They can be accompanied by the sale 
of products; however selling those products is meant to be supporting. Probably the 
products can even be provided by others than franchisor as long as those suppliers 
comply with the standards set forth by franchisor. In this kind of franchise the 
knowhow within the franchise organisation is of the utmost importance.
Industrial or production franchise is the method in which franchisor gives a licence 
to franchisee to be able to produce and sell products under franchisor’s label or 
401 Franchise can be divided into more business methods than the three mentioned, however those 
three form a fair picture in the perspective of this chapter. In order to outline only the basics if have 
left the aspect of master franchising unspoken. 
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trade mark. The purpose of this agreement is to bring production and commercial 
sales closer to each other.
Franchise has been able to develop mainly through economic values more than 
through legislation. In the Netherlands there are still no specific franchise laws. 
Franchise agreements are to meet the requirements of general contract laws 
and, if applicable, the agency and distribution regulations. Greece, Germany, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden offer more or less the same arrangement. The 
USA, Canada, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy and Switzerland meanwhile all have 
specific legislation on the subject of franchising, most of them however limited 
to information requirements to be given prior to the agreement.
Generally there are two legally relevant documents, the franchise agreement and 
the information disclosed prior to the signing of this agreement. The franchise 
agreement is designed to assure that all of the franchisees within an organisation are 
treated equitably. The expectations must be uniform throughout the system. The 
franchise agreement is a document that is signed by both parties upon completion 
of the deal to do business together. It provides outlines on how the franchisor 
expects the franchisee to run the operation.
As mentioned before there are legal systems that require a franchisor to provide 
all potential franchisees with relevant business information merged in a so called 
‘Pre-contractual Information Document (PID)’ or a ‘Franchise Disclosure Document 
(FDD)’. These are documents presented prior to the final agreement. The potential 
franchisee has the opportunity to review this information before making a final 
determination as to whether or not to move forward in becoming a franchisee 
within the organisation. The type of information provided by the document entails 
comprehensive details about the company’s background and history. Included in 
this document is the disclosure of any lawsuits or bankruptcies that has occurred 
within the franchise organisation. Also incorporated in this document is a host 
of financial data as well as distribution channel information. Any confidentiality 
restrictions are also disclosed, as far as what a franchisee may and may not discuss 
with others. The laws of the Netherlands do not require franchisors to disclose 
such information in general. However if a franchisor provides information, the 
information should be reliable.
The requirements of general contracts law in the Netherlands also contain 
competition rules. Those mostly economic values are of great interest to both 
franchisor and franchisee. Both parties act in close and ongoing collaboration and 
the success of the franchise organisation depends on mutual trust and transparency. 
Nevertheless the franchise agreement creates an unequal relationship between 
the franchisor and its franchisees. The franchisees economically depend on the 
franchisor and on the continued existence of the exclusive distribution relationship 
with the franchisor and within the franchise chain.
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In order to streamline the consequences of the contractual freedom and in order to 
avoid government regulation to be incorporated, the franchise sector has been self-
regulating. This self-regulation is best to be seen in the standards laid down in the 
European Code of Ethics for Franchising from the European Franchise Association 
as they are incorporated by all affiliated national franchise federations.402 The force 
in law of these national codes of conduct, especially in relation to the customers 
of a franchisee, is questionable (as is for most other codes of conduct).403 Their 
economic value on the other hand is of great importance as most of the franchise 
organisations incorporate the code of conduct in their franchise agreement. The 
Dutch Franchise association (NFV) commits its members to comply with the code 
of conduct and offers an enforcement mechanism through mediation.
One of the essential obligations of the franchisee mentioned in this code of 
conduct is to ‘devote its best endeavours to the growth of the franchise business and 
to the maintenance of the common identity and reputation of the franchise network’.404 
The common identity and reputation of the franchise network and the way in 
which this identity and reputation should be maintained, is often outlined in a 
franchise (operations) manual. The manual contains everything the franchisees 
need to know to successfully operate their business. It helps the franchisor ensure 
consistency from one franchisee to another and protects the business’ profitability 
and good name.
At a minimum, the manual sets quality standards and provides a coherent framework 
to ensure uniformity across the entire franchise network. The franchise operations 
manual will list the agreed upon standards and procedures for the franchise. Each 
franchisee will be expected to carry out business according to these standards. 
If a franchisee fails to abide by these rules, he or she may be subject to serious 
consequences including loss of the right to operate the franchise or even litigation. 
This in itself stipulates the value of franchise agreements for the increase of standards.
An example of how franchising works (mentioned in the guidelines)405 furthermore 
clarifies this value of franchise for the growing impact of standards:
A manufacturer has developed a new format for selling sweets in so-called 
fun shops where the sweets can be coloured specially on demand from the 
consumer. The manufacturer of the sweets has also developed the machines 
to colour the sweets. The manufacturer also produces the colouring liquids. 
402 Europese Erecode inzake franchising, Nederlandse Franchise Vereniging (NFV).
403 Van der Heijden, M.J., 2011. ‘Supplier codes of conduct’ en mensenrechten in een keten van 
contracten; Over enige vermogensrechtelijke implicaties van gedragscodes met betrekking tot 
mensenrechten en milieu in contractuele relaties. Contracteren 2011 (1): 3-22.
404 European Code of Ethics for Franchising, European Franchise Federation (EFF).
405 Article Nr. 191 of EU, 2010. Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. Official Journal of the European Union 
C 130, 19/05/2010: 1–46.
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The quality and freshness of the liquid is of vital importance to producing 
good sweets. The manufacturer made a success of its sweets through a number 
of own retail outlets all operating under the same trade name and with the 
uniform fun image (style of lay-out of the shops, common advertising, etc.). 
In order to expand sales the manufacturer started a franchising system. The 
franchisees are obliged to buy the sweets, liquid and colouring machine 
from the manufacturer, to have the same image and operate under the trade 
name, pay a franchise fee, contribute to common advertising and ensure 
the confidentiality of the operating manual prepared by the franchisor. In 
addition, the franchisees are only allowed to sell from the agreed premises, 
to sell to end users or other franchisees and are not allowed to sell other 
sweets. The franchisor is obliged not to appoint another franchisee nor 
operate a retail outlet himself in a given contract territory. The franchisor 
is also under the obligation to update and further develop its products, the 
business outlook and the operating manual and make these improvements 
available to all retail franchisees. The franchise agreements are concluded 
for a duration of 10 years.
(…)
Most of the obligations contained in the franchise agreements can be 
deemed necessary to protect the intellectual property rights or maintain 
the common identity and reputation of the franchised network and fall 
outside Article 101(1).406 The restrictions on selling (contract territory and 
selective distribution) provide an incentive to the franchisees to invest in 
the colouring machine and the franchise concept and, if not necessary to, 
at least help maintain the common identity, thereby offsetting the loss of 
intra-brand competition. The non-compete clause excluding other brands 
of sweets from the shops for the full duration of the agreements does allow 
the franchisor to keep the outlets uniform and prevent competitors from 
benefiting from its trade name. It does not lead to any serious foreclosure 
in view of the great number of potential outlets available to other sweet 
producers. The franchise agreements of this franchisor are likely to fulfil 
the conditions for exemption under Article 101(3) in as far as the obligations 
contained therein fall under Article 101(1).
The example shows us that there are several moments in which a franchisor can 
impose private standards upon the franchisees within the franchise network or 
were standards used have effect on consumers or purchasers throughout the 
franchise chain.
In the example the franchisor is also the manufacturer of the liquids and machines. 
He can make sure that the coloured sweets that are produced within the franchising 
network comply with certain standards. The operating manual used within the 
406 Of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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network is, besides off course the franchise agreement itself and the general 
terms and conditions used for the sale of the products, the most common place 
to constrain conditions upon the use of the trade marks i.e. the know-how, such 
as compliance with private standards in order to guarantee uniformity or quality 
of goods and services.
What is mentioned in the example on the ‘restrictions on selling’ equally applies 
to the use of private standards within a network. It provides an incentive to 
the franchisees to invest in the network and the franchise concept and, if not 
necessary, to at least help maintain the common identity, thereby offsetting the 
loss of intra-brand competition.
The example mentions the obligation of the franchisee to ‘contribute to common 
advertising’. This shows us the effect of indirect regulations, for instance the 
franchisor that is using a communication campaign in order to teach its consumers 
or purchasers all about the essence of hygiene and food.
Another incentive for applying to the standards set within the franchise network 
could be found in the topic of legal responsibilities on products, although the 
opinions differ.407 This incentive could work from the perspective of the franchisor 
as well as from the perspective of the franchisee. From the perspective of the 
franchisor because liability and/or claims could harm his know-how and the 
reputation developed by him or could lead directly to liability by fault in cases 
where the franchisor is the manufacturer of the products involved (distribution 
franchise). The franchisee is an independent entrepreneur who is, notwithstanding 
the commercial and technical support he receives by franchisor, liable by fault if 
he does not comply with food safety, even if the franchisor is the manufacturer 
of the products. From both sides because insurance companies demand the entire 
franchise network to comply with the desired behaviour.
Most likely, however, the real incentive for parties to comply with standards is the 
(fear of) reputation (damages) of the franchise network. This incentive applies 
to all parties, franchisor and franchisees. The connection between franchisor 
and the franchisees is important. Franchisor will do its utmost to maintain the 
interests of the franchise network and its know-how and reputation. That’s what 
franchisor has invested in. Franchisee has an interest in the protection of his 
franchise rights and therefore will comply with the agreement and the franchise 
obligations in order to safeguard those franchise rights. Within those franchise 
networks where the adherence to the requirements is a binding provision, non-
compliance will immediately lead to the loss of the business relationship with 
the franchise organisation.
407 Havinga, T., 2010. Draagt aansprakelijkheidsrecht bij aan de voedselveiligheid. Recht der Werkelijkheid 
31 (1): 6-27.
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The difficulty of maintaining standards in franchise chains is the result of an 
inability of the individual franchisee to expropriate the full benefit that accrues 
to his investment in improving for instance quality. While his improvement of 
quality contributes to the overall reputation of the chain and therefore to the 
revenues generated in each of the chains markets, the franchisee can extract at 
the most only his contribution to the revenues in the franchised single outlet 
that he owns. Because of this gap between the private benefit to an individual 
franchisee and the total benefit to the owner of the chain many franchisors select 
to own or closely monitor a significant selection of their companies’ retail outlets 
in an attempt to guarantee that adequate services are indeed provided. Others 
add some kind of bonus or malus system to their agreements in order to make 
franchisees ‘voluntarily’ comply with quality standards.
11.4 Conclusion
The continuous development of distribution chains, such as a franchise, occurs 
parallel with the harmonisation and benchmarking of private standards as a 
response to the overwhelming growth in their number and variety. Harmonisation 
and benchmarking of private standards is especially welcome as this greatly 
simplifies compliance and leads to costs savings for both buyer and the suppliers. 
Franchising will help realise this, at least for those franchisors that have a strong 
formula. They will use standards in order to gain share in the competitive market 
and they will oblige the franchisees to act accordingly. They formulate standards 
to be applied within their own business organisation and the organisations of 
their suppliers and partners, therefore within the entire supply chain and they 
supervise compliance. Through the use of private standards parallel with the 
use of standard franchise agreements within food organisations customers will 
eventually benefit from the strengthened use of private food standards.
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12.  On the borderline between state law 
and religious law
Regulatory arrangements connected to kosher and halal 
foods in the Netherlands and the United States408
Tetty Havinga
12.1 The developing supply of halal foods
In 2006, the Dutch supermarket chain Albert Heijn introduced halal meat products 
in some of its shops to better serve Muslim customers. Immediately, animal rights 
organisations protested strongly against the selling of meat from animals that had 
been slaughtered without being stunned first. They also pointed out that non-
Muslim customers might unknowingly buy this meat and launched a campaign to 
remove it from the supermarket.409 In response, Albert Heijn switched to another 
halal certification scheme that allows reversible electrical stunning prior to the 
killing of the animal.410 This resulted in protests and warnings from Muslims 
not to eat this halal meat because it was not really halal.411 On the other hand, 
a complaint was filed with the Dutch Advertising Standards Authority against 
Albert Heijn for making an unjust claim that its halal meat was kind to animals.412
The above case shows that halal food, and religious slaughter in particular, is a 
contentious subject in the Netherlands that involves complicated issues such as 
the substance of the religious requirements for halal food, the reliability of halal 
certificates, animal welfare in religious slaughter and the role of public authorities 
in relation to halal food.
Within the wider subject of food regulation, the regulation of halal food – food 
that is permitted for faithful Muslims because it is in accordance with Islamic 
dietary laws – is particularly interesting. Because of the obvious parallels, this 
408 A previous (almost similar) version of this chapter was published as: Havinga, 2010. Regulating halal 
and kosher foods: different arrangements between state, industry and religious actors. Erasmus Law 
Review 3(4): 241-255.
409 Duizenden tegen halal vlees AH. De Volkskrant, 25 October 2006; Radar en Albert Heijn ruziën 
over halal-vlees. Available at: http://www.nu.nl/economie/860223; Haal halalvlees uit de schappen. 
De Volkskrant, 26 October 2006.
410 See: http://www.ah.nl/halal; http://www.evmi.nl/nieuws, reports of 16, 24 and 31 October and 3 
November 2006; AH: halalvlees toch van verdoofde dieren. de Volkskrant, 31 October 2006, AH stopt 
verkoop halal-vlees. AD, 30 October 2006.
411 Moslims: Halal vlees Albert Heijn is niet halal’, Elsevier, 3 November 2006.
412 Albert Heijn claimt ten onrechte diervriendelijk halal. Available at: http://www.wakkerdier.nl/
persbericht/447; Albert Heijn trekt halal-claim in. Distrifood, 10 December 2008; AH trekt claim 
‘diervriendelijk halal’ in. Available at: http://www.maghreb.nl/2008/12/12.
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chapter compares the regulation of halal food to the regulation of kosher food. The 
objective of this chapter is to analyse the division of roles between state actors, 
the food industry, certification agencies and religious authorities in regulatory 
arrangements connected with halal and kosher food in the Netherlands and the 
United States.
The chapter starts with a brief introduction to the issue of halal and kosher 
food and its regulation. Both the Netherlands and the United States have special 
arrangements for religious slaughter and the labelling of halal and kosher food. The 
next sections deal with the regulation of halal and kosher food in the Netherlands 
and the United States, relying on a review of literature and internet sources. The 
subsequent sections describe the system of kosher certification in the Netherlands, 
halal certification in the Netherlands, the regulation of religious slaughter in the 
Netherlands, the regulation of kosher food in the United States and the regulation 
of religious slaughter in the United States. The next section compares the regulation 
in the Netherlands with the regulation in the United States. The final section 
searches for an explanation for the different position of the Dutch and US public 
authorities on the regulation of halal and kosher food.
12.2 Regulating halal and kosher food
In addition to Islam, many other religions also forbid certain foods or have specific 
requirements related to food. There are Jewish, Islamic, Hindu and Buddha dietary 
laws. Food has always been the subject of taboos and obligations. Which food 
we prefer and what we consider fit for (human) consumption differs depending 
on the place and time we live and the faith we adhere to. Religious dietary laws 
are important to observant Jewish and Muslim populations, although not all the 
faithful comply with the religious dietary laws.
Islamic dietary laws determine which foods are permitted for Muslims. Halal 
means permitted, whereas haram means prohibited. Several foods are considered 
harmful for humans to consume and are forbidden. This is expressed by the 
prohibition of the consumption of pork, blood, alcohol, carrion and meat that has 
not been slaughtered according to Islamic prescriptions. Meat is the most strictly 
regulated food. The animal (of a permitted species) must be slaughtered by a 
sane adult Muslim by cutting the throat quickly with a sharp knife. The name of 
Allah must be invoked while cutting. The question whether stunning is allowed 
remains an issue of debate, both within and beyond the Muslim community. The 
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rules for foods that are not explicitly prohibited by the Quran may be interpreted 
differently by various scholars.413
Jewish dietary laws (kashrut) determine which foods are fit for consumption by 
observant Jews (kosher). It is a complex and extensive system with many detailed 
prescriptions concerning the production, preparation and consumption of food. 
The prescriptions are laid down in Jewish biblical and rabbinical sources. Kosher 
laws deal predominantly with three issues: prohibited foods (e.g. pork, shellfish 
and rabbit), prescriptions for religious slaughter (shechita) and the prohibition on 
preparing and consuming dairy products and meat together. In addition, there are 
numerous prescriptions dealing with special issues such as wine and grape juice, 
cooking equipment and Passover. Ruminants and fowl must be slaughtered by a 
specially trained religious slaughterer (shochet) using a special knife. Prior to the 
slaughter, the shochet makes a blessing. The animal is not stunned. Slaughtered 
animals are inspected for visible defects by rabbinically trained inspectors, 
particularly the lungs. Red meat and poultry have to be soaked and salted to 
remove all the blood. Any ingredients derived from animal sources are generally 
prohibited because of the difficulty of obtaining them from kosher animals. The 
prohibition of mixing milk and meat requires that the processing and handling of 
all materials and products fall into one of three categories: meat, dairy or neutral 
(pareve). To assure the complete separation of milk and meat, all equipment must 
belong to a specific category. After eating meat, one has to wait 3 to 6 hours before 
eating dairy. There is some disagreement over what constitutes kosher between 
the Orthodox, Conservative and Reform Jewish schools of thought.414
It cannot be visibly determined whether food is halal or kosher (as with other 
credence quality attributes relating to organic food and Fair Trade products). So, 
how does a consumer know which food is halal or kosher? There are basically 
three options:
• buying from someone of known reputation (e.g. an Islamic butcher);
• asking a religious leader which foods are permitted; or
• buying foods with a halal or kosher label.
In traditional societies, a combination of the first two options is often applied. 
People living in a religious community that runs all political, economic and 
communal matters internally rely on religious leaders and food suppliers of known 
413 For an overview of Islamic dietary laws and their interpretations see Regenstein, J.M., Chaudry, M.M. 
and Regenstein, C.E., 2003. The kosher and halal food laws. Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science 
and Food Safety 2(3): 111-127; Bonne, K. and Verbeke, W., 2008. Religious values informing halal meat 
production and the control and delivery of halal credence quality. Agriculture and Human Values 25: 
35-47; Milne, E.L., 2007. Protecting Islam’s garden from the wilderness: halal fraud statutes and the first 
amendment. Journal of Food Law and Policy 2: 61-83.
414 See Regenstein et al. (2003), Rosenthal (1997), Sigman (2004), Hodkin (2005), Milne (2007) and 
Popovsky (2010) for an overview of Jewish dietary laws and their interpretations.
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reputation. In bygone days, this applied to many European Jewish communities, 
for whom the chief rabbi was often the final authority in kashrut supervision.415 
In the 1930s in the Netherlands, only a few food manufacturers were under 
rabbinical supervision as most foods were prepared in the home.416
Due to the increase in industrially manufactured foods and the growing geographical 
distance between production and consumption (internationalisation of the food 
market), reliance on local suppliers and religious leaders is often no longer 
sufficient. Traditional local arrangements are also disrupted by migration. 
Nowadays, consumers who seek kosher or halal foods are dependent on a label 
or trademark that identifies a product as kosher or halal. The consumer has to 
trust the source and message of the communication. These developments have 
resulted in a large number of kosher certified products in US supermarkets and 
a growing number of halal labelled or certified products in Western European 
supermarkets.
The growth of halal certification in the Netherlands fits into a general pattern of 
growing third-party certification and other regulatory arrangements involving a 
mix of private and public actors. Food safety regulation currently involves a large 
number of public and private organisations with complementary, overlapping 
or competing roles.417 The relations between public and private actors in food 
regulation are varied and complex and form an interesting field of study. In some 
cases, private regulation is largely independent from public regulation (such as 
the Marine Stewardship Council label for sustainable fish); in other cases, private 
regulation is encouraged or enforced by governmental actors (such as many 
industrial hygiene codes).418
Most private regulatory arrangements are nonetheless deeply intertwined with 
governmental and intergovernmental regulatory structures.419 Food products 
and producers are subject to multiple regulatory arrangements. At least some of 
them will be public in most cases. In this respect, the halal/kosher certification 
system in the Netherlands appears to be rather exceptional, since governmental 
and intergovernmental regulators are largely absent. Governmental regulation 
does not encompass kosher and halal labelling and certification. It only includes 
prescriptions for and oversight of (religious) slaughter and general food regulations. 
To the general issues involved in the relation between private and public actors, 
the case of halal and kosher food regulation adds freedom of religion and the 
responsibilities of the state vis-à-vis the autonomy of religious communities.
415 Epstein and Gang (2002); Sigman (2004: 523).
416 Information from the Chief Rabbinate of Holland provided to the author (9 July 2010).
417 Fuchs et al. (2011), Havinga (2006), Levi-Faur (2010), Marsden et al. (2010) and Van Waarden (2006).
418 Havinga (2006).
419 Meidinger (2009: 234).
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Comparison with the United States is particularly interesting. Like the Netherlands, 
the United States is not an Islamic or Jewish country. Unlike the Netherlands, 
however, the United States is characterised by an extensive kosher certification 
industry and an important role for legislators, governmental enforcement agencies 
and courts in kosher labelling.
In this chapter, I will analyse the division of roles between state actors, the food 
industry, certification agencies and religious authorities in regulatory arrangements 
connected with halal and kosher foods in the Netherlands and the United States.
12.3 Kosher certification in the Netherlands
The Second World War decimated the Jewish community in the Netherlands. A 
large proportion of the current community are non-observant or observe kashrut 
partially by abstaining from pork and shellfish or not drinking milk with a meat 
meal. According to a rough estimate of the Chief Rabbinate of Holland, only 300-
400 households keep a kosher kitchen nowadays.420 Kosher food has not been 
the subject of public debate in recent years. However, slaughter without prior 
stunning, including slaughter in accordance with Jewish dietary laws, has come 
up for discussion.
Since 1945, the Chief Rabbinate of Holland has been the Dutch kosher certifying 
agency for ingredients, semi-finished products and end products.421 Kosher shops 
and restaurants are under the supervision of local rabbinates such as the Rabbinate 
of Amsterdam or the Rabbinate of The Hague.
Kosher certification is particularly important for exporting foods and ingredients 
to Israel and the United States (as the local Dutch need for kosher products is too 
small to legitimise certification). The Chief Rabbinate of Holland issues kosher 
certificates for a single product or several products or a certificate for the whole 
production process. The procedure starts with a food producer applying for kosher 
certification. After receiving the application a supervisor visits the location to 
judge whether the plant or production can be certified kosher.
The Jewish dietary norms and requirements for certification do not appear in a 
written document of the Chief Rabbinate of Holland. The Chief Rabbinate applies 
Jewish laws as laid down in the Old Testament (notably Leviticus and Deuteronomy) 
and rabbinical directives and interpretations. After rabbinical approval of the 
ingredients and the equipment, the Chief Rabbinate regularly supervises the 
production site. Products and plants under the supervision of the Chief Rabbinate 
of Holland may use a seal of approval (hechsher) stating ‘onder toezicht van het 
420 Information from the Chief Rabbinate of Holland provided to the author (9 July 2010).
421 See: http://www.kosherholland.nl.
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Opperrabbinaat voor Nederland’ (‘under supervision of the Chief Rabbinate of 
Holland’) around Hebrew text. This seal is a protected hallmark. The producer 
pays an hourly rate for the supervision and a fee for the certificates. The frequency 
of supervision visits depends on the hazards involved in the particular product 
and plant. Thus, a Jewish butcher is supervised on a daily basis, while a kosher 
plant that only produces kosher foods receives a year letter. Most plants produce 
both kosher and non-kosher foods; these plants are visited more frequently (e.g. 
monthly) and every product needs a kosher certificate.
Every year, the Chief Rabbinate publishes a kashrut list containing products 
generally available in Dutch supermarkets that are permitted for Jews to eat. 
The listed products are not produced under the supervision of the Chief Rabbinate 
and do not have a kosher certificate. Instead, the Chief Rabbinate investigated 
the product and decided that it is permitted for Jews (though with a lower kosher 
standard).422 A list of forbidden E-numbers for food additives is also included. The 
list is published to assist Jews living far from kosher shops. In the Netherlands 
and other European countries, the principal method of rabbinical approval is via a 
kosher list published by local or national Jewish authorities, and Jewish consumers 
rely heavily on these authorities, such as the Chief Rabbinate.423
12.4 Halal certification in the Netherlands424
The domestic market for halal foods in the Netherlands is more sizeable than the 
kosher market. In the Netherlands, the influx of migrants has resulted in a growing 
number of Muslims. It is estimated that in 2006 about 5% of the population in the 
Netherlands was Muslim (837,000 persons).425 This has only recently become visible 
in supermarkets, shops, hospital and corporate cafeterias, where halal products are 
being introduced. In the media and in the Dutch parliament, some persons and 
organisations have objected to this development as unwelcome Islamisation.426 
Religious slaughter has also been criticised from the perspective of animal welfare.427
Van Waarden and Van Dalen distinguish between the ‘official’ and ‘international’ 
halal market and the local ‘uncle and auntie’ market. The official market includes 
large-scale exporting companies, large supermarket chains and certification 
agencies. The ‘uncle and auntie’ market is a local market based on trust in the 
422 Information from the Chief Rabbinate of Holland provided to the author (9 July 2010).
423 Bergeaud-Blackler et al. (2010: 27).
424 The information on halal certification in the Netherlands is based mainly on Van Waarden and Van 
Dalen (2010).
425 Van Herten and Otten (2007).
426 E.g. Handelingen TK 17 (1013) of 29 October 2003. See also: http://scepticisme.prikpagina.nl/read.
php?f=1056&i=241469; http://www.elsevier.nl/opinie/reacties_op_commentaar.
427 See: http://www.dierenbescherming.nl/downloads/docs/offerfeest_2006.doc.
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local butcher and grocery store of the same social and ethnic group. The domestic 
halal market in the Netherlands is still dominated by this local market.428
Unlike kosher certification, there is not one single halal certifier in the Netherlands. 
There are about 30-40 different halal certificates. These include larger, official 
certifying bodies (such as the Halal Feed and Food Inspection Authority, Halal 
Quality Control, Halal Correct and the Halal Audit Company), small – often 
individual – certifiers (imams), self-certifiers (businesses that label their brand 
or shop as halal, such as Mekkafoods) and the international certification bodies 
(such as JAKIM, IFANCA and IHI Alliance). This chapter does not consider the 
international certification bodies. Many certifiers operate under the supervision of 
or are recognised by an Islamic authority such as Majlis Al Ifta, the Association of 
Dutch imams, JAKIM Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic 
Development Malaysia),429 Majelis Ulama Indonesia MUI (Indonesia Council 
of Ulama), the Islamic Board for Fatwa and Research of the Islamic University 
of Rotterdam, the Al Azhar University of Cairo or an imam. In the case of some 
certifiers, it is unclear whether they are under religious supervision or recognised 
by an Islamic authority.
Dutch halal certifying bodies are not recognised by the Dutch Council of 
Accreditation and most of them would not qualify for accreditation because a 
written document containing all requirements for certification is not available. 
Some halal hallmarks are legally protected by civil law, as is unauthorised use 
of the Halal Feed and Food Inspection Authority logo, which is protected by 
international copyright law.430
12.5 Religious slaughter in the Netherlands
Specific requirements for religious slaughter are included in both Jewish and 
Islamic dietary law. Orthodox Jewish communities and some Islamic communities 
do not accept that animals are stunned before slaughtering. In the Netherlands, 
slaughtering animals without prior stunning is prohibited, as in all European Union 
countries.431 Since the adoption of the first Dutch laws prohibiting slaughtering 
without prior stunning in 1922, an exception has been made for Jewish slaughter. 
428 Van Waarden and Van Dalen (2010); Bonne and Verbeke (2008).
429 There are two Dutch bodies on the list of approved foreign halal certification bodies of MUI: Halal 
Feed and Food Inspection Authority and Total Quality Halal Correct. See: http://www.mui.or.id. These 
halal certifiers are also on the list of JAKIM. The Control Office of Halal Slaughtering also appears 
on the JAKIM list. See: http://www.jurnalhalal.com/2010/04/halal-bodies-recognized-by-jakim.html.
430 See: http://www.halal.nl.
431 Oosterwijk (1999); Havinga (2008); Kijlstra and Lambooij (2008); Ferrari and Bottoni (2010). Council 
Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter and 
killing, replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of 
animals at the time of killing, which will enter into force in 2013.
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Since 1996, a similar exception has been made for Islamic slaughter.432 Religious 
slaughter is legally defined as slaughter of animals without prior stunning taking 
place according to Jewish or Islamic rite. Slaughter according to Islamic or Jewish 
rite can only take place in authorised slaughterhouses after notifying the Dutch 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) in advance.433 More detailed 
requirements are laid down in a special Regulation on Religious Slaughter. These 
requirements include the avoidance of suffering, instructions for the handling 
and restraining of animals and slaughter techniques.434 Veterinarians of the VWA 
supervise religious slaughter, and non-compliance with the above-mentioned 
requirements may result in a warning, a fine or the stoppage of slaughtering. 
This supervision does not include compliance with religious laws.
With its specific provisions for religious slaughter, Dutch law implicitly assumes 
that religious slaughter equals slaughter without prior stunning. In the Netherlands, 
religious slaughter is disputed. The current wave of criticism comes from three 
sides. First of all, animal rights organisations object to the inhumane and 
painful treatment of animals. Some of these organisations want an official ban 
on religious slaughter, while others are trying to convince Islamic and Jewish 
organisations to accept some form of reversible stunning. Secondly, some right 
wing politicians and political organisations object to the growing Islamisation of 
Dutch society. These Islamophobic critics perceive religious slaughter as a clear 
sign of the intrusion of Islamic norms and the unwanted permissiveness of the 
left-wing elite. Finally, veterinarian organisations in the Netherlands and Europe 
advocate obligatory stunning prior to slaughter. They argue that scientists agree 
that slaughter without prior stunning causes unnecessary pain and suffering for 
the animals. The Federation of Veterinarians of Europe is of the opinion that the 
practice of slaughtering animals without prior stunning is unacceptable under any 
circumstances.435 Dutch veterinarians point to an ethical dilemma for veterinarians 
who have to supervise religious slaughter. They see religious beliefs as dynamic 
and as allowing change in order to improve animal welfare.436 As long as slaughter 
without prior stunning is allowed under national or European legislation, the 
veterinarians recommend stipulating specific minimum requirements.
432 Gezondheids- en welzijnswet voor dieren III-44 (Animal Health and Welfare Act of 24 September 1992). 
Many other EU countries also allow slaughter without prior stunning for religious reasons (e.g. Germany, 
UK, Italy and Belgium). However, some countries do not allow slaughter without prior stunning (e.g. 
Sweden, Norway and New Zealand). Denmark, Finland and Austria do allow the killing of unstunned 
animals but require immediate post-cut stunning (Kijlstra and Lambooij 2008: 5-6; Ferrari and Bottoni 
2010: 10). Until 1975, the Dutch government was not prepared to make an exception for Islamic slaughter, 
as an explicit prohibition on stunning is not found in the Quran (Oosterwijk 1999: 111-112).
433 Until 2006, a declaration by the religious authority regarding the number of animals was required.
434 Besluit Ritueel Slachten 1996.
435 Federation of Veterinarians in Europe, ‘Slaughtering of animals without prior stunning’, FVE position 
paper FVE/02/104 (2002). Available at: http://www.fve.org.
436 KNMvD-standpunt over het onbedwelmd slachten van dieren, 15 March 2008.
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At the end of 2007, a motion in favour of a prohibition on slaughter without prior 
stunning was rejected by the Dutch parliament. Almost half the votes (68 of the 
150 votes) were in favour of such a prohibition. Freedom of religion was the 
most common reason for opposing the motion. A pending private member’s bill 
prescribing prior stunning in ritual slaughtering has gained a majority in Dutch 
Parliament in April 2011.437
The coming regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
provision of food information to consumers includes a provision that meat and meat 
products derived from animals that have not been stunned prior to slaughter (i.e. 
have been ritually slaughtered) should be labelled as such (‘Meat from slaughter 
without stunning’). This amendment was adopted by the European Parliament at 
first reading on 16 June 2010 (326 votes in favour, 270 against and 68 abstentions).438 
The objective of the provision of food information is to provide a basis for informed 
choices and safe use of food. This provision was not adopted by Coreper and the 
Council.439 In December 2010 Dutch Parliament accepted a similar resolution 
urging the government to provide for obligatory labelling of halal meat to enable 
free choice for consumers to avoid ritually slaughtered meat.440
12.6 Regulation of kosher food in the United States
In the United States, kosher certification and supervision is quite different from 
the situation in the Netherlands. The domestic kosher market is extensive. In 
the Northeast of the United States, nearly half of the products on supermarket 
shelves are certified kosher. In the United States, kosher food is also bought by 
many non-Jewish consumers, because they believe it to be healthier, natural and 
higher-quality food.441
The process of kosher supervision is very similar to kosher certification in the 
Netherlands. A food manufacturer initiates the supervision and certification process 
437 Bill from MP Thieme (Political Party for Animal Rights, Partij voor de Dieren) Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 
31 571. The majority was gained after the Labour party decided to support the bill in April 2011: http://
nu.pvda.nl/berichten/2011/04/PvdA-steunt-voorstel-voor-verplichte-verdoving-bij-rituele-slacht.html#.
438 See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0222&lan
guage=EN&ring=A7-2010-0109.
439 European Parliament, MEPs set out clearer and more consistent food labelling rules, Press release, 
16 June 2010. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20100615IPR76127; 
http://halalfocus.net/2010/12/08/world-halal-forum-europe-approves-eus-rejection-of-
amendment-205/. Jewish organisations lobbied against this obligatory labelling: ‘Shechita fears if 
European law changes’ (http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/32930/shechita-fears-if-european-
law-changes); http://halalfocus.net/2010/12/07/uk-a-cautious-welcome-from-shechita-uk-to-eu-
council%E2%80%99s-rejection-of-205/); ‘Kosher bosses welcome EU labelling decision’ (http:// www.
meatinfo.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/11958/Kosher_bosses_welcome_EU_labelling_decision.html).
440 Resolution of MP Graus (PVV), Kamerstukken II 2010/11 32 500 XIII, nr. 111. http://www.
tweedekamer.nl/images/07-12-2010_tcm118-215256.pdf, last visited 17 February 2011. 
441 Sullivan (1993: 201), Sigman (2004: 537, 544-545).
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(mostly in response to an appeal from consumers or a buyer). The certifier 
investigates the product, the production process and location based on a contract 
between certifier and manufacturer. The kosher supervision agency (KSA) will 
pay a qualified inspector to make continual visits. Sometimes a representative of 
the KSA is required to be present to monitor during production (e.g. in the case 
of matzo for Passover).
Unlike in the Netherlands, there are many competing KSAs in the United States. 
Four KSAs are estimated to certify 90% of kosher products. The largest KSAs are 
often non-profit organisations, such as the Kashruth Division of the Union of 
Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (OU). The organisations and individuals 
who supervise and certify kosher food are all Jewish.442 There are over 300 
registered kosher symbols used by KSAs in the United States.443 The legal status 
of these certification marks is that of a protected trademark. Kosher supervision 
agencies can be divided into three broad categories: the large organisations that 
dominate supervision of larger food companies, individual rabbis with standards 
beyond the normative Orthodox standard and individual rabbis who are more 
‘lenient’ (e.g. Conservative rabbis).444 Most KSAs do not work with a written 
document defining general standards for kosher certification.445
An even more important difference with the Netherlands is the involvement of 
state law and state enforcement in the United States. Many states have specific 
laws governing kosher food. Kosher food is a very attractive market, which creates 
a strong temptation to pass off non-kosher food as kosher. Federal and state 
governments have enacted laws to protect consumers from this fraud. In 1922, 
the state of New York passed the first state-wide kosher fraud law to protect 
consumers from non-kosher food sold as kosher. Many other states followed 
and issued a kosher fraud statute.446 The Orthodox Union was the main force 
behind the campaign to enact kosher fraud statutes.447 Most kosher fraud statutes 
operate in a similar fashion. They generally prohibit the advertisement or sale 
of food labelled ‘kosher’ unless it conforms to state-defined food preparation and 
handling requirements. In these laws, kosher is defined as ‘prepared or processed 
in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements’ or similar.448 Some 
of these statutes are part of the state criminal code, while others are part of state 
codes on public health, food regulation or commerce and trade. The penalty for 
442 Sigman (2004: 536).
443 Sigman (2004: 525). Some of the most important KSAs are: the Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America (OU, est. 1924), the Organized Kashrus Laboratories (OK, est. 1935), the 
Star-K Kosher Certification (est. 1947) and the KOF-K Kosher supervision (est. 1968).
444 Regenstein et al. (2003: 125).
445 Sigman (2004: 531-532).
446 Rosenthal (1997: 951, note 1) lists 23 kosher fraud statutes.
447 This was before the OU entered the kosher supervision and certification business. Sigman (2004: 552).
448 Gutman (1999: 2369); Sigman (2004: 553).
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violating these laws can be fines or even imprisonment.449 Some statutes vest the 
power to inspect compliance with the law in the attorney general, a commission 
or a special agency. States such as New York and New Jersey established a Bureau 
of Kosher Enforcement and employed rabbis to enforce compliance.450 In 2002, 
the Kosher Law Enforcement Division of the New York Department of Agriculture 
and Markets conducted 7,500 inspections in New York State to assure consumers 
that food products offered for sale as kosher were indeed kosher.451 The situation 
seems to be quite different now, as the division is facing cuts of more than 95% 
to its budget for staff and kosher food inspections.452
Based on his analysis of reputation-based non-legal sanctions, private law remedies 
and consumer protection laws, Sigman concludes: ‘There is no evidence that state 
kosher fraud enforcement plays a significant role in preventing wilful kosher 
fraud; nor is there evidence that enforcement addresses the problems facing 
kosher consumers today.’453
Kosher fraud statutes have been challenged in court for being unconstitutional. At 
first, the courts upheld the kosher statutes. But from 1992 onwards several courts 
invalidated kosher statutes for creating excessive state entanglement between 
church and state and advancing and inhibiting religion.454 Most of these court 
cases are initiated by kosher establishments or kosher certifiers, often after a state 
inspector had found violations whereas a supervising rabbi or kosher certifier claims 
that everything is in compliance with the Jewish laws of kashrut. Two elements 
have led the courts to decide that kosher fraud statutes are unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment: kosher is defined according to Orthodox standards and the 
relevant state or local governments employed a rabbi as state-appointed official. 
The court found that the statute required the state to take an official position on 
the interpretation of Jewish dietary laws and advance the Orthodox definition of 
kosher. In response to this decision, several states changed their laws into a kosher 
disclosure statute (e.g. New Jersey, New York and Georgia). For example, the new 
2010 Georgia Kosher Food Consumer Protection Act requires that ‘a person who 
449 Sigman (2004: 554); Gutman (1999: 2369, note 144).
450 Sigman (2004: 554). Division of Kosher Law Enforcement, New York State Department of Agriculture 
and Markets. See: http://www.agmkt.state.ny.us/kosher.
451 See: http://www.agmkt.state.ny.us/KO/KOHome.html.
452 See: http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/General+News/65637/Do-Not-Cripple-NYS-Kosher-
Law-Enforcement.html. New York State Kosher-Enforcement Division wiped clean. Available at 
http://newyork.grubstreet.com/2011/01/new_york_state_cuts_every_last.html; Restore kosher 
division, new N.Y. Gov. Cuomo urged (3 January 2011). Available at: http://jta.org/news/article-
print/2011/01/03/2742388/jewish_groups_call_on_ny_gov. 
453 Sigman (2004: 601).
454 Ran Dav’s County Kosher Inc v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992), Barghout v. Mayor of Baltimore, 66 
F.3d 1337, 1342-46 (4th Cir. 1995), Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
9576 (2nd Cir. June 21, 2002).
Ciesla (2010); Levenson (2001); Milne (2007); Popovsky (2010); Rosenthal (1997).
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makes a representation regarding kosher food shall prominently and conspicuously 
display on the premises on which the food is sold, in a location readily visible to 
the consumer, a completed kosher food disclosure statement…’.455 A kosher food 
disclosure statement shall state in the affirmative or negative whether the person 
operates under rabbinical or other kosher supervision, the name and address of 
the supervising rabbi, agency or other person and the frequency with which the 
supervising person visits the establishment. The statement shall state whether 
the person sells or serves only food represented as kosher, or both kosher and 
non-kosher food, and whether meat, dairy and pareve food is sold or served. The 
Georgia law covers many other issues on which information has to be disclosed, 
such as rabbinical or kosher supervision in the slaughterhouse, glatt kosher meat 
and the use of separate work areas and utensils for kosher and non-kosher food 
and for kosher meat, kosher dairy and kosher pareve food. In the case of violation 
of this law, the administrator or the court may issue a cease and desist order or 
a civil penalty.
New York State’s Kosher Law Protection Act 2004 requires producers and distributors 
of kosher food to ‘have registered with the department the name, current address 
and telephone number of the person certifying the food as kosher’.456 Special 
requirements are included for disclosure of information on the soaking and salting 
of kosher meat.
Only recently, some states also enacted a similar law for halal food.457 These laws 
often define halal as ‘prepared under and maintained in strict compliance with the 
laws and customs of the Islamic religion’ or ‘in accordance with Islamic religious 
requirements’.458 ‘Despite the widespread disagreement among and within Islamic 
‘schools of thought’ over halal food, various individual states in the United States 
have attempted to define, by legislative edict, this inherently religious term. 
The stated purpose behind such legislative definitions of halal is to prevent the 
fraudulent representation of food as being halal. The constitutionality of these 
government-enacted definitions of halal is uncertain.’459
12.7 Religious slaughter in the United States
Religious slaughter is an important part of kosher and halal requirements and 
needs permanent supervision by certifying agencies or religious authorities. The 
455 See: http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/pdf/hb1345.pdf.
456 See: http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us.
457 E.g. the Halal Food Consumer Protection Act New Jersey (2000). Available at: http://www.njleg.state.
nj.us/2000/Bills/a2000/1919_i1.htm. Also California (2005), Illinois (2005), Michigan (2005), Minnesota 
(2005) and Texas (2005). See Milne (2007: 63, note 9); Regenstein et al. (2003: 127).
458 Milne (2007: 71).
459 Milne (2007: 63).
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Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) stipulates that the slaughter of animals 
should be humane. In the Act, two methods are found to be humane:
1. when the animal is rendered insensible to pain by a gunshot or electrical, 
chemical or other means; or
2. when the slaughter takes place in accordance with the ritual requirements of 
the Jewish faith or any other religious faith.
Furthermore, the US Code contains the following clause: ‘nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to prohibit, abridge, or in any way hinder the religious freedom 
of any person or group…’.460 The inspectorate of the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) has only a minimal role in monitoring ritual slaughter. It is required to 
request written verification of slaughter methods from the religious official who 
has the authority over the enforcement of religious dietary requirements and to 
verify that animals are handled in a humane manner prior to the slaughter.461
Hodkin argues that if an animal is not stunned prior to slaughter and the kosher 
slaughter fails, the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act is violated. Hodkin advocates 
that USDA inspection personnel are well versed in the requirements of Jewish 
law to guarantee compliance with Humane Methods of Slaughter Act. She reached 
this conclusion after analysing a scandal about animals treated cruelly in a kosher 
slaughterhouse (video clips on YouTube and elsewhere generated protest).462
12.8 Comparative conclusions
In both the Netherlands and the United States, slaughter without prior stunning 
in accordance with religious requirements is permitted. The US regulations 
exclude religious slaughter from legal requirements by including a provision in 
the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act stating that slaughter in accordance with 
ritual requirements of a religious faith is humane. In the Netherlands, religious 
slaughter is subjected to more legal requirements, and compliance with these 
requirements is monitored and enforced by the Dutch Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority. These requirements do not extend to halal or kosher claims.
In the Netherlands, the certification of halal and kosher foods is left entirely 
to private actors. Halal and kosher certification is not regulated by public law, 
460 See: http://assembler.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode07/usc_sec_07_00001902----000-.html. 
See also Milne (2007).
461 Hodkin (2005: 146).
462 The animal rights group PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) has filed a complaint 
against Agriprocessors (one of the largest kosher slaughterhouses in the world) for abusing animals. See: 
http://www.peta.org/Automation/AlertItem.asp?id=1192; http://www.goveg.com/kosher.asp. PETA 
complaint against kosher slaughterhouse. Available at: http://www.jewfaq.org/peta.htm; Statement 
of rabbis and certifying agencies on recent publicity on kosher slaughter. Available at: http://www.
ou.org/other/5765/shichita2-65.htm. Agriprocessors is certified as kosher by the Orthodox Union. See 
also Gross (2005).
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and governmental agencies are not involved in monitoring and enforcing halal 
and kosher regulations. Halal certification in the Netherlands is dominated by 
commercial actors, verified by religious authorities. Kosher certification is executed 
mainly by the Chief Rabbinate of Holland, a religious actor.
In the United States, religious authorities dominate the kosher and halal certification 
industry. State laws and state enforcement agencies are in place to protect 
consumers of kosher or halal foods from misrepresentation. The current laws 
focus on public disclosure of information and trademark protection. Relics of the 
previous legitimation of Orthodox Jewish standards by state law and institutions 
can still be found. It is not clear how the new kosher disclosure acts are being 
enforced. The enforcement of these acts is the subject of new law suits.463
In the United States, which is a liberal market economy, one would expect to 
find minimal governmental interference in the kosher and halal industry. In the 
Netherlands, which is a corporatist welfare state, one would expect to find a high 
level of state involvement in the regulation of the kosher and halal industry.
The regulation of religious slaughter is in line with these expectations. In the 
United States, one finds loose regulation with only minimal requirements providing 
freedom for (religious) variation. In the Netherlands, one finds more detailed 
regulations with state inspectors and state veterinarians controlling compliance 
in slaughterhouses.
However, a comparison of halal and kosher certification in the two countries reveals 
a different pattern. Contrary to expectations, the regulation of kosher certification 
is more state-centred in the United States than in the Netherlands. Even after the 
constitutional challenges to the former kosher fraud statutes, many US states have 
laws to protect the halal or kosher logo. Several states also have a special kosher 
enforcement agency to inspect compliance with legal requirements. Conflicts over 
the interpretation and enforcement of kosher laws have resulted in a substantial 
amount of case law. Although the role of governmental institutions in regulating 
the kosher industry has been limited in the past decades, governmental agencies 
still play a significant role.
By contrast, halal and kosher certification has been left entirely to commercial 
and religious organisations in the Dutch corporatist welfare state. ‘Halal’ and 
‘kosher’ are not legally defined and protected designations. State authorities in 
463 Butchers file another lawsuit challenging NY State’s kosher certification authority. Long Island 
Business News, 4 March 2005. Available at: http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/1027321-1.html. New 
York – conservative rabbis fight orthodox kosher state laws, 30 July 2008. Available at: http://www.
vosizneias.com/post/read/18724/2008/07/30/new-york-conservative-rabbis-fight-orthodox-kosher-
state-laws/print/with-images.
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the Netherlands do not regard this as their task and avoid getting mixed up in 
religious matters.
This comparative conclusion raises questions concerning the protection of 
consumers in the Netherlands and the relationship between state and religion 
in the United States.
In the Netherlands, public law does not protect consumers from misrepresentation 
or fraud involving food sold as kosher or halal. Does this result in many stories of 
deception of Islamic and Jewish consumers? How do kosher and halal certificates 
succeed in establishing credibility without involvement of the state?
Focus groups of Jewish consumers in Amsterdam and five other European cities 
revealed that Jewish consumers rely on rabbinical supervision. Most participants 
said they themselves trusted all kosher certificates, but others only trust known 
stringent supervisors.464 However, halal consumers in Amsterdam and five other 
cities questioned the reliability of halal food labels and certificates. They believed 
that halal labels should be authenticated by trustworthy religious institutions 
and preferred more traditional and personal networks of supply such as butcher 
shops. The focus group participants in the Netherlands believed that their food 
supply chain was trustworthy.465
In 1999, a Muslim woman (of Pakistani origin) bought and consumed a halal veal 
snack (croquette) in Amsterdam. After she found out that the meat was from 
animals that had not been religiously slaughtered, she claimed damages against 
the manager of the snack bar. The manager, a Muslim woman of Moroccan origin, 
claimed the snack was halal, because it contained no pork. She had put stickers 
with the word ‘halal’ in Arabic on products not containing pork at the request 
of some Moroccan youths. The judge in the summary proceedings declined to 
decide what ‘halal’ meat is. The chain of snack bars did order the manager to 
remove the ‘halal’ stickers.466 This case illustrates the different interpretations 
of the concept of ‘halal’ ranging from ‘contains no pork’ to ‘contains no pork and 
animals are religiously slaughtered without prior stunning and citing the name 
of Allah’. It also illustrates that it can be hard for an observant Muslim consumer 
to know what food is allowed and what is not.
Recently, complaints have been reported about ‘unauthorised’ halal certificates 
and about organisations in the Netherlands and Germany issuing ‘fake halal 
464 Bergeaud-Blackler et al. (2010: 26-28).
465 Bergeaud-Blackler et al. (2010: 46-48). Similar observations in Bock and Wiersum (2003: 22), 
Bijzondere ontmoetingen over vlees (2002: 7-9) and Bonne and Verbeke (2006).
466 Rechter buigt zich over religieus gehalte van kroket. Het Parool, 1 September 1999; Geen straf voor 
foute kroketten. Het Parool, 11 September 1999; Halal-producenten wensen keurmerk voor rein voedsel. 
Trouw, 29 April 2000.
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certificates’.467 Van Waarden and Van Dalen found that all but one of their 
respondents from halal certifiers in the Netherlands agreed that the Dutch 
government should play a key role in the development of a national halal certificate 
in the Netherlands.468 Only the largest halal certifier did not agree, as they already 
regard themselves as the supreme Dutch halal authority. Most of the 11 firms 
that produced or sold halal foods that we interviewed, indicated to be in favour 
of more government involvement.469 The Islamic community in the Netherlands 
is said to have a need for a general halal hallmark, among other things because 
many products sold as halal are suspected of not really being halal.470
The Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) is reluctant to 
become involved in religious matters. They are not involved in controlling whether 
foods are halal (or kosher) but only monitor and enforce legal requirements 
(hygiene, mandatory labelling and food safety). The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture 
has adopted the recommendation of a consumer platform to strive for a single 
halal certificate in the Netherlands and to define ‘halal’ in law.471
The newly established European Association of Halal Certifiers (AHC-Europe) 
aims to bring order and unity to the halal food sector in Europe. One of the 
founders has stated that governments should take the necessary measures to force 
certifiers to operate in line with the rules defined by AHC-Europe.472 Currently, 
the Netherlands normalisation institute NEN explores the need of the market to 
be engaged in the development of a European Union halal standard.473
Van Waarden and Van Dalen conclude that governmental cooperation seems to 
be unavoidable and that a formal registration of the term ‘halal’ is required.474
467 De Volkskrant, 27 November 2009; see: http://halalfocus.net/2009/10/04/new-organization-to-sort-
out-rotten-apples-in-european-halal-food-market; Seada Nourhussen, Halal-label kan ook op ‘onrein’ 
toetje zitten. De Volkskrant, October 6 2003; Halal vlees blijkt vaak ‘onrein’. Het Parool, 16 February 2005; 
Vlees van varkens in kosjere en halal kip. Het Parool, 15 June 2003; J. Siebelink, 2007. Herrie om halal. 
Reportage moslims weten niet wat ze eten. See: http://www.halalpagina.nl/index.php?pagina=halal2.
468 Van Waarden and Van Dalen (2010).
469 Havinga and Gerards (2011: 16-17). However, respondents from firms that produced kosher products 
were not in favour of government involvement.
470 Smits and Van den Berg (2003: 32).
471 Smits and Van den Berg (2003), confirmed by telephone on 19 July 2010. No concrete measures have 
been taken so far. The Ministry of Agriculture expects European regulation on halal certification (or 
on certification more generally).
472 See: http://halalfocus.net/2009/10/04/new-organization-to-sort-out-rotten-apples-in-european-halal-
food-market.
473 The norm will be developed from the Austrian halal norm ONR 14200 ‘Halal food – Requirements 
for the food chain’, NEN organiseert halal-norm bijeenkomst. Available at: http://www.evmi.nl/
nieuws/marketing-sales/9389/nen-organiseert-halal-norm-bijeenkomst.html; http://www.nen.nl/web/
Normen-ontwikklen/Nieuwelopende-normtrajecten/Commissie-in-oprichting.htm. 
474 Van Waarden and Van Dalen (2010).
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The kashrut expert rabbi of the Chief Rabbinate of Holland recalls two cases of 
fraud in which a hechsher (seal of approval) was used without the product being 
supervised. The first case, involving canned mushrooms that carried the rabbinical 
hallmark but were produced without rabbinical supervision, was detected by the 
Israeli authorities. The Chief Rabbinate initiated summary proceedings before a civil 
court which found it in favour, while the manufacturer had to pay compensation. 
In the other case, which was settled, a pastry manufacturer agreed to pay the 
amount claimed by the lawyer. The Chief Rabbinate spokesman noted that it 
would have been impossible to take legal action against a person who wrongfully 
describes his product or site as kosher: ‘In the United States, when I say my product 
or premises are kosher, this should be on solid grounds: which rabbi declared it 
kosher, is this rabbi recognised and so on. The United States has a high penalty 
in such cases. Not in the Netherlands. Even calling a ham sandwich kosher is not 
an offence under Dutch law.’475
The involvement of state law, state enforcement officers and the court system 
in halal and kosher certification of food is a delicate issue, since it relates to 
the separation of state and religion and freedom of religion. The principle of 
the separation of state and religion implies that government should be neutral 
towards religious matters and not biased in favour of or against a particular faith. 
Derogating from a general legal provision implies that the situations and actions 
to which this exemption applies or does not apply need to be defined. Does the 
exemption only apply to religious slaughter according to Jewish rites or also to 
slaughter in accordance with Islamic law or other religions? An exemption is based 
on particular religious requirements. Does it allow slaughter without prior stunning 
in recognised slaughterhouses or are all Muslims allowed to slaughter an animal for 
the Feast of the Sacrifice? Dutch law implicitly assumes religious slaughter to be 
slaughter without prior stunning. In the United States, as Hodkin points out, state 
inspectors even have to decide whether slaughter is in compliance with detailed 
religious requirements when they want to enforce humane slaughter methods 
in a kosher slaughterhouse.476 This type of decision is difficult for governments, 
because it means that they have to intervene in religious matters or to rely on some 
religious authority to make the decision. This is particularly hard when there is 
no consensus within the religious community or when it generates resistance in 
the rest of the society. There is no univocal interpretation of ‘kosher’ within the 
Jewish community in the United States, and there is no univocal interpretation 
of ‘halal’ in the Islamic community in either the Netherlands or the United States. 
So far, Dutch law does not lay down what constitutes ‘halal’ or ‘kosher’ food. Many 
US states used to have laws that define kosher food according to Orthodox Jewish 
standards. This has resulted in entanglement between state and religion.
475 Information from the Chief Rabbinate of Holland provided to the author (9 July 2010).
476 Hodkin (2005).
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12.9 Explaining the different position of the government
How to explain the more state-centred regulation in the US compared to the 
Netherlands? Our findings resemble the findings of Boström and Klintman, who 
compare standardisation of organic food in the United States and Sweden.477 The 
organic food scene in the United States is characterised by many different regulatory 
schemes, which poses problems for consumers, producers, retailers and importers. 
The federal US government controls organic food standardisation, framing organic 
food as a marketing label. In Sweden, a well-reputed non-governmental organisation 
(KRAV) is allowed to audit organic production and ensure that EU regulations are 
being followed. Organic food is framed as an eco-label in Sweden. For Boström and 
Klintman, these different patterns of standardisation reflect traditional political, 
organisational and regulatory characteristics in the two countries. The open, 
consensus-building political culture in Sweden makes state and non-state actors 
willing to communicate, negotiate and search for pragmatic solutions. The political 
culture in the United States is more polarised, political authorities and organic 
actors are antagonistic, the general level of trust in the federal government is low 
and the government is willing to regulate (regulatory culture). In addition, the 
national organisational structure influences practices and debates. In Sweden, KRAV 
has an inclusive form of organisation that brings together all interest groups (with 
members from environmental NGOs, organic farmers’ organisations and organic 
food manufacturers). Such an inclusive organisational platform is lacking in the 
United States, which leads to polarised debates. Finally, the regulatory arrangement 
itself triggers conflict in the US case. The centralisation of the standardisation 
process leaves no space for an organic movement to set stricter standards of its 
own, because the federal government sets minimum and maximum requirements. 
In contrast, KRAV has gained legitimate status within the EU regulatory framework 
but at the same time also has its own stricter rules.
Can these factors also explain the different patterns in kosher and halal certification 
in the Netherlands and the United States?
First of all, political culture seems to be important. The debates and law suits on 
kosher laws and kosher certification in the US case show antagonistic relations 
between state, religious and commercial actors and also within the Jewish 
community. As in the case of organic food, governments are also willing to regulate 
kosher food. Even after the kosher fraud laws were found to be unconstitutional, 
the existing laws were replaced by new laws and enforcement agencies stayed 
in place. Consumer rights are particularly important in US political culture, and 
framing the issue as consumer protection has contributed to successful lobbying 
for kosher laws.
477 Boström and Klintman (2006).
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The traditional consensual political culture in the Netherlands makes the Dutch 
government reluctant to regulate an industry without consensus among all 
interested parties, as in the case of halal certification.
Comparative studies on environmental regulation show that the US government 
and the US public do not trust industry to comply with regulations without strict 
enforcement, whereas in the Netherlands and other European countries the 
government and the public do generally trust industry to comply with regulations 
and act responsibly.478 In this context, industrial self-regulation is supported widely 
in the Netherlands. However, this does not imply that government takes no part in 
the regulation of industry. Thus, the Dutch government and the European Union 
are involved in the certification of organic food, with EU law defining what may 
be labelled as ‘organic’. In addition, the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety 
Authority (VWA) inspects fast food outlets that claim to use healthy frying fat, 
although this is not a legal requirement but just a voluntary private regulation.479 
At the same time, however, the VWA does not inspect the deception of consumers 
by means of fake-halal certificates due to the lack of a legal requirement to do so. 
The difference between these two cases seems to be that the use of liquid frying 
fat is framed as a health issue, whereas halal is framed as a religious issue.
Secondly, national organisational structure also seems to be important in the 
case of halal and kosher certification. Kosher certification in the Netherlands is 
dominated by the Chief Rabbinate, which apparently manages to unite all Jewish 
voices (possible differences of opinion are not voiced externally). The situation in 
the Netherlands after the Second World War probably facilitated this (only a small 
Jewish population was left, united against a hostile environment). However, this 
is not the inclusive form of organisation of KRAV. In the United States, which has 
experienced Jewish immigration from different countries and lacks the centuries 
of rabbinical tradition found in Europe, the battles over supervision of Jewish 
dietary practice and over what is and is not kosher were particularly intense.480
In the world of halal certification in the Netherlands, a dominant or central 
organisation is lacking and many competing organisations strive for a share of the 
market. This is indicative of a situation in which migrants from many different 
countries with different food and religious traditions are not united in a single 
association. Initiatives to establish a national halal hallmark have failed so far.
478 Vogel (1986); Kagan (1990); Verweij (2000).
479 The ‘Verantwoord Frituren’ (Responsible Frying) campaign of the Dutch Catering Industry 
Association and the Public Information Office for Margarine, Fat and Oil. The VWA controls the use 
of liquid frying fat to protect consumers from deception. See: http://www.vwa.nl/onderwerpen/
levensmiddelen-food/dossier/frituurvet/wat-is-er-geregeld.
480 Epstein and Gang (2002).
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In the United States, Orthodox Jewish organisations have lobbied strongly for 
the establishment of kosher fraud laws. These laws and their public enforcement 
are particularly strong in US states with a large and powerful Jewish community 
(e.g. New Jersey and New York). Only recently, Muslim organisations have also 
lobbied for halal laws in the United States. To the best of my knowledge, the 
Jewish community in the Netherlands has not campaigned strongly for state 
regulation. Muslims in the Netherlands are not a powerful political group, being 
new migrants with internally mixed opinions. It is only recently that some Muslim 
organisations have advocated a leading role for the government in halal certification. 
Kosher food was never perceived as a social problem, and no claims were made 
on the government to take action. In contrast, halal food is currently associated 
with several ‘problems’, such as illegal slaughter, animal welfare in religious 
slaughter and unreliable halal certificates. Religious slaughter has successfully 
been framed as an animal welfare issue. At the same time, the political climate in 
the Netherlands is not in favour of Muslim immigrants, and animal rights groups 
have gained a strong position.
The position of religious groups and authorities in the state may also be important. 
Kosher certification arrangements fit into this pattern. The United States is a more 
religious country, while the Netherlands is more secular. The traditional system 
of pillarisation in the Netherlands (which has declined in recent years) implied 
that every faith had its own service organisations (with public funding) in such 
fields as broadcasting, hospitals and schools. These pillars were semi-autonomous, 
and the government was reluctant to interfere in their activities.
Goldstein concludes that a general principle that applied for centuries in the 
United States was that courts should avoid deciding religious questions. Since 1944, 
however, this principle has expanded into a seemingly absolute prohibition.481 
This shift may have contributed to the court decisions disabling kosher fraud 
laws as unconstitutional.
Thirdly, the regulatory arrangements around kosher food in the United States 
have reinforced the powerful position of Orthodox rabbis, excluding rabbis of 
non-orthodox groups from rabbinical supervision.
In conclusion, the different patterns in the regulation of kosher and halal foods 
in the United States and the Netherlands can be partly explained by a different 
division between the state and religion, the powerful Jewish political lobby in the 
United States in favour of state regulation, framing kosher and halal labelling as a 
consumer rights issue in the US and as a religious issue in the Netherlands, and 
the high level of trust in industry and self-regulation in the Netherlands.
481 Goldstein (2004: 316).
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13. Organic food
A private concept’s take-over by government and the 
continued leading role of the private sector
Hanspeter Schmidt
13.1 Introduction
On a first level of analysis it is clear, that today public law, not private rules, 
regulate organic food labelling in major markets (such as the market in the EU, 
the US or in Japan). Statutory regulation by government appears comprehensive, 
however, analysis on a second level, of private commercial practices, demonstrates, 
that it is a function of the private sector, to draw the clear line between products 
which can and those which cannot be sold as ‘organic’. It is the private and not 
the public sector, which developed rules, that force organic operators to avoid 
pesticide contamination of organic products by conventional agriculture.
This chapter presents two intertwined lines of argument. One is about the shifts 
in nature of organic norms between public and private. The second, making 
the other concrete, is about contamination of organic products with residues of 
pesticides and chemicals as perceived by public and private regulators.
13.2 ‘Bio’ and ‘Eco’ and ‘Regular’?
In July 2010 I asked the sales manager of a Dutch horticulture nursery what it 
means, when I read on his invoices to organic farmers in Germany the indication 
‘Bio’ next to the botanical name of seedlings. He said: ‘Here in Holland we have 
Normal, Bio, and we have Eco’. He continued to explain: ‘Bio means no pesticides 
and a clean substrate. Eco is with SKAL certification’. So it became clear, that he had 
supplied organic farmers with seedlings, which were ‘Bio’ as he defined it. And not 
certified by the Stichting Skal (NL-BIO-01) in Zwolle, which is the sole institution 
in the Netherlands, admitted by the authorities to certify organic production.
This player in the ‘Bio’ market was not aware of the rules: today no ‘Bio’ indication 
is permitted in the European Union for the marketing of food, feed, seeds and 
seedlings not certified in organic controls as required by two EU Regulations: 
Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 and Regulation (EC) No 889/2008. Thus, this manager 
was mistaken to believe that there is a ‘Bio’ for his products outside of the statutory 
EU organic food certification. He was required to seek the certification by SKAL for 
the product and for his company before he used the term ‘Bio’ for the marketing 
of herbal seedlings.h
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13.3 Comprehensive protection of organic terminology
There is no distinction between ‘Bio’ and ‘Eco’, since they (as well as ‘organic’) 
are statutorily defined as synonyms for all of the languages482 of the European 
Union.483 The same applies to ‘ökologische’ (Landwirtschaft) and ‘biologischer’ 
Landbau as attributes to farming in German language: these terms are synonyms to 
‘organic’ by statutory definition. However, not only these terms, but all indications 
suggesting the origin from organic agriculture, such as the trade mark ‘Biobronch’484 
or ‘Biogarde’485, trigger the full statutory program of the two EU Regulations. They 
encompass performance requirements, both for farming and food processing, and 
they require third party certification.
13.4 The friendly take-over by government in the 1990s
The concept of ‘organic food’ had been the private sector‘s original creation. It had 
defined two elements as distinctive: ‘organic’ products originate from ‘organic’ 
farming. And they undergo not more than merely ‘organic’ food processing.
In the 1970s organic farmers founded growers‘ associations and the International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) as their transnational 
roof organisation. The IFOAM Basic Standards for Organic Agriculture486 were 
published in 1980.
The Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 established organic labelling rules as statutory 
law directly applicable in all EU Member States first for plant and in 2000 also 
for animal products487. In the United States the National Food Production Act of 
1990488 provided for the basis for a National Organic Program congruent in many 
ways to the European development. Thus ‘organic food’ as a private marketing 
profile was subject to a friendly, but comprehensive take-over by government.489
482 European Court of Justice, 14.07.2005, C-107/04.
483 EU, 2007. Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and labelling 
of organic products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91. Official Journal of the European Union 
L 189, 20/7/2007, Article 23 (1). 
484 BVerfG, 30.01.2002, 1 BvR 1542/00, NJW 2002, 1486.
485 Landgericht Leipzig, 20.04.2004, 1 HK O 7140/03, GRUR-RR 2004, 337.
486 Current IFOAM Basic Standards for Organic Production and Processing (corrected version 2007) 
is available at: http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/standards/norms/norm_documents_library/IBS_
V3_20070817.pdf.
487 EU, 1991. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 of 24 June 1991 on organic production of agricultural 
products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of 
the European Union L 198, 22/07/1991: 1-15. Repealed by Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007.
488 US Government, 1990. Public law 101-624, Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act: Title 21 
Organic Foods Production Act.
489 A similar take-over by government occurred at the same time in the USA (Federal Organic Foods 
Production Act 1990).
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13.5 Contaminants
The absence of traces of pesticides was not introduced as a parameter of statutory 
distinction of conventional and organic food production. The considerations of 
Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 merely mentioned the possibility to later introduce 
‘provisions aimed at avoiding the presence of certain residues of synthetic chemicals 
from sources other than agriculture (environmental contamination) in the products 
obtained by such production methods’.
Provisions aimed at avoiding the presence of residues of synthetic chemicals 
from agricultural sources (contamination by drift from neighbouring conventional 
cultures) in organic products were not mentioned in 1991 nor were they introduced 
into the public law at a later date. Obligations to avoid agricultural pesticide 
contamination by conventional agriculture were never introduced: EU organic 
food law still does not require the minimisation of residues of synthetic chemicals 
from conventional agricultural sources (contamination by drift from neighbouring 
conventional cultures) into organic products.
13.6 2011: still the same concept
In 2007 the 1991 Regulation of the European Union was revised and split into two 
parts, but its concept and its language remained the same: ‘organic’ refers to the 
process of food production rather than product properties such as the absence of 
residues of agrochemicals. This splitting was to make more clear which parts of 
the organic rules were in the responsibility of the EU Commission (administration) 
and which in the realm of the EU Council (Member States). To make sense of the 
food regulations for producers, zigzag-reading is required.
Avoiding the presence of residues of synthetic chemicals from conventional 
agricultural sources has not been addressed in the revision process. The reason in 
2007 was probably, as it had been in 1991, that the EU Rules on organic agriculture 
were not to be amended in any manner, that would necessitate organic farmers 
to force their conventional neighbours to avoid spray drift in the application 
of synthetic pesticides in their cultures. Avoidance of rules in the EU Organic 
Production Law with respect to the avoidance of toxins introduced into organic 
food products from conventional agriculture serves to protect the interests of 
conventional agriculture. Some may say, that this makes life of organic farmers 
easy: they are not responsible for traces of synthetic pesticides in their products, 
but their conventional neighbours are responsible for this. Traces of synthetic 
pesticides in organic food products caused by conventional agriculture do not 
impair, in accordance to the rules of EU Public Law, the selling as organic. The 
second level of analysis will show, that private commerce cannot live with such 
a half-complete system, since its application could damage consumers’ trust in 
the integrity of organic food.
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The public law definition of organic food versus conventional products emphasises 
aspects of the production process, as it had been the case in the private rules of the 
1970s. Organic management measures are mentioned, for example the maintenance 
of soil fertility by the cultivation of legumes, green manures and multi-annual crop 
rotation. But the practical implementation of such active measures is a function 
of the farmer’s skills, climatic and soil conditions in the region, and other rather 
‘soft’ factors. There is no requirement to force conventional neighbours to avoid 
spray drift.
Also, any descriptive outline of organic management measures does not provide 
for a clear line of separation between organic and conventional food production. 
Practically efficient distinctiveness was achieved by the use of ‘positive lists’, that 
permit the use of a narrow catalogue of traditional plant protection substances, 
while all other are prohibited in organic agricultural production. The ‘positive lists’ 
remain the pivotal point of the EU law on organic food labelling. And it would 
blur the distinctiveness of organic agriculture to drop the concept of ‘positive lists’ 
for a system of ad-hoc decisions. It is the positive lists and their management by 
public statutory law, which ascertain that there remains nothing nebulous in the 
definition of ‘organic farming’ and its produce.
13.7 Positive lists for farming and processing
The organic farmers‘ associations imposed a full prohibition of plant protection 
products (synthetic pesticides) and (synthetic nitrogen) fertilisers combined with 
a scheme of selective authorisation by registration in a ‘positive list’.
Only very few off-farm substances were registered for these purposes, such as 
copper compounds (Bordeaux and Burgundy mixture) to control fungi on grapes 
and stone meal to repel insects. The separating line between ‘conventional’ and 
‘organic’ was thus drawn by general prohibition of agrochemical inputs and the 
cautious use of the positive listing mechanism. In the 2010 EU organic food law it is 
this scheme of general ban and selective admission, which draws the clear line.490
The ‘positive list’ determines organic food processing as well. The organic farmers’ 
associations required ‘organic’ food to come not only from organic farmers but 
from ‘organic processing’ where most additives or processing aids permitted and 
used in mainstream food processing are not used. This dual concept is the model 
of the EU organic food law today. The distinction of conventional and ‘organic’ 
food products is not only defined by positive lists for agricultural inputs but by a 
490 EU, 2008. Commission Regulation (EC) No 889/2008 of 5 September 2008 laying down detailed rules 
for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on organic production and labelling 
of organic products with regard to organic production, labelling and control. Official Journal of the 
European Union L 250, 18/9/2008, Annexes I, II, V to VII. 
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ban of additives and processing aids with a limited number permitted for organic 
processing by having been positive listed.491 Thus only about 1/5 of food additives 
used in conventional food processing are allowed for organic food.
Today it is the prohibition of radiation, GMOs and the ban on non-agriculture inputs 
with the selective permission of a limited number by positive listing which draws 
the sharp line between conventional and organic food production and processing.
13.8 The friendliness of the take-over
The organic farmers asked in the 1980s for the take-over by government. Their 
products were challenged in Germany as misleading labelling.492 Conventional 
competitors claimed, that the public perceives ‘organic’ as an indication of a 
‘pristine’ condition and as a guarantee for the absence of all traces of pollution. 
At the time German courts applied the prohibition of the use of synonyms of 
‘naturrein’ (nature pure) rather broadly and it was not clear how ‘organic’ label claims 
would fair in the German courts when challenged by conventional competitors.
The European IFOAM members asked the European Commission to use its 
competence for legislative initiative to define organic labelling requirements by 
statutory law. The interest on the Commission’s side was to legally define an 
alternative form of agriculture as a basis for selective support by agricultural 
subsidies.
13.9 Take-over of norms, but not of controls
Take-over by government however stopped on the normative side. The set-up of 
organic certification was left to the Member States and they were given the choice 
of implementing organic certification by private bodies or public authorities or a 
mix of both. In 1991, most, with the exception of Denmark, opted for private bodies. 
While organic certification had been executed within the framework of the organic 
farmer associations, now independent organisational units were established.493
The question, whether organic certification is a governmental task or a private 
function has remained a rather controversial or blurred issue in some of the 
Member States. The European Court of Justice held organic certification not to 
be one of the activities which are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise 
491 In Annex VIII of Regulation (EC) No 889/2008.
492 Max Forstmann, Sind Bezeichnungen wie ‘Bioland’, ‘Biodyn’, ‘biologisch-dynamisch’, ‘auf 
Spritzmittelfreiheit geprüft’, ‘biologisch kontrolliert’ unzulässige Angaben im Sinne des § 17 Abs. 1 Ziff. 
4 oder § 17 Abs. 1 Ziff. 5 LMBG, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht 1985, 16 ff.
493 As prescribed by the ‘<WWP>General requirements for bodies operating product certification 
systems’ (ISO/IEC Guide 65:1996 = EN 45011:1998), available at: http://www.beuth.de/langanzeige/
DIN+EN+45011/3357759.html.
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of official authority.494 The Advocate General of the EU Court had argued, that 
the system put in place by the Regulation is one in which, essentially, the private 
inspection bodies operate a product certification system under the supervision 
of a public authority.495 The German Federal Administrative Court claimed, that 
clearly, organic certification is a governmental function (Staatsaufgabe).496
Other German courts believe, that organic certification by private inspection bodies 
does not lead to a decision of a particular case (such as a German ‘Verwaltungsakt’). 
Organic certification is here understood to have no binding quality. It is meant to 
be open to cancellation with no regard to the narrow circumstances prescribed by 
the national law on administrative procedures for the cancellation of administrative 
acts.497 This legal opinion perceives organic certification as a non-binding expert 
assessment. This leads to uncertainty with respect to the status of a product as 
organic. All this is not in line with requirements of procedural fairness and due 
process. And thus the protection of property rights is not well balanced with the 
rightful target to remove products of doubtful origin from the organic market.
The issue, whether organic certification should become a part of the regular public 
food inspection was quite controversial, when Regulation (EC) No. 2092/91 was 
revised. The text of Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 repeats now many sentences 
of the Food Inspection Regulation (EC) No. 882/2004. The idea was to convey, 
that the rules laid down in these sentences shall apply to organic certification, 
while the issue, whether organic certification shall be regarded as an integral part 
of the public food inspection in the Member States is left undecided on the level 
of the Union, to be decided by the Member States in their national legal order.
Germany has decided in its federal statute (Ökolandbaugesetz), that private organic 
certifiers are entrusted with the implementation of organic inspection. On the 
federal level this allocation of responsibility is, however, limited to implementation 
measures which are not ‘administrative procedures’ (Verwaltungsverfahren).
Administrative procedures are defined by German law as those, which lead to 
administrative decisions. Administrative decisions are those, which decide a 
particular case in the field of public law. Whether organic certification is an 
administrative act is thus still open to a quite controversial discussion.
In Germany it is the Federal Agency (Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und 
Ernährung), which admits private organic certifiers to practice, but it is in the realm 
of the sixteen German States (Bundesländer) to decide, whether they treat private 
494 At that time Articles 45, 49, and 55 EC Treaty.
495 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 12 July 2007 in Case C-393/05, Commission v. 
Austria, and Case C-404/05, Commission v. Germany.
496 Bundesverwaltungericht, 13.06.2006, 3 BN 1/06.
497 Oberverwaltungsgericht Lüneburg, 10.06.2008, 13 ME 80/08.
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organic certifiers as assistants to the public administration (Verwaltungshelfer) 
or as bodies entrusted with official functions of the administration (Beliehene).
Twenty years after the friendly take-over of the normative standards of organic 
food products the relationship between public food inspection and private organic 
certification remains widely unclear. In Germany numerous cases are pending 
in the administrative court system, comprising issues such as whether the States 
may limit their liability for wrong-doings of private organic certifiers. Or whether 
government is restricted to a supervision of private organic certifiers which is 
bound by the law or, the alternative concept, whether government may supervise 
the organic certifiers guided by considerations of societal opportunity.
There is a comprehensive lack of clarity whether it is the civil or the administrative 
courts which control acts of private organic certifiers and consequently a lack of 
effective judicial review of decisions taken in the complex interwoven activities 
of private inspection bodies and supervising public authorities.
13.10 Toxins from non-regulated sources
The EU organic food law remains silent on drift from neighbouring conventional 
productions. And silent on the application of pesticides not as plant protection 
products (on the plants or their harvested products) but (as biocides) to control 
pests in storage facilities, containers, trucks or ships before they are used for 
organic produce, risking they may leave traces.
While Regulation (EC) No 889/2008 requires a management of the storage 
of products, that avoids contamination by products and/or substances not in 
compliance with the organic production rules,498 there are no positive lists for 
the use of biocides for pest control in empty facilities.
When, for example, organic durum products (wheat) arrives in 2011 with traces 
of pirimiphos-methyl in Germany from Mediterranean production regions the 
seller is likely to justify this with drift or the permitted use to sanitise facilities 
before their use for organic goods. Consequently the seller is likely to argue, that 
any traces of pirimiphos-methyl lower than the threshold under public law for 
conventional durum, will not impair the possibility to sell the product as ‘organic’.
13.11 BNN orientation values
It is the private regulations of organic associations which deal with these sources 
of contamination in requiring minimisation and suitable measures of quality 
improvement. The German Federal Association for Natural Foods and Products of 
498 Articles 35 (1), 63 (1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 889/2009.
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Traders and Processors (Bundesverband Naturkost Naturwaren – BNN) published 
orientation values as a practical means of dealing with traces of active toxic 
substances in organic products.499
The General Organic Buying Conditions of major EU organic food companies 
refer to the BNN Orientation Values (Orientierungswerte). These have first been 
published in 2001. They are indicators for the assessment of whether small amounts 
of synthetic plant protection agents or preservatives point to their prohibited 
active use. In practice BNN members pledge to trade only those goods as organic 
that do not exceed the BNN Orientation Values.
In the EU market organic food companies (BNN members or not, and not only 
those which process infant formulae products) use the BNN Orientation Values 
‘as a sample or model’ for the contractually required product qualities (in the 
sense of Article 35 (2)(b) CISG 1980500).
The BNN Orientation Value for each pesticide agent is 0.010 mg/kg. For processed 
products that are diluted or concentrated during processing (by dehydration, 
extraction, pressing or other processes), the analytical result must be converted to 
reflect the original fresh product. If there is evidence of post-harvest contamination 
by harvest protection agents, or mixing with non-organic produce, conversion of 
results by calculation back to the original product is not permitted. The exceeding 
of a total of two pesticide agents is not allowed.
The BNN Orientation Values serve ‘to distinguish between such trace quantities of 
residue resulting from contamination, and excessively high quantities of residue 
requiring investigation’. The BNN orientation value is perceived as ‘a practical and 
helpful decision-making support mechanism’. Where the BNN orientation value 
quantities are exceeded, the requirement arises to investigate the origins of the 
residue and whether the statutory norms on organic production were complied 
with. This is explained not to ‘impact the fundamental concept that organic foods 
and products are defined by their cultivation and not by their residual substance 
quantities’.
The BNN Orientation Values of 2001 developed in a decade to the gold standard 
of trade with organic commodities and thus closed a logical and practical gap in 
organic production requirements.
499 See http://www.n-bnn.de/html/img/pool/Orientierungswert_EN_0906.pdf?sid=7c5ed2ee9ec 
528d1f0d8bee9324c44d6.
500 United Nations Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
Private food law 297 
Organic food
13.12 Pesticide traces as misleading labelling
In 2003 a less differentiated approach of one of the advisory services in the 
General German food inspection (‘Edelhäuser Proposition’ by CVUA Stuttgart) 
suggested to consider organic label claims on products with detectable traces of 
plant protection products beyond 0.01 mg/kg as misleading labelling and therefore 
as per se prohibited. The organic grower associations in Germany considered 
this concept of disregard of particular circumstances a reopening of the ‘battle of 
ideologies and cultures inherent in the completion’ of organic and conventional 
agriculture as they had experienced it in the 1980s.501 Today the positions have 
become quite close: the authorities agree with a case-to-case review of the causes 
of pesticide traces in organic food products. All sides agree, that organic products 
are rightfully expected to show very low traces. In particular traces much lower 
than those in conventional products.
Reports on the Organic Monitoring Program of Baden-Württemberg are published 
annually on the Internet. In 2008, as in preceding years, organic fruit and vegetable 
samples were found to differ significantly from conventional samples regarding 
residues of synthetically produced pesticides, both in frequency of their occurrence 
and the total amount found:
‘In most of the organic samples no detectable residues of plant protection 
products were found. In the few cases where residues were detected, they 
mainly involved one active substance at trace level (below 0.01 mg/kg), thus, 
far below the usual concentrations, which come about in plant products after 
pesticide treatment. (…) The overall average amount of pesticides detected 
in the analysed fruit samples labelled as organically grown was 0.004 mg/kg. 
If those samples, where it was suspected that the product was not organically 
grown or a blend with conventionally grown fruit may have occurred, are 
omitted in the calculation, the overall average pesticide amount results to 
low 0.001 mg/kg. In contrast, conventionally grown fruits contained on the 
overall average 0.44 mg/kg pesticides’.502
A factor of 100 thus divides the average pesticide trace level in organic foods 
from conventional products. This is one of the aspects which make organic food 
attractive to consumers. Many of them doubt that testing of pesticide chemicals 
reliably accounts for hormone effects and other less obvious paths of damages 
to human health.
501 See: http://www.bvl.bund.de/DE/07__DasBundesamt/05__Veranstaltungen/00__doks__ 
downloads/symposium__2010__vortrag__edelhaeuser,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/
symposium_2010_vortrag_edelhaeuser.pdf.
502 See: http://oekomonitoring.cvuas.de/english.html.
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13.13 The statutory role of doubt
BNN Orientation Values are applied in the EU organic industry as pre-emptive 
expert witness assessments. When these values are exceeded, doubts with respect 
to the organic origin of the produce arise. This doubt triggers a mandatory review 
of the circumstances of the particular case. In the course of this review organic 
marketing is stopped. Here the private BNN values interact with the procedural 
rules of the statutory law in a quite particular manner.
Regulation (EC) No 889/2008 prescribes ‘Measures in case of suspicion of 
infringements and irregularities’503: ‘Where an operator ... suspects that a product 
is not in compliance with organic production rules, he shall ... withdraw from 
this product any reference to the organic production method ... . He may only 
put it ... on the market after elimination of that doubt, ... . In case of such doubt, 
the operator shall immediately inform the control body or authority. The control 
authority or control body may require that the product cannot be placed on the 
market ... until it is satisfied, by the information received from the operator or 
from other sources, that the doubt has been eliminated’.
This statutory prescription of a mandatory self-suspension of the marketing of 
certified organic food products as organic in cases where any doubts arise, is 
triggered when the BNN Orientation Values are exceeded. The CVUA Reports on 
the considerable gap of pesticide residue levels between organic and conventional 
products render the BNN Orientation Values a convincing expert documentation 
of what residue patterns may and may not be expected in organic food products.
The assessment of a specific organic production may, however, demonstrate the 
causation of traces beyond the BNN values by particular circumstances such as 
the unavoidable impact due to the excessive use of agro-chemicals by conventional 
farmers in the region of origin.
13.14  Conclusion on the role of private organic food 
regulation
Organic Foods are a success story of private regulation. The past shows a practically 
full and comprehensive take-over of private rules by the government. In its origins 
this take-over was friendly. Presently some swift and decisive measures to protect 
the integrity of organic products are required. Any unregulated influx of toxins 
into organic foods contradicts consumers’ rightful expectations. Where the public 
organic food law lacks stringent measures, these are in trade practice imposed 
by private rules. Such as the BNN Orientation Values.
503 Article 91 (1) of Regulation (EC) No. 889/2008.
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For the future the private organic sector is likely to regulate open issues, such as 
toxins from conventional agriculture, from nano materials, and from packaging.
Thus innovation in the protection of organic food integrity remains a pivotal 
function of the private sector.
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pdf.
US Government, 1990. Public law 101-624, Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act.
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14. Food online
Reconnaissance into a consumer protection no-man’s 
land between food law and the Civil Code
Lomme van der Veer504
14.1 Introduction
The concept of distance contract, defined as a contract entered into by parties 
who did not physically come together for this purpose, has a long history. In 1744, 
Benjamin Franklin published a catalogue in colonial North America from which 
readers could order scientific books through mail; the first mail-order delivery 
firm was born.
Apparently, Franklin thought that an agreement that was entered into without 
the parties being physically near one another entailed risks for purchasers, and 
they had to be protected from the possibility that the supplier’s anonymity would 
make it possible for him/her not to fulfil his/her obligations. Franklin included 
a warranty in the catalogue: ‘Those persons who live remote, by sending their 
orders and money to B. Franklin may depend on the same justice as if present’. 
The catalogue constituted the origination of the first mail-order delivery firm as 
well as the initial rights for the benefit of distance buyers.
A few centuries later, the Pony Express had developed into an extremely efficient 
and refined global system of mail delivery. The paper catalogue, however, is on 
the wane because the internet has enabled sellers to present their goods in a shop 
along the digital highway. The purchase agreements entered into in these shops are 
distance contracts, the same as Franklin entered into. But the technology is new.
As always, legislators follow the technology. Legislators, both European and 
national, believe that, with the introduction of web shops, a new situation has 
emerged in legal traffic which deviates from what already existed to such an extent 
that modification of the law is required. So legislators apply imperative rules of law 
to intervene in the contractual relationship between distance sellers and buyers.
The new technology has resulted in the expansion of the world of distance buying 
to foodstuffs. In the shadow of the turbulence of food safety crises and related 
modernisation of public and private food laws, a silent modernisation of the food 
market is taking place. Suppliers of ‘food online’ create their very own private 
rules, which must steer a middle course between the Scylla of the new legislation 
504 This chapter is written in the context of his PhD research with the Law and Governance Group at 
Wageningen University.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
302 Private food law
Chapter 14
under private law for the way of contracting and the Caribdis of the public food 
law for the nature of the product. This chapter envisages mapping out the passage. 
The analysis is executed within the context of Dutch civil law.
In this book about private food law, emphasis lays on the way in which contracting 
parties mutually bind each other to private standards. This contribution considers 
whether, in the case of a distance contract, civil law legislation contributes to the 
food law objectives of food safety and food security. An ever-increasing amount 
of food is entering physical kitchens via digital supermarkets.
14.2 The distance contract, buying food online
Most considerations of the European Parliament and Council for Directive 
97/7/EC505 regarding distance contracts do not in any way consider the element 
that distinguishes transactions via the Internet from Franklin’s ‘mail-delivery 
transactions’: digital technology. This is different in the following considerations 
regarding the provision of information and privacy. The nature of the technology 
plays a role here:
(13) Whereas information disseminated by certain electronic technologies 
is often ephemeral in nature insofar as it is not received on a permanent 
medium; whereas the consumer must therefore receive written notice in good 
time of the information necessary for proper performance of the contract;
(17) Whereas the principles set out in Articles 8 and 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
of 4 November 1950 apply; whereas the consumer’s right to privacy, 
particularly as regards freedom from certain particularly intrusive means 
of communication, should be recognised; whereas specific limits on the use 
of such means should therefore be stipulated; whereas Member States should 
take appropriate measures to protect effectively those consumers, who do 
not wish to be contacted through certain means of communication, against 
such contacts, without prejudice to the particular safeguards available to 
the consumer under Community legislation concerning the protection of 
personal data and privacy;
The European Union is not the only entity with the desire to act in a regulatory 
manner; Member States also desire this. A motive for the Directive was found in 
the already existing and mutually differing national rules for distance contracts 
in the Member States. The Directive intends to remove the detrimental effects 
505 EU, 1997. Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts - Statement by the Council and the Parliament 
re Article 6 (1) - Statement by the Commission re Article 3 (1), first indent. Official Journal of the 
European Union L 144, 4/6/1997: 19-27.
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arising from this for the competition between businesses in the internal market 
by implementing a minimum of common rules on a Community level.
(4) Whereas the introduction of new technologies is increasing the number 
of ways for consumers to obtain information about offers anywhere in the 
Community and to place orders; whereas some Member States have already 
taken different or diverging measures to protect consumers in respect of 
distance selling, which has had a detrimental effect on competition between 
businesses in the internal market; whereas it is therefore necessary to 
introduce at Community level a minimum set of common rules in this area;
In the explanatory memorandum to Dutch regulations for the ‘Adjustment of Book 
7 of the Civil Code to Directive 97/7/EG of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of the European Union of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers 
in respect of distance contracts’, this is formulated as follows:
Firstly, some Member States had taken various measures with a view to 
the protection of consumers in respect of distance selling, with detrimental 
effects on the competition between the businesses in the internal market, 
while for consumers cross-border distance selling could be one of the main 
tangible results of the completion of the internal market (considerations 3 
and 4.). Secondly, the Council Resolution of 14 April 1975 (PbEG C 92) is 
mentioned where the need to protect consumers from demands for payment 
for unsolicited goods and from high-pressure selling methods (consideration 5) 
is highlighted. Furthermore, the use of technology for distance communication 
must not lead to a reduction in the information provided to the consumer 
or to the provision of ephemeral (not recorded on a permanent data carrier) 
information (considerations 11 and 13). It is also important for consumers to 
actually see the product or ascertain the nature of the service before entering 
into the contract (consideration 14).
Finally it is pointed out that the consumer’s right to protection of his/her 
privacy should be recognised, particularly as regards freedom from certain 
particularly intrusive means of communication (consideration 17).
Since 1 February 2001, the Dutch ‘distance contracts’ (Civil Code, book 7, title 1, 
part 9A. Articles 7:46a up to and including 46j)506 is prevailing law.
It is thus the nature and manner in which contracting parties relate, based on 
which legislators judge that consumers require mandatory protection in addition 
to general contract law. It is not the object of the agreement, the merchandise, 
but instead the technology used in the offer and the technology used in the 
506 Civil Code (or Dutch: Burgerlijk Wetboek) will be abbreviated as CC in the text. 
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acceptance of the offer that requires modification. There are additional rules in 
the traffic with consumers on the digital highway.
We consider these additional rules as laid down by the Dutch legislator in part 
9A of book 7 CC to be relevant in this scheme.
Article 46a
In this part, the following words have the following meanings:
a. distance contracts: a contract for which, within the framework of a system 
organised by the seller or service provider for the purpose of distance selling or 
service provision, up to and including the conclusion of the contract, exclusive 
use is made of one or more technologies for distance communication;
b. distance buying: the distance contract which is a consumer purchase;
(…)
e. technology for distance communication: a means that can be used without 
simultaneous personal presence of parties for entering the distance contract.
(…)
g. Directive 97/7/EG: by the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union of 20 May regarding the protection of consumers in respect 
of distance contracts (PbEG L 144);
(…)
The legislator has designed things in such a way that ‘distance purchasing’ is a 
subset of the distance contract, where, in addition to the nature of the contract – 
it is after all a purchase agreement – characteristics of the parties involved have 
been laid down in the contract. After all, a consumer purchase involves a seller 
who acts within the execution of a profession or business and a buyer, a natural 
person, who does not act within the execution of a profession or business as parties.
Article 46b
1. (…).
2. This part does not apply to distance purchasing:
a. concluded by means of automatic vending machines or automated 
commercial premises;
b. concluded at an auction.
3. Articles 46c-46e and 46f, paragraph 1 do not apply to the distance purchasing 
of mainly foodstuffs supplied to the home of the buyers, to his/her residence 
or to his/her workplace by regular roundsmen.
The question of what exactly is meant by vending machines and automated 
commercial premises arises. Coffee, beverage and sweets vending machines – there 
are even fruit machines that supply actual fruit – must be considered as vending 
machines. In the case of an automated commercial premises, people probably 
think of ‘a wall’ in which people deposit money and pull out foodstuffs from 
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behind a hatch. Although these machines can hardly be considered a ‘technology 
for distance communication’ as defined in Article 7:46a, a. CC, the legislator has 
apparently intended to do good by excluding this form of selling with technical tools.
It is also relevant to know whether it is only the baker and milkman who are 
meant by ‘regular roundsmen’, i.e. the suppliers who deliver with some frequency 
at set times. You may also see the occasional cheese and ice cream vendors in 
rural areas. Apparently, the legislator has considered the possibility of the buyer 
and seller not meeting near or in the vending car, but that instead the seller 
delivers orders to a private address based on a note or e-mail. The difference 
between the frequent and punctual roundsman to whom the rule of the distance 
purchase does not apply, and the roundsman who delivers at the buyer based 
on an order from a web shop or buyer, thus lies in the frequency and regularity 
of deliveries. This difference would be minimised if the buyer frequently orders 
from a web shop at set times, and the web shop delivers just as frequently and at 
set times. The intended distinction is that of the supplier who follows the usual 
route, contrary to a roundsman who comes by on the occasion of an order. This 
leads to the curious conclusion that if the sales contract is initiated by the seller, 
the protective measures of the distance purchase do not apply, and do apply in 
those cases in which the initiative is taken by the purchaser.
Article 46c deals with the provision of information to which the seller is obliged 
with distance purchases. Contrary to the conformity requirement to be discussed 
later, this is not mainly about information about the product. As regards the 
product, only the main characteristics of the item must be named. Usually, this 
involves information about prices, costs and the seller.
Article 46c
1.  In good time prior to the conclusion of a distance purchase, the other party 
shall be provided with the following information using means adapted to 
distance communication technologies, of which the commercial purpose 
must explicitly be made clear:
a.  the identity of the seller, and, if the distance purchase requires (part) 
advance payment, the seller’s address;
b.  the most important characteristics of the item;
c. the price of the item, including any taxes;
d.  the costs of delivery, insofar as this applies;
e.  the manner of payment, delivery or execution of the distance purchase;
f.   the possible application of the option for dissolution in accordance 
with articles 46d, paragraph 1 and 46e;
g.   if the costs for the use of distance communication are calculated on 
any basis other than the basic rate: the amount of the applicable rate;
h.   the period for the acceptance of the offer, or the period for the 
fulfilment of the price;
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i.   where appropriate, in the case of a distance purchase which serves 
to permanent or periodic delivery of items: the minimum duration 
of the contract.
Pursuant to Article 46c, paragraph 1, the seller is obliged to provide the information 
meant ‘in good time prior to entering into a distance purchase’. The legislator has 
thus not stipulated to make the information available to the purchaser ‘prior to or 
while entering into the contract’, in accordance with the system as formulated in 
Article 6:234, paragraph 1a CC regarding the applicability of general terms and 
conditions. This difference could be interpreted in wording, but it may also be 
that the difference is to be explained by causes less relevant for the meaning.
Paragraph 2 of Article 46c deals with the way and time at which information is 
to be provided in the execution insofar as this is not already the case based on 
paragraph 1.
2.  In good time during the execution of the distance purchase and, as far 
as this does not concern items to be supplied to third parties, not later 
than the time of delivery, the buyer must be provided with the following 
information in a clear and comprehensible manner in writing, or insofar 
as the information under a and c-e are concerned, in another durable 
medium available and accessible to him/her, unless this information has 
already been provided prior to entering into the distance sale:
a. the information meant in part a-f of paragraph 1;
b.  the requirements for exercising the right of dissolution in accordance 
with articles 46d, paragraph 1 and 46e, paragraph 2;
c.   the visiting address of the place of business of the seller to which the 
buyer can submit complaints;
d.   insofar as applicable; information concerning the warranty and the 
services offered within the framework of the distance purchase;
e.   if the distance sale has a duration exceeding one year or an indefinite 
duration: the requirements for dissolution of the contract.
In addition to a general termination option for seven days after receiving an item, 
the arrangement for the distance sale has an extended period in which dissolution 
is an option if the provisions are not fulfilled as laid down in Article 46c.
Article 46d
1.   During a period of seven working days after receiving an item, the buyer 
is entitled to dissolve the distance purchase without stating the reasons. 
If all requirements of Article 46c, paragraph 2 are not met, this term is 
three months. The first sentence applies accordingly as from the moment 
all requirements of Article 46c, paragraph 2 have been met within the 
period meant in the second sentence.
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2.   In the case of dissolution pursuant to paragraph 1, the seller cannot charge 
compensation from the buyer, except for the direct costs for returning 
the item.
3.   In the case of a dissolution pursuant to paragraph 1, the buyer is entitled to 
the free refund of what he/she has paid to the seller. The reimbursement 
shall be carried out as soon as possible and in any case within thirty days 
after the dissolution.
4.  Paragraphs 1-3 do not apply to the distance purchase:
a.  in the case of items of which the price is bound to fluctuations in the 
financial market over which the seller has no control;
b.   in the case of items that:
1.  have been produced according to the buyer’s specifications;
2.  are clearly personal;
3.  cannot be returned by reason of their nature;
4.  are susceptible to rapid decay or ageing;
c.  of audio and video recordings and computer software if the buyer 
has broken the seal;
d. of newspapers and magazines.
Despite the fact that the arrangement for distance purchasing applies unimpaired 
to the distance purchasing of foodstuffs, the exception as formulated in Article 
46d, paragraph 4, under b, 3rd and 4th appears to result in that a violation of the 
provisions in Article 46c, paragraph 2 remains without any threat for dissolution 
for many foodstuffs. After all, it must be stated of many foodstuffs that, because 
of their nature, they cannot be returned, or that they may decay or age rapidly.
In early 2008, the European Commission published a proposal for a Directive 
regarding consumer rights.507 In this Directive, the exceptions to the right to revoke 
are somewhat extended. Deliveries of wine if the delivery takes place after thirty 
days and agreements concluded in a sale by auction were added.
For the time being, it must be established that the legislator intends to provide 
consumers in distance selling with additional protection by ordering the provision of 
information which is not aimed at the product as much, but instead at the supplier 
and the costs involved in the contract; after all, Article 7:46c, paragraph 1b CC 
provides only the marginal order to state ‘the most important characteristics of the 
item’. It must also be established that the violation of this limited obligation will 
regularly fail to lead to the option to avail of the dissolution options as formulated 
in Article 7:46d relating to the exceptions as presented in paragraph 4.
507 EU, 2008. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council regarding consumer 
rights, Brussels, 8 October 2008, COM (2008) 614 def. 2008/0196 (COD).
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In relation to the fact that consumers are not in the physical vicinity of the article 
to be purchased in the distance purchasing, the legislator has provided him/her 
with ample opportunity without putting forward arguments to dissolve the contract 
during a period in which s/he has been in the physical vicinity of the product. 
This is impossible in the case of foodstuffs that can decay or age rapidly. The 
provision of information about products prior to the purchase is thus of significant 
importance in the case of foodstuffs.
14.3 Information and expectations about the product
Where foodstuffs are concerned, the European and national legislators attach 
sufficient importance to proper information about products that the provision of 
information on foodstuffs is regulated in a special way. Directive 2000/13/EC508 
orders Member States to harmonise legislation where labelling is concerned, 
which in the Netherlands was realised through the Food Labelling Decree. The 
Netherlands has entirely included the Directive into national legislation, so if the 
labelling of foodstuffs complies with the provisions of the Food Labelling Decree, 
these foodstuffs can be traded freely in other European Union Member States, 
provided that the indications and notifications on the packaging are stated in the 
language of the country where the foodstuff is marketed.
In distance contracts, the merchandise is presented in a digital display case. A 
brief study shows that foodstuffs are hardly ever displayed in such a way that the 
label is legible, and the accompanying text hardly ever provides the information 
prescribed by labelling law.
The buyer cannot examine the label prior to or during the purchase and is therefore 
unable to base his/her expectations on this. Subject of further research could 
be whether legislators of the directive and decree intended to have buyers take 
cognizance of the label prior to or during the purchase, or prior to or during 
consumption.509 If the outcome is that the law orders that buyers must be able to 
take cognizance of the label prior to the purchase, almost every Internet foodstuff 
provider will be forced to modify their website. In addition, the texts on labels 
508 EU, 2000. Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising 
of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union L 109, 6/5/2000: 29-42. 
509 A strong indication in the direction of the former – though postdating current food labelling law 
and not entirely unambiguous in its wording – is Article 8(1) of the General Food Law (Regulation (EC) 
178/2002) setting as objective for food law to enable consumers to make informed choices (‘Food law 
shall aim at the protection of the interests of consumers and shall provide a basis for consumers to make 
informed choices in relation to the foods they consume…’). EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures 
in matters of food safety. Official Journal of the European Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24. 
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must be legible in all of the languages of the Member States from which people 
can buy digital products in the web shop.
Questions that require elaboration within this framework not only see to the 
readability of labels, but also whether labels can be exemplary or that people need 
to be able to take note of the actual labels of the product that is to be delivered 
after purchase. The difference between both variants is expressed most tersely 
in the notification of the best-before date and use-by date.
It has been determined that, pursuant to Article 7:46c, paragraph 1 CC, the seller 
is obliged to make the information regarding ‘the most important characteristics 
of the product’510 known prior to the purchase. Assuming that the mandatory 
information on a label contains more than ‘the most important characteristics of 
the product’, the buyer of foodstuffs must first avail of the information legislators 
consider necessary after they have been purchased and delivered. As regards 
products which cannot be returned due to their nature or to the fact that they 
may decay or age rapidly, this means that the buyer can take cognizance of the 
properties of a product at a time when s/he can no longer return it based on the 
provisions of distance purchase. In fact, the seller can even limit the options for 
return by placing the best-before or use-by date presented close to the date of 
delivery.511
The legislator thinks that the impossibility of coming into physical contact with a 
product in the case of distance purchasing is to be compensated with additional 
options for dissolution. The legislator also thinks that the provision of information 
as regards foodstuffs must take place extremely precisely and carefully through 
mandatory statements on labels. For many foodstuffs, distance buyers have to 
do without the information on the label and without the options of dissolution 
as laid down in the distance contracts section in the Civil Code. None of the 
arrangements stated provide protection in the areas in which the legislator has 
considered that additional protection is required. Do distance buyers of foodstuffs 
have any instruments to make up for this?
14.4 Conformity
The item delivered must comply with the agreement. The conformity requirement 
is no more complicated than this. In fact, it simply is the application of the Latin 
adage pacta sunt servanda on purchase agreements. The question whether that 
which has been delivered complies with the agreement proves to require more 
elaboration. The Dutch legislator answers the question a contrario:
510 Article 7:46c, paragraph 1 b CC.
511 The seller who labels has a margin in choosing the date. Sellers of pre-labelled foodstuffs may choose 
to send the oldest stock first.
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Article 7:17 CC
1. The supplied product must be in conformity with the agreement.
2.  A product does not meet the agreement if, also in view of the nature of the 
product and the statements the seller has made about it, it does not have 
the properties the buyer could have expected based on the agreement. 
The buyer may expect the product to have the properties necessary for 
normal use and the presence of which he/she does not need to question, 
as well as the properties that are required for a particular use as provided 
for in the agreement.
3.  A product that differs from that which has been agreed or a product of 
another type does not meet the agreement. The same applies if that 
which has been delivered differs in number, weight or measure from 
what has been agreed.
4.  If a sample or model has been shown or given to the buyer, the product 
is to correspond with this unless it was provided merely as an indication 
without the product having to correspond with it.
5.  The buyer cannot rely on the fact that the product does not meet the 
agreement if he/she was informed or reasonably could have been informed 
of this at the time of the conclusion of the agreement. The same applies 
if this is due to defects in or the unsuitability of raw materials originating 
from the buyer, unless the seller should have warned him/her about 
these defects or unsuitability.
6.  (…)
This Dutch law that prevails since 1 May 2003 is the implementation of Directive 
99/44/EC.512 In this Directive, the requirement for conformity is expressed as 
follows:
Article 2 Directive 99/44
1.  The seller must deliver goods to the consumer which are in conformity 
with the contract of sale.
2.  Consumer goods are presumed to be in conformity with the contract if 
they:
a.   comply with the description given by the seller and possess the 
qualities of the goods which the seller has held out to the consumer 
as a sample or model;
b.  are fit for any particular purpose for which the consumer requires 
them and which he made known to the seller at the time of conclusion 
of the contract and which the seller has accepted;
512 EU, 1999. Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on 
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 171, 7/7/1999: 12-16.
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c.  are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type are normally 
used;
d.  show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the 
same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect, given the 
nature of the goods and taking into account any public statements 
on the specific characteristics of the goods made about them by the 
seller, the producer or his representative, particularly in advertising 
or on labelling.
3.   There shall be deemed not to be a lack of conformity for the purposes of 
this Article if, at the time the contract was concluded, the consumer was 
aware, or could not reasonably be unaware of, the lack of conformity, 
or if the lack of conformity has its origin in materials supplied by the 
consumer.
4.   The seller shall not be bound by public statements, as referred to in 
paragraph 2(d) if he:
–  shows that he was not, and could not reasonably have been, aware 
of the statement in question;
–  shows that by the time of conclusion of the contract the statement 
had been corrected; or
–  shows that the decision to buy the consumer goods could not have 
been influenced by the statement.
5.  Any lack of conformity resulting from incorrect installation of the 
consumer goods shall be deemed to be equivalent to lack of conformity 
of the goods if installation forms part of the contract of sale of the goods 
and the goods were installed by the seller or under his responsibility. 
This shall apply equally if the product, intended to be installed by the 
consumer, is installed by the consumer and the incorrect installation is 
due to a shortcoming in the installation instructions.
In his article, entitled ‘De koopregeling in het richtlijnvoorstel consumentenrecht’513 
(The purchase scheme in the consumer law Directive proposal), Hijma observes a 
difference in meaning between both arrangements as a result of a free translation 
of the Dutch legislator: One more peculiarity can be observed. Article 2, paragraph 
3 of Directive 99/44 determines that there is no non-conformity if, at the time 
of entering the contract, the consumer ‘was aware, or could not reasonably be 
unaware of, the lack of conformity’. In the implementation, the Dutch legislator 
has translated this text in a peculiar manner: ‘was aware or reasonably could be 
aware’ (Article7:17, paragraph 5 CC).
513 Hijma, J., 2009. De koopregeling in het richtlijnvoorstel consumentenrecht. In: Hesselink, M.W. and 
Loos, M.B.M. (eds.), Het voorstel voor een Europese richtlijn consumentenrechten: een Nederlands 
perspectief. Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague, the Netherlands, p. 171.
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A less free translation, however, would have resulted in the Dutch text being 
as introverted as the English text: there is no non-conformity if the buyer was 
aware or should have been aware of the lack of conformity. Hijma states that, 
as evidenced by the explanatory memorandum, the Dutch ‘implementation text’ 
does not intend to result in a buyer’s obligation to examine. The formula merely 
prevents the buyer from relying on the fact that the defect was unknown to him/
her, while it is virtually impossible that it would have escaped him/her.
In the Dutch version of the applicable text, the Vienna Sales Convention514 is 
translated just as roughly. In the English text, Article 35, paragraph 3 reads as 
follows:
The seller is not liable under subparagrpaphs (a) to (d) of the preceding 
paragraph for any lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract the buyer knew of could not have been unaware 
of such lack of conformity.
The German text is just as clever:
Der Verkäufer haftet nach Absatz 2 Buchstabe a) bis d) nicht für eine 
Vertragswidrigkeit der Ware, wenn der Käufer bei Vertragsabschluss diese 
Vertragswidrigkeit kannte oder darüber nicht in Unkenntnis sein konnte.
The Dutch text reads:
De verkoper is niet ingevolge het in het voorgaande lid onder a)-d) bepaalde 
aansprakelijk voor het niet-beantwoorden van de zaken aan de overeenkomst, 
indien de koper op het tijdstip van het sluiten van de overeenkomst wist of 
had behoren te weten dat de zaken niet aan de overeenkomst beantwoorden.
The core issue translates as ‘knew or ought to have known’.
On 8 October 2008, the European Commission published the proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive.515 The proposal envisages the adoption of a Directive 
that is to form a recast of the European provisions regarding consumer rights, 
jointly specified with the term ‘consumer acquis’.
The proposal includes a conformity arrangement that provides more room for the 
statement that there is some obligation to have something examined or investigated 
on the part of the buyer. Article 24, paragraph 3 reads:
514 United Nations Convention on contracts for the international sales of goods (CISG).
515 EU, 2008. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council regarding consumer 
rights, Brussels, 8 October 2008, COM (2008) 614 def. 2008/0196 (COD).
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There shall be no lack of conformity for the purposes of this article if, at 
the time the contract was concluded, the consumer was aware, or should 
reasonably have been aware of, the lack of conformity, or if the lack of 
conformity has its origin in materials supplied by the consumer.
So in fact, with Article 7:17, paragraph 5, the Dutch legislator comes closer to the 
proposal for the Directive than the current Directive.
14.5 Conformity requirement and distance contracts
It is conceivable that the Dutch or European legislator would be aware of the fact 
that consumers who become involved in distance purchasing develop expectations 
about products along routes other than by actually seeing and possibly holding 
the product. After all, the expectations to be fulfilled for the distance buyer in 
connection with the conformity requirement are constituted by presentations of 
the product in the digital shelf. It would have been possible for the legislator to have 
acted as a controller in the presentation regarding the provision of information.
The legislator decided another road, the road of ‘unmotivated’ dissolution. After 
all, based on the article, the distance buyer can dissolve the agreement without 
stating reasons for seven days, which can be extended to three months, after 
receiving the product. The buyer thus has the time to decide whether his/her 
expectations about the product are met. But it is this instrument a foodstuff buyer 
will regularly have to do without, pursuant to Article 7:46 d, paragraph 4.
The distance buyer also has to do without the information the label provides. A 
label can adjust the expectations of foodstuffs. As a result of the lack of corrective 
action of the label, the seller is fully obliged to comply with that which the buyer 
may expect from the seller in view of the nature of the product and the statements 
of the seller.
The above described difference in meaning between Article 7:17, paragraph 5 
CC, which indicates some level of obligation to have something examined or 
investigated; and the more reticent Article 2, paragraph 3 Directive 99/44 may 
have a considerable impact to the question whether the label modifies the buyer’s 
expectations as such that deliveries are always conform if the label provides 
accurate information. In distance purchasing, the label will play an opposite 
role; after all, buyers cannot read the label until the product has been bought and 
delivered, and are not able to determine whether the product is in conformity 
with the expectations until it has been delivered. So the label cannot contribute 
to the formation of expectations of the product, but instead to the assessment 
that the product does not meet the expectations.h
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What is the set of instruments available to distance buyers of perishable goods if 
the label forces him/her to adjust expectations? Actually, the buyer can avail of 
the entire set of instruments for non-conformity.
Based on Article 7:21 CC, buyers can demand delivery of that which is missing, 
repair or replacement. For a vegan who reads on the label that his/her vegetarian 
hamburger contains products of animal origin, these options for demand are no 
consolation, as is the case with a buyer of cheeseburgers who reads that there is 
no real cheese in the cheeseburger. Article 7:22 CC outlines other powers:
Article 7:22 CC
1.  If, in the event of a consumer sale agreement, that which has been 
delivered does not comply with the agreement, the buyer also has the 
right to:
a.  dissolve the agreement, unless the deviation of that which has been 
agreed does not justify this dissolution and its consequences in view 
of its minor importance;
b.  reduce the price in proportion to the degree of deviation of that which 
has been agreed.
2.   The rights meant in paragraph 1 arise only if repair and replacement 
are impossible or cannot be expected from the seller, or if the seller has 
failed to perform an obligation as meant in article 21, paragraph 3.
3.   Insofar as this part does not deviate from this, the provisions of part 5 
of title 5 of book 6 regarding dissolution of an agreement apply to the 
authority as meant in paragraph 1 b.
4.   The buyer may exercise the rights and authorities stated in paragraph 1 
and article 20 and 21 without prejudice to any other right and claim.
Now that it appears from Article 7:6 CC that Article 7:22 has also a mandatory 
character, the distance seller will not be able to rule out the option to dissolve in 
the case of non-conformity, even if the foodstuffs are subject to decay or ageing.
A superficial investigation into what distance sellers of foodstuffs stipulate for 
themselves provides a curious result. Let us take a little excursion to practice. In 
which cases do the Albert Heijn, Etos en Gall & Gall webshops rule out dissolution 
in their General Terms and Conditions (Textbox 14.1)?
As many other distance sellers, Albert.nl derives its General Terms and Conditions 
to the set of terms and conditions developed by the Dutch Homeshopping 
Organisation in conjunction with the Consumers’ Association within the framework 
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Textbox 14.1. Albert.nl webshop: general terms and conditions.
I. Web shop General Terms and Conditions
These General Terms and Conditions of the Nederlandse Thuiswinkel Organisatie (Dutch 
Homeshopping Organisation) were established in consultation with the Consumers’ 
Association within the framework of the Coördinatiegroep Zelfreguleringsoverleg (CZ; Self-
Regulation Coordination Group) of the Social and Economic Council and came into effect as of 
1 January 2009.
Article 2 – Identity of the entrepreneur
• Albert Heijn bv trading under the name/names: Albert
• Business and visiting address: Provincialeweg 11 1506 HA Zaandam
• Telephone number: +31 (0)800-2352523
• Accessibility: from Monday through Friday from 8:30 am until 10:30 pm and Saturday from 
8.00 am until 2.30 pm
• E-mail address: info@albert.nl
• Chamber of Commerce number: 35012085
• VAT identification number: nl002330884b01
(…)
Article 5 – The agreement
1.  Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the agreement is concluded at the time of 
the consumer’s acceptance of the offer and the fulfilment of the conditions set for this 
purpose.
2.  If the consumer has accepted the offer electronically, the entrepreneur will immediately 
confirm receipt of the acceptance of the offer electronically. As long as the receipt of this 
acceptance has not been confirmed, the consumer may dissolve the agreement.
3.  If the agreement is concluded electronically, the entrepreneur will take appropriate 
technical and organisational measures to safeguard the electronic transfer of data and 
ensures a safe web environment. If the consumer has the option of paying electronically, 
the entrepreneur shall observe appropriate safety measures.
4.  Within legal frameworks, the entrepreneur may investigate whether the consumer is able 
to meet his/her payment obligations and whether all facts and factors that matter in a 
responsible conclusion of the distance contract. If the entrepreneur has valid grounds not 
to conclude the agreement based on this investigation, he/she is entitled to refuse an order 
or application stating reasons or to attach special conditions to the execution.
5.  The entrepreneur shall include the following information for the product or service to the 
consumer, in writing or in such a way that the consumer can save it on a permanent data 
carrier in an easily accessible manner:
• the visiting address of the business location of the entrepreneur where the consumer 
can lodge complaints;
• the conditions under which and the way in which the consumer may invoke the right to 
revoke, or a clear notification of being refused the right to revoke;
• the information about existing service after sale and warranties;
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• the information included in Article 4, paragraph 3 of these terms and conditions, unless 
the entrepreneur has already provided the consumer with this information prior to the 
execution of the agreement;
• the requirements for dissolution of the agreement if the agreement has a duration of 
over one year or if the duration is indefinite.
6.   If the entrepreneur has committed him/herself to supply a series of products or services, 
the provision in the above paragraph applies to the first delivery only.
Article 6 – The right to revoke on delivery of products
1.  When purchasing products, the consumer has the option to dissolve the agreement 
without stating reasons for a period of 14 days. This period comes into effect on the day 
after receiving the product by or on behalf of the consumer.
2.  During this period, the consumer shall handle the product and its packaging with due care. 
He/she shall unwrap or use the product only to such an extent in so far as this is required 
to be able to assess whether he/she wishes to keep the product. If he/she makes use of 
the right to revoke, he/she shall return the product and any accessories – if reasonably 
possible – in the original state and packaging to the entrepreneur, in accordance with the 
reasonable and clear instructions by the entrepreneur.
Article 7 – Costs in the event of revocation
1.  If the consumer exercises the right to revoke, the costs for return shipment at the most 
will be at his/her expense.
2.  If the consumer has paid an amount, the entrepreneur shall repay this amount as soon as 
possible and no later than 30 days after the return shipment or revocation.
Article 8 – Exclusion of the right to revoke
1.  If the consumer does not have a right to revoke, this can only be excluded by the 
entrepreneur if the entrepreneur has clearly stated this in the offer, in any case in good 
time prior to the conclusion of the agreement.
2.  Exclusion of the right to revoke is possible only for products:
• that have been produced by the entrepreneur in accordance with the consumer’s 
specifications;
• which have a distinct personal nature;
• that cannot be returned because of their nature;
• that can decay or age rapidly;
• of which the price is bound to fluctuations in the financial market over which the 
entrepreneur has no control;
• for single issues of newspapers and magazines;
• for audio and video recordings and computer software of which the consumer has broken 
the seal.
(…)
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of the Self-Regulation Coordination Group of the Social and Economic Council.516 
As do many other suppliers, Albert.nl has, as appears from the formulation of 
its Terms and Conditions, copied the instructions of the Dutch Homeshopping 
Organisation, which in turn have been copied from Article 7:46d, paragraph 4 
CC instead of following them.
Article 8, paragraph 1 is particularly confusing. Which right to revoke has been 
excluded if the consumer does not avail of a right to revoke? In Article 8, paragraph 
2, Albert.nl does not express the cases in which they avail of the option to exclude 
the right to revoke. Similar to the legislator, they merely outline the cases in which 
they are entitled to exclude this right, and as such leave the buyer uncertain 
about their intentions.
14.6 Conclusions
In digital distance sale the provisions of Directive 2000/13/EG and the Food 
Labelling Decree miss their objective if the purpose is to inform consumers about 
foodstuffs before they buy them.
The stipulations in Directive 97/7/EG and part 9A of title 1, book 7 CC miss 
their objective insofar as these stipulations intend to compensate for the lack of 
physical contact with ample options for dissolution, now that these options for 
dissolution may be lacking in the case of foodstuffs.
Ultimately, online buyers of food might know their position is best protected not 
by a lex specialis of consumer law or food law, but by the legi generali of the law 
of obligations because these eventually provide an option for dissolution. After 
all, it is impossible for the distance seller to keep the consumer from the right of 
dissolution in the case of non-conformity, even if he/she has drafted the General 
Terms and Conditions correctly.
Now that the legislator fails to provide a proper arrangement, the expectation that 
private parties will provide the highly necessary regulation seems justified. But 
the initial attempts to this are as yet far from perfect.
516 The Social and Economic Council is an advisory board to the government and the highest body within 
the corporatist structure of product boards and industrial boards. On this system, see also Chapter 9 by 
Maria Litjes. Members of the Social and Economic Council are appointed by the government, by trade 
unions and by employers’ associations (each one third of the total number). See: http://www.SER.nl.
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15.  National public sector and private 
standards
Cases in the Netherlands
Irene Scholten-Verheijen
15.1 Public law and private standards
Sometimes public law refers to private standards. The question, whether this 
reference to private standards make them binding rules under public law, has 
been the subject of several – civil and administrative law – court cases, of which 
we will discuss some in this chapter. Furthermore we will go into a complaint 
before the Dutch Competition Authority regarding the (abuse of a) dominant 
economic position with regard to private standards.
15.1.1 Dutch civil law proceedings
A noteworthy case is the civil law case of a Dutch company, Knooble B.V., versus 
the Dutch State and the Dutch Normalisation Institute (Stichting Nederlands 
Normalisatie Instituut, NNI).517 The NNI is a foundation that prepares the so-
called NEN-standards. NEN is short for NEderlandse Norm (which means Dutch 
Standard). NEN-standards contain technical specifications and rules describing the 
performance criteria of a product, a process or a service. There are about 2,000 
specific Dutch NEN-standards for all kinds of things, from utensils to machinery, 
fire protection and dangerous goods.518 The NNI holds the copyright of the NEN-
standards and provides them against payment of € 62 on average. It is prohibited 
to further disclose, reproduce or multiply the NEN-standards.
The Dutch Buildings Decree (Bouwbesluit) (an Administrative Order based on 
article 2 of the Dutch Housing Act, Woningwet) provides structural conditions with 
regard to safety, health, operability, energy efficiency and environment. In the 
Dutch Buildings Decree and the Dutch Buildings Regulation (Regeling Bouwbesluit) 
(a Ministerial Regulation based on the Buildings Decree) reference is made in 
this regard to specific NEN-standards. Knooble is a consultant in building issues. 
Knooble requested the Court to rule that despite the reference in the law, the NEN 
standards are not binding law, alternatively that they should be made available 
free of copyrights. The first question the Court had to answer was whether the 
performance criteria in these private standards become generally binding by the 
517 Knooble vs. State and NNI, CoJ The Hague, 31 December 2008 (LJN: BG8465). LJN is the number 
used to disclose case law (in Dutch language) at: http://www.rechtspraak.nl.
518 See http://www.nen.nl and http://www.nni.nl.
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reference to these standards in the Buildings Decree and the Buildings Regulation. 
The Court considers that the concept of a ‘generally binding regulation’ consists 
of three elements:
• is it generally applied;
• does it have external effect; and
• do the public authorities enacting the provision have legal authority?
The Court considers that by reference in public law the performance criteria in 
the NEN-standards obtain external effect, as if they were part of the law itself 
and therefore become binding. They apply – just like the Buildings Decree and 
Regulation themselves – to anyone who wishes to undertake any building activities. 
In order to obtain a building permit, one should comply with the Buildings Decree 
and the Buildings Regulation, and therefore with the performance criteria in the 
private standards referred to. By referring to the private standards, the legislator 
determines the content of the NEN-standards to be binding for everyone. The 
fact that the standards have been drafted by a private entity is of no concern. The 
public authorities enacting the provision have legal authority. The Court therefore 
answers the question, whether the performance criteria in private standards 
become generally binding by the reference to these standards, to the affirmative.
By consequence, the NEN-standards fall under the scope of the Dutch Constitution519 
and the Dutch Publication Act. Article 89, sections 3 and 4, of the Constitution 
determines that the law regulates the publication and the entering into force 
of Administrative Orders as well as other generally binding rules; they will not 
enter into force until they are properly published. Article 3 of the Publication 
Act provides that articles do not enter into force unless they are published in the 
Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees (Staatsblad) (Acts, Administrative Orders and 
other Royal Decrees establishing generally binding rules) or in the Government 
Gazette (Staatscourant) (Ministerial Regulations establishing generally binding 
rules). Now that the standards have not been published – but are only available 
from the NNI upon payment – the Court rules that they cannot be considered 
to be binding as part of a public law. ‘The law should be known and available for 
everyone’.
In short, the Court ruled that when legislation refers to private standards, these 
standards share in the legally binding character of the law. If, however, the 
requirements of publication (and public availability) have not been complied with, 
this (private part of the) legislation is void. In other words, the Court recognises 
the competence of the legislature to turn private standards into public law. To the 
exercise of this competence all requirements for public law apply.
519 For a translation into English language see: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/
publicaties-pb51/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.html.
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Both Knooble and the State/NNI filed for appeal with the Court of Appeal in The 
Hague. At the moment of submission of this chapter, the judgement was still 
pending.
15.1.2 Dutch administrative law proceedings
After Knooble, some administrative courts rendered a judgement regarding the 
same issues. The Court of Utrecht follows the Civil Court of The Hague in its 
judgement.520 But the Court in ‘s-Hertogenbosch judges differently.521 As in 
Knooble, the Court is of the opinion that the NEN-standards have binding effect, 
through the reference made to them in public law. But then the Court judges that 
the fact that the standards have not been published according to the Publication 
Act, does not deprive the standards of their binding effect. Article 3 of the Housing 
Act states that in the Administrative Order as meant in article 2 of the Housing 
Act, reference may be made to (parts of) standards and quality statements. The 
Court considers that Article 3 of the Housing Act provides an explicit legal basis 
for the reference to the NEN-standards in the Building Decree. The Court further 
considers that the Housing Act is an Act of Parliament and therefore is not inferior 
to the Publication Act. The Court is of the opinion that by reference alone in the 
Housing Act, the NEN-standards already have obtained the character of generally 
binding rules, and therefore the Publication Act does not apply. In so far as the 
Housing Act in that way interferes with Article 89 of the Constitution, the Court 
considers it is not authorised to assess Acts of Parliament (according to Article 
120 Constitution). The Court comes to the conclusion that the NEN-standards 
should be considered binding as such.
The Court of Groningen, in conclusion, judges that the reference to the NEN-
standards in the Building Decree cannot be seen as a statutory provision and 
therefore the Publication Act does not apply.522 The Court considers that it is not 
uncommon to refer to generally applicable standards and directives; these are 
sufficiently available and therefore can be known to everyone. The reference to 
such standards is not in conflict with legal certainty. Given these considerations, 
the (summary trial) judge sees no reason to conclude that the NEN-standards 
should be considered non-binding.
Consensus seems far away. The case of ‘s-Hertogenbosch will be judged in appeal 
by the Council of State. It will be interesting to see how the (civil) Court of Appeal 
and the (administrative) Council of State will deal with this matter. It should come 
520 Portaal Vastgoed Ontwikkeling vs. Mayor and Aldermen of Nieuwegein, CoJ Utrecht, 6 July 2009, 
SBR 09/156 (LJN: BJ2496).
521 City Crash vs. Mayor and Aldermen of ‘s-Hertogenbosch, CoJ ‘s-Hertogenbosch, 5 February 2010, 
AWB 08/1587 (LJN: BL3758).
522 [Applicant] vs. Mayor and Aldermen of Groningen, CoJ Groningen, 29 July 2010, AWB 10/613 (LJN: 
BN2936).
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as no surprise that the entanglement of private and public law, leads to puzzles 
and controversy.
15.1.3 Complaint before the Dutch Competition Authority
On August 31, 2010, the Dutch Competition Authority decided upon a complaint 
against the NNI.523 The complaint was that the NNI abuses its dominant economic 
position by charging high rates for copies of the NEN-standards. The complainants 
are of the opinion that the NNI should provide these copies for free or against 
payment of reproduction costs only. Especially given the fact that these standards 
are being referred to in public law and legislation.
The NNI has been contractually appointed by the Dutch Government as the 
national normalisation institute; it therefore has a legal monopoly with regard 
to the formation and publication of the NEN-standards. The activities of the NNI 
may be considered economic activities. Subsequently, the Dutch Competition 
Authority establishes that the NNI most likely has a dominant economic position 
regarding the formation of the NEN-standards as well as regarding the publication 
and sale thereof. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the NNI abuses 
this position. The question is whether the NNI charges excessive high tariffs for 
those standards that are referred to in the law and legislation. Whether or not 
this is the case depends on the economic value of the formation and publication 
of NEN-standards in relation to the tariffs being charged. In order to establish 
this, the Dutch Competition Authority would need more time for investigation, 
which would take a huge effort on the part of the Dutch Competition Authority.
The Dutch Competition Authority also refers to a political discussion regarding 
the finance structure of the NNI. Parliament suggested that the NEN-standards 
should be available for free and that the NNI should be financed from public 
funds.524 As the Dutch cabinet was under resignation, the decision was postponed 
until a new cabinet had been installed. The Dutch Competition Authority further 
refers to the pending civil and administrative legal proceedings, amongst others 
the pending case of Knooble versus the State/NNI.
Given the political discussion and the (pending) judicial cases, as well as the 
relatively low economic interest of complainants, the Dutch Competition Authority 
decided to give no priority to this complaint and to conduct no further investigation 
with regard to this matter.
523 Rechtspraktijk BAWA c.s. / Kombiplast B.V. vs. Stichting Nederlands Normalisatie-instituut, Dutch 
Competition Authority, 31 August 2010, 6965/7.
524 See: Kamerstukken II (documents of the second chamber of Parliament) 2008-2009, 28 325, nr. 109.
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15.2 Public procurement and private standards
Private standards also play a role in public procurement. In this section two civil 
law cases will pass review regarding the use of private standards as criteria in a 
tender procedure. We will furthermore have a look at the European Commission’s 
opinion regarding this matter.
15.2.1 Dutch civil law proceedings: Douwe Egberts
Here we will discuss two fairly similar civil law cases with Douwe Egberts playing 
the leading part.525 The Province of Groningen respectively the municipalities 
of Den Helder and Alkmaar initiated an open European tender procedure – in 
accordance with Directive 2004/18/EC – for the supply, maintenance and service 
of hot drinks machines (coffee, tea, cocoa, hot water). The local governments 
are the contracting authorities according to the Decree on procurement rules for 
government tenders (Besluit aanbestedingsregels voor overheidsopdrachten), which 
applies to the public tenders. The tenders were to be assessed on grounds of 
exclusion criteria, selection criteria and award criteria. In the terms of reference 
the governments require that the coffee and tea should have a Fairtrade label, 
such as Max Havelaar or EKO label (this was established as a knock-out criterium). 
At least the following specific criteria should be fulfilled:
• coffee/tea/cacao will be purchased from small farmers co-operations;
• prices that aim at covering the costs of sustainable production (according to 
social and environmental standards);
• an additional Fairtrade premium based on the world market price;
• advance credit, enabling coffee farmers to do the necessary investments;
• longer term trade relationships.
Douwe Egberts holds the UTZ Certified label for coffee and tea. Upon request 
whether the UTZ Certified label would be considered equivalent to the Max 
Havelaar / EKO label, the answer was that a Fairtrade label was explicitly mentioned 
because of their specific objectives (sustainability, social and environmental 
standards – such as prices that aim at covering the costs of sustainable production, 
an additional Fairtrade premium, advance credit, longer term trade relationships, 
and decent working conditions for hired labour – all aiming at the highest rate of 
sustainability possible). Only other labels that would meet these objectives could 
be considered equivalent, and UTZ Certified would not be considered as such. 
Douwe Egberts was of the opinion that this was unlawful and started interim 
525 Douwe Egberts Coffee Systems Nederland B.V. vs. Province of Groningen (and intervening party Max 
Havelaar Foundation), CoJ Groningen, 23 November 2007, 97093/KG ZA 07-320 (LJN: BB8575); and 
Douwe Egberts Coffee Systems Nederland B.V. vs. Municipality of Den Helder/Municipality of Alkmaar 
(and intervening party Max Havelaar Foundation), CoJ Alkmaar, 18 March 2010, 117231 (LJN: BL7898).
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injunction proceedings, requesting reconsideration of the specific sustainability 
criteria in the public tender.
The Courts reason that the requirements cannot be seen as technical specifications, 
describing the mandatory characteristics of a product or service. They can only 
be seen as additional conditions, relating to the way the assignment is performed. 
Under European and Dutch procurement law it is allowed to request such 
conditions. Moreover, the conditions at hand set by the local governments are 
acceptable, now that they are being subscribed by the European Parliament, the 
European Commission and the Dutch governments, according to the Courts.526 
Furthermore, the principle of equity was not breached, because there would still 
be a number of tenderers that could make a bid. In conclusion, Douwe Egberts 
did not succeed in substantiating that the UTZ Certified label, giving the results, 
is at least equal to the Fairtrade label.
15.2.2 Infraction procedure European Commission
The European Commission, however, holds another opinion. On 14 May 2009, the 
European Commission gave the Netherlands a notice of default in a similar case, not 
unlikely based upon a complaint from Douwe Egberts. The European Commission 
was of the opinion that the Netherlands infringed EU public procurement rules. 
The Province of Noord-Holland awarded a public contract for the supply and 
management of coffee machines through an open EU-wide tender procedure. In 
the Commission’s view, the award procedure did not meet the requirements of EU 
public procurement rules, in particular those relating to technical specifications, 
selection criteria and award criteria.
In terms of technical specifications, the Province requested the tenderers to supply 
coffee and tea with one or two specific labels for organic and Fair Trade products: 
EKO and/or Max Havelaar. This is not allowed under the public procurement 
rules as it discriminates against certain tenderers. The Province stated that it 
would accept equivalent labels; however it did not specify substantive criteria 
526 The Court of Groningen refers to the Interpretative Communication of the Commission on 
the Community law applicable to public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social 
considerations into public procurement, Brussels, 15.10.2001, COM(2001) 566 final, p. 8; to the draft 
Resolution of the European Parliament on Fair Trade and Development, (2005/2245(INI)), p. 8; and to 
the Agenda of the Dutch cabinet 2015 regarding the realisation of the Millennium planning aims, The 
Hague, 29 June 2007, p. 10.
The Court of Alkmaar refers to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Contributing to Sustainable 
Development: The role of Fair Trade and nongovernmental trade-related sustainability assurance 
schemes, Brussels, 5.5.2009 COM(2009) 215 final, p. 6; and to the letter of the Dutch Ministers Cramer, 
Donner and Koenders to the Dutch Parliament with regard to the international social criteria of 
Sustainable Purchasing, 16 October 2009 (PDI 2009037807), p. 5.
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that could clarify to tenderers when a label would be considered equivalent. This 
situation was not transparent for competing businesses.
With regard to the selection of tenderers, the Province required the tenderers, 
among other things, to indicate what they do to make the coffee market more 
sustainable and how they contribute to environmentally, socially and economically 
sound coffee production. However, the objective of such criteria is not to ensure 
that tenderers have the necessary technical and professional capabilities to perform 
the contract, as would be required under EU public procurement rules, but rather 
inform the contracting authority about the general business policy of the tenderers. 
Also, it was not clear how and according to which criteria the Province would 
assess the information submitted by the tenderers. This was detrimental to the 
transparency of the tender procedure.
Lastly, the Province also breached the rules on award criteria. It used a criterion 
under which additional points are granted to tenders that offer ingredients (sugar, 
milk) that have a specific label or a comparable label. In the Commission’s view, 
a contracting authority cannot use such an award criterion, since a label as such 
is not a criterion suitable to identify the economically most advantageous offer. 
The Province did not specify any substantive criteria in this regard, which again 
is not transparent for tenderers.
The Dutch government does not agree. According to the Ministry, the Province did 
not exclusively request the Max Havelaar label; therefore the tender was open for 
other labels as well. The conditions of the Max Havelaar label are freely available 
and generally known for everyone. Moreover, the observed conditions regarding 
sustainability and corporate social responsibility should not be considered selection 
criteria. They are merely specific performance criteria, which authorities are 
allowed to request. And even if it were selection criteria, it would still be allowed, 
so the Ministry argues. In conclusion, the Ministry is of the opinion that neither 
the rules regarding the award criteria have been breached. A contracting authority 
– in this case: the Province of Noord-Holland – is allowed to choose a product 
that, because of certain quality features, may not be the best priced product 
per se. From this it follows that the Province of Noord-Holland was allowed to 
appreciate the tenders including the Max Havelaar or EKO label, or a comparable 
label, over other tenders.
The Commission still wasn’t convinced and sent the Netherlands a reasoned 
opinion;527 the Commission even announced to take the Netherlands to the 
527 EU press release, IP/09/1618, Brussels, 29 October 2009; Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1618&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangu
age=en.
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European Court of Justice.528 In the mean time the civil servants of the Province 
of Noord-Holland drank fairtrade coffee already as of 1 January 2009 from coffee 
machines from a company called Maas International. The legal proceedings came 
too late for the contract at issue. It expired on 31 December 2010…
The question, however, if public authorities in formulating a call for tender under 
EU procurement law are entitled to refer to private standards, remains highly 
relevant.
15.3 Public enforcement and private standards529
Private supervision in the form of audits and public supervision in the form of 
official controls exist next to each other, but they also interrelate. The EU framework 
for official controls is Regulation 882/2004 (the Official Controls Regulation).530 
The competent authority ensures that official controls are guaranteed in all stages 
of the food chain. Food businesses are responsible for meeting all the conditions 
in order to produce and supply safe food. Some conditions specifically state the 
standards a product should comply with. Others only relate to the safety of the 
food; the businesses may decide what is the best way to achieve this objective. On 
the one hand, these ‘open standards’ give the businesses the opportunity to find 
their own solutions and ways of working; on the other hand they have to convince 
the competent authority that what they do is the right thing and leads in the 
end to food that is safe. If not, the competent authority has the power to impose 
punitive or corrective measures (either through administrative or criminal law).
Regulation 882/2004 states that:
• ‘official controls’ must be performed by the competent authority;
• the competent authority may delegate specific tasks related to official controls 
to one or more control bodies;
• taking into account self control systems.
The official controls take place on the basis of risk analysis, taking into account 
specific risks, the way a company behaved in the past (does it normally comply 
with the law?), as well as the reliability of self control systems. And this is allowed 
under the Control Regulation. If and when a company or sector has a form of self-
528 EU press release, IP/10/499, Brussels, 5 May 2010; Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/499&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangua
ge=en.
529 This part of the chapter is based on: Beuger, H., 2010. Overheidstoezicht en voedselveiligheid, in: 
Voedselveiligheid: certificatie en overheidstoezicht. Praktijkgidsen Warenwet, Sdu, The Hague, the 
Netherlands.
530 Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal 
health and animal welfare rules. Official Journal of the European Union L 165, 30/4/2004, p. 1.
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control that adequately guarantees food safety, the supervision can be performed 
differently by the competent authority.
We give you the example of the way the Dutch competent authority deals with 
private standards (the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, Voedsel 
en Waren Autoriteit VWA). The VWA performs the official controls, and where 
possible, takes into account private control systems. The controls of the VWA 
over the years therefore shifted more and more from product control to process 
and system control. The VWA takes into account and controls the requirement of 
HACCP. The VWA also takes into account other private schemes guaranteeing a 
well functioning food safety system. Therefore such a system should at least be:
• transparent;
• based on a standard;
• connected to independent third party auditing;
• sufficiently able to self-correct.
The VWA assesses self-control systems on the basis of these criteria and performs 
‘reality checks’ in the businesses. It does not approve the systems, but it accepts 
them. In that way, the VWA keeps the opportunity of continually monitoring the 
system at hand as well as other systems. The VWA approach is based on ‘legitimate 
trust’, based on the results in practice. If and when it turns out that a private 
system contributes to the compliance with law by the businesses, the VWA will 
restrict its supervision to the minimum: (1) low frequency of company visits; (2) 
an incidental infringement of law will not be sanctioned with a punitive sanction 
immediately; businesses will have the opportunity to take corrective measures 
in order to be compliant. This will only be different when the company causes a 
dangerous situation for human or animal welfare.
In general, the Control Regulation in most member states resulted in intensified 
supervision. The VWA approach leads to a more remote supervision, reducing the 
burden the supervision causes for the businesses. This approach is based on (1) 
working risk based; (2) put responsibility of the businesses in the first place; (3) 
offer the businesses assistance in complying with the law (be more transparent); 
(4) take severe measures when things go wrong. The businesses are being divided 
by the VWA in three categories: red, orange and green; whereas green stands for 
most compliant and red for least compliant. The VWA supervision concentrates 
mostly on the red and orange businesses. The green businesses will be subject 
to a more remote supervision.
According to the VWA, the Netherlands is ahead of other countries on the point of 
remote supervision. Export interests however require that other parties in Europe 
and the rest of the world remain sufficiently confident regarding the quality of 
Dutch products and the supervision thereof. Obviously, there is a field of tension 
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between (full) responsibility for businesses and substantial government supervision. 
It will always remain a challenge to find the right balance between the two.
15.4 Conclusions
Other chapters in this book show how the private sector uses private standards 
to express quality and safety wishes and to translate them into legally binding 
terms. The Dutch cases discussed in this chapter show that it is problematic 
to say the least if the public sector tries to use them in the same way. At the 
current stage of development, experience in the Netherlands does not provide 
firm answers. What it does do is placing important questions on the agenda: what 
happens to the private law character of private standards if reference is made to 
them in legislation? What happens if public authorities refer to private standards 
in calls for tender under EU procurement law? And finally, to what extent can 
enforcement bodies in setting their priorities rely on the performance of private 
quality management systems?
As regards the first question, Dutch courts express interpretations ranging from 
‘nothing out of the ordinary’ to ‘this turns them into full-fledged – but void – 
public law’. As regards the second question, in accepting that authorities in calls 
for tender express their wishes by reference to private standards Dutch courts 
position themselves in opposition to the European Commission who considers such 
practice contrary to the law. The last issue at first glance seems least controversial. 
The choice to turn enforcement attention away from effective private schemes 
in order to focus on sectors not applying such schemes seems to have the logic 
of risk based controls on its side.
Postscript
On November 16, 2010, the Court of Appeal in The Hague gave its judgement 
regarding the appeal in the Knooble-case.531 The Court reversed the judgement of 
the Court of Justice in appeal. According to the Court of Appeal the reference to 
the NEN-standards in generally binding regulations does not make the standards 
generally binding themselves. In order to be generally binding – according to the 
law – the regulation must be laid down by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament. The 
NEN-standards cannot be considered as such, since they are private agreements 
established by representatives of organisations having an interest in the use by 
everyone of one general standard. The regulatory authority did not lay down the 
standards, it merely declared the NEN-standards applicable and therefore generally 
prevailing; setting the standards everyone at least or by equivalence should comply 
with. By consequence, according to the Court of Appeal the NEN-standards do 
not fall under the scope of the Dutch Constitution or the Dutch Publication Act. 
531 State vs. Knooble and Knooble vs. NNI, CoA The Hague, 16 November 2010 (LJN: BO4175).
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The NEN-standards have been published by the NNI and are sufficiently known 
to the public; they can be examined at the NNI or acquired against payment. 
Knooble filed an appeal in cassation on 15 February 2011.
Contrary to the Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal does not recognise the 
competence of the legislature to turn private standards into public law. In the 
case of City Crash against the Mayor and Alderman of ‘s-Hertogenbosch the 
Council of State on 2 February 2011 denied the appeal. The Council of State judged 
that although the NEN-standards have binding effect, they cannot be considered 
generally binding rules within the meaning of Article 89 of the Dutch Constitution; 
therefore the Dutch Publication Act does not apply. The way the standards are 
made known (either against fair payment or by copy for inspection) is sufficient 
to safeguard that they can be consulted by everyone.532
In the mean time the Dutch Legislative Drafting Instructions (Aanwijzingen voor 
de regelgeving, Article 91a) were adjusted in such a way that in principle reference 
to private normalisation standards in legislation can only be done in a non-binding 
way (merely providing evidentiary presumption).533 
If and when however a binding reference is made to private standards in legislation, 
the standards must be known and available to the public. The Dutch government 
on 30 June 2011 presented their intention to make some standards available free 
of charge.534
Furthermore, on November 30, 2010, Douwe Egberts announced that as of January 
1, 2011, they will extend their sustainable product range with Fairtrade certified 
products for the whole-sale market.535 However, there are still pending court 
cases where Douwe Egberts fights against the Fair Trade monopoly in public 
procurement.
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16. The outside of private food law
The case of braided private regulation in Dutch dairy 
viewed in the light of competition law
Maria Litjens, Bernd van der Meulen and Harry Bremmers536
16.1 Introduction
Regulation of food safety and food quality no longer is exclusively a public interest. 
Since the 1990s also entrepreneurs have taken responsibility by developing private 
regulation systems. Private systems in the domain of food production probably 
affect all or almost all businesses one way or another. They either adopt private 
rules to align the level of the quality of their products to their customers’ demands, 
or, ultimately, they are excluded from the market. To counteract this last effect 
the Dutch Competition Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit; NMa) 
in 2000 took a decision that created a temporary hitch in the increase of private 
regulation. The NMa refused to grant exemption from the ban on cartels to a 
private regulation system of an association of dairy processors. In this quality 
arrangement virtually all dairy processors on the market in the Netherlands 
participated. It set rules for their suppliers, dairy farmers, and was considered 
likely to lead to exclusion of non-participating farmers because of lack of outlet. 
The NMa’s decision seemed to limit the expansion of private regulation. Although 
private regulation more and more embeds in the food chain, no new similar NMa 
decisions followed. Have the private regulation systems become more adjusted 
to the requirements of competition policy or did the NMa change their policy or 
practices?
Key questions that can be asked are: Who makes private regulation systems, who 
should comply with them, how do systems relate to each other, what is their effect 
in the market and how do they relate to the first decision of the NMa regarding 
this topic? Did the competition policy change or did the competition authority 
in the Netherlands redefine her role regarding these initiatives of businesses?
The first objective of this chapter is to identify different private regulation systems. 
Once the regulatory private food law systems governing food safety and quality have 
been investigated, the competition policy and the positioning of the competition 
authority towards the new reality are addressed.
536 This chapter elaborates on Litjens, M., 2009. Private regulation in the Dutch dairy chain. In: B. van der 
Meulen (ed.) Reconciling food law to competiveness, Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, 
the Netherlands, pp. 101-107.
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The methodology which is applied is a case study. Data were gathered by means of 
interviews with key players in the feed and food domains in addition to a desktop 
study including literature, websites, decisions and other documents from the Dutch 
competition authority and case law. The topic covered is private food safety and 
quality regulation in the dairy supply chain in the Netherlands, including the feed 
chain supplying dairy farmers. This case study is based on an empirical inventory 
of actors and the systems these actors apply, giving special attention to the way 
different systems refer to and rely on each other, thus ‘braiding’ themselves into 
a web of connected private systems.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. First we will provide 
necessary background information on the concepts which are used and on some 
peculiarities of the governance of food safety and quality in the Netherlands and 
provide the structure of the analysis applied in this chapter (section 16.2). Then 
the main part of this chapter (section 16.3) takes the reader through the different 
stages of the feed and dairy chain by presenting the different elements of the 
entanglement of the systems. Subsequently, these are the processing businesses, 
their cooperation platforms and – last but not least – the private systems they 
have formulated. Next (section 16.4) all elements (private systems and their 
interconnections), are put together again to form a ‘big picture’ – literally. The 
big picture provides the foundation for addressing the repositioning of the public 
competition authority vis à vis the new private governance of quality assurance. 
This is done in section 16.5. This chapter concludes with summarising the findings 
with respect to the objective of this research in section 16.6.
16.2 Background
16.2.1 Nomenclature
In this chapter we use the label ‘private regulation’. ‘Regulation’ refers to specific 
activities to standardise outcomes by rules. We prefer ‘private regulation’ to label 
rules set by private actors over ‘self-regulation’. The latter label may invoke the 
image that the regulated party participates voluntarily in the system and has the 
initiative in the formulation of the rules or at least takes part in it. Participation 
may be voluntary as understood in contract law theory, because parties bind 
themselves through a meeting of minds resulting in explicit agreement. As will 
be shown below, it is not voluntary in economic reality, because saying ‘no’ is 
not a viable option. Also, generally regulated actors do not or only to a limited 
extent participate in setting the rules.
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In analysing private regulation of food quality, including food safety and food 
hygiene537 requirements, we can distinguish rules to be applied by the addressed 
businesses and additional rules necessary to make these rules work. The former 
we call ‘standard’, the latter ‘scheme’. Standard and scheme taken together form 
a ‘system’. A standard is a set of rules concerning topics such as product, process 
and business management of food companies. The standard may apply to quite 
a large number of regulated actors. A scheme provides rules regarding authority 
over the system, coordination and control with regard to its execution including 
topics such as certification and audit.
16.2.2 Private regulation and public hygiene law
Although the subject of this research is private regulation, some attention will be 
paid to public food law as well. From Hygiene Regulation 852/2004 European and 
national public authorities derive the power to acknowledge a private standard 
as a guide to good practice. Such recognition confirms the accuracy of the 
implementation of public rules on hygiene of foodstuffs in the private standard at 
issue.538 Sometimes a public authority in its acknowledgement explicitly excludes 
certain rules in the standard that go beyond statutory requirements. Thus this 
exclusion expresses the view of public authorities on exclusively private rules in 
the standard. Rules of a scheme are not included in the acknowledgement. This 
does not mean, however, they are not relevant from a public law point of view.
Dutch public enforcement authorities shift emphasis from public controls on 
businesses and on products to supervision on private controls. In this context 
the rules of the scheme are at the centre of attention. While there is no formal 
acknowledgement as there is for standards, the acceptance of schemes as relevant 
in official controls, grants the some status under public law.
16.2.3 Public yet private product boards
An important role in the development of private regulation in the Dutch dairy 
sector is played by product boards. Product boards are a typical Dutch form of 
537 According to Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation 852/2004 ‘hygiene’ means the measures and conditions 
necessary to control hazards and to ensure fitness for human consumption of a foodstuff taking into 
account its intended use. In this sense ‘hygiene’ equals ‘food safety’ viewed from business perspective. 
Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
hygiene of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union L 139, 30/4/2004: 1-54.
538 Article 8 and 9 Regulation (EC) 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union L 139, 30/4/2004: 1-54.
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government.539 They are mandatory associations set up by Act of Parliament 
and for that reason enjoy the status of a public authority. It is compulsory for 
businesses dealing with products within the scope of a board to be registered and to 
contribute a fee.540 The management of a product board consists of representatives 
of associations of employers and employees in the relevant branches. The 
management has the statutory power to issue regulations of a public law nature 
that are binding upon the members.541 However, as associations of businesses, 
instead of exercising their regulatory powers, product boards can also act on 
a private law basis for the sake of the businesses in the branches within their 
scope.542 This makes product boards public and private law hybrids.
16.2.4 Structure of analysis
All businesses engaged in production of any sorts need inputs. Outputs again are 
inputs for businesses downstream in the production chain. Upstream the chain 
stretches as far as businesses source inputs from other businesses. As we will 
see below, as far as private regulation is concerned, the dairy chain is closely 
connected to the animal feed chain from where dairy farmers source inputs. For 
this reason, in the analysis, we include the feed branches.
Products move downstream from producers of ingredients of animal feed to 
producers of compound feed, to dairy farmers, to dairy processors, to retail and 
finally to consumers. Private regulatory requirements move upstream: retail setting 
standards for processors, which in their turn make requirements to farmers, 
which put their demands on feed suppliers. In this sense we see two streams 
flowing in opposite directions. A product stream flowing from producers towards 
retailers. When we use the expressions ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ they refer 
to this product stream. In the second stream requirements flow from retailers 
towards producers. In the coming analysis of private regulation we follow this 
539 They are based on Article 134 of the Constitution of the Netherlands. In English translation (available 
at: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties-pb51/the-constitution-of-the-
kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.html), this provision reads:
Article 134
1. Public bodies for the professions and trades and other public bodies may be established and dissolved 
by or pursuant to Act of Parliament.
2. The duties and organisation of such bodies, the composition and powers of their administrative organs 
and public access to their meetings shall be regulated by Act of Parliament. Legislative powers may be 
granted to their administrative organs by or pursuant to Act of Parliament.
3. (…).
540 Product boards (productschappen) are vertically integrated public bodies for trades. Next to product 
boards exist industrial boards (bedrijfschappen) with a horizontal nature. In this chapter these are not 
addressed. On this system see also: http://www.ser.nl/sitecore/content/Internet/en/About_the_SER/
Statutory_trade_organisation.aspx.
541 On this issue, see also Chapter 7 by Otto Hospes.
542 Article 71 Industrial Organisation Act (Wet op de bedrijfsorganisatie: WBO). Available at: http://
wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002058/ [In Dutch].
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flow of requirements moving upstream from the point of view of production, as 
expressed in Figure 16.1.
…  
Quality 
arrangements
Direction eect 
Permanent cooperation
Direction eect Temporary cooperation
Food chain 
Producers of 
raw materials 
Feed 
manufacturers 
Dairy farmers 
Dairy 
processors 
Retailers 
Consumers 
Product ow 
Private regulation 
Figure 16.1. Structure of analysis of private regulation in the Dutch dairy chain.
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16.3 Private regulation structured in the food chain
16.3.1 Sale of dairy products
In the Netherlands 99% of dairy sales to consumers take place in supermarkets.543 
The Netherlands is a small country with a high retail concentration. Retail chains 
cooperating in three retail purchase combinations account for more than 70% of 
all food sales.544 
The Dutch association of retailers (Centraal Bureau Levensmiddelen: CBL) has 
drawn up a hygiene code for retailers. This code restates statutory requirements 
but does not add any requirements of its own. Therefore it is not stricter than 
the law. It is just a standard not connected to a scheme. Application is left to 
the discretion of the individual supermarket owners, no audits or certification 
takes place. No schemes exist which address retailers, neither at global nor at 
European level.
The so-called retailer standards set up by retailer organisations in several European 
countries do not address retailers, but provide retailers’ requirements to be fulfilled 
by their suppliers. Nowadays all Dutch retailers require their suppliers of retailer-
branded products to comply with the BRC or IFS545 food safety standard.546 Dutch 
retailers, as well as CBL, are member of GlobalGAP. GlobalGAP is a private regulation 
system with rules for the primary sector.
Dutch retailers support the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). GFSI is an 
international cooperation of retailers. It has developed a guide on benchmarking 
food safety systems.547 BRC, IFS and GlobalGAP systems as well a few other 
systems are recognised with a view to mutual exchangeability of these certification 
systems.548 Dairy businesses have to apply GFSI benchmarked food safety standards 
set by retailer organisations to acquire access to the supermarket shelves in the 
Netherlands.
543 See www.prodzuivel.nl/pz/productschap/publicaties/sjo/sjo05_engels/SJO_2005_H4.pdf, p. 42.
544 Connor, J.M., 2003. The changing structure of global food markets: dimensions, effects, and policy 
implications. In: OECD Conference on Changing Dimensions of the Food Economy: Exploring the 
Policy Issues 6-7 February 2003, the Hague, Netherlands, pp. 3-4; Dobson, P.W., 2003. Buyer power in 
food retailing: the European experience. In: OECD Conference on Changing Dimensions of the Food 
Economy: Exploring the Policy Issues, 6-7 February 2003, The Hague, Netherlands, pp. 4-6.
545 BRC = Global Standard of British Retail Consortium; IFS = International Food Standard of German 
and French retailer organisations.
546 Havinga, T., 2006. Private regulation of food safety by supermarkets. Law and Policy 28(4): 515-533. 
As an example see: http://www.frieslandcampina.com/english/responsibility/foqus-for-quality.aspx.
547 See http://www.mygfsi.com/information-resources/gfsiguidancedocumentsixthedition.html.
548 For more detail see Chapter 3 by Bernd van der Meulen and Chapter 4 by Theo Appelhof.
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16.3.2 Processed milk products
In the Netherlands 10 dairy businesses, one huge and nine relatively small, process 
virtually all milk.549 This small number of businesses is the result of a long process 
of concentration. The businesses process raw milk into cheese (60%), butter 
(30%) and consumption milk (10%). Some 60% of the Dutch dairy production 
is for export, mainly to other EU-countries (Germany, France and Belgium). To 
comply with retail’s requirements, Dutch dairy processors are certified for the 
BRC standard or standards recognised as equivalent under GFSI, such as IFS, 
FSSC 22000 or Dutch HACCP.
Processors in turn request their suppliers to comply with private standards. At 
the end of the last Millennium processors with a total market share of 98% in the 
Netherlands and so virtually all dairy farmers as their suppliers created the joint 
quality system KKM (Keten Kwaliteit Melk; chain quality milk) and according 
to the Netherlands’ Competition Act as it stood at that moment, submitted an 
application for an exemption from the ban on cartels to the NMa. In 2000 the NMa 
refused to exempt this joint system. KKM-requirements went beyond statutory 
requirements. Dairy farmers producing according to legal requirements but not 
according to KKM should not be denied all market access.550 The NMa judged 
the total exclusion of non-KKM milk which resulted from the agreement of the 
dairy processors to be incompatible with competition law. Then each processor 
went for its own private quality system. These processor systems are legally 
positioned as an element of the general terms and conditions of purchase or as a 
recognition scheme linked to an article in the cooperative society constitution.551 
All these systems have been constructed by the same certification organisation, 
the successor of the foundation KKM, which is currently named Qlip. The only 
exception was the quality system of Friesland Foods. After the merger of Friesland 
Foods and Campina in 2008 into FrieslandCampina the quality standard (‘Foqus’) 
replaced the previous standards of both businesses. Foqus is based on retailer 
schemes benchmarked by GFSI.552 This merger resulted in one quality system 
for 80-85% of the market of Dutch raw milk. Foqus and KKM, the standard used 
by other processors,553 are both monitored by Qlip (who owns the KKM system). 
The requirements of processors stretch further upstream into the feed chain. All 
Dutch dairy processors’ quality standards for raw milk (Foqus and the individual 
KKM based systems) require dairy farmers to only purchase feed that has been 
GMP+ certified and meets some further requirements. The processors of meat in 
549 An insignificant quantity is processed on the farm and by some very small processors. See http://
www.nzo.nl and http://www.prodzuivel.nl.
550 NMa 14 March 2000, case 1237: Ontheffingsaanvraag Stichting Keten Kwaliteit Melk. Available at: 
http://www.nmanet.nl [in Dutch].
551 See http://www.qlip.nl and http://www.frieslandcampina.com. 
552 See http://www.frieslandcampina.com/english/responsibility/foqus-for-quality.aspx.
553 For example, http://www.deltamilk.nl, also http://www.Noorderlandmelk.nl.
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the Netherlands apply the same strategy. Together these requirements virtually 
exclude non-GMP+ certified feed from the market for feeding cattle.
The requirements of processors regarding feed go beyond GMP+ certification. 
In 2005 Friesland Foods and Campina (at that moment still two independent 
processors in the dairy chain, together with >80% market share) and a processor 
in the meat chain (Vion, earlier named Sovion; a company with >80% of the Dutch 
slaughterhouse capacity) published their intention to require farmers to only use 
certified feed from suppliers with an adequate liability insurance. They obliged 
feed suppliers to have an insurance covering all losses caused by contaminated 
feed including consequential losses suffered in processing and sale such as recall 
costs.554 At that time only six Dutch feed processors could fulfil these requirements. 
They had created a new foundation named TrusQ to collaborate in control of 
ingredients, to share data and to conclude a common insurance high enough 
to cover all possible damages. The costs of this insurance would be too high for 
each individual processor. In the text of its quality scheme, Qarant, Friesland 
Foods chose not to mention TrusQ by name, but it phrased the requirements 
for feed in such a way that only TrusQ companies would be able to comply. In 
reaction to TrusQ other feed processors set up a foundation called Safe Feed. In 
2007 Campina wrote Safe Feed a letter communicating a joint approach with six 
other dairy processors. On top of the requirements at that moment met by Safe 
Feed, the dairy processors required quality guarantees, electronic monitoring of 
feed and checks of the private insurance of feed manufacturers.555
GMP+, TrusQ and Safe Feed will be discussed in more detail in the sections below.
16.3.3 Raw milk
About 18,000 dairy farmers in the Netherlands produce 12 billion kg of milk a 
year. To comply with the requirements made or passed on by the processors, 
virtually all of the farmers are certified for Foqus or KKM.
Primary producers are organised in the Dutch Organisation for Agriculture 
and Horticulture (Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie: LTO)556 and/or the Dutch 
Dairy Farmers Union (Nederlandse Melkveehouders Vakbond: NMV).557 LTO in 
cooperation with TrusQ, Safe Feed and the slaughterhouse Vion have drafted a 
554 Sources: http://www.trusq.nl/nieuws_details.php?pID=22 (no longer available, consulted 2008) and 
http://www.frieslandfoods.com/content/zoeken/news.asp?id=2520 (no longer available, consulted 
2008). This joint press release is included in a thesis by M. Willems, 2007. Productaansprakelijkheid in 
de agrarische sector. Thesis Juridische Hogeschool Avans-Fontys, ’s Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands, 
Bijlage VIII. Available at: http://hbo-kennisbank.uvt.nl/cgi/av/show.cgi?fid=2419.
555 Letter dated 30-03-2007 of Campina to Safe Feed (referentienr. 2007116/AS/avl) (unpublished).
556 http://www.lto.nl.
557 http://www.nmv.nu.
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model agreement for use by farmers when purchasing feed. It complies with the 
requirements of FrieslandCampina (dairy) and Vion (meat), in that it requires 
GMP+ certification and additional insurance such as organised in the context 
of TrusQ and Safe Feed.558 No additional requirements on behalf of the farmers 
seem to have been set by the farmer’s organisation. The model agreement grants 
the dairy and meat processors, as the customers of the farmers, the right to 
access information relating to product quality and the insurance policy of the 
feed processor.
NMV does not occupy itself with food safety and quality but focuses on fair prices 
for its members.559
16.3.4 Compound feed
Among the most vulnerable products used on dairy farms are feeds not produced 
on the farm. Most feeds (around 75%), such as grass and maize, are produced on 
the farm. The remaining 25% is purchased feed. This feed is known as compound 
(or mixed) feed. Usually a compound feed comprises about twenty different 
ingredients.
Some 150 compound feed manufacturers supply the dairy farmers in the 
Netherlands. About half of the mixed feed used in the Netherlands originates 
from outside the EU, a quarter from other EU Member States and a quarter is of 
Dutch origin but may include imported ingredients.
Almost all Dutch compound feed producers are certified by the quality system 
GMP+. GMP+ has been developed by the Product Board Animal Feed (Productschap 
Diervoeder; PDV).560 For some years GMP+ was a public law-based, but voluntary, 
regulation. The Product Board, however, changed it to a private law based system. 
Despite this private law character, due to its association with the Product Board 
GMP+ to some extent retained its public law image which contributed to its 
smooth implementation. Almost all mixed feed processors use GMP+. The branch 
association of feed manufacturers ‘Nevedi’, representing 96% of feed production 
in the Netherlands, requires in its code of conduct the use of GMP+.561 Among 
558 See http://www.gezond-ondernemen.nl/nl/25222812-Basis_Inkoopvoorwaarden_Varkenshouderij.
html. Also applicable for dairy farmers.
559 In 2006 NMV initiated the Dutch Dairymen Board (DDB); an association intended to negotiate jointly 
on behalf of the member dairy farmers with processors, because they consider current positions of 
parties to be such that the milk price is not determined by the market but by the processors (http://
www.ddb.nu). DDB signed up to the European Milk Board (EMB) to reach a fair milk price of 40 cent/
kg milk (http://www.europeanmilkboard.org).
560 http://www.pdv.nl.
561 Source: http://www.nevedi.com/uploads/Gedragscode%20Nevedi.pdf (no longer available, 
consulted 2008).
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the requirements of milk and meat processors a GMP+ certificate has become a 
license to deliver for producers in the primary sector.
In 2009 a part of the associations of businesses involved in the Product Board set 
a next step in privatisation of GMP+. The public law disposition of the Product 
Board became too restrictive. The associations established a foundation: ‘GMP+ 
International’. The ownership of the GMP+ system is transferred into the hands 
of this private organisation.562
The scope of GMP+ continuously expands. GMP+ started as a regulation for 
compound feed processors only, but now GMP+ comprises different standards to 
regulate all kind of activities performed by other branches in the feed chain, like 
production of raw materials, transport, storage, compound feed processing. This 
expansion, however, is not reflected in the composition of the board of GMP+ 
International. Not all business associations have a say in GMP+ International.
GMP+ has been brought in line with other standards like OVOCOM (Belgium), 
QS (Germany) and AIC (Great Britain). Certification for any of these systems is 
accepted as fulfilment of GMP+.
Together with the European Feed Manufacturers’ Federation (FEFAC)563 the owners 
of these systems established a joint association, the International Feed Safety 
Alliance (IFSA), with the aim – among other things – to construct a common 
standard IFIS (IFSA Feed Ingredient Standard) for compound feed and raw 
materials.564 As is explained below, this attempt to turn these standards into a 
single standard did not meet with success.
In practice GMP+ certification alone was not considered to be sufficient assurance 
of a safe supply of raw materials. So, further collaboration in the mixed feed branch 
was undertaken, going beyond private regulation. Six compound feed producers 
created the foundation TrusQ. TrusQ is a co-operative alliance with a total market 
share in the Netherlands of 60 to 80%.565 The aim of TrusQ is to ensure safe feed 
(and food), but also to provide insurance against safety incidents. A common 
insurance for the TrusQ-members covers damages related to legal liability to a 
maximum of €75 million.566 TrusQ was closed to other Dutch manufacturers (foreign 
manufacturers, however, have always been welcome to join). This prompted the 
establishment of Safe Feed.567
562 http://www.gmpplus.org.
563 http://www.fefac.org.
564 Source: http://www.ifsa-info.net (no longer available, consulted 2009).
565 As stated in 2008 on http://www.trusq.nl.
566 Source: http://www.trusq.nl/nieuws_details.php?pID=26 (no longer available, consulted 2008).
567 Source: http://www.demolenaar.nl/nieuws/show-nieuws.asp?id=596 (no longer available, consulted 
2008).
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The two foundations, TrusQ and Safe Feed, go beyond audits and certification 
on the basis of GMP+. They also organise control of supply and suppliers. In 
addition they collect and exchange information to improve transparency in the 
chain.568 Individual businesses contribute with capital and labour. The foundations 
monitor the input of materials for the benefit of the participants. Participants in 
these schemes are not allowed to purchase raw materials from non-complying 
suppliers.569 Unlike TrusQ, Safe Feed does not organise insurance for its participants, 
but it requires participants to take care of insurance individually.570 Such insurance 
should cover damages from €2 to €5 million for different types of risks.
The supplementary requirements to GMP+ are tuned to the demands of processors 
of primary products downstream in the product chain.571 In June 2009 Safe Feed 
and TrusQ started to explore possibilities to cooperate.572 It took a while before 
concrete results became visible. On 30 March 2011 a press release notified the 
world of the decision to merge as from the 1st of July 2011 and to create a new 
organisation under the name TRUST FEED. This new organisation will come to 
cover close to 100% of the market.
16.3.5 Raw feed materials
Raw materials for compound feed are the so-called single feed ingredients, by-
products and additives. Single feed ingredients are soy, grain, maize, and tapioca. 
By-products come from the food industry. Additives have the form of single additives 
or of premixes (a combination of additives). Ingredients are interchangeable. 
Mixed feed has different composition depending on the requirements. There are 
no data available about quantities of specific materials used in compound feed.
The feed ingredients sector in Europe consists of a considerable number of 
producers and traders. Many of them are organised in associations on national, 
European and global level. More than a dozen of the European associations jointly 
formed the European Feed Ingredients Platform (EFIP).573 EFIP is a voluntary 
platform encouraging the use of guides to good practice. It evaluates these private 
law sector guides on the implementation of public law requirements. A benchmark 
standard has been drawn up to describe the minimum requirements. One of the 
member organisations of EFIP, the foundation FAMI-QS, owns a sector guide for 
568 See http://www.safefeed.nl/data/Feed%20Safety%20Data%20Sheet%20EN.doc, including 
explanation [English text, but only available on the Dutch website].
569 http://www.trusq.nl and http://www.pdv.nl/lmbinaries/08_leverancierbeoordeling_(roordink).pdf.
570 http://www.safefeed.nl.
571 http://www.safefeed.nl/desktopdefault.aspx?panelid=90&tabindex=2&tabid=175, and http://
www.gezond-ondernemen.nl/nl/25222812-Basis_Inkoopvoorwaarden_Varkenshouderij.html, also 
applicable for dairy farmers.
572 Source: Press release http://www.safefeed.nl: SAFE FEED and TRUSQ examine the possibilities of 
coöperation (no longer available).
573 http://www.efip-ingredients.org.
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feed additives and pre-mixtures and linked it to a certification scheme. Establishing 
FAMI-QS was considered the perfect way for a dozen of multinationals in Europe 
to have a voice in private rules addressing their products. FAMI-QS is now required 
for virtually all imports into the European Union. Participation in FAMI-QS means 
submitting to an obligation to use the guide of good practice and to contribute 
financially for controls and certification. The FAMI-QS-guide is approved by the 
European Commission and recognised as a Community Guide to Good Practice.574 
EFIP contributes successfully to the development of standardisation of other raw 
materials. The activities of the processors of feed ingredients in the EFIP platform 
outshone the IFSA initiative mentioned above. Their IFIS-standard was not put 
into operation.
The owners of the four national standards continued with their own standards. 
The owner of GMP+ has recognised FAMI-QS as equivalent. Certified products 
in one system are accepted in the other.
16.4 The big picture
The findings discussed above, can be graphically represented as shown in Figure 
16.2. The starting point is Figure 16.1 (see section 16.2.4). The first column 
represents the feed and food production with a downstream flow of products. 
The other columns form an elaboration of the flow of private regulation and 
additional activities as explored in the former sections. The sequence in the 
discussion above is in the diagram pictured upwards, just like the right column in 
Figure 16.1. The second column in Figure 16.2 holds different private regulation 
systems. Collaboration based on private regulation and public-private activities 
are placed in separate columns.
The second column expresses private food safety arrangements established by 
single businesses, associations of businesses or vertically integrated organisations 
such as Product Boards. Beside the sector in which a private system is established, 
also the effects in other branches are shown. Associations of retailers establish 
common systems for suppliers and the primary sector. These regulations apply 
in a vertical direction (BRC, GlobalGAP). The use of the standards is voluntary, 
but economic dependency brings such a need to do so that choice is an illusion.
Dairy processors require corporate standards to be applied by their suppliers. The 
relation between regulator and regulated is in a vertical direction, upstream. The 
quality systems are either part of general conditions and terms of purchasing 
contracts and thus of the existing contractual relations or linked to the articles 
of association of a cooperative society (FrieslandCampina) and form in this way 
574 Press release January 2007: FAMI-QS recognized as Community Guide to Good Practice. Available 
at: http://www.fami-qs.org/Press%20Release%20EU%20Guide%201.pdf.
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part of membership obligations. Either way they acquire a contractual binding 
character. These two legal constructions can also occur in combination.
Food chain Public-private tuning and collaborationPrivate regulation 
Cooperation based on 
private regulation 
Producers of 
raw materials 
Feed 
manufacturers 
Dairy farmers 
Dairy 
processors 
Retailers 
Consumers 
EFIP Benchmark
FAMI-QS … …
Cooperation in the dairy chain
… Quality arrangements
Direction eect 
Permanent cooperation
Direction eect Temporary cooperation
Covenant 
Food Safety
Authority (VWA)
Safe 
Feed
KKM 
BRC Global GAP 
National  
ApprovalTrusQ
GFSI benchmark
Friesland Campina
withFoqus
Approval EC
GMP+
LTO conditions
Nevedi  code 
Agreement processors
and slaughterhouse
Figure 16.2. The external relations of private schemes in the Dutch dairy chain.
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Other businesses use some form of KKM created by the same independent 
foundation. Unsurprisingly, all KKM schemes are similar.575 Foqus and the 
KKM-standards include the obligation for farmers to use GMP+ certified feed. 
Horizontally developed common standards and corporate standards have effects 
in vertical regulation where regulator and regulated are not the same. In other 
parts of the production chain standards are established by company networks, 
Product Boards or associations of companies. These regulations apply in horizontal 
as well as vertical direction, thus also imposing standards on suppliers (GMP+). 
The use of the standards is voluntary, but again strongly motivated by external 
drivers. Some quality arrangements have a chain character in that they set a 
number of standards for different sectors that are geared to each other (GMP+).
The third column expresses how on top of food quality arrangements stakeholders 
have joined forces on the basis of private law. Cooperation has different aspects. 
TrusQ and Safe Feed are established as foundations with input from and output 
for individual businesses. GMP+ provides an interesting case in that even an 
association not involved in setting the standard (Nevedi) applies it as a prerequisite 
for membership. By mutual agreement with associations of suppliers and customers 
LTO created a model for general terms and conditions to feed purchasing contracts 
including GMP+ and information requirements. Gentlemen’s agreements between 
dairy processors and a slaughterhouse chain produced additional insurance 
requirements regarding feed purchased by farmers. These joined forces increase 
the necessity to submit to participation in a private regulation system.
Public-private cooperation is positioned in the fourth column. Private regulation 
does not operate in isolation from public law. Public recognition of quality standards 
as guides of good practice and public-private covenants create the possibility to 
reduce public controls. The food safety authority (Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit; 
VWA) entered into consultations with the standard owner (GMP+) and with the 
businesses cooperating in the implementation of the standard (covenant TrusQ-
VWA). The objective was to come to recognition of the food safety arrangements 
but also to establish trust in their implementation. Such trust would justify a 
policy of the food safety authority to reduce public controls. Regulation 882/2004, 
in Article 3(1), requires food safety controls to be risk based. The (former) Dutch 
ministry of agriculture (now Economic affairs, Agriculture and Innovation) has 
formulated a policy on supervision of controls strongly advocating to include in 
the assessment of risk requiring controls the presence (or absence) of trustworthy 
private schemes.576
575 Until 2007 all schemes were available online.
576 See http://english.minlnv.nl/portal/page?_pageid=116,1640593&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. 
On this topic see also Van der Meulen, B.M.J. and Freriks, A.A., 2006. Millefeuille. The emergence of a 
multi-layered controls system in the European food sector. Utrecht Law Review 2(1): 156-176.
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The current case study shows that private systems do not stand alone. They 
are embedded in cooperation arrangements and connected to each other. The 
processes of linking food safety arrangements multiply the effect of these systems 
(dotted lines in the diagram). The connections have different styles.A quality 
system can impose an obligation on the regulated business operators to comply 
with another system as well, for example by using certified materials (all private 
systems of dairy processors addressing farmers hold the obligation to use GMP+ 
feed). A condition for participation in an association may do the same (Nevedi 
for GMP+ certification).
Mutual recognition of independent systems is a different style of connection. The 
owners of systems recognise each other’s systems. Certification for one standard is 
accepted as proof of compliance with the requirements of another standard. This 
applies for example to FAMI-QS and GMP+, GMP+ with Ovocom, QS and AIC. 
This example shows that linking may have effects far beyond the production of 
feed and food in the Netherlands. Mutual recognition may have a similar effect 
in the market as one system at European or even worldwide level.
Benchmarking is a process whereby recognition of systems as equivalent is done 
not by the system owners among each other, but by a third party. Benchmarking 
may be done on the basis of an independent guide as yardstick.577 The GFSI 
benchmark of retailers holds requirements for systems like BRC and GlobalGAP. The 
benchmark standard ‘Feed Ingredient Standard for sector guides’ of EFIP includes 
only legal requirements, which the sector guides of the member-organisations have 
to contain.578 We even see that systems can be connected by simple agreement 
among businesses (Friesland Foods, Campina and Vion) to place obligations upon 
their suppliers.
For all practical purposes, it has become difficult – indeed next to impossible – 
to place feed and dairy products on the Dutch market without fulfilling private 
law requirements. Food quality and safety arrangements combined by all kinds 
of connection radiate the food quality requirements through the length and the 
breadth of the dairy chain.
16.5 Developments in competition law
As shown in the previous sections most systems and the connections between 
them are a result of cooperation between businesses. The empirical mapping 
provides a picture of such density, that it is appropriate to label the appearing 
577 The term ‘benchmark’ used in the dairy chain differs from the definition used in food quality 
management. See: Luning, P.A., Marcelis, W.J. and Jongen, W.M.F., 2002. Food quality management. A 
techno-managerial approach. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands, p. 277.
578 http://www.efip-ingredients.org.
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private regulatory infrastructure as ‘braided’. What we see is a web where private 
regulations are so closely ‘knitted’, ‘entangled’, ‘felted’ or however one wants to 
express it, that it seems to have become one interconnected structure.
Initially the NMa set limits, but what happened after that first decision? The 
developments in competition law and policy and their relevance to cooperation 
in the sphere of food quality are described in the following subsections.579
16.5.1 Competition law
Since 1998, Dutch competition law aligned itself to EU competition law. The 
Netherlands’ Competition Act holds a prohibition on cartels in parallel to the first 
paragraph of Article 101 TFEU, the former Article 81 EC.580
Article 6(1) of the Competition Act reads:
Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices of undertakings, which have the intention to or will 
result in hindrance, impediment or distortion of competition on the Dutch 
market or on a part thereof, are prohibited.
According to the third paragraph, of Article 101 TFEU (81(3) EC)581 the prohibition 
on cartels may be declared inapplicable in the case of an agreement or concerted 
practice ‘which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit’ if certain additional conditions are met. Initially, 
under Regulation 17/62582, to become operational this exception needed a decision 
from the European Commission to exempt a certain agreement or practice on 
the basis of an application.
Dutch national law has a comparable rule initially resulting in an equal approach. 
Article 6(3) of the Competition Act reads:
Section (1) shall not apply to agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
which contribute to the improvement of production or distribution, or to the 
579 On the details of competition law see Chapter 17 by Fabian Stancke.
580 Mededingingswet. A brief explanation in English is available, see: http://www.nma.nl/en/legal_
powers/dutch_competition_act/default.aspx.
581 EU, 2010. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (Lisbon). 
Official Journal of the European Union C 83, 3/3/2010: 47-199.
582 EU, 1962. EEC Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962 implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty. Offical Journal of the European Union 13/204 (last amended 2003 by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules of competition laid down in articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, Official Journal L 1/4/1/2003: 1) Official Journal of the European Union L 1: 1.
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promotion of technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a 
fair share of the resulting benefits, and which do not:
a.  impose any restrictions on the undertakings concerned, ones that are 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, or
b.  afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products and services in question.
Until 2004, businesses had to apply for an exemption for agreements with 
competition restrictions like the foundation KKM did for her quality arrangement 
in 2000.
16.5.2 Private systems grappling with competition law
Associations of dairy processors and farmers had initiated an integrated quality 
system for milk. This system was called KKM (Keten Kwaliteit Melk; chain quality 
milk). The processors concerned had a total market share of 98% of raw milk 
in the Netherlands. So virtually all dairy farmers were their suppliers and had 
to join this system. The NMa did not grant the exemption. KKM-requirements 
went beyond statutory requirements. Dairy farmers producing according to legal 
requirements but not according to KKM should not be denied all market access. 
The NMa judged the total exclusion of non-KKM milk which resulted from the 
agreement to be incompatible with the competition law ban on cartels. So at the 
turn of the Millennium, the deployment of a private regulatory infrastructure 
seemed to suffer a serious setback as it ran into trouble with competition law.
In 2002 the organisations involved in KKM made an attempt to bring KKM within 
the ambit of public law and thus outside the scope of competition law. They 
convinced the Dutch Dairy Board (Productschap Zuivel) to turn KKM from a 
private standard into a law-based regulation. For reasons not relevant in the 
current context, this regulation was struck down by the courts. The processors 
were back to square one.
After these setbacks to a collective quality system, dairy processors implemented 
individual private quality systems. Although these systems strongly resemble 
each other as well as the previous KKM and collectively they have probably the 
same excluding effect on non-qualified milk as KKM had, the NMa did not react 
as would have been expected on the basis of their previous decision. This decision 
included an explicit warning for businesses not to continue the forbidden agreement 
individually. However, in an informal opinion requested by Friesland Foods the 
NMa expressed no intention to look at the content of standards. In this informal 
opinion the NMa stated that individual processors, even with a dominant position, 
are permitted to set a quality standard for suppliers. Independent decisions of 
dairy processors fall outside the scope of the ban on cartels even if individual 
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standards mutually bear resemblance.583 This informal opinion did not repeal 
the former decision. Nonetheless, the informal opinion expresses more leeway 
for private standards. Just one private food safety system has been subject of 
investigation by the NMa since 2000.584
In December 2008 the two biggest dairy processors in the Netherlands, Friesland 
Foods and Campina, merged into FrieslandCampina. FrieslandCampina is now 
the third largest dairy processing company in the world. In the Netherlands it 
has a share of 80-85% of the dairy supply market. The European Commission 
authorised the merger. Neither the Commission nor the NMa raised any objections 
to the effect of a common quality standard (now Foqus), alone or together with 
KKM, on the market.
The informal opinions after the first decision did not throw light on the acceptability 
of private systems. Further on in the field of competition law private regulation 
submerged into silence.
16.5.3 Change in competition policy
A change in competition policy or law could provide an explanation. Initially 
cooperating businesses had to apply for an exemption. At EU level this changed 
with the coming into force of Regulation 1/2003585 on 1 May 2004. From that 
date onwards the exception is considered to be directly applicable. It is up to the 
businesses concerned to decide if they meet the requirements for this exception. 
The role of the European Commission is limited to enforcement. The Dutch 
Competition Act has been changed in the same way. Until the 1st of August 2004 
it employed a system of exemption from the ban on cartels granted by the NMa 
by decision on application. As from the 1st of August 2004 the exception applies 
directly. Article 6(4) of the Netherlands’ Competition Act now reads:
583 NMa 14 Januari 2005, case 4258, Informele zienswijze: borgingsysteem kwaliteit productie melk. 
Available at: http://www.nmanet.nl [in Dutch].
584 NMa 25 October 2001, case 317, Algemene Voorwaarden overeenkomsten PVV/IKB Blanke 
Vleeskalveren 1997. NMa made one other informal opinion concerning agreements over anaesthetised 
castration of piglets. NMa 27 October 2008, case 6645, Informele zienswijze:verdoofd castreren van 
varkens. Available at: http://www.nmanet.nl [in Dutch].
This opinion has been analysed in: Litjens, M.E.G., 2009. Kleine ingreep. een onversneden prijsafspraak 
en ongesneden biggen. Markt en Mededinging 12(5): 161-165. This informal opinion only deals with 
the temporary price agreements included in the scheme. The effects of the quality agreements in the 
market were not taken into account.
585 EU, 2003. Council regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Offical Journal of the European 
Union L 1, 4/1/2003:1.
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Any undertaking or association of undertakings invoking section (3)586 shall 
provide proof that the conditions of that subsection are met.
From that point in time, businesses had to evaluate themselves whether they 
met the requirements. There is no obligation anymore to submit arrangements 
to the NMa.
From now on, the role of the NMa is limited to supervision and enforcement. This 
change in process does not necessitate a change in focus of the NMa. And indeed, 
the NMa-website shows that the authority keeps a close watch on the food and 
agriculture sectors of industry. Nevertheless, no private food safety systems have 
been subject of investigation by the NMa since 2004. We do not see how in the 
absence of a change in competition policy the existing silence can be explained. 
Is it a lack of interest or have the businesses convinced the NMa that initiatives 
have turned individual to the extent where they fall outside the scope of the ban 
on cartels? The last seems the most plausible explanation, but it is not easy to 
reconcile with empirical evidence. In the meantime the exclusionary effect from 
the market not only continues, but has dramatically increased as has been shown 
in the previous sections.
This sub-section shows that the competition authorities have adjusted their policies 
in two ways. The first one is that their entire role had to be redefined due to major 
shifts in European and Dutch competition law. It provided autonomy to businesses 
in evaluating competition effects of concerted action. However the NMa retained 
the task to enforce competition law. Thus the second change in policy is that the 
NMa has taken no further action with regard to private systems. However, the 
single safety and quality requirements as well as the integration in one overall 
system might be in conflict with basic competition rules. Additionally, no opinion 
is noticeable on the braiding of systems which all have similar or even the same 
characteristics. All in all, we see no other explanation of this anomaly in public 
response to private regulation than a lack of interest or insight in the ‘system of 
systems’, which we have called ‘braided’.
16.6 Conclusions and discussion
The first objective of this chapter resulted in a description of the interconnected 
field of private food safety and quality regulation in the Dutch feed and dairy 
domains. Empirical findings show, that most private arrangements go beyond 
statutory requirements. In other words, they set stricter requirements than 
public law demands.587 This case study shows that private food quality and safety 
arrangements usually do not primarily provide for obligations on the businesses 
586 Quoted in section 16.5.1.
587 Information of expert stakeholders and investigation of quality systems.
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setting them, but on one or more branches upstream. In this sense they are not 
‘self-regulation’ but imposed regulation. The level of compliance which is required 
from businesses is further raised by the links between the arrangements.
Cooperatives may use their articles of association to impose requirements upon 
their members. In other cases economic dependence of suppliers may provide 
the customer the leverage to impose private standards. With the increase of the 
market share of collective private systems the possibility for suppliers not to 
participate decreases.
As the case study shows private systems do not stand alone. They are embedded 
in cooperation arrangements and connected to each other. System owners make 
systems exchangeable by mutual recognition and benchmark. In the feed and 
dairy domains this pattern unfolds both at national and international level.
Beside horizontal expansion by exchangeability, private systems become more 
and more linked in vertical direction in the chain. Although the connections have 
different styles, the overall effect is a more binding character of private rules. 
The linking of food safety and food quality arrangements increases buyers’ power 
to steer the production process of suppliers. Finally private regulation enables 
buyers not only to regulate their suppliers’ activities, but also those of players 
further upstream in the chain. The processes of linking food safety arrangements 
multiply the effect of the systems. Horizontal and vertical integration of private 
systems leads to a food chain that we labelled 'braided' in the subtitle to this 
chapter. If we look for a more ‘legal’ label, maybe an expression such as ‘inter-
regulated’ could be considered.
In a world of inter-regulated food chains for most businesses non-participation will 
not be a viable option. In economic terms, businesses that do not participate in 
the private systems are excluded from the market. If we further take into account 
that many private standards are stricter than legislation, we are back at our point 
of departure. The exclusion that provided the main motive for the NMa not to 
grant an exemption from the ban on cartels for the KKM dairy quality system 
seems currently omnipresent.
The second objective was to describe changes in competition policy regarding 
these initiatives of businesses after the rejection of the application for exemption 
of one private regulation system: KKM. The exemption to the ban on cartels no 
longer requires an explicit decision on an application. This turns the issue from 
an administrative issue into an enforcement issue, but in our view this should 
not fundamentally alter the reasons for authority action. Thus NMa identified the 
problem in one single private system but thereafter the competition authority 
has not acted against other systems with no less exclusive effects in the market.
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The NMa has no thought for the effect of ‘braided’ private regulation. Moreover, 
this observation leaves one to wonder if competition law based on the model of 
the EC Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU with added merger control) is 
ready to deal with inter-regulated markets. It requires further research to answer 
this question.
The present developments need a more active involvement of the public competition 
authorities in the governance of private food safety and quality systems, while the 
repositioning of these has changed their role from active to reactive. Undesired 
effects of the present absence of authority involvement are exclusion of non-
participants in several branches in the food chain and the increase of power 
positions of businesses mainly at the end-stages of the supply chain.
It appears that private food law not only has an inside worthy of investigation but 
also an outside. The inside consists of the details of individual systems – standards 
with schemes. The outside is the inter-relatedness of systems that turns private 
food law into a braided system of systems with an impact on businesses rivalling 
the impact of public food law.
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17. The limit of private food law
Competition law in the food sector
Fabian Stancke588
17.1 Introduction
For a number of years, food producers and food retailers have experienced intense 
competition and margin pressure. Stagnating sales,589 combined with the current 
structure of the market lead to an intense competition among retailers, a very 
low price level for groceries in Germany and corresponding pressure on margins 
in the food sector.590 This margin pressure leads in turn to fierce competition 
among food producers. At the same time, competition authorities intensify their 
pressure on the industry by way of multiplying investigatory proceedings.591 Ever 
since January 2010, when many premises in Germany were searched, the media 
suspect the food sector of having entered into illegal price fixing agreements.592 
As a consequence, market participants today face many uncertainties with regard 
to the legality of their business conduct. This uncertainty was reinforced by an 
informal letter593 issued by the German Federal Competition Office (FCO) in 
April 2010 that was circulated among market participants and their business 
associations and in which the authority summarised its opinions regarding certain 
business practices. Representatives of the FCO have also announced the intention 
to intensify competition law enforcement in the food sector. As a consequence, 
many companies in the food sector now decline to discuss consumer promotion 
measures across the board. It can be expected that these uncertainties will at least 
remain until the current investigations have been closed. Against this background 
and in view of the risks that infringements of competition law entail, managers, 
employees and lawyers working in the food sector should know what types of 
conduct are problematic from a competition law point of view and what is still 
permissible.
588 The author would like to thank Jakob Quirin, LL.M (Cambridge) for his contribution to this article. 
This is the English version of an article first published as Stancke, F., 2010. Das Kartellrecht der 
Lebensmittelbranche. Zeitschrift für das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht 2010: 543-565.
589 Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Ernährungsindustrie e.V., Kennzahlen der Ernährungsindustrie. 
Available at: http://www.bve-online.de.
590 Siemes, J., Mager, G., Gerling, M. and Vogell, K., 2010. In: KPMG, Trends im Handel 2010, p. 51. 
Available at: http://www.kpmg.de/docs/trends_im_handel_2010_de.pdf.
591 See the FCO’s press release of 11/01/2010 regarding its investigation into the dairy sector; the press 
release of 14/01/2010 regarding the search of premises of retailers and brand producers in view of price 
fixing suspicions and the press release of 09/06/2010 regarding the imposition of fines against coffee 
roasters. Available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de.
592 See Hasse, S., 2010. Kartellrecht für Privilegierte (commentary). LebensmittelZeitung, 16/04/2010, p. 2 
593 FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern von 
Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung der 
Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786-791.
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17.2 The requirements of competition law compliance
The risks connected to competition law infringements show that compliance is 
in the interest of companies and their management.594 Even merely negligent 
infringements may seriously threaten the reputation of a company. Hefty fines of 
up to 10% of the company’s total group turnover,595 fining and imprisonment of 
employees,596 D&O liability,597 claims for damages and injunctive relief asserted 
by both clients and competitors598 as well as the nullity of contracts599 are further 
possible consequences of a competition law infringement. This last aspect may 
mean that already concluded contracts are worthless. Against this background, 
companies cooperating with others in the food sector should always carefully 
assess whether their conduct is in compliance with competition law.
17.3 Addressees of competition law in the food sector
All companies active in the food sector, whether they are producers, wholesalers 
or retailers, have to comply with competition law. The same holds true for their 
business associations, consultants and external researchers. However, agreements 
and concerted practices among companies that belong to the same corporate 
group do not usually fall within the ambit of competition law.600
Large food retailers are currently under particular attack. The most common 
allegation is that they abuse their buying power in order to demand unfairly low 
prices from their suppliers and to impose unfair terms on them. In addition, 
business associations and consultancies are increasingly becoming a focus of 
594 Competition authorities and courts generally assume that managers must ensure competition law 
compliance: Mitsch, W., 2006. In: Senge, L. (ed.) Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 3rd edition, C.H. 
Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 17, margin number (‘mn.’) 56 with further information.
595 § 81 section 4 sentence 2 ARC; Article 23 section 2 of EU, 2003. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 
of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty. Official Journal of the European Union L 1 of 4/1/2003: 1-25. 
596 § 81 section 1 in connection with § 9 OWiG; bid rigging is a crime in Germany which can be punished 
with imprisonment pursuant to §§ 298 und 263 German Criminal Code. In other countries, any kind of 
competition law infringement may constitute a criminal offence, e.g. in Austria, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.
597 Directors and Officers Liability. See e.g. § 93 section 2 German Stock Companies Act (Aktiengesetz), 
§ 43 section 2 Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbH-Gesetz).
598 § 33 sections 1 and 3 Act against Restraints of Competition / ARC (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen).
599 Article 101 section 2 TFEU, § 1 ARC in connection with § 134 German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch).
600 Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 
6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 23; Schroeder, D., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. 
(ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 8, mn. 2 et seq. 
with further information; ECJ Case C-73/95 P Viho v Commission, ECR 1996: I-5457, mn. 16 et seq. and 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1997: 87; see also ECJ Case 15/74 Centrapharm v Sterling Drug, ECR 
1974: 1147, mn. 41 and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1975: 516.
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attention for competition authorities, mainly because they are suspected of playing 
important roles in cartels – for instance through recommendations on business 
conduct and information exchanges. A strict enforcement of competition law against 
such entities becomes possible through the German law of administrative offences 
which does not differentiate between the actual perpetrators of anticompetitive 
practices and persons aiding and abetting them.601 The same holds true for 
European competition law as the General Court clarified in the test case Treuhand 
v. Commission in 2008.602
17.4 The restrictions on anticompetitive conduct
The conduct of companies in the food sector has to comply with both national 
(e.g. German) and European competition law, as the latter is directly applicable in 
the EU Member States.603 The pertinent – and mostly congruent604 – prohibitions 
of anticompetitive conduct can be found in § 1 ARC and in Article 101 section 
1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)605 which 
prohibits ‘agreements between companies, decisions by associations of companies 
or concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition’. The European courts have decided that companies 
must enjoy real autonomy in determining their course of action in the market.606
601 Dannecker, G. and Biermann, J., 2007. In: Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.J. (eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht 
Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, 
Germany, Vor § 81, mn. 69; Vollmer, C., 2008. In: Hirsch, G. Montag, F. and Säcker, F.J. (eds.) Münchener 
Kommentar zum Europäischen und Deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht) Band 2: Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: GWB, 1st edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 81, mn. 43; 
Rengier, R., 2006. In: Senge, L. (ed.) Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 3rd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, 
Munchen, Germany, § 14, mn. 4.
602 CFI, Case T-99/04 Treuhand v Commission, ECR 2008, II-1505 and Europäisches Wirtschafts- und 
Steuerrecht 2008: 330.
603 See (extensive) Böge, U. and Bardong, A., 2008. In: Hirsch, G. Montag, F. and Säcker, F.J. (eds.) 
Münchener Kommentar zum Europäischen und Deutschen Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht) Band 2: 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: GWB, 1st edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, 
§ 22, mn. 1 et seq.; ECJ Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM, ECR 1974: 51, mn. 15/17 and Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 1974: 342; Case 37/79 Marty v Estée Lauder, 
ECR 1980: 2481, mn. 13 and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1980: 2632; Case C-234/89 Delimitis v 
Henninger, ECR 1991: I-935, mn. 45 and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1991: 2204; Case C-453/99 
Courage v Crehan, ECR 2001: I-6297, mn. 22 et seq. and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2002: 502.
604 Karl, M. and Reichelt, D., 2005. Die Änderungen des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 
durch die 7. GWB-Novelle. Der Betrieb 2005: 1436-1437; Stancke, F., 2005. Schadensregulierung und 
Kartellrecht. Versicherungrecht 2005: 1324.
605 Until 30 November 2009: Article 81 section 1 EC. The Lisbon Treaty, that entered into force on 1 
December 2009 amended the EU and EC – Treaty. The previous Article 81 section 1 EC became a new 
Article 101 section 1 TFEU.
606 ECJ Case 43/73 et al. Société anonyme Générale Sucrière and others v Commission ECR 
1975, 1663, mn. 174 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1976: 185 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/
Entscheidungssammlung EWG/MUV 347.
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§ 1 ARC and Article 101 section 1 TFEU cover both horizontal and vertical 
restraints.607 Agreements between competitors, e.g. between two food producers, 
may contain horizontal restraints; agreements between non-competitors, e.g. 
between food producers and food retailers, potentially contain vertical restraints. 
Agreements and concerted practices pursuant to which one party’s leeway or 
discretion to negotiate with third parties on, e.g. prices, is restrained, possibly 
constitute infringements. Typically of concern are practices which restrain 
one of the parties to an agreement or third parties in determining important 
market features such as end-consumer prices, exclusivity rebates, sales, costs and 
marketing608 or which harmonise costs.609 The same holds true for information 
exchanges between competitors that concern these market features.610 No restraints 
of competition exist, however, if the companies merely inform each other about 
objective circumstances that lie outside their individual influence and which 
concern the framework of competition such as general technical developments 
or new case-law.611 Also, conduct will only be caught by § 1 ARC and Article 101 
section 1 TFEU if it noticeably affects trade, i.e. if the restraint on competition 
has a noticeable effect.612 And even if such noticeable effect is given, it is possible 
that the restraint on competition is exempted from the prohibition pursuant to 
a so-called block exemption regulation (‘BER’) or as a result of a case-specific 
substantive test on the basis of § 2 ARC / Article 101 section 3 TFEU. It should 
be borne in mind, however, that such an exemption will only be possible where 
607 Schwintowski, H.-P. and Klaue, S., 2005. Kartellrechtliche und gesellschaftsrechtliche Konsequenzen 
des Systems der Legalausnahme für die Kooperationspraxis der Unternehmen. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 
2005: 370-378; draft bill on the 7th comprehensive amendment to the ARC, Bundestagsdrucksache 
15/3640: 23 et seq.
608 Bunte, H.-J., 2010. Einführung zum GWB. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum 
deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 1, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, mn. 84.
609 EU, 2011. Communication from the Commission. Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements 
(Horizontal Guidelines). Official Journal of the European Union C 11, 14/1/2011: 1-72. Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:011:0001:0072:EN:PDF, mn. 27, 
33 et seq.; Wagner-von Papp, F., 2004. Marktinformationsverfahren – Grenzen der Information im 
Wettbewerb: Die Herstellung praktischer Konkordanz zwischen legitimen Informationsbedürfnissen 
and Geheimwettbewerb. Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik: Vol. 191. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
Baden-Baden, Germany, p. 228.
610 Stancke, F., Marktinformation, Benchmarking und Statistiken - Neue Anforderungen an Kartellrechts-
Compliance. Betriebs-Berater 2009: 912 et seq. with further information; see also section 17.6.2 and 17.6.13.
611 Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1976. Kooperationsfibel - Zwischenbetriebliche Zusammenarbeit 
im Rahmen des Gesetzes über Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, section II section 1.1; EU, 1968. Notice 
concerning agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the field of cooperation between 
enterprises. Official Journal of the European Union C 075, 29/07/1968: 3-6; Schumm, K., 2003. In: 
Schröter, H., Jakob, T. and Mederer, W. (eds.) Kommentar zum Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht, 1st 
edition, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany, Article 81 mn. 48.
612 Established case-law since ECJ Case 5/69 Völk v Vervaecke, ECR 1969: 295, 302, mn. 7 and Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1970: 399; Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 37 
et seq.
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the collusion has particularly positive effects which consumers must also profit 
from.613
17.5  The restrictions on non-collusive / unilateral 
conduct by market dominant companies
Competition law does not only restrict anticompetitive collusive conduct between 
market participants. It also restricts unilateral measures by companies that are 
dominant in their market or have a particularly strong market position, if these 
measures constitute an ‘abuse’ of that strong market position.614 The abuse of a 
dominant market position is prohibited by both German and European competition 
law. The pertinent rules are §§ 19 et seq. ARC and Article 102 TFEU. Both provisions 
contain very similar rules,615 but the German law tends to be stricter.616
The economic power of companies is usually constrained by competitors and the 
freedom of buyers to choose their supplier. Yet, some companies do not experience 
sufficient competitive pressure with the consequence that they have a particularly 
broad leeway to manoeuvre in their market(s). A company is dominant in this sense 
if, as a supplier or buyer of certain products, it is without competitors or does not 
experience significant competition or is particularly strong in a given market.617 
Theoretically, it is also possible that a number of companies are collectively 
dominant in a specific market.618
613 Regarding the individual requirements see Kamann, H.-G. and Bergmann, E., 2003. Die neue 
EG-Kartellverfahrensverordnung - Auswirkungen auf die unternehmerische Vertragspraxis. 
Betriebs-Berater 2003: 1743, 1745 et seq.; Schwintowski, H.-P. and Klaue, 2005. Kartellrechtliche und 
gesellschaftsrechtliche Konsequenzen des Systems der Legalausnahme für die Kooperationspraxis der 
Unternehmen. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2005: 370, 372 et seqq.; Roth, P. and Rose, V., 2008. Bellamy 
& Child: European Community Law of Competition, 6th edition, Oxford University press, Oxford, UK, 
3.020 et seqq.; Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und 
europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 2, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, Art. 81 EG, mn. 
146 et seqq.
614 Wiedemann, G., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck 
Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 23, mn. 16; de Bronett, G.K., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch 
des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 22 mn. 7.
615 See Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 20, mn. 115.
616 Even where Article 102 TFEU and § 19 et seqq. ARC are parallely applicable, a national competition 
authority or court may apply the stricter national law, even if the conduct in question is permissible 
under European law: Article 3 section 1 sentence 2 Regulation 1/2003; Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, 
R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, 
Munchen, Germany, § 20, mn. 117.
617 See in detail section 17.6.15. 
618 § 19 section 2 sentence 1 No. 2 ARC. See § 19 section 3 ARC for the presumptions of market 
dominance under German law; Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum 
deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 2, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, 
Article 82, mn. 52 et seq.
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Examples of potentially abusive conduct by dominant companies are refusals to 
supply, discrimination between buyers or suppliers, loyalty and target rebates 
that are linked to the total volume of sales of a buyer, the imposition of unfair 
prices or terms, and tying practices.619
17.6  Groups of cases relevant under competition law in 
the food sector
In light of these preliminary observations, some groups of cases that are potentially 
relevant in the food sector will now be examined more closely. Quite naturally, 
this will not be a full list of relevant cases so that other forms of collusive and non-
collusive / unilateral conduct should also be carefully assessed for their compliance 
with competition law in practice. Examples would be the sale of products over 
the internet and margin guarantees. Also, in view of the potential complexity 
of collusive and non-collusive conduct, only general legal considerations can be 
set out in this chapter.
17.6.1 Price fixing among competitors
Any direct or indirect agreement to fix prices among competitors, i.e. between 
producers of certain groceries or between wholesalers or retailers, which stops the 
parties from freely determining their buying or selling prices is problematic from 
a competition law point of view. In particular, the fixing of uniform sale prices,620 
be it with regard to gross price,621 list price, net price, price components or rebates 
is prohibited.622 Both collusion with regard to price increases and with regard to 
price decreases as well as fixing a point in time to change prices is problematic. 
Of relevance are not only agreements on fixed prices but also the fixing of a target 
or orientation price or of a price frame. Suggestions on how to calculate prices by 
e.g. business associations are, however, not prohibited if they merely give technical 
619 Wiedemann, G., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck 
Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 23, mn. 41 et seqq., 51 et seq.; for details see section 17.6.15.
620 Examples from German case law are Federal Court of Justice, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/
Entscheidungssammlung 40, 41 - Schulspeisung; Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 
148, 150 - Freisinger Bäckermeister; Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-R 711, 717 
- Ost-Fleisch; on the European level see e.g. EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 
EV 917 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1982: 959 – Italian Flat Glass; Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/
Entscheidungssammlung EV 1173 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1987: 263 – Roofing Felt (confirmed 
by ECJ Case C-246/86 Belasco et al. v Commission, ECR 1989: 2117 and Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht 1990: 323).
621 See EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EV 820 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 
1980: 770 - BP Kemi - DDSF.
622 Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen 
Kartellrecht Bd. 2, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, Art. 81 EG, Generelle Prinzipien, 
mn. 103.
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help to find a price and if they cannot lead to uniform prices.623 Price fixing cannot 
be justified by a reference to dumping practices by other companies,624 alleged 
‘cut-throat’ competition from other companies,625 steep increases in commodity 
prices,626 unfair trading practices by other companies627 or over-capacity628.629
17.6.2 Hub and spoke agreements
Prices cannot only be fixed directly between competitors but also indirectly through 
the mediation of a third party. An example is the wholesaler that distributes 
products of a number of suppliers and thus serves as a ‘hub’ to these suppliers that 
makes price fixing agreements possible.630 Such mediated horizontal price fixing 
raises competitive concerns just as much as direct price fixing would.631 That 
623 Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und 
europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 1, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, § 1 GWB, mn. 
182; for critical remarks see Regional Court Munich, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1985: 1906 and 
EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EV 846 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1981: 
572 – Re-rolled Steel, mn. 36; FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen 
zwischen Herstellern von Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke 
der Konkretisierung der Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 790. (786-791). 
624 See e.g. EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EV 1214 and Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 1987: 430 - MELDOC; EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EV 1101 
and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1986: 255 – Aluminium imports from Eastern Europe.
625 See e.g. EU, 1992. 92/204/EEC: Commission Decision of 5 February 1992 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.572 and 32.571 - Building and construction industry in 
the Netherlands). Official Journal of the European Union L 92, 7.4.1992: 1-30; – SPO (confirmed by CFI 
Case T-29/92 SPO et al. v Commission, ECR 1995: II-289, 341 mn. 146).
626 See EU, 1994. 94/599/EC: Commission Decision of 27 July 1994 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/31.865 – PVC). Official Journal of the European Union L 239, 14.9.1994: 
14-35; PVC II, (mainly confirmed by CFI, see e.g. joined Cases T-305/94 – T-335/94 Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij, ECR 1999, II-931 and CFI, 1999. Umfang von Verteidigungsrechten. Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 1999: 623-631; mainly confirmed by ECJ Case C-238/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij et 
al. v Commission, ECR 2002: I-8375 and ECJ. Folgen der Nichtigerklärung einer Geldbußenentscheidung. 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2002: 1257-1266).
627 See ECJ joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 - VBVB and VBBB v Commission, ECR 1984: 19 and Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1985: 546.
628 See EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EV 1165 and Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 1987: 81 – Polypropylen; ECJ Case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission, ECR 1999: I-4287 
and ECJ, 1999. Bestätigung der Polypropylen-Entscheidung durch den Gerichtshof. Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 1999: 902-907.
629 See Wägenbaur, B., 2009. In: Loewenheim, U., Meessen, K.M. and Riesenkampff, A. (eds.) 
Kartellrecht, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, Art. 81 EG, mn. 208.
630 The suppliers would correspondingly be the ‘spokes’. 
631 Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 4691, 
4692 – Sternvertrag; Federal Court of Justice, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2003: 
633 - Ausrüstungsgegenstände für Feuerlöschzüge; see also FCO, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/
Entscheidungssammlung DE-V 1813 and FCO, 2010. Bußgeld wegen Beschränkung des 
Internetvertriebs. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 91-97; - CIBA Vision, mn. 45, 61 et seq.; see also 
FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern von 
Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung der 
Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 788. (786-791).
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‘hub and spoke’ situations are primarily problematic in view of their potential for 
horizontal collusion should not lead one to the assumption that the hub itself must 
not fear intervention by the competition authority. If, for instance, the wholesaler 
in the above example consciously facilitates the anti-competitive collusion by the 
suppliers, it will itself be held liable for a competition law infringement.632 In 
order to avoid such risks parties should refrain from any disclosure of third party 
information on prices and conditions. It is also advisable to agree on confidentiality 
agreements prohibiting the disclosure of prices or price-relevant information to 
other market participants, in particular the other spokes.
17.6.3  Agreements on opening hours, certification marks and 
marketing
Non price-related agreements among competitors can also be problematic. For 
instance, agreements on opening hours directly regulate the conduct of parties in 
the market so that they are generally considered to have anti-competitive effects.633 
Agreements on certification marks634 and other marketing agreements among 
competitors with regard to the sale, the distribution (e.g. through a common internet 
platform) or consumer promotion (e.g. through advertising associations635) can raise 
competitive concerns. Marketing agreements can, for instance, be problematic if 
they are merely a framework for agreements on prices or production quantities, if 
the parties to the agreement share markets among each other and/or if prohibitions 
on advertising or non-compete clauses are agreed on. Marketing agreements can 
also facilitate prohibited exchanges of information.636 The European Commission 
has made critical comments on the harmonisation of distribution and marketing 
632 See also the relatively recent judgement by the Court of Appeal, Argos Ltd and Another v Office of 
Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, available at: http://www.bailii.org.
633 This is the prevailing opinion in Germany: Kammergericht, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1990: 945 
– ‘Ladenöffnungszeit’; FCO, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 339 and Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 1961: 305 – ‘Sonnabendarbeitszeit’; Rehbinder, E., 1964. Betriebs-Berater 1964: 896; 
extensively Immenga, U., 1989. Grenzen des kartellrechtlichen Ausnahmebereichs Arbeitsmarkt. 
C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, p. 25, 39; Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. 
(eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 1, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, Koln, Germany, § 1 GWB, mn. 193 with further information; Nordemann, J.B., 2009. In: 
Loewenheim, U., Meessen, K.M. and Riesenkampff, A. (eds.) Kartellrecht, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, 
Munchen, Germany, § 1 GWB, mn. 135; with regard to collective agreements see Zimmer, D., 2007. In: 
Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.J. (eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen 
Kartellrecht, 4th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 262.
634 Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen 
Kartellrecht Bd. 1, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, § 1 GWB, mn. 186 with further 
information.
635 Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen 
Kartellrecht Bd. 1, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, § 1 GWB, mn. 189 with further 
information.
636 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 56, 233; on information exchanges between competitors see section 
17.6.2. and 17.6.13.
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costs – a possible effect of marketing co-operations.637 Despite these objections 
marketing co-operations do not infringe competition law if they are objectively 
necessary for a company to access a market, e.g. through the cost saving effects 
that the co-operation generates. In addition, marketing co-operations can, under 
certain conditions, be exempted from the prohibition on collusive conduct by law. 
Whether or not a marketing co-operation is permissible must thus be determined 
in each and every individual case. It is generally possible to design them in ways 
that are non-objectionable.
17.6.4 Vertical price fixing agreements
The FCO currently focuses its activity on the direct or indirect fixing of resale 
prices638 among suppliers and buyers / future sellers.639 Quite recently, the FCO 
stated that one of the central elements of price competition in the food sector is 
that wholesalers and retailers can determine prices freely and that they carry the 
economic risk of their decisions.640
a. Agreements on fixed resale prices or minimum prices
Of particular concern is the oral or written fixing of resale prices or collusion with 
regard to minimum prices641 irrespective of whether the resale price was explicitly 
agreed on or whether it is merely the consequence of the unilateral granting of 
advantages or exertion of pressure. Business meetings are typical occasions for 
such collusive practices. Even the mere mentioning of resale prices or minimum 
prices in ordering forms or other documents or the use of packaging with non-
removable price imprints642 is problematic. The mere fixing of maximum prices 
637 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 233.
638 Agreements on prices between a buyer / future seller and its supplier fall outside the pertinent 
prohibitions, if the buyer / future seller is a commercial agent, i.e. is simply meant to negotiate contracts 
on behalf of the principal and does not carry the economic risk, see Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, 
R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, 
Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 26.
639 See FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern 
von Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung 
der Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 787 et seq.
640 See FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern 
von Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung 
der Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 787.
641 See FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern 
von Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung 
der Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 787, 789.
642 Regional Court Düsseldorf, Judgement of 18/3/2010, file number 14c O 234/09. Available at: http://
www.justiz.nrw.de.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
362 Private food law
Chapter 17
is not generally impermissible but can be exempted pursuant to § 2 ARC, Article 
2, sections 1 and 4 letter a of the block exemption on vertical restraints.643
b. Recommended resale prices (RRPs)
RRPs do not necessarily infringe competition law.644 Handing out a list with RRPs 
to a buyer that asks for it is unproblematic for instance. When handing over the 
list, the supplier may also explain the reasons for the price recommendations 
and the strategy that it pursues with regard to the positioning and marketing 
of the products. Price recommendations have a useful orientation function for 
consumers and can facilitate the calculation of prices for retailers. It therefore 
seems justified to assume that recommended resale prices generally do not 
noticeably affect competition.645 The competition authorities do, however, keep 
a strict eye on RRPs that have the same effect as a fixed or minimum resale 
price because of the way in which they were suggested to a future seller. Such 
RRPs are considered to be hardcore restrictions pursuant to § 2 section 2 ARC, 
Article 4 letter a BER-vertical.646 It should be noticed, however, that the question 
whether a resale price was agreed on or freely determined by the seller must be 
carefully assessed in each individual case.647 The FCO has clarified that every 
attempt to influence the determination of prices by future sellers that goes beyond 
643 See EU, 2010. Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements 
and concerted practices. Official Journal of the European Union L 102, 23.4.2010: 1-7 (‘BER-Vertical’); 
Kirchhain, S, 2008. Die Gestaltung von innerstaatlich wirkenden Vertriebsverträgen nach der 7. GWB-
Novelle. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2008: 167, 172 et seq.; Hildebrand, D., 2004. Wettbewerb in Recht 
und Praxis 2004: 470, 473; Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 58.
644 FCO, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-V 1813 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 
2010: 91 - CIBA Vision, mn. 43; Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
2007: 603, 604 - Zulässige Verwendung einer Abkürzung für eine Preisempfehlung; CFI Case T-208/01 
Volkswagen v Commission, ECR 2003: II-5141, mn. 33 et seqq. and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2004: 
203; ECJ Case C-74/04 P Volkswagen v Comission, ECR 2006: I-6585, mn. 35 et seq. and Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 2006: 1082; Kirchhain, S., 2008. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2008: 167, 175 et seq. 
645 See Baron, M., 2009. In: Loewenheim, U., Meessen, K.M. and Riesenkampff, A. (eds.) Kartellrecht, 
2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, GVO-Vertikal, mn. 167; Veelken, W., 2007. In: 
Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.J. (eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht Band 1: EG. Kommentar zum Europäischen 
Kartellrecht, 4th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, Vertikal-GVO, mn. 182; Bunte, H.-J., 
2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht 
Bd. 2, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, Art. 81 EG, Generelle Prinzipien, mn. 184. 
646 EU, 2010. Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. Official Journal of the European Union C 130: 1-46 (Vertical 
Guidelines), mn. 48, 226 et seq.; FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen 
zwischen Herstellern von Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke 
der Konkretisierung der Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 788.
647 Kirchhoff, W., 2009. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck 
Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 11, mn. 29.
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non-binding recommendations is impermissible.648 Any kind of contact with the 
future seller that makes RRPs a topic after the price was suggested, particularly 
with a view to the seller’s previous ‘price policy’, puts a question mark behind 
the non-binding character of the RRP according to the somewhat questionable 
view of the FCO.649 The creation of, or demand for, price comparison lists and/or 
receipt collections as well as the preparation of calculation schemes is looked at 
critically by the FCO. Somewhat beside the point seems to be the opinion of the 
FCO that advertising by the producer (‘price cut, now only € 9.99’) can unduly 
influence the free determination of prices by the distributor.650 If distributors and 
retailers voluntarily participate in such campaigns they are not forced to lower 
their prices to the newly recommended price or to give rebates. According to 
the FCO, a particularly severe way of exerting pressure is the announcement of 
specific disadvantages in case of non-compliance with the RRP, e.g. the unilateral 
reduction of payments, delisting, worsening of terms, termination, deferment, 
suspension or limitation of the supplies or the downsizing of shelf space.651 Other 
examples are limitations on gross margins,652 prohibitions on selling at a loss653 
and obligations to return goods at net price to the distributor if the purpose of 
such provisions is to prevent retailers from pursuing a low price policy.654 Finally, 
incentives that are meant to enforce compliance with RRPs, such as certain types 
of rebates,655 kick-backs and margin-loss compensation raise the competition 
authority’s concern.
17.6.5 Most-favoured-customer clauses
In view of the illegality of vertical price fixing the question arises how so-called 
most-favoured-customer clauses must be assessed. Such clauses oblige e.g. a food 
648 FCO, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-V 1813 and FCO, 2010. Bußgeld 
wegen Beschränkung des Internetvertriebs. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 91-97; - CIBA Vision, 
mn. 44; FCO, ‘Informationsblatt des Bundeskartellamts zu den Verwaltungsgrundsätzen bei UVP für 
Markenwaren’, published in: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.), 2006. Kommentar zum deutschen und 
europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 2, 9th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, p. 2858 et seq.
649 FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern von 
Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung der 
Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 788.
650 Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 2256 – 
Herstellerpreiswerbung.
651 FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern von 
Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung der 
Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 789.
652 Zimmer, D., 2007. In: Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.J. (eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. 
Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 
250, 238.
653 Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 1036 and Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 1970: 80 - Lockvogel.
654 Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 2479 and Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 1990: 73 - Völkl.
655 FCO, 2004. Tätigkeitsbericht 2003/2004, p. 161. Available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de.
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producer to afford to all buyers the best prices and terms that it offers to any 
one buyer. The clauses show many variations, usually to the detriment of the 
supplier and in individual cases also to the detriment of the buyer. The FCO 
takes a particularly critical look at most-favoured-customer clauses that tend to 
harmonise prices among wholesalers or retailers.656 This does not mean that most-
favoured customer clauses are generally inadmissible. For instance, provisions 
to the detriment of the supplier are exempt from the prohibition pursuant to § 2 
section 2 ARC, Article 2 BER-Vertical if the market share of each of the participating 
companies does not exceed 30%.
17.6.6 Price guarantees
Most-favoured-customer clauses must be differentiated from price guarantees. 
The point of the latter is to give buyers a claim against their suppliers if they can 
source the respective products from a competitor at a lower price. Despite their 
similarity with most-favoured-customer clauses, price guarantees do not raise 
competitive concerns. This is because a most-favoured-customer clause legally or 
factually obliges a company with regard to the future setting of prices and/or terms 
in relation to third parties, while price guarantees do not cause similar obligations: 
They merely oblige the guarantor towards the other contractual party.657
17.6.7 Listing fees
Advance payments to retailers in return for services and for listing groceries raise 
concerns both from a general competition law perspective and more specifically 
under the law of unfair competition. Of great importance are listing fees, so-
called pay-to-stay fees and fees for access to a retailer’s advertising campaign. 
Such agreements can develop ‘pulling power’ to the advantage of specific suppliers 
and can thus foreclose the market to the suppliers’ competitors, in particular if 
the parties to the agreement hold market shares of more than 30%.658 Under 
the German law of unfair competition payments with the intention to ‘squeeze 
out’ specific competitors from the market are problematic.659 On the other hand, 
listing fees can also lead to an efficient allocation of shelf space for new products 
and other positive effects. Such agreements must therefore undergo an individual 
assessment in practice.
656 FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern von 
Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung der 
Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 790.
657 Zimmer, D., 2007. In: Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.J. (eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: GWB. 
Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 
401 et seq.
658 See Vertical Guidelines, mn. 203 et seq.
659 See section 17.6.16.
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17.6.8 Selling at a loss
§ 20 section 4 sentence 2 ARC contains a provision that prohibits companies which 
are particularly strong compared to their small and medium sized competitors 
from offering goods or services below cost without an objective justification.660 
Even occasional selling at a loss is problematic.661 In practice, difficulties are 
most often attached to the calculation of costs and prices.662 For instance, the 
Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf recently decided that contributions towards 
advertising costs may be taken into account when calculating costs for the purpose 
of the assessment whether goods were sold below costs.663
17.6.9 Category management
Category management has gained a foothold in Europe in recent years. It can be 
defined as the marketing of a whole group of goods at the point of sale by only one 
of the producers of the grouped goods. This ‘category captain’, chosen by the retailer, 
is responsible for designing the distribution of this group of goods at the retailer’s 
point of sale. The support can be of varying intensity, from merely occasional 
advice up to the creation of a comprehensive marketing concept.664 European 
Competition Authorities have only become aware of category management in 
660 See Alexander, C., 2010. Privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Verbots von Verkäufen unter 
Einstandspreis. Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 2010: 727, 731 et seq. with regard to selling at a loss 
under the German law of unfair competition (§§ 3 sections 1, 4 Nr. 10 UWG).
661 Loewenheim, U., 2009. In: Loewenheim, U., Meessen, K.M. and Riesenkampff, A. (eds.) Kartellrecht, 
2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 20 GWB, mn. 146; See also Alexander, C., WRP 
2010: 727, 728. 
662 Extensively: Markert, K., 2007. In: Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.J. (eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht Band 
2: GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, 
§ 20, mn. 297 et seqq.; and also FCO, Bekanntmachung zur Anwendung des § 20 section 4 Satz 2 
GWB. Available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkblaetter_deutsch/
Bekanntmachung_Einstandspreis.pdf.
663 OLG Düsseldorf (VI-2 Kart 9/08 OWi). Schütze, J. and Beck, R.S., 2010. Drogerie Rossmann darf 
pauschale Werbekostenzuschüsse auf einzelne Produkte umlegen – Kein Verkauf unter Einstandspreis. 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht - Praxis: 208. See also: FCO, Sektorenuntersuchung Milch 
– Zwischenbericht, Dezember 2009: 95. Available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de.
664 Loest, T., 2004. ‘Category Captaincies’ im Ordnungsrahmen des Kartellrechts. Wettbewerb in Recht 
und Praxis 2004: 454, 454 et seq.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
366 Private food law
Chapter 17
recent years.665 The concerns brought forward are of a rather complex nature. The 
main concern is that category management could serve as the basis for information 
exchanges that could then, in turn, serve as a basis for collusive conduct. In order 
to comply with its obligations, a ‘category captain’ usually needs information on 
the market behaviour of its competitors.666 From a competition law perspective it 
is important to limit information flows to the degree that is objectively necessary 
for an effective category management. It is also advisable to make sure that the 
information which the ‘category captain’ receives is not freely accessible within its 
undertaking but protected by ‘Chinese walls’ from the curious look of others. Category 
management also creates the risk of an impermissible exchange of information 
on the level of retailers. Opportunities for such an exchange of information exist 
where competing retailers choose the same producer as their ‘category captain’. 
Finally, an exchange of information between retailers and their ‘category captain’ 
can also be problematic if the retailer competes against the ‘category captain’ with 
a private brand.667 Other pitfalls in connection with category management are: 
vertical price fixing,668 an agreement between ‘category captain’ and retailer to 
the detriment of competitors of the ‘category captain’669 as well as the abuse of 
a possibly dominant position of the ‘category captain’. While companies will not 
have a dominant position merely because they take over the category captaincy,670 
producers that are already dominant must be careful not to abuse their position 
as a category captain, for instance through attempts to convince ‘their’ retailers 
to delist competing products. Importantly, the ‘category captain’ may only give 
665 Apparently, the only case in which a European national competition authority considered category 
management is UK Office of Fair Trading, ME/1213/04 United Biscuits/Jacobs Bakery Limited, mn. 42 et 
seqq. (available at: http://oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/2004/united-biscuits). The FCO has, 
in its decision Pelikan/Herlitz (Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-V 1892 and 
FCO, 2010. Freigabe eines Zusammenschlusses in Schreibgerätemärkten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 
2010: 568-577) only pronounced its opinion on a similar method of managing products (see Besen, M. 
and Jorias, R., 2010. Kartellrechtliche Grenzen des Category Managements unter Berücksichtigung 
der neuen EU-Leitlinien für vertikale Beschränkungen. Betriebs-Berater 2010: 1099, 1100). The French 
Autorité de la Concurrence has been working on the topic since March 2010. On the European level 
should be noted: EU, 2005. Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.3732 – Procter & 
Gamble/Gillette). Official Journal of the European Union C 139, 08/06/2005: 35, mn. 134 et seq. in 
which the Commission came to a generally positive conclusion with regard to category management 
and the Vertical Guidelines, which dedicate mn. 209-213 to category management. Finally, it should 
be noted that the topic was discussed in the US already at the beginning of the decade; see Wiring, R., 
2010. Sortimentsplanung im Supermarktregal – Welchen Spielraum lässt das Kartellrecht? Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht. Praxis 2010: 332.
666 On the ‘secrecy’ of competition see section 17.6.13.
667 See also section 17.4.13.
668 See already section 17.4.4.
669 See Besen, M. and Jorias, R., 2010. Kartellrechtliche Grenzen des Category Managements unter 
Berücksichtigung der neuen EU-Leitlinien für vertikale Beschränkungen. Betriebs-Berater 2010: 1099, 
1101. 
670 Wiring, R., 2010. Sortimentsplanung im Supermarktregal – Welchen Spielraum lässt das Kartellrecht? 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht. Praxis 2010: 332.
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non-binding recommendations to the retailer. The latter one must remain free to 
deviate from the course of action suggested by its ‘category captain’.671
17.6.10 Exclusive supply/single branding obligations
Agreements on exclusivity are of natural relevance from a competition law point 
of view. Oftentimes, producers and retailers have an interest to agree on exclusive 
supply or single branding obligations. Such vertical restraints672 of competition 
raise concerns because they can seal off the market to possible new entrants.673 
Exclusive supply obligations can e.g. make it difficult for non-participating 
producers to supply their products through certain distributors. On the wholesale 
or retail level, competition can be constrained if exclusive supply obligations 
lead to wholesalers and/or retailers being ‘cut off’ from the supply of certain 
goods. And finally, exclusive supply obligations can make it difficult for end 
consumers to gain access to products. Despite these problems, it is well accepted 
that agreements on exclusivity can, under certain circumstances, be permissible. 
Obligations to source less than 80% of total demand from a supplier are usually 
not problematic if each of the parties’ aggregate market shares does not exceed 
30%.674 Exclusive supply obligations of short duration (about a year) do generally 
not cause problems.675 Producers and suppliers with a strong (not necessarily 
dominant) position in their market that want to oblige their partners to source 
more than 80% of their demand over a longer period of time or distributors that 
intend to demand exclusive supply should be particularly careful when structuring 
their supply agreements.
671 Loest, T., 2004. ‘Category Captaincies’ im Ordnungsrahmen des Kartellrechts. Wettbewerb in Recht 
und Praxis 2004: 454, 460; Besen, M. and Jorias, R., 2010. Kartellrechtliche Grenzen des Category 
Managements unter Berücksichtigung der neuen EU-Leitlinien für vertikale Beschränkungen. Betriebs-
Berater 2010: 1099.
672 In practice, such agreements take many different forms. Even merely factual exclusive supply 
obligations, e.g. on the basis of rebate systems can raise concerns.
673 See Regional Court Mannheim, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-R 
298, 302 – Stromversorgung; EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EV 827 and 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1980: 777 – Lab (confirmed by ECJ Case 61/80 Cooperatieve Stremsel- en 
Kleurselfabriek v European Commission, ECR 1981: 851 et seq.).
674 See Article 1 section 1 lit. d) in connection with Article 2 section 1 BER-Vertical; Vertical Guidelines, 
mn. 66, 129; Vertical Guidelines, mn. 23, 87 et seq.; Holzmüller, T. and von Köckritz C., 2009. Zur 
Kartellrechtswidrigkeit langfristiger Bezugsbindungen und ihrer prozessualen Geltendmachung. 
Betriebs-Berater 2009: 1712, 1713. 
675 Holzmüller, T. and von Köckritz, C., 2009. Zur Kartellrechtswidrigkeit langfristiger Bezugsbindungen 
und ihrer prozessualen Geltendmachung. Betriebs-Berater 2009: 1712, 1713; Regional Court Dortmund, 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-R 1175, 1176 – Stadtwerke Lippstadt; CFI 
Case T-7/93 Langnese-Iglo v Commission, ECR 1995: II-0153, mn. 111; CFI Case T-9/93 Schöller v 
Commission, ECR 1999: II-1611, mn. 71 et seqq.; but see also Article 5 section 1 lit. a) BER-Vertical; 
Vertical Guidelines, mn. 133.
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17.6.11 Purchasing cooperatives
The term ‘purchasing cooperative’ describes the many different forms of 
cooperation that companies enter into in order to manage their purchases.676 
Whether this cooperation takes the form of a simple agreement, a joint venture 
or a true cooperative is unimportant from a competition law perspective.677 
Purchasing cooperatives are often entered into in order to create or enhance 
buying power for the participating companies, often small and medium sized 
enterprises. In recent times, purchasing cooperatives are also increasingly used 
by big distributors in order to profit from economies of scale in the production of 
goods that are distributed under a private label.678 Examples from practice are, the 
regional retailer cooperatives in Germany and international co-operations such as 
ALIDIS/Agenor. Since increased buying power can cause a reduction in prices on 
the selling market of the participating distributors, purchasing cooperatives are 
generally seen as a positive thing.679 In individual cases purchasing cooperatives 
can, however, raise competitive concerns. This holds particularly true if the 
participating companies have a strong position in their selling markets and are 
thus able not to pass on the efficiencies gained to consumers.680 Another concern 
is that competitors of the purchasing cooperative may be foreclosed from accessing 
important suppliers.681 Finally, suppliers could be forced to reduce the number 
or quality of products offered, in view of the intense margin pressure created by 
purchasing cooperatives.682
Parties whose combined market share on both the purchasing and selling market 
does not exceed 15% usually do not have to fear an intervention by competition 
authorities when agreeing on a purchasing cooperative.683 Companies which 
exceed these thresholds should carefully assess whether the intended cooperative 
is competition law compliant. Important criteria are whether the efficiencies 
676 Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen 
Kartellrecht Bd. 1, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, § 1 GWB, mn. 159 et seqq.; 
Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 194 et seq.
677 Schroeder, D., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck 
Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 8, mn. 86, 107.
678 EU, 2009. SEC(2009) 1449 Competition in the food supply chain, p. 9. Available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/economy_finance/publications/publication16065_en.pdf. 
679 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 194, 217; FCO, Tätigkeitsbericht 1995/1996: 72; with regard to farming 
cooperatives see ECJ Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim, ECR 1994: I-5671, mn. 32 et seq. In this case, the ECJ 
even accepted the prohibition of a double membership in a purchasing cooperative and a minimum 
duration for the membership.
680 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 201. See FCO, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-V 
1607 and FCO, 2008. Kartellbehördlich angeordnete Cluster-Strategie. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2008: 
1119-1128; – EDEKA/Tengelmann. The pertinent passages are on p. 103 et seq. of the full decision that 
is available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de.
681 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 200, 203.
682 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 202.
683 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 208.
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created through additional buying power are passed on when selling and whether 
the cooperative is accompanied by additional agreements (e.g. a market sharing 
agreement). An unfair use of the buying power gained through entering into 
the cooperative, e.g. through retroactive agreements that a supplier could not 
reasonably expect or through the arbitrary delay of payments to the supplier, 
should also be avoided.684
17.6.12  Subcontracting/supply agreements, e.g. for private label 
products
Supply agreements are mostly concluded among non-competing companies 
(‘vertical’ supply agreements) and are not objectionable if they are not accompanied 
by ‘add-on’ agreements such as agreements on exclusivity or resale prices.685 
However, it is also not uncommon that competing companies conclude supply 
agreements in order to save costs and to improve their offer of goods. A typical 
example is the supply of a distributor with products that are meant to be distributed 
under a private or ‘white’ label or the production for a brand-owner that does 
not own production facilities in the respective country. Supply agreements are 
problematic only if they contain non-compete obligations regarding future market 
activities686 or if the supply agreement is a means to harmonise costs.687 It is also 
of concern to competition authorities that supply agreements could serve as a 
‘bridge’ for illegal exchanges of information.688 In practice, companies should 
make sure that information is only exchanged to the extent that is necessary for 
the intended cooperation. Cost savings should also, at least in part, be passed 
on to consumers.689 All in all it is possible to design supply agreements between 
competitors in unobjectionable ways.
17.6.13 Market information, benchmarking, business associations
Cooperation in the food sector for the purposes of market information and/or 
benchmarking gives companies an opportunity to determine their position in 
684 In practice, the successor to the British ‘Supermarkets Code of Practice’, that is the ‘Groceries Supply 
Code of Practice’ may be a helpful tool. Available at: http://www.competition-commission.gov.uk/
inquiries/ref2006/grocery/pdf/revised_gscop_order.pdf. While the Code is only applicable in Great 
Britain and only for distributors with an annual turnover of more than 1 billion British pound, many of 
the Codes’ guidelines contain helpful suggestions for approaching purchasing cooperatives. 
685 Whether such ‘add-on’ agreements would be permissible had to be examined in detail. 
686 See EU, 1979. Commission notice of 18 December 1978 concerning its assessment of certain 
subcontracting agreements in relation to Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty. Offical Journal of the European 
Union C 1, 3.1.1979: 2-3, No. 2/3 at the end; Article 5 section 1 lit. c) of EU, 2000. Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of specialisation agreements. Official Journal of the European Union L 304, 5.12.2000: 3-6. 
687 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 176 et seq..
688 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 181 et seq. 
689 Horizontal Guidelines, mn. 185.
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the market and to understand where they need to improve their performance. In 
addition, such cooperation also serves to better inform wholesalers, retailers and/
or end-consumers.690 Generally speaking such cooperation is suited to improve 
competition among market participants.691 On the other hand, the direct or indirect 
exchange of information among competitors can violate the confidentiality of 
competitively relevant company information.692 Yet not every contact between 
competitors is suited to create anti-competitive effects. The mere exchange of 
opinions and experiences on/with objective circumstances that do not concern the 
individual market conduct of the participants is permissible.693 This is because 
such an exchange of opinions or actual information, e.g. on technical, economic 
or legal features of the market, is usually not characterised by an exchange of 
the kind of details that must remain confidential.694 Whether a specific piece of 
information is of relevance to the competitive process or not can only be assessed 
in each and every individual case.695 Prices, product specifics or product launches 
690 For details see Stancke, F., 2009. Marktinformation, Benchmarking und Statistiken - Neue 
Anforderungen an Kartellrechts-Compliance. Betriebs-Berater 2009: 912; Voet van Vormizeele, P., 
2009. Möglichkeit und Grenzen von Benchmarking nach europäischem und deutschem Kartellrecht. 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2009: 143-154; Whish, R., 2006. Information agreements. In: The pros 
and cons of information sharing, Swedish Competition Authority, Stockholm, Sweden, pp. 19-42 with 
further information (Available at: http://www.kkv.se/upload/filer/trycksaker/rapporter/pros&cons/
rap_pros_and_cons_information_sharing.pdf); Lübbig, T., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des 
Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 8, mn. 240.
691 Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 
6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 1, mn. 85; OLG Düsseldorf, Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-R 949, 950 – Transportbeton Sachsen; EU, VII. Bericht über 
die Wettbewerbspolitik 1978: 19; ECJ Case C-194/99 P Thyssen v Commission ECR 2003: I-10821, mn. 
84 and ECJ, 2004. Vom vorgeschriebenen zum freiwilligen Informationsaustausch. Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 2004: 75-80; ECJ Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission ECR 1998: I-3111, mn. 88 et 
seqq. and ECJ, 1998. Wettbewerbsbeschränkung durch Informationsaustauschsysteme. Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 1998: 747-752.
692 Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 2006: 1337, 1342 - 
Aluminium-Halbzeug; Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung: 
2313, 2315 et seq. - Baumarkt-Statistik; Schröter, H. and Haag, M., 2003. In: Schröter, H., Jakob, 
T. and Mederer, W. (eds.) Kommentar zum Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht, 1st edition, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany, Article 81, mn. 66 with further information; Wagner-
von Papp, F. 2004. Marktinformationsverfahren – Grenzen der Information im Wettbewerb. Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany, p. 164 et seq. with further information.
693 EU, 1968. Notice concerning agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the field of cooperation 
between Enterprises. Official Journal of the European Union C 075, 29/07/1968, p. 4; Federal Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, Kooperationsfibel ‘Zwischenbetriebliche Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des Gesetzes 
über Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen’, section II subsection 1.1.
694 Correspondingly: Karenfort, J., 2008. Der Informationsaustausch zwischen Wettbewerbern - 
kompetitiv oder konspirativ? Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2008: 1154, 1165. (1154-1166).
695 Haag, M., 2003. In: Schröter, H., Jakob, T. and Mederer, W. (eds.) Kommentar zum Europäischen 
Wettbewerbsrecht, 1st edition, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany, Article 81, mn. 65; 
FCO, Tätigkeitsbericht 1976: 11 et seq., 217 (Annex 1); ECJ Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax ECR 2006: I-11125, 
mn. 54 and ECJ, 2007. EG-kartellrechtliche Grenzen der Zulässigkeit von Kreditinformationssystemen. 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2007: 539-544; EU, 1978. VII. Bericht über die Wettbewerbspolitik: 19; 
Stancke F., 2005. Schadensregulierung und Kartellrecht. Versicherungsrecht 2005: 1324, 1325.
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but also billing details must usually be kept confidential.696 Of relevance can 
also be information on the functioning of the distribution chain and the internal 
organisation of a company.697 According to the FCO the mere exchange of that 
kind of information constitutes a per se infringement, independent of the kind 
of products concerned and of the market structure.698
However, it is well accepted that non-coordinated price announcements in public do 
not, taken by themselves, infringe the prohibition on anti-competitive conduct.699 
This holds true even if competitors become aware of the announcement regarding 
prices, as long as the publication of prices is not used to circumvent the prohibition 
on direct price fixing.
If cooperation with regard to market information or benchmarking is meant to 
comprise information that is relevant to competition and refers to confidential 
company data, this will only be permissible if the exchanged information is 
anonymised.700 In special cases, the exchange of non-anonymised information 
may be exempt from the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements and will thus 
be permissible.701 Whether the prerequisites for such an exemption are fulfilled 
must be carefully assessed by the companies concerned.
17.6.14 Information exchanges between distributors and producers
As in every other line of business, food producers and distributors are interested 
in exchanging certain types of information before concluding contracts. Supply 
696 Wagner-von Papp, F., 2004. Marktinformationsverfahren – Grenzen der Information im Wettbewerb. 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany, p. 219 et seq.; Gehring, S., 2006. In: Mäger, T. (ed.), 
2006. Europäisches Kartellrecht. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany, 1st edition, p. 60, 
mn. 78 with further information; Carle, M. and Johnsson, J., 1998. Benchmarking and E.C. Competition 
law. ECLR 19: 74, 78; see also FCO, press release of 20/2/2008 on information exchanges with regard 
to demands for rebates and separate agreements at the occasion of annual meetings – ‘Drogerieartikel’. 
Available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de. 
697 Lübbig, T., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, 
Munchen, Germany, § 8. mn. 240; with regard to the kind of information exchanged see also Voet van 
Vormizeele, P., 2009. Möglichkeit und Grenzen von Benchmarking nach europäischem und deutschem 
Kartellrecht. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2009: 143, 150 et seq. with further information.
698 FCO, press release of 10/7/2008 – ‘Luxuskosmetik’. Available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de. 
The fining decisions are still appealable. On current developments in France and Italy which are similar 
see Möhlenkamp, A., 2008. Verbandskartellrecht - trittfeste Pfade in unsicherem Gelände. Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb: 428, 433, footnote 29 with further information. (428-440).
699 ECJ joined Cases C-89/85 et al. Ahlströhm et al. v Commission, ECR 1993: I-1307, mn. 59-65 and 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1988: 3086; but see Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/
Entscheidungssammlung 2182 – Altölpreise.
700 For details see Stancke, F., 2009. Marktinformation, Benchmarking und Statistiken – Neue 
Anforderungen an Kartellrechts-Compliance. Betriebs-Berater 2009: 912, 914 et seq.
701 For the specific requirements see Stancke, F., 2009. Marktinformation, Benchmarking und Statistiken 
– Neue Anforderungen an Kartellrechts-Compliance. Betriebs-Berater 2009: 912, 916 with further 
information.
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
372 Private food law
Chapter 17
agreements may provide for an obligation to report on sales, stocks and the market 
situation in the allocated area. Such agreements raise concerns if the supplier 
and the distributor are active in the same market, e.g. because the supplier also 
distributes its goods directly to consumers. In these cases, the considerations 
described above regarding the exchange of information between competitors 
apply. In so far as the exchanged information, e.g. the concrete purchase price 
for the delivery, is immediately connected to the supply agreement and in so 
far as the flow of information is necessary for the execution of the contract, the 
information exchange will not raise competitive concerns because it is ‘inherent’ 
in the contract.702 Information exchanges beyond what is necessary, e.g. generally 
on prices and rebates, sales or contractual relations to third parties should be 
avoided. It should also be observed that the exchange of information on sales, 
prices demanded by customers etcetera must not serve to enforce compliance703 
with recommended prices or orientation prices and that the exchange of price-
relevant information must not lead to a competition law infringement in the hub 
and spoke sense (see above).704
17.6.15 Abusive conduct
As mentioned above, competition law is particularly strict on companies which have 
a strong position in their market(s). To begin with, it should be noted that a strong 
market position in itself is not problematic. It is only the abuse of that position 
by the company holding it which is prohibited. The difficulties in determining 
what an ‘abuse’ is have led to a number of case groups, the most relevant of which 
shall now be discussed in more detail.
a. Refusals to deal
That a refusal to deal or a discontinuation of supplies can constitute an abuse 
may surprise. After all, the freedom of contract is a fundamental pillar of our 
economic order. However, it is well accepted today that the strict enforcement of 
702 On the German ‘Immanenztheorie’ see Bunte, H.-J., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) 
Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 1, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
Koln, Germany, § 1 GWB, mn. 134 et seq.
703 See section 17.6.4.
704 FCO, 2010. Vorläufige Bewertung von Verhaltensweisen in Verhandlungen zwischen Herstellern von 
Markenartikeln, Großhändlern und Einzelhandelsunternehmen zum Zwecke der Konkretisierung der 
Kooperationspflichten. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2010: 786, 790. (786-791).
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this principle can sometimes have market foreclosing effects.705 For instance, it 
can be problematic if a dominant producer refuses to supply a distributor because 
it wants to enter into the distribution of its products itself.706 The use of a cut-
off of supply as a sanctioning mechanism against buyers that export products to 
other European countries raises similar competitive concerns in the absence of 
a permissible sales-restriction. A non-permissible refusal to deal may also occur 
where a company arbitrarily discriminates against certain competitors or in the 
case of a particular dependency on the products of the supplier.707
b. Discrimination
Both European and German Competition Law enumerate the discrimination of 
trading partners without justification as an example of abusive conduct by a 
dominant company.708 Such discrimination may for instance occur with regard 
to marketing opportunities, prices and other supply terms. Different prices and 
terms will, however, be justified if they reflect actually existing differences in 
costs, i.e. if an actual reason for the difference exists.709 It is also increasingly 
accepted that in certain cases an efficient allocation of resources is only possible 
through the use of discriminatory pricing.710
705 Wiedemann, G., 2008. In Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. 
Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 23, mn. 49; Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/
Entscheidungssammlung 886, 892 – Jägermeister; ECJ Case 6/73 & 7/73 Commercial Solvents, ECR 
1974: 223, mn. 25; EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EV 1265 and Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 1988: 257 – Boosey & Hawkes; EU, 1996. 92/213/EEC: Commission Decision of 26 
February 1992 relating to a procedure pursuant to Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/33.544, 
British Midland v. Aer Lingus). Official Journal of the European Union L 96, 10.4.1992: 34-45, mn. 24 et 
seq. The same reasoning is at the core of the so-called ‘essential facilities’ – doctrine pursuant to which 
companies must, under narrow circumstances, afford access to infrastructure and intellectual property. 
See § 19 IV No. 4 ARC and Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 
DE-R 977, 982 – Fährhafen Puttgarden; EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EU-V 
931 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2004: 673 – Microsoft (mainly confirmed by CFI Case T-201/04 
Microsoft v Commission, ECR 2007: II-3601 and Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 2005: 75).
706 See Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/E 2479, 2483 – Reparaturbetrieb; ECJ Case 
6/73 & 7/73 Commercial Solvents, ECR 1974: 223, mn. 25.
707 For details see. Bulst, F.W., 2010. In: Langen, E. and Bunte, H.J. (eds.) Kommentar zum deutschen 
und europäischen Kartellrecht Bd. 2, 11th edition, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Germany, Art. 82 EG, 
mn. 253 et seq.
708 Article 102 letter c) TFEU, §§ 19 section 4 No. 3, 20 section 1 ARC. 
709 Wiedemann, G., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck 
Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 23, mn. 62. 
710 CFI Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline v Commission, ECR 2006: II-2969, mn. 271 and CFI, 
2007. Nichtigerklärung der Versagung der Freistellung des Preisdifferenzierungssystems eines 
Pharmaherstellers. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2007: 93-108. 
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c. Loyalty and target rebates
Complex case law has developed on the question under which circumstances 
dominant companies abuse their position through affording rebates to their 
customers.711 Rebates are not generally illegal. There is a justified concern, 
however, that the design of rebates can have a similarly market foreclosing effect 
as an exclusive supply obligation.712 To a particular extent, this risk occurs where 
rebates are openly linked to the buyer sourcing exclusively or mainly from a 
specific supplier over long periods of time.713 But also ‘covered’ loyalty rebates 
can raise competitive concerns, for instance if a rebate on the total volume of 
sales retroactively increases when certain sales thresholds are crossed.714 Similar 
problems are raised by target rebates which are linked to the achievement of a 
sales volume that corresponds to a buyer’s foreseeable annual total demand.715 
Against the background of the existing case law, dominant companies should 
structure their rebates with short reference periods and not retroactively on the 
total volume of sales.
d. Predatory pricing and similar conduct
The imposition of unfairly high or low prices by a dominant company when buying 
or selling716 constitutes a classic abuse of a dominant position. Accordingly both 
German and European competition law enumerate this conduct as an example of 
abuse.717 Quite naturally, it is often highly contentious whether a price is unfairly 
711 Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 2755, 2758 – 
Aktionsbeiträge; ECJ Case 43/73 et al. Société anonyme Générale Sucrière and others v Commission, 
ECR 1975: 1663 and Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 1976: 185; ECJ Case 85/76 Hoffmann LaRoche v 
Commission, ECR 1979: 461, mn. 89 and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1979: 2460; ECJ Case 322/81 
Michelin I, ECR 1983: 3461, mn. 71 et seq.; CFI T-203/01 Michelin II, ECR 2003: II-4071, mn. 56 et 
seq. and CFI, 2003. Rabattgewährung durch marktbeherrschendes Unternehmen. Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb 2003: 1331-1346; ECJ Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission, ECR 2007: I-2331, mn. 
61 et seq. and ECJ, 2007. Missbräuchliche Prämienregelung beim Vertrieb von Flugscheinen. Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb 2007: 821-823.
712 ECJ Case 85/76 Hoffmann LaRoche v Commission, ECR 1979: 461, mn. 89 and Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1979: 2460; see also Wiedemann, G., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des 
Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 23, mn. 47 et seq. 
713 The European Commission fined Intel with more than € 1 billion for such (and other) practices 
in 2009; see EU, 2009. 1,06 Mrd. € Geldbuße wegen schuldhaft missbräuchlicher Ausnutzung einer 
marktbeherrschenden Stellung. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2009: 1201-1216 - Intel, mn. 323.
714 Kammergericht, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 2403, 2410 – Fertigfutter; 
CFI T-203/01 Michelin II, ECR 2003: II-4071, mn. 95 and CFI, 2003. Rabattgewährung durch 
marktbeherrschendes Unternehmen. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2003: 1331-1346.
715 ECJ, Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar, ECR 1999: II-2969, mn. 212. See also European Commission, Decision 
of 29/3/2006: COMP/E-1/38.113 Prokent-Tomra, mn. 314 et seq. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/index_en.html. 
716 Wiedemann, G., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck 
Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 23, mn. 52. 
717 Article 102 letter a) TFEU and § 19 IV No. 2 ARC. 
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low or high. In accordance with the existing case law, the first step is to establish 
a price that would occur in a situation of regular competition. This is done by 
looking at the price of the same product on comparable geographical markets. 
The price thus detected will then be compared to the actually demanded price. 
For an abuse, the German Federal Supreme Court’s case-law requires there to be 
a ‘significant’ deviation from the established price;718 the test under European law 
is whether there is an ‘exaggerated disproportionateness’ or an inappropriateness 
in comparison to the established price.719
e. Tying
A further example of an abuse of a dominant position pursuant to Article 102 
TFEU is the ‘conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other party of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts’. A comparable 
provision in the ARC was deleted in the past. This does not affect the illegality of 
certain tying practices also under German law, however.720 The primary concern 
with tying practices is that a dominant company uses its position in one market 
in order to gain a strong position or even dominance in another market.721 An 
example is the Microsoft case. Microsoft was fined almost € 500 million in 2004 
by the European Commission for an alleged use of its power in the market for 
computer operating systems in order to gain a dominant position in the not 
yet dominated market for multi-media applications.722 A further example is the 
German Soda Club 2 case, in which the tying of drinks makers to the hire of gas 
cylinders was held to infringe competition law.723
718 Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 1445, 1454 – Valium; 
Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 
6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 19, mn. 74. 
719 ECJ Case 27/76 United Brands, ECR 1978: 207, mn. 248/257 and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1978: 2439; see also EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EU-V 1097 and EU, 2005. 
Zurückweisung eines Vorwurfs von Preismissbrauch. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2005: 1179-1186 – Port 
of Helsingborg, mn. 98 et seq.
720 Wiedemann, G., 2008. In: Wiedemann, G. (ed.) Handbuch des Kartellrechts, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck 
Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 23, mn. 48.
721 See Möschel, W., 2007. In: Immenga, U. and Mestmäcker, E.J. (eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht Band 2: 
GWB. Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht, 4th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 
19, mn. 133. 
722 EU, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung EU-V 931 and EU, 2004. Kartellrechtswidrige 
Ausdehnung von Marktmacht. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 2004: 673 – Microsoft (mainly confirmed 
by CFI Case T-201/04 Microsof v. Commission, ECR 2007: II-3601 and Europäisches Wirtschafts- und 
Steuerrecht 2005: 75). Microsoft then received fines worth more than € 1 billion for alleged non-
compliance with the Commission’s decision. 
723 FCO, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-V 1177 et seq. – Soda Club; Higher 
Regional Court Düsseldorf, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung DE-R 1935 et seq. – 
Soda Club; Federal Supreme Court, 2008. Betriebs-Berater: 970 – Soda Club with case note: Zimmer, D. 
and Werner, J., 2008. Marktabgrenzung und Verhältnis von Eigentums- und Kartellrecht. Entscheidung 
des BGH, 4.3.2008 – KVR 21/07. Juristenzeitung 2008: 897, 901. (897-904). 
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17.6.16 Unfair practices by competitors
Companies may have claims under competition law and the German law of unfair 
competition more specifically against their competitor’s conduct if the purpose 
of that conduct is merely to impede the process of competition, if the claiming 
company’s business is unduly hindered or if wholesalers and retailers are incited 
to boycotts.724 Examples of such behaviour would be agreements among food 
producers with distributors on exclusive supply and a parallel delisting of all other 
products if kick-backs, listing fees or other payments of an unusual amount are 
agreed on. It is also problematic if producers buy up the stock of their competitors 
from distributors at the regular price in order to then sell those products at a 
fraction of the usual price and in a way which is detrimental to the reputation 
of the product.725
17.7 Concluding remarks
The case groups discussed above show that many forms of cooperation which 
are of particular importance to daily business in the food sector can become 
the focus of prosecutorial concern by competition authorities. The increasing 
importance of competition law means that market participants must, in times of 
intense competition, assert themselves not only towards their competitors and 
their counterparties in the market. If they want to comply with the demands of 
competition authorities and courts, they are also severely constrained in the design 
of their supply and cooperation agreements. In order to avoid daily interference 
between business and legal considerations, it is highly recommendable to take into 
account competition law concerns already at the stage of planning cooperation 
and sales and trade strategies. This guarantees that legal risks are minimised 
and that attractive projects can be implemented in an environment of sufficient 
legal certainty.
724 See § 4 No. 10 German Act against Unfair Competition (UWG), §§ 20 section 1, 21 section 1 und § 1 
ARC, Article 102, 101 section 1 TFEU. See also Bechtold, R., 2010. In: Bechtold, R. (ed.) GWB, Kartellgesetz, 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 6th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 21, 
mn. 3; on boycotts see Federal Supreme Court, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb/Entscheidungssammlung 
2372, 2379 et seq., – Importierte Fertigarzneimittel; Federal Supreme Court, Wettbewerb in Recht 
und Praxis 1999: 1283, 1287 – Kartenlesegerät; Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz 
und Urheberrecht 1999: 1031, 1033 – Sitzender Krankentransport and on purposeful hindrance of 
competitors Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2001: 1061, 1062 
– Mitwohnzentrale.de; Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2004: 
877, 879 – Werbeblocker; Federal Supreme Court, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 2005: 881, 884 – The 
Colour of Elégance; Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 200: 8081 
– ad-hoc-Mitteilung. On price policies on the basis of an unfair intention to ‘squeeze out’ competitors 
from the market Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 199: 685, 686 – 
Anzeigenpreis I; Köhler, H., 2010. In: Köhler, H. and Bornkamm, J. (eds.) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb UWG. 28th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 4 UWG, mn. 10.189.
725 See Köhler, H., 2010. In: Köhler, H. and Bornkamm, J. (eds.) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb 
UWG. 28th edition, C.H. Beck Verlag, Munchen, Germany, § 4 UWG, mn. 10.49.
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18. EU ‘new approach’ also for food law?
Nicole Coutrelis
18.1 What is the ‘new approach’
The ‘new approach’ is a legislative technique put in place in the EU in the 80’s to 
harmonise the legislations of the Member States regarding products, where such 
harmonisation proved to be necessary in order to achieve one of the fundamental 
objectives of the Common Market, i.e. the free movement of goods.
This approach and the reasons why it was put in place cannot be understood 
without a little bit of history, related both to the jurisprudence of the EC Court of 
Justice and the Policy of the Commission, which have continuously supported 
each other to enforce the free movement of goods principle (originally Articles 
30-36, then 28-30 after the Amsterdam Treaty, and now 34-36 under the Lisbon 
Treaty). Indeed, we must always keep in mind that one of the basic purposes 
of EU law, from the beginning and, hopefully, still now, is the realisation of an 
Internal Market without borders within the Union.
18.1.1 A little bit of history
In order to achieve an internal market where products circulate freely, when 
those products are defined and regulated in very different ways in the various 
Member States, two avenues can be taken: either harmonise the regulations, to 
have them all identical, or at least compatible, in all the Member States, or decide 
that products can circulate freely, despite their differences. The entire history of 
food regulation in the EU has been dominated by the balance between these two 
ways – or a combination of both.
Until the 1970s (with only 6 founding Member States), the main tool was 
harmonisation, giving birth to some so called ‘recipe laws’, through directives 
related to products such as chocolate, fruit juice, etc. Obviously, it was not possible 
to harmonise that way the definitions and regulations of every single food product 
sold in the EU. In this context, came the famous ‘Cassis de Dijon’ case,726 in which 
the Court of Justice said that in the absence of harmonisation, the Member States 
are free to set up national rules for products sold on their territory, and can ban 
the importation of products which are not in conformity with national rules, 
if those national rules are justified by ‘mandatory requirements’, such as, for 
instance, the protection of the consumer or fair trade. On the other hand, if the 
national rules are not justified by such ‘mandatory requirements’, they cannot 
726 ECJ, 1979. Case 120/78, February 20, 1979. Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon). ECR 1979: 649.
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justify restrictions to the importation of products legally produced and marketed 
in other Member States.
On this basis, the Commission issued a Communication on October 3, 1980, on the 
consequences of the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ case, putting the emphasis on the principle 
of free movement of products legally produced and marketed in one Member 
State. In the Commission’s view, this was the basic remedy to what was called 
‘technical barriers to trade’, i.e. obstacles due to the existence of different rules 
and specifications of products among the Member States. As a consequence, the 
Commission announced its intention to limit harmonisation to what was strictly 
necessary to achieve the Single Market, where the mere enforcement of the 
principle of free movement of goods was not sufficient, i.e. where ‘mandatory 
requirements’ could justify national measures entailing barriers to trade.
Further to this first Communication, the year 1985 brought essential developments 
in view of the complete Achievement of the Single Market, which was to be 
reached in 1992. On the basis of a Communication issued by the Commission 
(‘the white paper’), the Council took a Resolution on the ‘new approach’,727 valid 
for all products except foodstuffs. As to foodstuffs, the Commission issued the 
same year a specific Communication called ‘White Paper bis’.
18.1.2 What is the ‘new approach’
The ‘new approach’ for the regulation of products specifications is based on the 
four following principles:
• EU legislation should be limited to the adoption of essential requirements, 
regarding specifically safety or other requirements of general interest.
• The task of drawing up the technical specifications of products, in conformity 
with the essential requirements laid down in the legislation, is entrusted to 
organisations which are competent in the standardisation area.
• These technical specifications are not mandatory.
• However, products conform to the standards are presumed to conform to the 
essential requirements.
This means that products may conform to the essential requirements by other 
means than the conformity to standards, a system which leaves space for individual 
initiatives and innovation. This legal technique has been enforced and has become 
quite common in a lot of industrial sectors such as toys, electricity, vehicles, etc.
727 EU, 1985. Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and 
standards. Official Journal of the European Union C 136, 04/06/1985: 1-9. 
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18.1.3 Scope and limitation of the new approach for food
The purpose of the ‘white paper bis’ issued in 1985 and specifically devoted to 
food is similar to the New Approach, i.e. to achieve the Single Market. However, 
it has been considered at that time that for food, the approach should be slightly 
different. The main difference is that for foodstuffs, there is no reference to 
standardisation.
Despite this basic difference, we can nevertheless consider that the orientation 
taken in 1985 for food is also a ‘new approach’ because full harmonisation (‘recipe 
laws’) is abandoned: harmonisation of the specification of products will be limited 
to the ‘essential requirements’, i.e. the basic requirements which, according to 
the case-law of the ECJ regarding the free movement of goods, allow the Member 
States to keep barriers to trade. As to other specifications of products, which are 
not considered as essential, the principle of Mutual Recognition of national rules 
should apply.
This position was solemnly reiterated by the Commission in 1989 in its 
Communication ‘On the Free Movement of Foodstuffs in the Community’,728 
where the two basic pillars are put forward: Minimal Harmonisation, and Mutual 
Recognition. As to standardisation, it was still totally absent from this text.
Does it mean that the ‘new approach’ as defined above is totally unknown in EU 
Food Law?
18.2 Is the ‘new approach’ unknown in EU Food Law?
Many references to private rules or standards are found in regulations regarding 
Food Law, but this sole reference to standards does not correspond to the real 
‘new approach’ as defined above for industrial products, because they do not meet 
the four criteria. For example:
• The specifications of products which benefit from Geographic Indications 
and specificities are mostly derived from professional rules. However, abiding 
by these rules is not optional, but compulsory in order to benefit from the 
protected appellation.
• In the ‘labelling directive’ (2000/13)729, the name under which the product is 
sold can be, in the absence of a legal name defined by laws or regulations, the 
‘customary’ name, which may be ruled by private or professional standards. 
728 EU, 1989. Communication on the free movement of foodstuffs within the Community. Official 
Journal of the European Union C 271, 24/10/1989: 3.
729 EU, 2000. Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising 
of foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union L 109, 6/5/2000: 29-42. 
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However, in such a case, the name defined by private bodies in a specific 
Member State may not be valid all over the EU.
Closer to the real ‘new approach’ technique is the case of accredited laboratories 
and some methods of analysis, which are often established by standardisation 
bodies. Also, the regulation on hygiene recognises the relevance of GMP codes 
as presumptions of conformity to the rules. However, all this cannot be really 
qualified as the enforcement of the ‘new approach’, which is not only a reference 
to standards. As explained above, the ‘new approach’ is a complete legal system in 
which essential requirements are compulsory, and where conformity to standards 
are not compulsory, but provides a presumption of conformity to the essential 
requirements. As a consequence, conformity to the essential requirements 
can be established by other means than by conformity to the standards, and 
the presumption of conformity to the essential requirements provided by the 
conformity to standards can be overturned is specific circumstances.
The closest situation to that system in the Food sector is not within the EU, but 
at the International level, in WTO, where SPS and TBT agreements730 refer to 
Codex standards. Codex standards are not compulsory, but conformity to Codex 
standards provides a presumption of conformity to SPS/TBT principles, i.e. national 
measures justified by what we can call, by analogy with the EU system, ‘mandatory 
requirements’. However, the legal consequences in this context are very specific, 
limited to the scope and objective of WTO, i.e. international trade: conformity to 
Codex rules helps Member States of the WTO justify barriers to trade, since their 
national rules are presumed to conform to the essential requirements accepted 
as barriers in SPS and TBT agreements. However, this mechanism is limited to 
international trade, and is not supposed to replace national rules.
Also, and in any case, Codex rules are set up by representatives of the Governments, 
and not by private bodies such as standardisation bodies in the EU ‘new approach’.
18.3  Public/private – regulation/standards: present 
situation and questions
Before answering, or trying to answer, the question which is the topic of this 
discussion, it is essential to keep in mind a few essential issues. The basic question 
is, to our view: do the interests and goals of Public Authorities (who regulate) 
and of Private Bodies (who can set up all sorts of ‘standards’) converge? Probably 
yes, sometimes, but certainly up to a limit. Indeed, both sets of rules are, by their 
very nature, fundamentally different. The ‘new approach’ is just a technique to 
730 Agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO). Available at: http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO). 
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf.
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delegate the setting up of technical rules, the purpose of this technique being to 
achieve compliance with public rules.
On the other hand, private standards taken at the initiative of private bodies, or 
referred to at their initiative, are set up in the interest of those private bodies, 
and their very nature is of contractual relationship. One should also not forget 
that private standards may raise competition law issues: if standards are set up 
by associations of undertakings with a view to, or the effect of, restricting access 
to the market, they may be considered as decisions of associations caught by 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union731. Likewise, 
standards imposed to their counterparts by a company, or by a group of companies, 
holding a dominant position on the market, might, under certain circumstances, 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position caught by Article 102.
Under this very general background, several specific issues should be kept in 
mind, such as (among others), depending on the situations:
• Reference to private standards or codes of practices in national law, to assess 
the conformity of products to those national standards, may contradict the 
principle of mutual recognition between Member States, which should be 
applied in the Single Market.
• Various optional standards granting a ‘plus’ to products or to processes (for 
instance, ‘eco labels’ or labels referring to fair trade), are purely private and the 
consumer should not be misled as to what they do represent, a requirement 
of transparency which is obviously of public interest.
• Some purely technical standards (such as, for example, set up for logistic 
considerations) may have nothing to do with legal requirements, and may 
raise competition issues by constituting barriers to enter or to remain on the 
market if such standards become de facto compulsory.
• Similar problems may derive from insurance companies requirements.
These general questions have been recently addressed by the EU Commission, 
who has published a detailed Communication on December 16, 2010, which 
deserves careful consideration.732 In the introduction of this Communication, 
the Commission underlines that: 
‘Clearly, private certification is not needed to show compliance with legal 
requirements. Any private certification scheme for the agricultural and 
food sector must remain voluntary. Where operators employ certification 
of compliance with basic requirements in order to facilitate transactions 
731 EU, 2010. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union C 83, 30/03/2010: 1-388.
732 Commission Communication, 2010. EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification schemes 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs. Official Journal of the European Union C 341, 16/12/2010, p. 
5. See appendix 1.
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with other actors along the food chain, it should be clear that this practice 
cannot be used to differentiate products in the market’.
In such a context, would the ‘new approach’ now be possible/desirable in EU 
Food Law?
18.4  Is the ‘new approach’ now possible/desirable in EU 
Food Law?
It seems obvious that all the above mentioned questions could not be solved by the 
mere virtue of applying now the ‘new approach’ in the food sector. However, some 
of these questions might be solved, at least partially, and the changes occurred 
since 1985 should also be taken into account. Indeed, many things have changed 
since 1985. The expectations are not the same as they used to be, and different 
new procedures have been put in place.
As to the expectations, the main trauma was the ‘mad cow’ crisis in 1996, which 
entailed a dramatic shift of priorities. Since then, after the publication of the 
‘Green Paper on Food Law’ issued by the Commission in 1997,733 and up to now, 
the emphasis has been put on safety rather than on the internal market – even 
if the internal market is still the necessary legal basis for regulating at the EU 
level. In parallel – and this is also a clear symptom of that shift – the entire area 
of food law has been taken out from the DG ‘Enterprise’ (at that time DG III, in 
charge of Industry and of Internal Market at the same time) and placed under the 
responsibility of DG SANCO (Health and protection of the Consumer).
During the same period of time, and parallel to that shift of priorities, the procedures 
for setting up EU food law have changed too. Harmonisation is easier than it 
used to be in the past, since it does not require any more unanimity at the 
Council as was the case with the old ‘Article 100’ of the Treaty of Rome. All basic 
texts now require a qualified majority at the Council. But at the same time, the 
decision making process is more complex, involving the Parliament in co-decision. 
Likewise, the Commission has more powers since many texts can now be taken 
in ‘comitology’, but the Parliament comes now into play with the procedure of 
‘scrutiny’. Experience shows that the Parliament, in these matters, has become 
a key actor of the protection of the consumer’s interests, particularly, but not 
exclusively, as regards food safety.
Since 1985, the principle of subsidiarity has also been introduced in EU Law, but 
at the same time the decision making process in Food Law has withdrawn powers 
from the Member States, by replacing systematically directives by regulations – 
733 The General Principles of Food Law in the European Union. Commission Green Paper. COM (97) 
176 final, 30 April 1997.
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which facilitates uniform implementation and, consequently, the materialisation 
of the single market. Also, crisis management is less and less only left to national 
authorities, and has more and more become an EU competence with the Rapid 
Alert System and obligations deriving from it.
Last but not least, the legal frame of Food Law has totally changed with the so-called 
‘General Food Law’ Regulation (Regulation 178/2002)734. In the system put in place 
by this regulation, the share of competences between the authorities is between 
Risk Assessors (the EFSA) and Risk Managers (the EU Institutions), according 
to the well-known principles of Risk Analysis. This share of competences has 
nothing to do with the ‘new approach’ system, where the line is drawn between 
essential requirements and technical standards. In such a frame, there seems to 
be very little room for the ‘new approach’.
However, the situation is not totally clear cut: as we have seen before, the general 
safety requirements which lay upon the food operators can be enforced through 
compliance with standards, such as the GMP codes of hygiene referred to in the 
hygiene regulation. There is probably other room for other private standards in 
some specific fields, such as codes of ethics, ‘self-regulation’ in the publicity sector, 
or for very specific ranges of products (kosher, hallal, etc.). Does this mean that 
we could now envisage the implementation of the ‘new approach’, and if yes, to 
what extent?
We do not see why some questions could not, or could not have been, solved by 
delegating to standardisation the setting up of technical requirements, in order to 
implement the essential requirements laid down in the Regulation. As a practical 
existing example, we can refer to the definition of yoghourt, which is found in 
an AFNOR standard in France. Why not delegate to the CEN some topics such as 
the purity criteria for additives, or the definition of what is a ‘medical’ claim, or 
even nutritional profiles, or some claims for which no harmonisation seems to 
be foreseen, even if it would be most useful, such as ‘natural’? Once the essential 
requirement of not misleading the consumer and ensuring its safety are laid 
down in the regulation, there is no theoretical obstacle to delegating the practical 
implementation of such principles to standardisation. It could also be envisaged 
that, in some cases, conformity to those standards would be optional, constituting 
only a presumption of conformity.
We are well aware that some of the examples given above may be considered to be 
provocative, because the idea of acting that way has not been seriously examined, 
734 EU, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 31, 1/2/2002: 1-24.
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at least as far as we know. However, such an avenue would certainly deserve to 
be explored in some specific cases.
This having been said, we do not go to the conclusion that the ‘new approach’ 
could now be applicable to the entire Food Law. It is also clear in our mind that, 
in any case, the role of EFSA is not questioned, and should not be questioned. We 
do not advocate for attributing the EFSA’s competences to standardisation bodies. 
As opposed to industrial sectors where the ‘new approach’ has been used to ensure 
the mere safety of the products, food is also closely related to health, which goes 
far beyond safety, and which necessitates unquestionable independent scientific 
expertise. In these matters too, technical specifications cannot be always optional.
Also, and in any case, the central objectives of EU Food Law – as well as any EU 
Law – should not be forgotten: Market access and free trade should remain the 
basic goals, while ensuring the protection of the consumer through safety and 
correct information, which should not be misleading and should be relevant. To 
achieve these goals, a broader use of the ‘new approach’ technique might well 
help better monitor the ever expanding flow of private standards, by providing 
legitimacy to those standards which really deserve it, and only to them.
So, as a conclusion and in an attempt to answer the question: ‘EU new approach 
also for Food Law?’, we tend to answer: ‘why not?’. The question does deserve to 
be seriously addressed, 25 years after the birth of the concept. It could certainly be 
useful in some cases … but totally useless or unrealistic in other cases: pragmatism is 
of the essence. But at least, the ‘new approach’ is a tool, among others, the existence 
of which regulators should not ignore when they face new or unsolved questions.
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Appendix 1.  
Commission Communication – EU 
best practice guidelines for voluntary 
certification schemes for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs735
735 Official text available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:341:
0005:0011:EN:PDF.
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Private food law 393 
Commission Communication — EU best practice guidelines for voluntary certification schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs 
(2010/C 341/04) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen substantial growth in voluntary certifi­
cation schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs. An 
inventory compiled for the Commission in 2010 ( 1 ) lists more 
than 440 different schemes, most of which were established 
during the last decade. 
Certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs 
provide assurance (through a certification mechanism) that 
certain characteristics or attributes of the product or its 
production method or system, laid down in specifications, 
have been observed. They cover a wide range of different 
initiatives that function at different stages of the food supply 
chain (pre- or post-farm gate; covering all or part of the food 
supply chain; affecting all sectors or just one market segment, 
etc.). They can operate at business-to-business (B2B) level (where 
the supermarket or processing business is the intended final 
recipient of the information) or at business-to-consumer (B2C) 
level. They can use logos although many, especially the B2B 
schemes, do not. 
While certification schemes by definition employ third-party 
attestation, there are other schemes in the market which 
operate on the basis of a label or logo (often registered as a 
trademark) without involving any certification mechanism. 
Adherence to these schemes is done by self-declaration or 
through selection by the scheme owner. In line with the defi­
nitions provided in Section 2, these schemes will be referred to 
as ‘self-declaration schemes’. The use of certification is most 
appropriate when the undertakings made are complex, laid 
down in detailed specifications and checked periodically. Self- 
declaration is more appropriate for relatively straightforward 
(single-issue) claims. 
The development of certification schemes is driven mainly by 
factors such as societal demands for certain characteristics ( 2 ) of 
the product or its production process on the one hand (mostly 
for B2C schemes), and operators’ desire to ensure that their 
suppliers meet specified requirements, on the other hand 
(mostly for B2B schemes). In the area of food safety, Regulation 
(EC) No 178/2002 laying down general principles and 
requirements of food law ( 3 ) puts the primary responsibility 
for ensuring that food and feed satisfy the requirements of 
food law and for verifying that such requirements are met, on 
the food and feed business operator. Large players in the food 
supply chain in particular often rely on certification schemes in 
order to satisfy themselves that a product meets the 
requirements and to protect their reputation and liability in 
the event of a food safety incident. 
Clearly, private certification is not needed to show compliance 
with legal requirements. Any private certification scheme for the 
agricultural and food sector must remain voluntary. Where 
operators employ certification of compliance with basic 
requirements in order to facilitate transactions with other 
actors along the food chain, it should be clear that this 
practice cannot be used to differentiate products in the market. 
Certification schemes can bring benefits: 
— to intermediate actors in the food supply chain, by assuring 
standards and thereby protecting liability and reputation for 
product and label claims, 
— to producers, by increasing market access, market share and 
product margins for certified products and also, potentially, 
by increasing efficiency and reducing transaction costs, and 
— to consumers, by providing reliable and trustworthy 
information on product and process attributes. 
Some stakeholders have argued that certification schemes can 
have drawbacks: 
— threats to the single market ( 4 ), 
— questions relating to the transparency of scheme 
requirements and the credibility of claims particularly for 
schemes that certify compliance with baseline requirements, 
— potential for misleading consumers, 
— costs and burdens on farmers, particularly where they have 
to join several schemes to meet demands from their buyers,
EN 16.12.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 341/5 
( 1 ) Study conducted by Areté for DG AGRI; see http://ec.europa.eu/ 
agriculture/quality/index_en.htm 
( 2 ) For example: animal welfare; environmental sustainability; fair trade. 
( 3 ) OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1. 
( 4 ) In its Communication ‘A better functioning food supply chain in 
Europe’ (COM(2009) 591), the Commission stated its intention to 
review selected environmental standards and origin-labelling 
schemes that may impede cross-border trade.
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394 Private food law
— risk of rejection from the market of producers not partici­
pating in key certification schemes, and 
— impacts on international trade, especially with developing 
countries ( 1 ). 
The Commission has noted that the issue of consumer 
confusion arising from different schemes with similar objectives 
is being taken up by private initiatives ( 2 ) aiming to create ‘codes 
of good practice’ for private standard-setting organisations 
mainly in the social and environmental field. Moreover, 
certain proponents of existing schemes have already taken 
steps to align requirements with similar schemes and some 
existing certification schemes (mostly at B2B level) have 
emerged from a harmonisation process of various individual 
standards. 
1.1. Types of scheme 
There is a great diversity of schemes in terms of their scope, 
their objectives, their structure and their operational methods. 
As mentioned earlier, one important distinction between 
schemes is whether or not they rely on a third-party attestation 
procedure, thereby grouping them into self-declaration schemes 
on the one hand and certification schemes on the other. Certifi­
cation schemes can be further distinguished based on whether 
they operate at business-to-business (B2B) level or whether they 
aim to provide information from the business chain to the 
consumer (B2C). 
Another important classification criterion pertains to whether 
the scheme assesses products and processes (mostly B2C) or 
management systems (mostly B2B). In terms of specified 
requirements, schemes may attest compliance with provisions 
laid down by governmental authorities (baseline) or they can 
add criteria which go beyond the legal requirements (above 
baseline). Distinction between the two is not always easy to 
make: on the one hand, schemes often combine baseline 
criteria in some areas with higher requirements in others; on 
the other hand, certain baseline requirements particularly in the 
environmental and farming area require operators to use good 
and best practice, and make value-judgment about due care, so 
that the concrete actions to be taken can differ between actors 
and between Member States. Indeed, the technical requirements 
of some certification schemes are used by operators to interpret 
and make concrete these general obligations. 
The following table illustrates this classification: 
Classification of schemes 
Type of attestation: Self-declaration Certification (third-party attestation) 
Audience: B2C B2C B2B 
Objects of specified requirements: Products and processes Mostly products (including 
services) and processes 
Mostly management 
systems 
Content of requirements: Mostly above baseline Mostly above baseline Baseline and above 
baseline 
The guidelines will focus on certification schemes as outlined in 
the right-hand side of the table above. 
1.2. Purpose of the guidelines 
In its Communication on agricultural product quality policy ( 3 ), 
the Commission stated that in the light of developments and 
initiatives in the private sector, legislative action was not 
warranted to address the potential drawbacks in certification 
schemes at this stage ( 4 ). Instead, drawing on comments from 
stakeholders, the Commission undertook to develop guidelines 
for certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs 
in consultation with the Advisory Group on Quality ( 5 ). 
These guidelines are designed to describe the existing legal 
framework and to help improving the transparency, credibility 
and effectiveness of voluntary certification schemes and 
ensuring that they do not conflict with regulatory requirements. 
They highlight best practice in the operation of such schemes, 
thereby offering guidance on how to: 
— avoid consumer confusion and increase the transparency 
and clarity of the scheme requirements,
EN C 341/6 Official Journal of the European Union 16.12.2010 
( 1 ) The issue of private standards has been discussed in the SPS 
Committee of the WTO. 
( 2 ) E.g. the ISEAL Alliance (http://www.isealalliance.org). 
( 3 ) COM(2009) 234. 
( 4 ) This conclusion was based on a thorough impact assessment that 
explored different options for the way forward (see ‘Certification 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs’; http://ec.europa. 
eu/agriculture/quality/policy/com2009_234/ia_annex_d_en.pdf). 
( 5 ) Advisory Group on ‘Quality of Agricultural Production’, established 
under Commission Decision 2004/391/EC (OJ L 120, 24.4.2004, 
p. 50).
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Private food law 395 
— reduce the administrative and financial burden on farmers 
and producers, including those in developing countries, and 
— ensure compliance with EU internal market rules and prin­
ciples on certification. 
The guidelines are directed primarily to scheme developers and 
operators. 
Uptake of the guidelines is voluntary. Adherence to these 
guidelines does not mean that the Commission has endorsed 
the requirements set up by these schemes. The present 
guidelines neither have a legal status in the EU nor are they 
intended to alter requirements under EU legislation. 
Finally, these guidelines should not be considered as a legal 
interpretation of the EU legislation as such interpretations are 
the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. 
2. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
2.1. Scope 
The guidelines are applicable to voluntary certification schemes 
covering: 
— agricultural products, whether or not intended for human 
consumption (including feed), 
— foodstuffs covered by Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002, and 
— processes and management systems related to the 
production and processing of agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. 
The guidelines do not apply to official controls carried out by 
public authorities. 
2.2. Definition of terms ( 1 ) 
1. Specified requirement: need or expectation that is stated. 
2. Conformity assessment: demonstration that specified 
requirements relating to a product, process, system, person 
or body are fulfilled. 
3. Review: verification of the suitability, adequacy and effec­
tiveness of selection and determination activities, and the 
results of these activities, with regard to fulfilment of 
specified requirements. 
4. Attestation: issue of a statement, based on a decision 
following review that fulfilment of specified requirements 
has been demonstrated. 
5. Declaration: first-party attestation. For the purpose of these 
guidelines, the term ‘self-declaration schemes’ is used for 
collective schemes and label claims that are not certified, 
and which rely on the producer's self-declaration. 
6. Certification: third-party attestation related to products, 
processes, systems or persons. 
7. Accreditation: third-party attestation related to a body 
conveying formal demonstration of its competence to 
carry out specific tasks. In the EU ( 2 ), accreditation shall 
mean an attestation by a national accreditation body that 
a conformity assessment body meets the requirements set 
by harmonised standards and, where applicable, any addi­
tional requirements including those set out in relevant 
sectoral schemes, to carry out a specific conformity 
assessment activity. 
8. Inspection: examination of a product design, product, 
process or installation and determination of its conformity 
with specific requirements or, on the basis of professional 
judgement, with general requirements. 
9. Audit: systematic, independent, documented process for 
obtaining records, statements of fact or other relevant 
information and assessing them objectively to determine 
the extent to which specified requirements are fulfilled. 
3. EXISTING LEGAL PROVISIONS AT EU LEVEL 
3.1. Rules related to the operation of schemes 
Certification schemes operating in the EU are subject to the 
following basic EU provisions:
EN 16.12.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 341/7 
( 1 ) Based on EN ISO/IEC 17000 ‘Conformity assessment — Vocabulary 
and general principles’. 
( 2 ) Article 2(10) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 setting out the 
requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to 
the marketing of products (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30).
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396 Private food law
— Rules on the internal market. Certification service-providers 
may benefit from the freedom of establishment and freedom 
to provide services as enshrined in Articles 49 and 56 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
and relevant provisions of the Directive on Services ( 1 ). They 
shall face no unjustified restrictions when establishing in 
another Member State. Equally, they should face no unjus­
tified restrictions when providing the services across the 
borders. Certification schemes must also not result in de 
facto barriers to trade in goods in the internal market. 
— Rules on State involvement in schemes. Certification 
schemes supported by public bodies, such as regional or 
national authorities, may not lead to restrictions based on 
the national origin of producers or otherwise impede the 
single market. Any support for certification schemes granted 
by a Member State or through State resources within the 
meaning of Article 107 of the TFEU, must comply with 
State aid rules. 
— Rules on competition. Certification schemes may not lead to 
anticompetitive behaviour, including in particular on a non- 
exhaustive basis: 
— horizontal or vertical agreements restricting competition, 
— foreclosure of competing undertakings by one ore more 
undertakings with significant market power (such as 
preventing access of competing buyers to supplies 
and/or access of competing suppliers to distribution 
channels), 
— preventing access to the certification scheme by market 
operators that comply with the applicable pre-requisites, 
— preventing the parties to the scheme or other third 
parties from developing, producing and marketing alter­
native products which do not comply with the specifi­
cations laid down in the scheme. 
— Consumer information and labelling requirements ( 2 ). The 
labelling, advertising and presentation of food must not be 
such as it could mislead a purchaser to a material degree, 
particularly: 
— as to the characteristics of the foodstuff and, in 
particular, as to its nature, identity, properties, 
composition, quantity, durability, origin or provenance, 
method of manufacture or production, 
— by attributing to the foodstuff effects or properties 
which it does not possess, 
— by suggesting that the foodstuff possesses special char­
acteristics when in fact all similar foodstuffs possess such 
characteristics. 
Schemes certifying only compliance with legal requirements 
may not lead to any suggestion that the certified products 
possess special characteristics which are different from those 
of similar products. Nor should the effect of the schemes be 
to discredit or tend to discredit other products on the market, 
nor the reliability of official controls. 
Moreover, labelling, advertising and presentation of food must 
not be such as it could mislead consumers according to the 
provisions of the Directive in Unfair Commercial Practices ( 3 ). 
— The EU takes into account its international obligations, in 
particular the requirements set out in the WTO Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade, when it introduces a 
conformity assessment procedure in a given piece of legis­
lation. 
3.2. Rules related to the content of schemes 
In addition, specific legislation exists on many subjects covered 
by the requirements of certification schemes (e.g. regulatory 
requirements for food safety and hygiene ( 4 ); organic farming; 
animal welfare; environmental protection; marketing standards 
for specific products). 
In areas where relevant standards or legislation exist, claims 
must take into account and be consistent with such standards 
or legislation and make reference to them in the specifications 
(e.g. if a scheme is making organic farming claims, it must be 
based on Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 about organic 
production and labelling of organic products ( 5 ); schemes 
making claims about nutrition and health must be in 
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 ( 6 ), and go 
through the required scientific assessment by EFSA).
EN C 341/8 Official Journal of the European Union 16.12.2010 
( 1 ) Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market (OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36). 
( 2 ) Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2000/13/EC on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and 
advertising of foodstuffs (OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29). 
( 3 ) Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market (OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, 
p. 22) and guidance for its implementation: SEC(2009) 1666. 
( 4 ) Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of 
foodstuffs; Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of 29 April 2004 laying 
down specific hygiene rules for the hygiene of foodstuffs and Regu­
lation (EC) No 854/2004 laying down specific rules for the organi­
sation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for 
human consumption (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 1). 
( 5 ) OJ L 189, 20.7.2007, p. 1. 
( 6 ) OJ L 404, 30.12.2006, p. 9.
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Private food law 397 
In particular, with regard to food safety and hygiene: 
— schemes may not prejudice or aim to replace existing official 
standards and/or requirements, nor should they purport to 
substitute for official controls carried out by competent 
authorities for the purposes of official verification of 
compliance with official obligatory standards and 
requirements, 
— product marketed under schemes which set safety and 
hygiene standards beyond legal requirements may not be 
advertised or promoted in a way that would discredit or 
tend to discredit the safety of other products on the 
market or the reliability of official controls. 
3.3. Rules governing conformity assessment, certification 
and accreditation 
Rules on the organisation and operation of accreditation of 
bodies performing conformity assessment activities in the 
regulated area have been laid down in Regulation (EC) No 
765/2008. While this Regulation does not contain a 
requirement for conformity assessment bodies to become 
accredited, such a requirement is part of some other EU legis­
lation ( 1 ). 
In addition, the internationally recognised rules for operating 
product/process or system certification schemes are set out in 
the International Standards Organisation (ISO) Guide 65 (EN 
45011) or ISO 17021, respectively. While product/process or 
system certification schemes are voluntary initiatives, to deliver 
product/process or system certificates under accreditation, 
certification bodies have to be accredited against EN 
45011/ISO 65 or ISO 17021. 
However, the above is without prejudice to all applicable EU 
food law requirements, including the general objectives laid 
down in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002: 
‘Food law shall pursue one or more of the general objectives 
of a high level of protection of human life and health and the 
protection of consumers’ interests, including fair practices in 
food trade, taking account of, where appropriate, the 
protection of animal health and welfare, plant health and 
the environment’. 
Within this framework, Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 ( 2 ) of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on official controls 
performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed 
and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules includes 
certain rules for delegation by competent authorities of official 
control tasks to independent third parties (including accredi­
tation and reporting obligations). 
The guarantees given by the official control activities are the 
baseline, on top of which specific certification schemes may 
operate on a voluntary basis, bearing in mind that any breach 
is liable to food law. Assessment of conformity with baseline 
requirements through certification schemes does not exempt the 
official control authorities from their responsibility. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING SCHEME 
PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
1. Schemes should be open under transparent and non- 
discriminatory criteria to all participants willing and able 
to comply with the specifications. 
2. Schemes should have a supervisory structure which allows 
for the contribution of all concerned stakeholders in the 
food chain (farmers and their organisations ( 3 ), agricultural 
and agri-food traders, food industry, wholesalers, retailers 
and consumers, as appropriate) in the development of the 
scheme and in decision-making in a representative and 
balanced way. Mechanisms for participation by stakeholders 
and the organisations involved should be documented and 
publicly available. 
3. Managers of schemes operating in different countries and 
regions should facilitate the participation of all concerned 
stakeholders from those regions in scheme development. 
4. Scheme requirements should be developed by technical 
committees of experts and submitted to a broader group 
of stakeholders for inputs. 
5. Managers of schemes should ensure the participation of 
concerned stakeholders in the development of inspection 
criteria and checklists, as well as in the design and deter­
mination of thresholds for sanctions. 
6. Managers of schemes should adopt a continuous devel­
opment approach where feedback mechanisms exist to 
regularly review rules and requirements in a participatory 
manner. In particular, scheme participants should be 
involved in the future development of the scheme.
EN 16.12.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 341/9 
( 1 ) E.g. Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection 
of geographical indications and designations of origin for agri­
cultural products and foodstuffs requires that ‘The product certifi­
cation bodies referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall comply with 
and, from 1 May 2010 be accredited in accordance with European 
standard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC Guide 65 (General requirements for 
bodies operating product certification systems)’. 
( 2 ) OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1. ( 3 ) E.g. cooperatives.
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398 Private food law
7. Changes to scheme requirements must be made only when 
justified, so as to avoid unnecessary adaptation costs for 
scheme participants. Scheme participants must be given 
appropriate notice of any change to the scheme 
requirements. 
8. Schemes should include contact information on all docu­
mentation associated with the scheme (including on a 
website) and establish a process to receive and reply to 
comments on the scheme. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING SCHEME REQUIRE- 
MENTS AND CORRESPONDING CLAIMS 
5.1. Clarity and transparency of scheme requirements and 
claims made 
1. Schemes should clearly state the social, environmental, 
economic and/or legal objectives. 
2. Claims and requirements should be clearly linked to the 
objectives of the scheme. 
3. The scope of the scheme in terms of products and/or 
processes should be clearly defined. 
4. Scheme specifications ( 1 ), including a public summary, 
should be freely available (e.g. on a website). 
5. Schemes operating in different countries should provide 
translations of the specifications if a duly justified request 
is made by potential participants or certification bodies. 
6. Scheme specifications should be clear, sufficiently detailed 
and easily understandable. 
7. Schemes using logos or labels should provide information 
about where consumers can find further details on the 
scheme, such as a website address, either on the product 
packaging or at the point of sale. 
8. Schemes should clearly state (e.g. on their website) that they 
require certification by an independent body and provide 
contact details of certification bodies which provide this 
service. 
5.2. Evidence base of scheme claims and requirements 
1. All claims should be based on objective and verifiable 
evidence and scientifically sound documentation. These 
documents should be freely available, e.g. on a website ( 2 ). 
2. Schemes operating in different countries and regions should 
adapt their requirements in line with the relevant local agro- 
ecological, socio-economic and legal conditions and agri­
cultural practices, while ensuring consistent results across 
different contexts. 
3. Schemes should clearly indicate (e.g. on a website) whether, 
where and to what extent their specifications go beyond the 
relevant legal requirements, including in the areas of 
reporting and inspections, if applicable. 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING CERTIFICATION AND 
INSPECTIONS 
6.1. Impartiality and independence of certification 
1. Certification of compliance with the scheme requirements 
should be carried out by an independent body accredited: 
— by the national accreditation body appointed by Member 
States according to Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, in 
accordance with relevant European or international 
standards and guides setting out general requirements 
for bodies operating product certification systems, or 
— by an accreditation body signatory to the multilateral 
recognition arrangement (MLA) for product certification 
of the International Accreditation Forum (IAF). 
2. Schemes should be open to certification by any qualified and 
accredited certification body, without the imposition of 
geographical restrictions. 
6.2. Inspections 
As a general principle, inspections should be effective, clear, 
transparent, based on documented procedures and relate to 
verifiable criteria underlying the claims made by the certification 
scheme. Unsatisfactory inspection results should lead to appro­
priate action. 
1. Regular inspections of scheme participants should be carried 
out. There should be clear and documented procedures for 
inspections, including frequency, sampling and laborato- 
ry/analytical tests in parameters related to the scope of the 
certification scheme.
EN C 341/10 Official Journal of the European Union 16.12.2010 
( 1 ) Exceptions may be needed where scheme specifications are based on 
standards which are not freely available (e.g. ISO and EN standards). 
( 2 ) An exception should be made for confidential and/or proprietary 
information, which should be clearly indicated.
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2. The frequency of inspections should take into account 
previous inspection results, inherent risks posed by the 
product or process or management system, as well as the 
existence of internal audits in collective producer organi­
sations which can complement third-party inspections. A 
minimum inspection frequency for all scheme participants 
should be determined by the scheme supervisor. 
3. There should be a systematic evaluation of the results of 
inspections. 
4. Unannounced inspections and inspections at short notice 
should be used as a general rule (e.g. within 48 hours). 
5. Inspections and audits should be based on publicly available 
guidelines, checklists and plans. The inspection criteria 
should be closely linked to the requirements of the scheme 
and the corresponding claims. 
6. There should be clear and documented procedures for 
dealing with non-compliance which are effectively imple­
mented. Knock-out criteria should be defined which could 
lead to: 
— non-issue or withdrawal of the certificate, 
— withdrawal of membership, or 
— reporting to the relevant official enforcement body. 
These knock-out criteria should include at least non- 
fulfilment of basic legal requirements in the area covered 
by the certification. Cases of non-compliance with adverse 
implications for health protection should be notified to the 
relevant authorities in accordance with regulatory 
requirements. 
7. Inspections should focus on analysing the verifiable criteria 
which underlie claims made by certification schemes. 
6.3. Costs 
1. Scheme managers should make public the membership fees 
(if any) and require their certification bodies to publish the 
costs associated with certification and inspection for different 
types of scheme participants. 
2. Possible discrepancies in fees charged to different scheme 
participants should be justified and proportionate. They 
should not serve to deter certain groups of potential 
participants, e.g. from other countries, to join the scheme 
concerned. 
3. Any cost savings arising form mutual recognition and 
benchmarking should be passed on to the operators 
subject to inspections and audits. 
6.4. Qualification of auditors/inspectors 
As a general principle, auditors/inspectors should be impartial, 
qualified and competent. 
Auditors carrying out the certification audits should have the 
relevant knowledge in the specific sector and should work for 
certification bodies that are accredited under the relevant 
European or international standards and guides for product 
certification schemes and for management system certification 
schemes. The required auditor skills should be described in the 
scheme specifications. 
6.5. Provisions for small-scale producers 
Schemes should include provisions enabling and promoting the 
participation of small-scale producers (especially from 
developing countries, if relevant) in the scheme. 
7. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING MUTUAL RECOG- 
NITION AND BENCHMARKING/OVERLAP WITH OTHER 
SCHEMES 
1. Where schemes are entering a new sector and/or expanding 
in scope, the need for the scheme should be justified. Where 
possible, scheme managers should make explicit reference 
(e.g. on their website) to other relevant schemes operating 
in the same sector, policy area and geographical region and 
identify where approaches converge and agree. They should 
actively explore possibilities for mutual recognition for parts 
or all of the scheme requirements. 
2. In areas where schemes have been identified to have partial 
or total overlap with the requirements of other schemes, 
schemes should include recognition or acceptance partially 
or totally of inspections and audits already carried out under 
those schemes (aiming to not re-audit the same 
requirements). 
3. If mutual acceptance cannot be achieved, scheme managers 
should promote combined audits based on combined audit 
checklists (i.e. one combined checklist and one combined 
audit for two or more different schemes). 
4. Managers of schemes that overlap in their requirements 
should as much as practically and legally possible also 
harmonise their auditing protocols and documentation 
requirements.
EN 16.12.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 341/11
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
Private food law 401 
Appendix 2.  
Communication from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social 
Committee736
Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role 
of Fair Trade and nongovernmental trade-related 
sustainability assurance schemes
736 Official text available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0215:FIN:EN:PDF
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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels, 5.5.2009 
COM(2009) 215 final 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE
Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role of Fair Trade and non-
governmental trade-related sustainability assurance schemes 
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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE
Contributing to Sustainable Development: The role of Fair Trade and non-
governmental trade-related sustainability assurance schemes 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This Communication examines the current situation of Fair Trade and other non-
governmental (i.e. private) trade-related sustainability assurance schemes. The Commission 
has long recognised that consumers can support sustainable development objectives by 
purchasing decisions. This Communication responds to the growing interests that have been 
articulated, at political level as well as in the growing level of purchases by EU consumers. At 
political level the European Parliament adopted a report in 2006 on Fair Trade and 
Development1. The report points out the need for raising awareness among consumers, and 
the risk of abuse by companies that enter the Fair Trade market without complying with 
certification criteria. Additionally, it recognises that Fair Trade is an essentially voluntary, 
private sector phenomenon, and that too heavy regulatory embrace could prove damaging 
rather than beneficial.
The 2005 exploratory opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
looked at "consumer assurance schemes". Key findings were to identify the need for 
authoritative quality assessment of consumer assurance schemes and to fix central definitions. 
In June 2006 the European Council adopted its renewed sustainable development strategy and 
encouraged Member States to promote sustainable products, including Fair Trade2.
EU consumers each year purchase Fair Trade certified products for approximately €1.5 
billion; which is 70 times more than in 1999 when the Commission adopted a communication 
on this topic. This success underlines the need for consumers public authorities and other 
stakeholders, including producer organisations in developing countries to measure the real 
impact of Fair Trade.  
In this communication the term "Fair Trade" is used in conformity with standards established 
by the international standard setting and conformity assessment organisations, that are 
members of the ISEAL3, and as applied by the Fair Trade organisations. The term "other 
private sustainability assurance schemes" is used to describe other labelling schemes that aim 
to inform consumers about the sustainability of the production of the product. (A brief 
overview of terms and organizations is appended in Annex I).
This Communication provides an up-date on developments arising since the 1999 
Commission Communication on fair trade4 and suggests preliminary considerations on the 
role of public authorities and stakeholders in the field of Fair Trade and other private 
sustainability assurance schemes. Issues to be addressed are relevant for several EU policy 
areas, e.g. consumer protection, economic and social development, trade, corporate social 
responsibility, environment and the EU internal market. Where appropriate, this 
Communication may be followed by more targeted initiatives in one or more policy fields.  
1 European Parliament Report on Fair Trade and Development (2005/2245(INI) "The Schmidt Report". 
2 "Member States should promote sustainable products that stem for organic farming and fair trade as 
well as environmentally sound products"  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st10/st10117.en06.pdf, page 13. 
3 International Social And Environment Accreditations and Labelling 
4 COM(1999)619 of 29-11-1999. Information on the 1999 Commission Communication is appended in 
Annex II. 
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This Communication does not cover sustainability and labelling schemes established by 
public authorities (such as the EU eco-label). 
2. FAIR TRADE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1999
The most striking developments since 1999 have taken place in national markets where 
certified Fair Trade products were already present. Answering the 1999 Communication’s call 
for a single label and the need for independent verification and control, the “Fairtrade 
Certification Mark” has been successfully implemented5.
The consumer recognition level for the Fair Trade mark in the UK was above 70% in 2008 
(compared to 12% in 2000)6 and in France 74% in 2005 (compared to 9% in 2000)7.
Worldwide sales of certified Fair Trade goods exceeded €2.3 billion by the end of 2007,8 (but 
still an order of magnitude behind organic food sales and still less than 1% of total trade)9.
Europe is Fair Trade's home: between 60% and 70% of global sales take place here, with 
large variations between its fastest growing market, Sweden, and newer Member States where 
the concept is still relatively young. 
Fair Trade has played a pioneering role in illuminating issues of responsibility and solidarity, 
which has impacted other operators and prompted the emergence of other sustainability 
regimes. Trade-related private sustainability initiatives use various social or environmental 
auditing standards10, which have grown in number and market share. The best known social 
standard is perhaps SA8000, initiated by Social Accountability International (SAI) in 199711.
Assurances that extend into broader issues, including both social and environmental criteria, 
are for example Utz certified and the Rainforest Alliance (RA).  
Multi-enterprise sustainability trade initiatives, in different parts of Europe, range from 
national arrangements to pool the results of social audits to transnational initiatives with some 
government backing, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)12. The background work by 
operators to fulfil and audit standards need not be transmitted by means of a certification and 
label for consumers; fulfilling and auditing standards can count as a company's efforts of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR)13, which is not always indicated on the product. CSR 
activities can be reinforced by a company committing to a recognised set of criteria or 
objectives, such as through the UN Global Compact14.
5 See further information on definitions in Annex I.  
6 Fairtrade Foundation, 2008. 
7 OECD, Trade Policy Working Paper No. 47. Part 1; Jan 10, 2007. 
8 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, 2008. 
9 Land, P. & Andersen, M, "What is the world market for certified products", Commodities and Trade 
Technical Paper, OECD.  
10 See also the Portal for Responsible Supply-Chain Management, established as part of the European 
Alliance on CSR; www.csr-supplychain.org.
11 SAI claims that "retailers, brand companies and other employers worldwide with annual sales over 
USD175 billion are using SA8000"; www.sa-intl.org.
12 Other initiatives to mention in this context include the Business Social Compliance Initiative 
(http://www.bsci-eu.com/), and the Global Social Compliance Programme (http://www.ciesnet.com/2-
wwedo/2.2-programmes/2.2.gscp.background.asp). 
13 Communication (2006) 136 of 22 March 2006 on "Making Europe a pole of excellence on Corporate 
Social Responsibility". 
14 www.unglobalcompact.org. 
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Private labelling markets can be divided between;
(1) Fair Trade proper;
(2) other "niche" certified products not participating formally in Fair Trade but targeting 
consumers aware of sustainability issues (Rainforest Alliance, Utz Certified);  
(3) products covered by baseline standards that aspire to be "industry-wide" (e.g. Code for 
the Coffee Community (4C's); Ethical Tea Partnership);  
(4) the rest ("no name" commodity supplies).  
A single producer may sell into all four of these categories. It can be tricky for the consumer 
to assess the significance of various sustainability schemes. It is against this complex and 
evolving backdrop that political and institutional developments should be assessed. 
3. SUSTAINABILITY CRITERIA APPLIED
Private trade-related private sustainability schemes use a set of criteria to assess and/or 
guarantee the sustainability of the products. Criteria often build on one or more of the three 
pillars of sustainable development; economic, environmental and social development, 
sometimes linking into international standards and agreements. Some schemes focus on a 
particular issue and objective (e.g. carbon footprint for climate change mitigation) whereas 
others rely on criteria in a wider sustainable development context. 
This section describes the first category – Fair Trade – referred to above15 which achieved 
significant levels of consumer recognition in those markets where it is operating. Recognition 
goes with a good measure of understanding of the issues that Fair Trade promotes. The 
criteria and standards applied by Fair Trade are among the most comprehensive and ambitious 
in terms of addressing a broad set of issues and conditions that impact the producers in 
developing countries, including in particular a minimum price for the producer and a premium 
paid to the community of the producer. 
Fair Trade criteria 
The criteria, as defined by the Fair Trade movement and recalled in the 2006 European Parliament 
report are; 
– a fair producer price, guaranteeing a fair wage, covering the costs of sustainable production and 
living. This price needs to be at least as high as the Fair Trade minimum price and premium where 
they have been defined by the international Fair Trade associations;  
– part payments to be made in advance if so requested by the producer;  
15 Appended in Annex III is a presentation of the additional private sustainability schemes; referred to in 
this section.  
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– long-term, stable relations with producers and producers' involvement in Fair Trade standard-
setting;
– transparency and traceability throughout the supply chain to guarantee appropriate consumer 
information; 
– conditions of production respecting the eight International Labour Organization (ILO) Core 
Conventions;
– respect for the environment, protection of human rights and in particular women's and children's 
rights and respect for traditional production methods which promote economic and social 
development; 
– capacity building and empowerment for producers, particularly small-scale and marginalised 
producers and workers in developing countries, their organisations as well as the respective 
communities, in order to ensure the sustainability of Fair Trade; 
– support for production and market access for the producer organisations; 
– awareness-raising activities about Fair Trade production and trading relationships, the mission 
and aims of Fair Trade and about the prevailing injustice of international trade rules; 
– monitoring and verification of compliance with these criteria, in which southern organisations 
must play a greater role, leading to reduced costs and increased local participation in the 
certification process;
– regular impact assessments of the Fair Trade activities. 
4. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
4.1. Contribution to Sustainable Development 
One of the particular features of Fair Trade and other private sustainability assurance schemes 
is that it is an essentially voluntary, dynamic mechanism that develops along with societal and 
consumer awareness and demands. As the understanding of sustainability challenges 
develops, private trade-related sustainability assurance schemes tend to follow. In some cases, 
they are at the forefront of issues; raising awareness and pushing consumer interest and 
understanding of new and emerging sustainable development challenges. Niche markets and 
schemes can influence mainstream business and government policy making.  
The Commission considers that it should not take a role in ranking or regulating criteria 
related to private trade-related sustainability assurance schemes, and their relevance in 
relation to sustainable development objectives. Regulating criteria and standards would limit a 
dynamic element of private initiatives in this field and could stand in the way of the further 
development of Fair Trade and other private schemes and their standards.  
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Sustainable development can be served by schemes that prioritise environmental, social, or 
economic elements.. It is important for good market functioning that consumers and 
producers have access to reliable information on the schemes. Here, it is possible to indicate 
some elements that are relevant in assessing good practice that operators should undertake 
according to the Commission:  
Standards and criteria should be objective and non-discriminatory to avoid any (unintended) 
negative impact on, in particular, producers in developing countries. The Commission 
welcomes efforts under way towards greater definitional clarity, such as the publication of a 
Fair Trade Charter. To allow consumers to make their choices in a well informed manner, 
standards and criteria should be applied in a transparent manner. Part of the information 
which consumers and producers may require to maintain confidence in the market is the 
proportion of the extra price which is transmitted to producers16.
Ideally, there should be independent monitoring to guarantee that the products are the result of 
practices carried out according to a specific set of criteria balancing ecological, economic and 
social considerations. The nature and results of the auditing process should be available for 
inspection17. The Commission therefore encourages relevant parties to improve their 
evaluation methodology so as to allow consumers to make informed choices.  
Further clarity and understanding is needed of the actual impact of the private sustainability 
schemes on producers in developing countries and also on their environment in a broader 
sense. Consumers should ideally be offered some element of objective assessment of the 
impact of schemes. In this area the Commission expects improvements given the work 
already under way and looks forward to progress which could form the basis for further policy 
considerations18.
Annex IV contains a list of process issues relating to consumer assurance schemes identified 
by the European Economic and Social Committee. The Commission encourages further work 
towards a common understanding of what basic process requirements it is reasonable to 
expect schemes to meet, while continuing to avoid entering into defining appropriate 
sustainability standards for private schemes. 
16 The U.K. House of Commons report "Fair Trade and Development, June 2007, suggested a label to 
inidiciate the percentage of the price received by the producer.  
17 Appended in Annex IV is a list of issues relating to consumer assurance schemes identified by the 
EESC.
18 The ISEAL Alliance is undertaking a project of writing to examine good practice for measuring the 
impact of standards and certification.  
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public procurement for a better environment19 (complementing the Commission's Green 
Procurement Guide) and is currently working on publishing a parallel guide on social 
procurement. Together, these guides constitute a comprehensive guide to sustainable public 
procurement. 
Many authorities are calling for tenders including sustainable objectives or "fair trade" in their 
procurement policies. Some Member States have gone further and require specific "Fair Trade 
label or equivalent". According to European public procurement rules, contracting authorities 
that wish to purchase fair trade goods, cannot require specific labels because this would limit 
the access to the contract of products which are not so certified but meet similar sustainable 
trade standards.  
If a contracting authority intends to purchase Fair Trade goods, it can define in the technical 
specifications of the goods the relevant sustainable criteria, that must be linked to the subject-
matter of the contract and comply with the other relevant EU public procurement rules, 
including the basic principles of equal treatment and transparency. These criteria must relate
to the characteristics or performance of the products (e.g. glasses made out of recycled 
material) or the production process of the products (e.g. organically grown).
Contracting authorities that intend to purchase sustainability assurance goods should not 
simply take the concept of a particular label and include it in the technical specifications of 
their purchases. They ought instead look at the sub-criteria underlying, for example, the Fair 
Trade label and use only those which are relevant to the subject matter of their purchase. 
Contracting authorities must always allow bidders to prove compliance with these standards 
by using Fair Trade labels or by other means of proof.  
Environmental and social criteria may also be incorporated in the execution clauses, provided 
these criteria are linked to the execution of the contract in question (e.g. minimum salary for 
the workers involved in the performance of the contract) and comply mutatis mutandis with 
the other requirements mentioned above in relation to the technical specifications. 
Principles to help realise the potential contribution to sustainable development from public 
purchasing decisions:
– Secure that appropriate guidelines are available on how to implement sustainable public procurement 
4.4. EU support  
The Commission has provided financial support for Fair Trade and other sustainable trade 
related activities essentially through its development cooperation instruments (budget chapter 
19), through co-financing actions with NGO's. Between 2007 and 2008, € 19.466 million 
were allocated for various NGO implemented and co-financed actions. The majority of these 
actions were in the field of awareness raising within the EU. 
Actions financed within the framework of multiannual Country Strategy Papers and Indicative 
Programmes, covering agricultural and rural sectors, include activities that contribute to 
facilitating Fair Trade. The Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers 
of Bananas and the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol have also contributed to 
19 Commission Communication on public procurement for a better environment: COM (2008)400 of 16 
July 2008. 
   8
Principles for maximising the impact of private trade-related sustainability assurance schemes; 
– Maintaining the non-governmental nature of private schemes throughout the EU.  
– Exploring the scope for possible synergies between schemes and enhancing clarity for the consumer 
and producers.  
– Achieving a common understanding of reasonable basic process requirements. 
– Establishing objective facts on the relative impacts of different private trade-related sustainability 
assurance schemes.
4.2. Private Trade-related Sustainability Assurance Schemes and the WTO 
Trade liberalisation can offer opportunities for economic growth and sustainable 
development. Development and the integration of developing countries into the global 
economy, especially the least developed, are key objectives of the WTO and of EU trade 
policy.
Multilateral trade liberalisation through the WTO system is the most effective way to expand 
and manage world trade, and may help to create opportunities for economic growth and 
sustainable development. However, trade liberalisation is not sufficient; impact of trade 
policies on growth, development and sustainability is in part framed by regulation and 
policies in a wide range of other areas that impact on growth and sustainable development.
Private initiatives that operate through essentially voluntary participation are consistent with a 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system. Any government intervention or regulatory 
mechanisms relating to such labelling schemes, while not problematic per se, need to take 
account of WTO obligations, in particular to ensure their transparent and non-discriminatory 
functioning.
Principle in relation to WTO; 
– Ensuring transparent and non-discriminatory functioning of labelling schemes. 
4.3. Public procurement 
A field in which important developments have been taking place is public procurement. 
Public authorities spend the equivalent of 16% of the EU GDP and therefore constitute a key 
strategic market.  
In order to better respond to the contracting authorities' need for guidance to implement 
sustainable public procurement, the Commission has recently adopted a Communication on 
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public procurement for a better environment19 (complementing the Commission's Green 
Procurement Guide) and is currently working on publishing a parallel guide on social 
procurement. Together, these guides constitute a comprehensive guide to sustainable public 
procurement. 
Many authorities are calling for tenders including sustainable objectives or "fair trade" in their 
procurement policies. Some Member States have gone further and require specific "Fair Trade 
label or equivalent". According to European public procurement rules, contracting authorities 
that wish to purchase fair trade goods, cannot require specific labels because this would limit 
the access to the contract of products which are not so certified but meet similar sustainable 
trade standards.  
If a contracting authority intends to purchase Fair Trade goods, it can define in the technical 
specifications of the goods the relevant sustainable criteria, that must be linked to the subject-
matter of the contract and comply with the other relevant EU public procurement rules, 
including the basic principles of equal treatment and transparency. These criteria must relate
to the characteristics or performance of the products (e.g. glasses made out of recycled 
material) or the production process of the products (e.g. organically grown).
Contracting authorities that intend to purchase sustainability assurance goods should not 
simply take the concept of a particular label and include it in the technical specifications of 
their purchases. They ought instead look at the sub-criteria underlying, for example, the Fair 
Trade label and use only those which are relevant to the subject matter of their purchase. 
Contracting authorities must always allow bidders to prove compliance with these standards 
by using Fair Trade labels or by other means of proof.  
Environmental and social criteria may also be incorporated in the execution clauses, provided 
these criteria are linked to the execution of the contract in question (e.g. minimum salary for 
the workers involved in the performance of the contract) and comply mutatis mutandis with 
the other requirements mentioned above in relation to the technical specifications. 
Principles to help realise the potential contribution to sustainable development from public 
purchasing decisions:
– Secure that appropriate guidelines are available on how to implement sustainable public procurement 
4.4. EU support  
The Commission has provided financial support for Fair Trade and other sustainable trade 
related activities essentially through its development cooperation instruments (budget chapter 
19), through co-financing actions with NGO's. Between 2007 and 2008, € 19.466 million 
were allocated for various NGO implemented and co-financed actions. The majority of these 
actions were in the field of awareness raising within the EU. 
Actions financed within the framework of multiannual Country Strategy Papers and Indicative 
Programmes, covering agricultural and rural sectors, include activities that contribute to 
facilitating Fair Trade. The Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers 
of Bananas and the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol have also contributed to 
19 Commission Communication on public procurement for a better environment: COM (2008)400 of 16 
July 2008. 
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helping farmers to sell in the Fair Trade niche. On the other side of the chain, projects in 
support of trade and private sector development may also contribute to facilitating trade 
activities, including Fair Trade.  
For the budget years 2008 and 2009, additional credits of €1 million each year have been 
included specifically for actions related to Fair Trade in the credits for trade budget (chapter 
20). These credits will be used to top up the financing under the development instruments20.
The EC has provided support to "fair trade related projects" mainly on a demand-driven basis, 
responding to grant requests from NGOs for co-financing actions in this area, mostly related 
to awareness raising within the EU. The EU Commission considers paying more attention to 
supporting impact assessments, market transparency efforts and assessing difficulties in 
implementing schemes and obtaining certification. This could be further supported by similar 
action by EU member states to finance studies on the impact of Fair Trade.  
A Commission project taken forward by UNCTAD is to develop an internet portal on 
sustainability claims schemes. The project aims to provide comparable information on the 
content and processes of the range of existing schemes, to the benefit of both consumers and 
producers. The intention is increase transparency on how different schemes tackle the various 
relevant criteria and to allow stakeholder exchanges on this.  
Principles to help the EU to use its direct support to schemes optimally; 
– Identifying target areas under existing budget provisions such as studies clarifying the impacts of 
different schemes, supporting market transparency efforts and cost-benefit analyses of support given.  
5. CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND OF OPERATORS IN 
RELATION TO FAIR TRADE AND OTHER PRIVATE TRADE-RELATED SUSTAINABILITY 
ASSURANCE SCHEMES
Given the potential contribution of Fair Trade and other trade-related sustainability assurance 
schemes to sustainable development, the Commission intends to stay engaged and further 
support such schemes. Where appropriate, this Communication may be followed by additional 
initiatives in one or more policy fields. At this stage, the Commission; 
• Reiterates the importance of maintaining the non-governmental nature of Fair Trade and 
other similar sustainability schemes throughout the EU. Public regulation could interfere 
with the workings of dynamic private schemes.  
• Observe that Fair Trade has a significant presence in much of the EU market and a high 
level of consumer recognition linked to the development and transparency of standards and 
principles underlying the system. 
• Observe that many different types private schemes can contribute towards sustainability 
objectives, but their multiplicity can carry risks of consumer confusion. The Commission 
sees scope for further reflection around the principles for maximising the impact of private 
trade-related sustainability assurance schemes, while avoiding entering into defining what 
are the appropriate sustainability standards to be followed by these private schemes: This 
20 Appended in Annex V are examples of current financing.  
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is, however, without prejudice to compliance with relevant sustainability-related standards 
and legislation set by public authorities. 
In this context the Commission; 
• Recalls that transparency and adequacy of information to consumers about standards of 
private sustainability schemes are key, and that there could be benefit from arriving at a 
common understanding of what basic process requirements, such as independent 
monitoring, are reasonable to expect. 
• Recalls that further assessment of the impact of private sustainability schemes could be a 
key step forward. 
• Intends to explore the scope for further dialogue, co-operation and, where appropriate, 
convergence between different private labelling schemes to promote possible synergies and 
enhance clarity for the consumer.  
In the context of public purchasing, the Commission; 
• Underlines the interest of providing guidance to public purchasing authorities help realise 
the full potential contribution to sustainable development from their decisions.  
• Underlines that a contracting authority that intends to purchase sustainability assurance 
goods should use only criteria linked to the subject matter of their purchase and comply 
with the other relevant EU public procurement rules. Contracting authorities must always 
allow bidders to prove compliance with these standards by using Fair Trade labels or by 
other means of proof.  
In the context of financing, the Commission; 
• Intends to continue funding for relevant Fair Trade and other sustainable trade related 
activities in accordance with its practice to date. This does not exclude the possibility of 
financing also more targeted actions in order to pursue priorities identified. 
• Recalls the need to assess the results of analyses of the impact of private sustainability 
assurance scheme on sustainable development parameters, including the implications for 
economic, social and developmental criteria in producing countries. Given the focus of 
private sustainability assurance scheme on the working and living conditions for producers 
in developing countries, the Commission considers that particular attention should be given 
to this aspect. Analysis should compare the impact of various private schemes so as to 
provide a basis for possible further initiatives in this field.  
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
414 Private food law
   21
ANNEX I
FAIR TRADE DEFINITION 
Fair Trade standards are the result of consultation of stakeholders and experts and are set in 
accordance with the requirements of the International Social and Environment Accreditations 
and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL). The alliance is a formal collaboration of leading 
international standard-setting and conformity assessment organizations focused on social and 
environmental issues. 
There are two international Fair Trade standard setters that certify Fair Trade Organizations 
across the world, according to ISEAL principles; the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations
(FLO) and the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) (previously the International Fair 
Trade Association, IFAT). The WFTO is an associate member of ISEAL. These two standard 
setters have produced the "Charter of Fair Trade principles".  
In accordance with the "Charter of Fair Trade principles" (January 2009) Fair Trade is 
defined as (based on the FINE definition in 2001): 
"Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks 
greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering 
better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers 
– especially in the South. Fair Trade Organizations, backed by consumers, are engaged 
actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the 
rules and practice of conventional international trade".
This above definition is used in this Communication. .  
The Fairtrade Labelling Organizations (FLO) is a multi-stakeholder association involving 23 
member organizations, traders and external expert. The organisation develops and reviews 
Fairtrade standards and provides support to Fairtrade Certified producer by assisting them in 
gaining and maintaining Fairtrade certifications and capitalizing on market opportunities. For 
example the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) sets the standards, and a separate 
international certification company - FLO-CERT - regularly inspects and certifies producers 
against these standards, and audits the flow of goods between producers and importers. 
Furthermore, the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) has developed an independent third 
party certification system: the sustainable fair trade management system.
A distinction not easy to make is that between NGO-initiated goal-driven operations, i.e. the 
primary objective is to contribute to sustainable development, and mainstream initiatives that 
are foremost business-oriented but seek to contribute to sustainability objectives. For example 
supermarkets propose their own fair trade brands together with other Fair Trade-certified 
products.
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ANNEX II
THE 1999 COMMUNICATION ON FAIR TRADE 
The issues identified in the Communication of 1999 have been addressed in different 
instances. At a European level, the 2006 report of the European Parliament (the "Schmidt 
Report") and the 2005 exploratory opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC) (rapporteur Richard Adams) presented considerations relating to Fair Trade and 
similar private sustainability schemes. In June 2006 the European Council adopted its 
renewed sustainable development strategy and included fair trade in the call to Member States 
to promote sustainable products21.
Issues of relevance to sustainability labelling have also been referred to in many EC policy 
documents; the Communication on Agricultural Commodity chains, poverty and dependence; 
the EU Policy for Africa; the Action Plan on Cotton; the Aid for Trade Strategy adopted by 
the council in October 2007) and the Commission's Green Paper on agriculture product 
quality (October 2008)22. Although the Commission's 1999 Communication on “fair trade”
remains the most comprehensive statement of the Commission’s stance towards what was 
then called “fair trade”.
The Communication pointed out three key issues; (i) the development of Fair Trade and 
"ethical trade" need to be dealt with in a coherent manner; (ii) Fair Trade should contribute to 
sustainable development through voluntary participation, and EC involvement should take 
WTO obligations into account; and (iii) schemes must satisfy the needs of producers from 
developing countries and allow consumers to make properly informed choices. 
21 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st10/st10117.en06.pdf, p. 13.
22 The Commission's Green Paper on agricultural product quality of October 2008 addresses the issue of fair trade in the context of food quality certification 
schemes. A Commission Communication (forthcoming) on the same subject is planned. Paper on agricultural product quality: product standards, farming 
requirements and quality schemes COM (2008) 641 final of 15 October 2008.
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ANNEX III
CRITERIA RELATED TO GOOD AGRICULTURAL AND BUSSINESS PRACTICE 
AS WELL AS SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTTAL CRITERIA 
This part refers to the section three in the Communication and provides examples for certified 
products targeting consumers awareness of sustainability issues.
It is common for certification schemes to include criteria related to good agricultural and 
business practice as well as social and environmental criteria. The Utz Certified Code of 
Conduct (which currently applies to coffee and is due to be extended to cocoa, tea and palm 
oil) includes elements such as standards for record-keeping, minimised and documented use 
of agrochemicals for crop protection, protection of labour rights and access to health care and 
education for employees and their families. In the social field, workers' protection is based on 
both national laws and ILO conventions but also relate to housing, clean drinking water and 
training for workers. Environmental criteria relate to the prevention of soil erosion, water 
usage, energy use and sustainable energy sources as well as deforestation. 
Other private schemes have a more environmental focus: it is evident from the name that the 
Rainforest Alliance is one of these, although in practice the RA certification scheme combines 
both environmental and social concerns: 
– Social and Environmental Management System  
– Ecosystem Conservation  
– Wildlife Protection  
– Water Conservation
– Fair Treatment and Good Working Conditions for Workers  
– Occupational Health and Safety  
– Community Relations  
– Integrated Crop Management  
– Soil Management and Conservation  
– Integrated Waste Management  
A third type listed in the report, section 3, is standards that have been set up with the intention 
that they should apply "industry-wide" rather than to cater for a niche market of 
discriminating consumers. One example of this type of initiative is the Common Code for the 
Coffee Community (4C) Association, which has worked over the past five years to set the 
baseline for sustainable development within the mainstream coffee sector. The 4C 
Association standards build on the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations and 
exclude the worst forms of social, environmental and economic practices in the production, 
post-harvest processing and trading of green coffee. Definitions are primarily based on the 
UN Human Rights Declaration as well as existing UN conventions and standards and, usually, ht
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national legislation. Once the ten worst practices have been eliminated participants have to 
continuously improve on the other parameters set out in the Code. 
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ANNEX IV
Range of process issues relating to consumer assurance schemes identified by the 
European Economic and Social Committee: 
a) Scheme Governance 
Where does ultimate control of the scheme lie? 
b) Scheme Goals 
 Are the goals clearly defined? 
c) Scheme scope 
 Does the scheme address the "problem" as normally defined? 
d) Scheme standards or terms 
 Do the standards set and monitored by the scheme express the goals?
e) Impact assessment 
 Is there credible assessment of the impact of the scheme on the goals? 
f) Independent review 
 Is there any independent review of the scheme's operation? 
g) Cost-benefit analysis 
 Is there any process to monitor and evaluate the costs of the scheme borne by 
suppliers, traders and consumers in comparison to the progress made to achieve the 
goals?
h) Public claims 
 Do the public claims by certified companies or suppliers match the goals, 
standards and outcomes of the scheme?
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 −deficit – 64, 224
Denmark – 126, 293
Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform – 138
Department for International Development 
(DfID) – 206, 209, 220
desist order – 248, 251, 252, 276
Det Norske Veritas – 61
developing country – 63, 64, 93, 100, 150, 
165, 170, 179, 180, 203, 204, 206, 208, 226
DfID –  see: Department for International 
Development
digital shelf – 313
digital supermarket – 302
dioxin – 177
discrimination – 373
disease – 250
dispute settlement – 79, 178, 254
dissolution – 307, 308, 309, 313, 314, 316, 317
 −of the contract – 306
distance sale and purchase – 46, 301, 302, 
303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 313, 314, 
317
distribution – 134
 −exclusie – 258
 −selective – 258, 259, 262
dominance – 57, 108, 162, 182, 319, 322, 366, 
373, 374, 375, 385
due diligence – 66, 88, 97, 177, 203, 226
Dutch Council of Accreditation – 271
Dutch Dairy Farmers Union – 338
Dutch Franchise association – 261
Dutch HACCP – 85, 104, 116, 122, 133, 337
Dutch Homeshopping Organisation – 314
Dutch Normalisation Institute – 280, 319, 
320, 322, 329
 −standards – 319, 320, 321, 322, 328
Dutch Organisation for Agriculture and 
Horticulture – 338
E
eco-label – 225, 282
economic dependence – 350
effectiveness – 64
EFIP –  see: European Feed Ingredients 
Platform
EFLA –  see: European Food Law Association
EFSA –  see: European Food Safety Authority
Egypt – 144
Electronic Data Interchange – 58
enforcement – 63, 67, 93, 97, 156, 328, 350
 −authorities – 333
E-numbers – 145, 270
environmental – 136
 −regulation – 283
ethical
 −behaviour – 127
 −standards – 67
ethics – 180, 387
EU –  see: European Union
EurepGAP – 94, 107, 179
European Code of Ethics for Franchising – 
261
European Feed Ingredients Platform – 341, 
342, 345
European Feed Manufacturers’ Federation 
– 340
European Food Law Association – 21, 22, 29
European Food Safety Authority – 387, 388
European Franchise Association – 261
European Institute for Food Law – 22
European Union – 161, 179, 203, 211, 226, 
271, 283, 289
European Vegetarian Union – 144
exclusie distribution/supply – 367, 374
exclusion – 67, 217, 337, 347, 349, 350, 351
exemption – 348
expert – 298
 −assessment – 294
export – 216, 217
 −interest – 327
extraterritorial – 64
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Private food law 427 
Keyword index
F
fairness – 67, 225
fair trade – 46, 67, 78, 135, 136, 161, 255, 256, 
267, 323, 324, 326, 329, 385
FAMI-QS – 128, 341, 342, 345
FAO –  see: Food and Agriculture 
Organization
 −guideline – 139
farm assurance standard – 104
FDA –  see: Food and Drug Administration
FDD –  see:  Franchise disclosure document
feed – 129, 130, 332, 334, 337, 338, 339, 340, 
341, 342, 344, 345, 349, 350
 −compound – 339, 340
 −hygiene – 128
FEFAC –  see: European Feed Manufacturers’ 
Federation
fertiliser – 292
feudalism – 69
fine – 47, 275, 354
Finland – 260
First Amendment – 275
food
 −insecurity – 187
 −intolerance – 142
 −riots – 67
 −safety – 33
 −safety authority – 344
 −security – 33, 93, 204, 302
 −trade – 33
Food and Agriculture Organization – 166, 
190
Food and Drug Administration – 105
Food and Veterinary Office – 161
food law – 32, 33, 106
 −collective – 31, 238
 −comparative – 49
 −global, private – 43
 −international – 34, 36, 108
 −public – 36, 333
Food Marketing Institute – 100, 133
Food Safety Management System – 102
foreclosure – 262, 364, 373, 374
Forest Stewardship Council – 155, 256
France – 125, 131, 140, 260, 337
franchise – 39, 44, 255, 258, 259
 −agreements – 258
 −disclosure document – 260
 −distribution – 259, 263
 −fee – 262
 −industrial or production – 259
 −operations manual – 261
 −services – 259
fraud – 230, 274, 275, 278, 281, 282, 284
freedom
 −of contract – 372
 −of religion – 268, 273, 281
 −to operate – 59
free movement – 382
 −of foodstuffs – 383
 −of goods – 381, 383
free trade – 59, 388
fresh – 133
 −produce – 125
FrieslandCampina – 337, 339, 348
frozen – 133
fruit juice – 126
Fruitnet – 117
FS22000 – 102
FSC –  see: Forest Stewardship Council
FSSC 22000 – 116, 132, 337
G
GAP –  see: Good Agricultural Practice
GATT –  see: General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – 56
General Food Law – 113, 114
geographic indication – 383
geographic scope – 34, 36
Germany – 117, 125, 126, 130, 131, 135, 140, 
155, 193, 209, 260, 279, 289, 290, 293, 294, 
295, 297, 337, 340, 353, 364, 368
Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit – 206, 209, 210, 211, 220
GFSI –  see: Global Food Safety Initiative
Ghana – 209, 210, 212, 213, 215, 217, 220, 221
GIFAP Code of Practice – 190
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ag
en
in
ge
na
ca
de
m
ic
.c
om
/d
oi
/b
oo
k/
10
.3
92
0/
97
8-
90
-8
68
6-
73
0-
1 
- M
on
da
y,
 D
ec
em
be
r 0
5,
 2
01
6 
1:
49
:3
1 
A
M
 - 
IP
 A
dd
re
ss
:1
31
.1
74
.2
48
.1
49
 
428 Private food law
Keyword index
global – 188
Global Food Safety Initiative – 69, 75, 100, 
103, 104, 115, 123, 127, 130, 131, 133, 151, 
164, 169, 170, 171, 181, 336, 337
GlobalGap – 60, 82, 94, 95, 117, 125, 126, 
139, 155, 160, 167, 169, 170, 179, 181, 204, 
205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 
215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 
225, 226, 256, 336, 342, 345
gluten free – 143
GMOs – 99, 293
GMP –  see: Good Manufacturing Practice
GMP+ – 126, 129, 337, 338, 339, 340, 342, 
344, 345
Good Agricultural Practice – 92, 164, 167, 
177, 204
Good Manufacturing Practice – 123, 132
governance – 48, 49, 51, 54, 59, 62, 63, 68, 
78, 149, 151, 152, 157, 160, 162, 165, 166, 
168, 169, 170, 188, 223, 224, 332, 351
 −global – 44
 −international – 69
 −plural – 68
Great Britain – 340
Greece – 114, 260
GreenPalm – 256
Green Paper on Food Law – 386
grievance – 195
 −panel – 196
 −procedure – 140
GTZ –  see: Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit
Guatemala – 141
guide of good practice – 87, 333, 341, 342, 
344
H
HACCP –  see: Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points
halal – 21, 119, 144, 145, 265, 266, 267, 268, 
269, 270, 271, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 
283, 284
hallmark – 270, 271, 280, 281, 283
harmonisation – 108, 116, 125, 178, 181, 203, 
226, 264, 381, 383, 386
 −global – 38, 105
 −minimal – 383
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
– 36, 42, 65, 75, 79, 87, 92, 93, 99, 100, 102, 
104, 108, 120, 123, 127, 129, 131, 132, 159, 
164, 176, 327
hearing – 251
Hindu – 266
hormone – 297
human right – 63, 134, 257, 302
 −to food – 34
hygiene code – 42, 75, 87, 268, 336
hygiene guide – 113, 114, 117, 119, 132
I
ICS –  see: Internal Control System
IFOAM –  see: International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements
IFOAM Basic Standards for Organic 
Agriculture – 290
IFS –  see: International Food Standard
IFSA –  see: International Feed Safety 
Alliance
IKB –  see: Integral Chain Control
implementation – 155
imprisonment – 275
inclusion – 224
independence – 122
India – 68
individual company standard – 153
individual firm scheme – 176
individual firm standard – 155
Indonesia – 187, 193
Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil – 199
information exchange – 355, 356, 360, 366, 
369, 370, 371, 372
information requirement – 260
infrastructure – 225
innovation – 57, 66, 225, 229, 382
 −juridical – 229
insects – 146
insurance – 263, 338, 339, 340, 341, 344
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Private food law 429 
Keyword index
Integral Chain Control – 119, 126
Integrated Crop Management – 94
Integrated Farm Assurance – 94
integrity programme – 82
intellectual property – 39, 41, 262
 −rights – 258
interconnectedness – 47
internal
 −Market – 381
Internal (Quality Management and) Control 
System – 207, 209, 210, 211
International
 −Accreditation Forum – 62
 −Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements – 60, 290
 −Feed Safety Alliance – 340, 342
 −Food Standard – 98, 99, 116, 120, 122, 
125, 131, 132, 134, 155, 160, 164, 166, 
168, 336, 337
 −Halal Integrity Alliance – 145
 −Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation 
– 61
 −Logistic Standard – 134
 −Monetary Fund – 54
 −Organization for Standardization – 60, 65, 
102, 122, 160, 162, 165
 −Organization for Standardization 
guidelines – 166
 −Plant Protection Convention – 175, 178, 
184
international standard – 42
internet – 39, 301, 308, 358, 360
intra-brand competition – 262
IPPC –  see: International Plant Protection 
Convention
Ireland – 114
Islam(ic) – 144, 266
 −dietary law – 265
 −food law – 144
ISO 22000 – 102, 132, 164
Israel – 146, 269, 281
Istituto dell’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria – 231
Italy – 114, 230, 231, 233, 242, 244, 245, 246, 
249, 252, 260
J
Japan – 140, 168, 183
Jewish – 266, 268, 270
 −dietary laws/norms – 267, 269
 −religion – 146
joint venture – 368
jurisdiction – 21
justification – 178
K
Kenya – 206, 210, 212, 215, 217, 220, 221, 225
KenyaGAP – 206, 220, 225
kick-back – 376
KKM –  see: Chain Quality Milk
know-how – 258, 263
kosher – 146, 147, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271, 
273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 
282, 283, 284
 −list – 270
Kraft – 147
L
label – 267, 309, 313, 314
labelling – 46, 231, 232, 234, 266, 268, 273, 
284, 289, 290, 292, 293, 308, 311, 317, 383
laissez-faire – 52, 68
language – 308, 309
Latin America – 135, 136
law
 −international – 53, 190
law making process – 188
legal
 −certainty – 321
 −compliance – 135
 −dimension of sustainability – 190
 −redress – 60
 −structure – 41
 −theory – 41, 42, 48
legitimacy – 39, 62, 64, 67, 166, 170, 224, 
225, 388
liability – 30, 79, 159, 231, 238, 263, 295, 338, 
340
 −D&O – 354
license – 83, 258
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430 Private food law
Keyword index
list
 −positive – 292, 295
listing fee – 364, 376
livelihood – 219
logo – 117, 142, 143, 144, 146, 271, 278
long-term relationship – 58
loss – 365
loyalty – 68
 −rebate – 374
LTO –  see: Dutch Organisation for 
Agriculture and Horticulture
M
Macedonia – 210, 213, 221, 222
majority vote – 197
Malaysia – 145, 187, 193
management commitment – 90, 98
management system – 90
mandatory – 114, 128, 178
 −quasi – 157
 −self-suspension – 298
margin pressure – 353
Marine Stewardship Council – 139, 140, 256, 
268
market
 −access – 175, 179, 203, 204, 216, 224, 388
 −failure – 223
 −information – 369, 371
 −power – 69, 77, 83, 188, 197, 258
 −sanction – 62
marketing – 117, 229, 231, 232, 233, 241, 244, 
245, 247, 248, 249, 251
market position – 357
Max Havelaar – 46, 323, 324, 325
Maximum Residue Level – 159, 167, 180
Maya – 141
meat sector – 126
mediation – 261
meeting of minds – 332
melamine – 177
merger – 337, 348
meta-control – 87
Middle East – 128, 144
minors – 236, 237, 243, 247, 249, 250, 251, 
252
misleading – 39, 232, 293, 297, 387, 388
 −labelling – 230
most-favoured-customer clause – 363, 364
MRL –  see: Maximum Residue Level
MSC –  see: Marine Stewardship Council
multinational – 43, 114, 135, 182, 188, 197, 
199, 257, 342
multi-stakeholder consultation – 188
multi-stakeholder initiative – 188
Muslim – 265, 270
mutual recognition – 345, 350, 383, 385
N
name – 383, 384
nano disaster – 68
nano material – 299
nanotechnology – 68
national legislation – 42
nature preservation – 139
Nature’s Choice – 104, 161, 176
NEN –  see: Dutch Normalisation Institute
neo-imperialism – 135
neoliberal(ism) – 51, 55, 59
Netherlands – 114, 119, 126, 129, 130, 140, 
188, 193, 196, 198, 260, 265, 266, 268, 269, 
270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 277, 278, 279, 280, 
281, 282, 283, 284, 289, 308, 324, 325, 327, 
328, 331, 332, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 345, 
347, 348
Netherlands Institute for Law and 
Governance – 49
Nevedi – 339, 344
New Approach – 39, 47, 48, 381–388
New Deal – 52
nitrite incident – 133
NMV –  see: Dutch Dairy Farmers Union
non-compete clause/obligation – 262, 360, 
369
non-compliance – 65
non-conformity – 194, 200
normative content – 188, 200
Northern Ireland – 138
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Private food law 431 
Keyword index
noticeable effect – 356
notice of default – 324
nutrition profile – 387
O
obligation – 115, 197
OECD –  see: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development
Office International des Epizooties – 175, 
178, 184
official control – 326, 333
OIE –  see: Office International des 
Epizooties
olive oil – 235
on-farm assurance systems – 95
opacity – 66
open standard – 326
operating manual – 262
optional law – 153
opt-out provision – 63
organic – 45, 119, 142, 267, 282, 283, 289, 
290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 
299, 324
 −processing – 292
 −standard – 21, 38
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development – 60
outcome indicator – 139
outcome standard – 37, 163
OVOCOM – 126, 340, 345
ownership – 129, 130, 342
Oxfam Novib – 135, 196
P
packaging – 133
palm oil – 141, 187, 193, 196
PAS 220 – 102, 132
Pastus+ – 126
PDO –  see: Protected Designation of Origin
peer assessment – 120
peer review – 139
performance criterium – 319, 320
performance requirement – 290
pesticide – 82, 158, 159, 167, 179, 211, 221, 
222, 289, 291, 292, 295, 296, 297, 298
petition(er) – 252, 253
PGI –  see: Protected Geographical Indication
PID –  see: Pre-contractual Information 
Document
plantation – 192
plural governance – 68
pluralise – 67
plurality of standards – 64
Poland – 115
poldermodel – 198
pork – 144, 146, 267, 269, 279
Portugal – 115
poultry – 145
precautionary principle – 229
Pre-contractual Information Document – 260
pre-farm-gate – 94
pre-requisite – 115, 123, 130
 −program – 102
price – 372
 −fixing – 353, 358, 359, 361, 363, 366, 371
 −minimum – 361
 −predatory – 374
 −premium – 222, 224
 −recommended resale – 362
primary
 −producers – 100, 338
 −production – 125, 130, 167
 −sector – 89, 93, 127, 336, 342
prior and informed consent – 190
privacy – 302, 303
private
 −brand – 366
 −inspection body – 294
 −judicial body – 246
 −justice – 241
 −label – 58, 83, 103, 368, 369
 −law remedies – 30, 275
 −regulation – 39, 41, 87, 89, 106, 147, 158, 
236, 268, 283, 295, 298, 331, 332, 333, 
334, 336, 342, 344, 346, 348, 349, 350
 −regulation system – 331, 336, 350
 −regulatory law – 31, 230, 231, 233, 234
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432 Private food law
Keyword index
procedure – 192
process
 −control – 176, 327
 −requirements – 171
 −standards – 37, 66, 70, 151, 161, 164
processing aids – 292, 293
procurement law – 46, 324, 326, 328
Product Board – 129, 198, 333, 334, 340, 342, 
344
product control – 327
product differentiation – 161
proliferation – 69
Protected Designation of Origin – 230
Protected Geographical Indication – 230
protectionist measures – 175
public
 −control – 344
 −goods – 230
 −law – 77, 79, 85, 88, 226, 319, 320
 −power – 191
 −private cooperation – 344
 −private partnership – 61, 223
 −procurement – 46, 323
 −tender – 323
purchase combination – 336
purchasing cooperative – 368
Q
Qlip – 337
QMS –  see: Quality Management System
QS – 125, 126, 340, 345
quality – 37, 60, 65, 66, 76, 77, 83, 100, 117, 
176, 325
Quality Management System – 127, 207, 208, 
210, 211, 214, 221
Quran – 267
R
Rainforest Alliance – 138, 139
reasoned opinion – 325
recall – 65, 113, 338
recipe law – 381, 383
Red Tractor – 161
regulatory affairs – 29
regulatory law – 33
religion – 89
religious – 135, 232
 −authority – 266
 −requirement – 144, 265
 −slaughter – 265, 266, 267, 270, 271, 272, 
276, 278, 279, 281, 284
 −standards – 38, 45
remedy – 236
reputation – 263, 264, 267, 354, 376
requirements, stricter – 159, 350
residue – 291, 296
responsibility – 113, 327
Responsible Frying – 283
restraint
 −horizontal – 356
retail(er) – 93, 115, 116, 125, 131, 153, 155, 
161, 162, 175, 182, 197, 206, 255, 256, 257, 
336, 353, 354, 362, 363, 364, 366, 367 –  See 
also: supermarket
 −chains – 177
 −standard – 336
Retail Industry Leaders Association – 97
right to revoke – 315, 316, 317
riligious
 −slaughter – 145
risk
 −analysis – 114, 123, 326, 387
 −assessment – 163, 178, 210, 344
 −based – 327, 344
 −based control – 328
 −management – 159, 160, 162, 179, 203
round table – 83
Round Table on Responsible Soy – 188
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil – 141, 
188, 256
 −Principles and Criteria – 190
RSPO –  see: Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil
rule of law – 49
S
Safe Feed – 338, 340, 341, 344
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Private food law 433 
Keyword index
Safe Quality Food – 60, 99, 116, 127, 133, 
160, 162, 164
 −institute – 133
salmon – 183
sanction – 79, 123, 207, 230, 238, 246, 247, 
252, 253
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – 27, 
69, 107, 108, 109, 150, 163, 165, 171, 175, 
176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 384
Saudi Arabia – 145
scheme – 151, 156, 160, 333
scientific justification – 178, 179
Scotland – 140
seafood – 140
seal of approval – 269, 281
self-control system – 326, 327
self-declaration – 156
self-regulation – 30, 31, 77, 87, 238, 332, 350
 −imposed – 87
separation of powers – 64
sexual success – 236, 243, 250
SGF –  see: Société Générale de Surveillance
shelf space – 363, 364
shrimp – 146
small and medium sized enterprises – 114, 
365, 368
small business – 139
small company – 99, 132
small farmer – 323
smallholder – 181, 192, 204, 205, 207, 208, 
209, 210, 211, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 
220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225
small-scale processor – 127
small-scale producer – 67, 179
social accountability – 180
social responsibility – 135
Société Générale de Surveillance – 61, 126, 
127
South Africa – 140
South America – 128
Southeast Asia – 135
sovereignty – 53
Spain – 114, 140, 260
spinach – 133
SPS –  see: Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures
SQF –  see: Safe Quality Food
stakeholder involvement – 181
standardisation – 383, 387, 388
standards development organisation – 59
standard setting – 155, 157, 188
 −organisation – 83
state – 31, 60, 62, 65, 68, 70
 −aid – 106
 −quasi – 224
 −weak – 49, 66
 −welfare – 52, 54
statutory public body – 198
storage – 134
store format – 56
stricter requirements (than legislation) – 
159, 350
St. Vincent and the Grenadines – 107, 179
subsidiarity – 386
subsidy – 293
supermarket – 97, 125, 130, 131, 204, 205, 
206, 256, 268, 270, 336 –  See also: reatail
 −chain – 56
supervision – 333
 −of controls – 344
 −reduction – 120
 −remote – 327
supplier investment – 58
supply chain – 255, 257
 −captain – 57, 63
 −certification systems – 191
 −governance – 216
 −management – 41, 55, 57, 257
sustainability – 46, 48, 67, 117, 119, 125, 135, 
138, 140, 141, 160, 189, 213, 255, 323, 324, 
325
 −dimensions of – 189
 −law – 200
 −principles and criteria – 199
 −private – 188
sustainable production – 188
Sweden – 140, 260, 282
Switzerland – 115, 260
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434 Private food law
Keyword index
system – 333
 −check – 207, 208
 −management – 123
 −owner – 345, 350
T
TBT –  see: Technical Barriers to Trade
tea – 138, 141
Technical Barriers to Trade – 69, 107, 382, 
384
technical specification – 382
technical standard – 113, 385, 387
teleshopping – 237, 242
tender procedure – 323
Thailand – 210, 212, 215, 221, 222
Thai Quality Shrimp – 139
third party – 345, 359
 −attestation – 38
 −audit – 80, 155, 176, 327
 −certification – 37, 60, 149, 151, 156, 160, 
268, 290
 −information – 360
 −verification – 195
third world – 78
three sisters – 178
totalitarianism – 53
traceability – 88, 90, 96, 99, 103, 114, 119, 
127, 141, 142, 151, 160, 166, 167, 177, 198, 
219, 226, 229
 −internal – 89
trade
 −barrier – 38, 106, 107
 −concern – 179
 −effect – 150
 −global – 59
 −international – 49
 −name – 262
 −organisation – 114
 −restriction – 120
 −secret – 66
trademark – 83, 230, 234, 235, 258, 260, 263, 
268, 274, 278, 290
traffic light – 129
transparency – 66, 179, 225
 −chain – 90
transport – 134
Tripartite Standards Regime – 51, 59, 224
TrusQ – 129, 130, 338, 339, 340, 341, 344
trust – 60, 64, 65
 −legitimate – 327
TRUST FEED – 341
tying – 375
U
UK –  see: United Kingdom
UNCTAD –  see: United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development
unfair
 −advertising – 241
 −commercial practices – 235
 −communication – 246
 −competition – 364, 376
Unilever – 140, 188, 196, 197
United Kingdom – 125, 130, 138, 155, 159, 
161, 193, 206
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development – 135
United States Agency for International 
Development – 209, 210
United States Department of Agriculture – 
105
USA – 65, 99, 138, 144, 145, 146, 147, 168, 
177, 193, 209, 260, 266, 269, 273, 274, 276, 
277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 290
USAID –  see: United States Agency for 
International Development
USDA –  see: United States Department of 
Agriculture
use-by date – 309
UTZ – 141, 142, 323, 324
V
vegan – 143, 144
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